

## **CAMBRAI ,**

### **PHASE II : AUGUST 28th to SEPTEMBER 5th , 1918.**

#### **Introductory.**

##### **General.**

In the First Phase of the Battle of CAMBRAI , Fighting continued right up to the hour when the Second and Third Cdn. Divisions were relieved.

Both Divisions had attacked vigorously on August 28th , and had encountered fierce opposition. During the evening of August 28th the enemy counterattacked on both Divisional Fronts. This made more difficult the task of the Reliefs , which , however , were carried out successfully during the night August 28th/29th.

The Second Cdn. Division , on the right of the Corps Front , was relieved by the First Cdn. Division. On the extreme right the 5th C.I.B. was relieved by the 3rd C.I.B. with 3 Battalions in the Front Line and 1 in Reserve. From right to left this Brigade Front was taken over by the 15th , 13th , and 14th C.I.Bns. , the 16th Battalion being in reserve. The 4th C.I.B. was relieved by the 2nd C.I.B. , and the 8th C.I.Bn. holding the Outpost Line , the 5th C.I.Bn. in close support , the 10th C.I.Bn. in support and the 7th C.I.Bn. in reserve. Machine Gun Reliefs were carried out the same night , the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. being relieved by the First Battalion , C.M.G.C.

##### **First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Aug. 26th to 28th.**

On August 26th , all 3 Companies of the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. were in Billets in ARRAS ; Battalion H.Q. was in HERMAVILLE. 3 Batteries , one from each Company , (“C” “E” and “M” ) were sent to ST. NICHOLAS where they were held in Divisional Reserve. The following day No.1 Company (Major E. R. Morris) , First Battalion C.M.G.C. , moved forward and went into Bivouacs for the night , just N. of TELEGRAPH HILL. No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM , D.C.M.) remained in Billets in ARRAS , and No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM , M.C.) proceeded via the CAMBRAI Road to a point half-way between NEUVILLE VITASSE and HAUCOURT where they arrived at 9 P.M. A warning order was sent to the Batteries in Divisional Reserve at ST. NICHOLAS to be ready to move at half an hour’s notice. At 10 A.M. August 28th these Batteries were ordered to move forward to positions close to No. 3 Company. They reached their destination at 3:30 P.M. At 6:00 P.M. August 28th the disposition of the Battalions were as follows :-

Battalion H.Q.	In ARRAS.
No. 1 Company	300 yards S. of TILLOY-les-MAFFLAINES.
No. 2 Company	In ABERDEEN TRENCH 2000 yards S.-E. of TILLOY-les-MAFFLAINES.
No. 3 Company	In BEUVILLE VITASSE SWITCH. LINE , 1600 yards E. of NEUVILLE VITASSE.
“C” “E” and “H” Batteries.	Close to No. 3 Company.

The First Battalion, C.M.G.C., (Lieut.-Col. WATSON , D.S.O.) moved into the Line and Batteries took up positions in support of their respective Brigades. The Second Battalion C.M.G.C. , was not relieved in the actual sense of the word , but the Batteries remained in position until midnight until August 28th/29th , and then withdrew. In this way , the incoming Batteries were well established in their new positions before the Second Battalion withdrew. No. 1 Company (Major E. R. Morris) was attached to the 1st C.I.B. in Divisional Reserve , in the HENINEL LINE , 400 yards S.-W. of WANCOURT. No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM , D.C.M.) was attached to the 2nd C.I.B. and took up positions for the defense of the right of the Divisional Area. The Guns of “F” Battery were disposed along a line from just W. of CHERISY to just W. of VIS-en-ARTOIS. “G” Battery Guns were distributed in the area N.-W. of CHERISY , S. E. of GURMAPPE , in the vicinity of SHIKAR AVENUE. The Guns Of “H” Battery were all located within 1000 yards of TRIANGLE WOOD , and N.-W. of this WOOD. “E” Battery was in Divisional Reserve.

No.3 Company (Major GRANTHAM , M.C.) took up positions for defense of the 3rd C.I.B. , on the left of the Divisional Front. The Guns were all disposed within 500 yards N. and S.-E. of SUN QUARRY. (SUN QUARRY is 1000 yards S. E. of CHERISY). 2 Guns of “J” Battery were in SUN QUARRY and the other Guns were disposed within 1000 yards N. and S.-E. of CHERISY. “L” Battery Guns were located on a Line 1000 yards W. of CHERISY. “M” Battery was in Divisional Reserve.

#### **General Situation, Night August 28th/29th.**

On the left of the Corps Front , the Third Cdn. Division was relieved by the Fourth Division (British) and BRUTINEL’S Brigade. The 8th C.I.B. on the right of the Divisional Front , was relieved by 10th Brigade (British). The 9th C.I.B. in the centre was relieved by the 11th Brigade (British). The extreme left , running from a point W. of JIGSAW WOOD in a North-Westerly direction to the RIVER SCARPE , 700 yards N. of PELVES , was taken over from the 7th C.I.B. by BRUTINEL’S Brigade. Machine Gun Reliefs were carried out early in the morning of August 29th , the Third Battalion C.M.G.C. being relieved by the Fourth Battalion , M.G. Corps (British).

At Relief , the General Line extended from a point on the Southern Boundary , midway between FONTAINE-les-CHOISILLES and HENDECOURT , thence in a direction almost N.-E. along UNION and ULSTER TRENCHES , through REMY WOOD , W. of ST. SERVINS FARM , N. of BOIHY-notre-DAME , E. of HATCHET and JIGSAW WOODS , W. of VICTORIA COPSE , to the RIVER SCARPE, about 1000 yards N. of PELVES. Ever since the capture of MONCHY-le-PHEUX , the enemy resistance had steadily increased and indications were plain that he would defend the DROCOURT LINE very stubbornly . On August 28th instructions were received that this Line would be assaulted , on or about September 1st , in conjunction with the XVII Corps. It was necessary before that date to secure a jump-off Line , parallel to , and at a distance of 500 yards or 600 yards. W. of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. This entailed the capture of the FRESNERS-ROUVROY LINE , the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH and a number of defended localities of very great strength , notably the CROWS NEST, UPTON WOOD and ST. SERVINS FARM. From August 29th to September 1st a series of minor operations were carried out with these ends in view . During the same period the Artillery concentrated on the task of cutting the Wire in front of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. On the First Cdn. Divisional Front , the Wire was very strong in front of ULSTER , UNION and UNICORN TRENCHES. The Infantry were holding positions very close to these trenches and , to enable the Artillery to cut this Wire the Battalions holding the Front Line were withdrawn 800 yards to a general Line UNA LANE , SAND ROAD and OBUS TRENCH.

#### **Line Improved and Redistributed ; August 29th.**

The Fourth Division (British) improved their positions in the vicinity of REMY and HAUCOURT , establishing Posts in both Villages. BRUTINEL’S Brigade advanced their Line and occupied BENCH FARM and VICTORIA COPSE. (X) N. of the SCARPE , the Fifty-first (Highland) Division gained ground , capturing GREENLAND HILL and the high ground in the vicinity , from which the advance of our Divisions had been harassed by enemy fire during Phase I.

Preparatory also to the attack , the Canadian Corps Frontage was considerably reduced. At 12:00 noon on August 29th , the Fifty-first (Highland) Division left the Canadian Corps , command of it’s Front passing to the XXII Corps. At the same time the Eleventh Division (British) was attached to the Canadian Corps from the I Corps , and relieved BRUTINEL’S Brigade , holding the Left Flank S. of the SCARPE. On the night of August 29th/30th , the XXII Corps extended it’s Front S. of the SCARPE to include the Eleventh Division (British). The Left Flank of the Canadian Corps now rested on the COJEUL RIVER , 1500 yards N.-W. of ETERPIGNY, The total Corps Frontage was 6000 yards.

(X) For the Operations of BRUTINEL’S Brigade during Phase II , vid. pp. page 576 ff.

## **Minor Operations , August 30th to September 1st.**

### **First Canadian Division Attack on August 30th.**

From August 30th to the morning of September 2nd , a series of Minor Operations took place which were preliminary to the attack on September 2nd . The Division on the right of the First Cdn. Division , in the XVII Corps Area was slightly ahead , having captured HENDECOURT . Hence plans were laid to advance the Line to conform with the XVII Corps Frontage , by an attack on UPTON WOOD and the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH . On the right , the 1st C.I.Bn. was to assemble just N. of HENDECOURT CEMETERY and attack ORIX TRENCH , with Right Boundary , CEMETERY AVENUE – UNICORN AVENUE and Left Boundary , UNICORN TRENCH (exclusive) UPTON QUARRY (inclusive) to ORIX TRENCH. The 2nd C.I.Bn. echeloned on the Left Rear , was to attack ULSTER and UNICORN TRENCHES with 2 Companies until a junction with the 3rd C.I.Bn. was affected . The 3rd C.I.B. was to deliver a frontal Attack on UNION TRENCH and ORIENT TRENCH with 2 Companies combining an overland attack with an advance along the Communication Trenches , S. of VIS-en-ARTOIS . It's objective was to form junctions with the 2nd C.I.Bn. in UNION and UNICORN TRENCHES and with the 1st C.I.Bn. in ORIX and OPAL.

3 Batteries of Machine Guns were detailed to take part in the Operation , 2 assisting in the attack from the S. and 1 in reserve with the 4th C.I.Bn.

The Barrage planned by the Artillery would box in the whole area attacked , and at the same time would move in from of each Attacking Battalion.

During the night August 29th/30th , the 10th C.I.Bn. attacked on the Left of the Divisional Front and as a result the Jumping-off Line for the Operation on the 30th was established in front of HAUCORT.

At 4:40 A.M. August 30th the 1st C.I.B. attacked. The enemy had delivered very powerful Counter-attacks against the XVII Corps on the right and had succeeded in regaining HENDECOURT. Owing to this feat , our Troops were subjected to heavy fire from the Right Flank , as well as from the strongly garrisoned Trenches in Front. Stiff resistance was encountered , the 3rd C.I.Bn. in particular having to contest every foot of ground , in their Frontal Attack , with Bomb and Bayonet . By 7 o'clock in the morning Battalions , had connected up as planned , the 3rd effecting junction with the 2nd in UNION and UNICORN TRENCHES and with the 1st C.I.Bn. in ORIX and OPAL. In the early part of the battle elements of the 2nd C.I.Bn. became deflected and swept through the W. corner of UPTON WOOD. The enemy's Barrage in reply to ours was fairly heavy but , as it came down on the W. side of ULSTER and UNION TRENCHES , it was behind our Attacking Troops who were not seriously affected.

Owing to the strength of enemy resistance , the flanking Battalions via , the 1st and 2nd , were reinforced by the 4th C.I.Bn. from Brigade reserve , 2 Companies going to each . One of the Companies sent to the 2nd C.I.Bn. was detailed to clean up UPTON WOOD from which heavy Machine Gun Fire was being brought to bear on the 3rd C.I.Bn. This task was accomplished and at 10:00 P.M. the Line was everywhere held. During this Operation the 3rd C.I.B. was in reserve to the 1st C.I.B. , the 16th C.I.Bn. forming a defensive flank at OUSE TRENCH , and the other Battalions moving up behind the Brigade at Zero Hour and occupying ULSTER and UNION TRENCHES.

### **Machine Gun Participation , August 30th , No. 1 Company , 1st Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

3 Batteries of No. 1 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. were attached to the 1st C.I.B. for this operation . "A" Battery supporting the right of the Attack , and "B" Battery the left , "D" Battery was in Brigade Reserve , "C" Battery was in Divisional Reserve . The supporting Batteries did not follow Infantry Battalions directly along their Lines of Advance , but closely supported them , as for a direct Frontal Attack . They were able to get occasional targets of small Infantry Parties , over the heads of our Advancing Troops at long range , and enfiladed the Front of their advance at fairly close range. 2 captured German Guns were brought into action by "A" Battery and 2 by "E" Battery , several thousand rounds of enemy Ammunition being fired . The advance was continuous , although slow , and consisted mainly of Bombing the enemy Trenches . No Guns were in action for any protracted period at any one point , but frequently targets of opportunity were momentarily engaged. The Guns were man-handled forward , Limbers being left in assembly positions. Objectives in ORIX and OX TRENCHES were reached by 8

A.M. , although fighting was still in progress in the forward elements and the situation not clear. All Guns including those captured by both Batteries , were disposed for defence in case of Counter-attack.

At noon , the enemy counter-attacked between UPTON WOOD and HENDECOURT , and 5 Guns of "A" Battery were in action with good targets. Our Infantry were obliged to temporarily withdraw , and "B" Battery covered their withdrawal to UPTON and UNICORN TRENCHES. The Guns of "A" Battery were sited on UPTON TRENCH S.-W. of UPTON WOOD , on completion of the movement. An hour later the 2nd C.I.B. regained the lost ground and recaptured their original positions . During this operation the Guns of "A" Battery fired heavily at points E. of UPTON WOOD and CROW'S NEST , where considerable enemy movement was observed . The left Guns of "B" Battery got small opportunity targets in the vicinity of OCEAN WORKS. On the development of the enemy Counter-attack at noon the G.O.C. Brigade ordered "D" Battery forward from Reserve , to protect the right flank. The Guns of this Battery took up positions just to the rear of "A" Battery . "C" Battery from Divisional Reserve replaced "D" Battery in Brigade Reserve.

Visual Communications between Company H.Q. and Batteries were not maintained during the actual fighting but was established as soon as Batteries were disposed for defence . Runners were used , 4 being employed by Company H.Q. and 2 with each Battery .

#### **Nos. 2 and 3 Companies , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , August 29th to 30th.**

Throughout the morning and afternoon of August 29th , Batteries of No.2 Company , First Battalion C.M.G.C. remained in positions occupied after taking over the Line , night August 28th/29th. (X) Late in the day however when the First Division (British) on the Canadian Corps left , attacked and advanced their Line E. of HAUCOURT, the Guns of No. 2 Company were moved forward to improve our defences . On August 30th , as soon as the success of the 1st C.I.B. was reported , one section , each , of "F", "G" and "H" Batteries was moved a little S. to protect the right flank of the 2nd C.I.B. At night CABLE and OSTRICH TRENCHES were searched with Machine Gun Harassing Fire , preparatory to an attack of the 2nd C.I.B. planned for the next day .

(X) See Page 332

Guns of No.3 Company , C.M.G.C., remained , during August 29th in defensive positions occupied on relief of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C., night August 28th/29th . Batteries were not actually engaged in the fighting of August 30th , but after the successful attack on UPTON WOOD , they moved up to positions in support of No.1 Company.

#### **2nd C.I.B. Minor Operations , August 31st.**

On the left flank of the 1st C.I.B. attack the enemy fought strenuously on August 30th , and not much ground was made. OCEAN WORK and OLIVE TRENCH , in particular , were holding out , and heavy Machine Gun Fire was coming from these localities. Consequently the 2nd C.I.B. received orders to prepare to attack on the morning of the 31st.

At the end of the fighting on August 30th , the Line was held as follows :

1st C.I.B.	ORIX TRENCH
2nd C.I.B.	OX TRENCH
10th Inf. Brigade (British)	N. side of CAMBRAI ROAD.

The 2nd C.I.B. attacked from OX and ORIX TRENCHES with the 8th C.I.Bn. on a 2-Company Frontage to take OLIVE and OSTRICH TRENCHES , and to establish Outposts E. of OSTRICH . The Barrage opened at 3:00 A.M. August 31st , and by 5 A.M. OCEAN WORK was in our hands , all of the enemy Garrisons there being dead or wounded . The attack extended as far N. as the Inter-Divisional Boundary and was quite successful. The 2nd C.I.B. Right Flank was secured and our Troops strongly established in ORIX and OPAL TRENCHES.

No. 2 Company , 1st Battalion C.M.G.C. , was detailed to assist the 8th C.I.Bn. and the Guns of this Company , particularly of "H" Battery , fired with excellent results , the Infantry stating that a great number of casualties were inflicted on the enemy by Machine Gun Fire.

The Artillery was instructed to search the ground between OSTRICH TRENCH and the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE during the night following this attack , as a preliminary to further Operations.

At the same time as the 2nd C.I.B. attack on August 31st the 10th Infantry Brigade (British) on the left of the First Canadian Division attacked ST. SERVINS FARM , with the objective of advancing their Outpost Line to the WOOD , N. of the Farm . All objectives were taken.

#### **Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , August 28th to 31st.**

So far only the First , Second and Third Cdn. Divisions had been involved in the Battle of CAMBRAI. The Fourth Cdn. Division did not rejoin the Canadian Corps from the AMIENS FRONT until August 28th. (X) On this date it was placed in Corps Reserve , and prepared to take part in our continuing attacks. On August 28th the Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. (Lieut.-Col. M. A. Scott , D.S.O.) was disposed as follows :-

Battalion H.Q.	HERMAVILLE
No. 1 Company	ARRAS
No. 2 Company	WALRUS
No. 3 Company	ST. NICHOLAS

(X) see Page 285

On August 29th Companies moved with their respective Brigade Groups to the Concentration Area E. of ARRAS. No. 2 Company , about 3000 yards N.-E. of NEUVILLE VITASSE , No. 3 Company , 2000 yards N. of TILLOY-MAFFLAINES. Battalion H.Q. August 30th to AGNY and No. 1 Company moved to the W. side of the ARRAS-BAPAURNE ROAD. due W. of NEUVILLE VITASSE. On August 31st Battalion H.Q. moved to Fourth Cdn. Division H.Q. , about 2000 yards W. of WANCOURT.

#### **Reliefs and Redistribution of Frontage ; Night August 31st/Sept.1st.**

On the night August 31st/Sept.1st , various moves and reliefs took place in the Line. The 5th C.I.Bn. was in close support to the 8th C.I.Bn. following the attack by the latter on August 31st , and was prepared to move forward next morning through the 8th C.I.Bn. This arrangement was however , altered. The 2nd C.I.B. received orders to move out of their area on being relieved by the 12th C.I.B. , Fourth Cdn. Division , and take over the Frontage from the 1st C.I.B. The 5th C.I.Bn. moved off at dusk , August 31st , to take over their new positions , leaving just sufficient Personnel to hand over their present Line to the relieving Unit of the 12th C.I.B. , at the same time , the 3rd C.I.B. took over the remainder of the 1st C.I.B. Frontage. The 12th C.I.B. came into the Line , relieving the extreme left of the 1st C.I.B. , the whole of the 2nd C.I.B. and the right of the 4th Division (British) . During the evening of August 31st , in connection with this relief the Guns of No. 2 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. were relieved by No.3 Company (Major BAILEY, D.S.O. , M.C.) , Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. , and side-slipped to their new Battle Front on the right , relieving Guns of 1 and 3 Companies , First Battalion C.M.G.C. This movement S. commenced at 11:00 P.M. but was not complete until daylight on Sept.1st owing to a serious traffic blockage in the road.

#### **Operations , September 1st.**

The attack on Sept.1st was launched along the whole Canadian Front , the 3rd C.I.B. attaching on the right , the 2nd C.I.B. in the centre and the 12th C.I.B. on the left. The 3rd C.I.B. moved forward at 4:50 A.M. with the objective of seizing CROWS NEST and the CHATEAU WOOD N.-E. of HENDECOURT. In this they were successful . An advance in all of 1000 yards was made and the capture of the strong outer Defences of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE provided a good starting point for the main attack which was planned for Sept. 2nd.

HENDECOURT was captured at the same time by XVII CORPS on the right . In the centre , the 2nd C.I.B. met with very strong opposition. The 5th C.I.Bn. bombed its way up the VIN-en-ARTOIS SWITCH

, and established a Line of Outposts from which good observation of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE was obtained. The enemy repeatedly counter attacked and on one occasion drove the 5th C.I.Bn. back to its starting point. The ground lost in this counter-attack was regained but the enemy maintained his resistance and constant hand-to-hand fighting took place right up to Zero Hour on Sept. 2nd. On the left, the 12th C.I.B. pushed Outposts beyond the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH and secured a good Jumping-off Line for the Major Operation.

2 Batteries of No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.), First Battalion C.M.G.C. fired on barrage, assisting the 15th and 14th C.I.Bns. to capture the CROW'S NEST, CRATEAU WOOD, the CHATEAU at N.-E. end of HENDECOURT and HANS TREE. As soon as the objective had been gained, Guns were immediately disposed in previously selected positions prepared to ward off a Counter-attack which was considered imminent. Owing to the Brigade on the left (2nd C.I.B.) not having pushed so far ahead, a Defensive Flank was thrown out, and as the Machine Guns were situated on high ground, many targets of opportunity were engaged during the day, particularly small enemy groups, dribbling forward to reinforce the DROCOURT QUEANT LINE. At 6:00 P.M. the enemy were observed massing for a Counter-attack on the Right Front. The right forward section (4 Guns) immediately came into action with concentrated fire, having excellent results, causing a general dispersal of the Party who were evidently none too eager to carry on. The other 2 Batteries of the First Battalion C.M.G.C., spent the day resting and getting Guns and Equipment ready for the Operation the following day.

No. 3 Company (Major BAILEY, D.S.O., M.C.) Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. was in support to the 12th C.I.B. in the Minor Operation but was not called upon to any great extent. During a Counter-attack against the 72nd C.I.Bn. the Guns of "M" Battery in forward positions fired 10 belts with good effect on the advancing enemy and helped break up the attack.

### **Capture of DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, September 2nd, 1918.**

#### **Tasks and Objectives.**

The series of Minor Operations already described had resulted in a favorable Jumping-off Line being obtained, and the Attack was arranged along the whole Corps Front to take place at 5:00 A.M. September 2nd. The First Cdn. Division attacked on the Right on a 2-Brigade Front, the Fourth Cdn. Division, in the centre on a 2-Brigade Front, and the Fourth Division (British) on the left on a 1-Brigade Front. The general idea was to break through the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE on a narrow Front and roll up the flanks, N. and S. The point chosen to make the breach was the junction of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. This achieved, the main attack was to push through, seize the high ground overlooking the CANAL du NORD and, if possible, cross the CANAL and secure the high ground on the E. Bank. The Objectives allotted to the Corps were the RED, GREEN and BLUE LINES as follows from right to left :-

The First Objective, or RED LINE, extended from a point S. of CAGNICOURT where the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE cut the Corps Southern Boundary W. of CAGNICOURT and VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT, thence N. Across the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, E. of MONT DURY, E. of DURY. Here the Fourth Cdn. Division Frontage ended. The Line then continued due N. for 1500 yards on Frontage occupied by the Fourth Division (British), thence due W. to a point N. of RIMY and including the Village of ETERPIGNY.

The Second Objective, or GREEN LINE, from the point where the BUISSY SWITCH cut the Corps Southern Boundary in a N.-E. direction along high ground for 1000 yards to the MOULIN de BUISSY, thence N.E. of BUISSY and W. of BAPALLE, thence N.E. about 5500 yards along the Spur almost parallel to the SENSEE RIVER, running N. of RECOURT and the BOIS de RECOURT, thence following high ground still and joining the RED LINE at its N.E. corner.

The Third Objective, or BLUE LINE, ran almost parallel to the Green Line, an average distance therefrom of 3000 yards, including the CANAL du NORD, SAINS-les-MARQUION, SAUCHY-

l'ESTREE , SAUCHY-CAUCHY , OISY-le-VERGER , BOIS de QUESNOY , and PALLUME , thence westwards , along the S. edge of the SENSEE MARSHES , including LECLUSE and ETAING , cutting the Corps Northern Boundary immediately N. of the latter Village.

### **Order of Battle , September 2nd.**

The Order of Battle of Assaulting Infantry Battalions from right to left of the Corps Frontage is shown in the following Table , together with the Machine Gun Batteries with which they were affiliated :-

#### **Order of Battle - September 2nd , 1918**

##### **For Attack on RED LINE.**

<b>Division</b>	<b>Brigade</b>	<b>Battalion</b>	<b>Affiliated Machine Gun Battery</b>
First Cdn. Division	3rd C.I.B. 2nd C.I.B.	(16th C.I.Bn. (13th C.I.Bn. 7th C.I.Bn.	"K" Battery , First Bn. , C.M.G.C. "J" Battery , First Bn. , C.M.G.C. "G" Battery , First Bn. , C.M.G.C.
Fourth Cdn. Division	12th C.I.B.  10th C.I.B.	(72nd C.I.Bn. (38th C.I.Bn. (85th C.I.Bn. (47th C.I.Bn.(X) (50th C.I.Bn.(X) ( 46th C.I.Bn.(Y)	"M" Battery , Fourth Bn. , C.M.G.C.  "L" Battery , Fourth Bn. , C.M.G.C. "C" Battery , Fourth Bn. , C.M.G.C. "A" Battery , Fourth Bn. , C.M.G.C.

##### **Resuming Attack from RED LINE.**

<b>Division</b>	<b>Brigade</b>	<b>Battalion</b>	<b>Affiliated Machine Gun Battery</b>
First Cdn. Division	3rd C.I.B. 2nd C.I.B.	(15th C.I.Bn. (14th C.I.Bn. 10th C.I.Bn.	"L" Battery , First Bn. , C.M.G.C.  "F" Battery , First Bn. , C.M.G.C.
Fourth Cdn. Division	12th C.I.B. 11th C.I.B. 10th C.I.B.	78th C.I.Bn. (54th C.I.Bn.) (75th C.I.Bn.) (87th C.I.Bn. 44th C.I.Bn.	"K" Battery , Fourth Bn. , C.M.G.C.  "H" Battery , Fourth Bn. , C.M.G.C.(Z) "G" Battery , Fourth Bn. , C.M.G.C. "B" Battery , Fourth Bn. , C.M.G.C.

(X) Objective , DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE

(Y) To leapfrog 47th and 50th C.I.Bns. in DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE

(Z) Replaced by "F" Battery from Brigade Reserve.

### **Task of Infantry , First Canadian Division.**

The 3rd C.I.B. attacked on the right on a frontage of 1600 yards .

The objectives of this Brigade were the S.-E. portion of the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH , the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE within the Brigade boundaries , CAGNICOURT , BOIS de BOUCHW and BOIS de LOISON. The 2nd C.I.B. attacked on the left. It was to assault and capture the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH and the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE within its boundaries , and also to capture the Village of VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT. The 1st C.I.B. held in reserve , was to leapfrog the 3rd and 2nd Brigades immediately E. of BUISY SWITCH and to capture the Villages of BUISSY and BARALLE. Its task also was to garrison the GREEN LINE and put it in a state of Defence , then push out Patrols to the Third Objective E. of the CANAL du NORD.

### **Role of Machine Guns , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The Batteries of the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , were allotted to Brigades , 3 Batteries to each Brigade , and the remaining 3 Batteries , 1 from each Machine Gun Company , were held in Divisional Reserve . No.3 Company (less "M" Battery) was to attack with the 3rd C.I.B. , on the right . No.2 Company (less "E" Battery) with the 2nd C.I.B. on the left , and No.1 Company (less "C" Battery) with the First C.I.B. "C" , "E" and "M" Batteries formed the Divisional Reserve under orders of the G.O.C. , First Cdn. Division. They were prepared to move to any part of the Front as soon as the Second Objective was taken. They would probably be ordered to take up positions on the high ground about 1000 yards N.-W. of HENDECOURT and were to be prepared to deal with counter-attacks from the S. and E.

The Artillery Barrage would cease on the RED LINE which was from 2500 yards to 3000 yards E. of the Jumping-off Line. From that point onwards , the principal support for the advancing Infantry would come from the Machine Gunners , who would supply Neutralizing and Covering Fire . Sections would advance by bounds and be allotted definite halting places where they could come into action with the greatest possible speed. In view of this fact , several vantage spots were selected and suggested to the Battery Commanders , in the Machine Gun Battalion Operation Order for the Attack. S.A.A. Limbers were to follow the Batteries as closely as possible , taking advantage of all covered Routes of Approach.

### **Task of Infantry , Fourth Canadian Division.**

On the left of the First Cdn. Division , was the Fourth Cdn. Division. The original plans called for the 12th C.I.B. on a Frontage of 1500 yards launching the initial attack against the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. The fighting on September 1st had all been in preparation of this one-Brigade Assault , the 10th and 11th C.I.Bs. having been detailed to support positions from which they would advance through the 12th Bde. and continue the attack.

However late in the evening of August 31st orders were received from Canadian Corps that the Fourth Division was to extend its Front 1000 yards further N. thus increasing our Battlefront to 2500 yards. This necessitated a considerable alteration to the Plan of the Operations and accordingly the 10th C.I.B. was ordered to relieve the Fourth Division (British) to the new Battle Boundary on the night September 1st/2nd. Credit is due to the 10th C.I.B. for the skilful manner in which they executed , at such short notice , this Order , which changed their whole role in the Operations.

This Brigade was obliged to march 10 miles , effect a Relief , and then immediately take up Assembly Positions for the Assault.

There had been no time for proper reconnaissance and the situation in the Assembly Area was obscure , as the enemy had made every effort to gain ground , and yet the assembly was effected so successfully that a Post of the enemy actually within our Jumping-off Line was entirely ignorant of our presence until Zero next morning. (X) Thus before Zero on the morning of September 2nd the Fourth Cdn. Division was holding its Battlefront with the 12th C.I.B. on the right , on a 1500 yards Frontage , and the 10th C.I.B. on the left with a Frontage of 1000 yards ; the 11th C.I.B. was in Reserve.

The 12th C.I.B. was to attack as far as the RED LINE , with 3 Battalions in the Line , the 72nd , 38th , and 85th , and 1 (the 87th) in Reserve. The 10th C.I.B. was to attack on the RED LINE with 2 Battalions in the Line (the 47th and 50th) , 1 in support , (the 46th) , allotted the special task of capturing DURY , and 1 (the 44th) in Reserve . The 11th C.I.B. was to leapfrog the Battalions of the 12th C.I.B. , on the RED LINE and proceed to the capture of the GREEN and BLUE LINES with the 54th C.I.Bn. on the right , the 75th in the centre , the 87th on the right and the 102nd in close Support.

(X) Fourth Cdn. Division Report on Operations , SCARPE , Art. 2.



### **Tasks of Machine Guns : Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

An intense Artillery Shrapnel Barrage was to carry the Attack to the RED LINE , but beyond this Line the advance would be made without Artillery Support other than that furnished by the Field Artillery allotted to each Brigade. Consequently , the importance of Machine Gun work was increased , it being necessary that supporting Batteries should get forward quickly , following the advance of the Infantry , to positions with good Field of Fire , to provide as effective Overhead Fire as possible and to neutralize enemy Machine Guns. The O.C. Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Lieut.-Col. M. A. SCOTT , D.S.O. allotted 9 Batteries to accompany the Infantry in the Attack. “K” , “L” and “M” Batteries going forward with the 12th C.I.B. , “A” , “B” and “C” Batteries with the 10th C.I.B. , while “F” , “G” and “H” Batteries were attached to the 11th C.I.B. and would go forward in the Second Stage of the Attack.

Of the Batteries attached to Brigade , 2 were to advance with each Brigade to assist the Advance when necessary , by Covering Fire on enemy points of resistance , to engage any Targets of Opportunity and to assist the Infantry in consolidating the ground won. The third Battery with each Brigade advanced under orders of the Company Commander in rear of the Brigade with a view to supplementing the Covering Fire of the Forward Batteries , consolidating in depth the ground won and reinforcing the Forward Batteries. In this way , the Mobile Batteries of the Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , were allotted duties as follows :-

“M” Battery , went forward with the 72nd C.I.Bn. , “L” Battery with the 85th C.I.Bn. on the on the right and left , respectively , of the 12th C.I.B. advance : “K” Battery was in Brigade Reserve with the 78th C.I.Bn. on the 12th C.I.B. Front. “C” and “A” Batteries were to go forward on the right and left , respectively with the 47th and 50th C.I.Bns. “B” Battery was allotted to the 44th C.I.Bn. in Brigade Reserve. “H” Battery , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. was to move forward with the 54th and 75th C.I.Bns. , “G” Battery with the 87th and 102nd C.I.Bns. , while “F” Battery would be in Brigade Reserve.

“D” , “E” and “J” Batteries (1 Battery from each Company) , under Capt. A.G. SCOTT , M.C. were detailed to carry out Barrage Fire during early Operations , firing a Rolling Barrage on the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE , where it crosses the CAMBRAI ROAD. On completion of this , they were to advance to the junction of the CAMBRAI ROAD and the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE , at which point they were to come into Divisional Reserve under Orders of the C.M.G.C. From here they were to follow in rear of the attacking Brigades , with a view to reinforcing the Brigades and of assisting the Infantry to consolidate in depth the ground won.

In addition , 8 Guns of the 4th Battalion M.G.C. (British) were to place a Rolling Barrage on the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE in front of the 10th C.I.B. advance.

### **Canadian Independent Force.**

The Canadian Independent Force , consisting of Cavalry , Motor Machine Guns , Artillery and Trench Mortars was to be held in reserve. These Troops were ordered to follow closely the advance down the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. As soon as the Line had been broken , they were to make for the crossings over the CANAL du NORD. If the Cavalry and Motor Machine Guns were successful the Infantry were to push forward and follow them as quickly as possible . (X)

(X) See Page 349

The Fifty-seventh Division (British) was on the Right Flank of the Canadian Corps and would conform to its movements. The First Division (British) was in Corps Reserve and was to move in Support of Operations.

### **3rd C.I.B. , Attack.**

Zero Hour was set for 5:00 A.M. September 2nd , 1918. During the whole of the night September 1st/2nd , the enemy harassed the forward area consistently with H.E. , Gas and Shrapnel. He made many local Counter-attacks to regain the Jump-off Line , which had been captured on September 1st. The Assembly under these circumstances was very difficult , but was completed well on time.

The Barrage came down promptly on time at 5:00 A.M. and the Assaulting Troops went forward to the Attack. The Barrage was excellent . The enemy immediately threw up many coloured Signals and his

Barrage opened up shortly afterwards. This did not fall on our Assembly Area but was directed , chiefly , against the Trenches of the FRESNES-ROUVROY System , behind.

The 16th C.I.Bn. on the right got away well , its left reaching the RED LINE on time. Its right however , was badly held up near the DROCOURT-QUEANT support Line , S.-W. of CAGNICOURT , by direct Artillery Fire and Machine Gun Fire from high ground on Ridges N. of the Corps Boundary and E. of RIENCOURT , localities strongly held by the enemy. The 15th C.I.Bn. leapfrogged the 16th according to plan and pushed forward on the right in spite of the very heavy Fire from the high ground on the right. This Battalion captured the BOIS de BOUCHE after heavy fighting. This advanced the right of the Line to a point about 1000 yards , E. of the RED LINE. The 16th C.I.Bn. having reorganized , pushed on in rear of the 15th C.I.Bn. and took up positions W. of the BOIS de BOUCHE. Many prisoners were taken.

The 13th C.I.Bn. on the left reached the RED LINE with comparatively light losses. This Battalion found the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE strongly held , numerically , but the enemy put up very little fight . A large number of prisoners were taken.

The 14th C.I.Bn. leapfrogged the 13th and , pushing forward rapidly , captured the Village of CAGNICOURT. Here a complete Battalion was surprised and captured , and an enemy Staff Officer. Enemy Machine Gun Nests in this vicinity put up hard fights , but were eventually overcome and captured . On emerging from the Village of CAGNICOURT , the 14th C.I.Bn. came under heavy Direct Fire from enemy Machine Guns and Artillery from the vicinity of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. This Battalion pushed on , however , and captured the BOIS de LOISON , suffering heavy Casualties.

Following the 14th C.I.Bn. closely the 13th C.I.Bn. also came under heavy Fire from the left and threw out a Defensive Flank facing the BUISSY SWITCH. Pushing through the BOIS de LOISON , the 14th C.I.Bn. made a quick dash for the BUISSY SWITCH , which was reached on the Brigade left boundary at 11:15 A.M. A determined attempt to follow the 14th C.I.Bn. to the BUISSY SWITCH was made by Troops of the 13th C.I.Bn. This was found impossible owing to heavy enemy Fire from the left. The main part of the 13th C.I.Bn. was at that time employed forming a defensive flank facing N. where the 2nd C.I.B. was held up.

Dispositions of the 3rd C.I.B. night September 2nd/3rd , were as follows :- the 15th C.I.Bn. , on the right held a Sunken Road S.-E. of the BOIS de BOUCHE , the 16th C.I.Bn. was in QUEER STREET , just behind them. The 14th C.I.Bn. was in the BUISSY SWITCH , with the 13th close behind them , on the Brigade Left Front. In close support was the 1st C.I.B. , in readiness to go through to attack on the following morning.

### **Action of No. 3 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

No. 3 Company , First Battalion C.M.G.C. attacked with the 3rd C.I.B. "K" and "J" Batteries attacked on the right and left with the 16th and 13th C.I.Bns. , respectively . "L" Battery followed with the 13th and 14th C.I.Bns. in close support.

"K" Battery jumped off at Zero in support of the 16th C.I.Bn. on the 3rd C.I.B. right. Very little resistance was encountered until the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE was reached. Here heavy Fire from enemy Machine Guns about 1500 yards E. of CAGNICOURT checked the advance. "K" Battery endeavoured to neutralize this Fire , 2 Guns being pushed forward to a position N.-W. of le BRULLE , at the N. end of RIENCOURT , and securing good Targets. In a short time the Infantry were able to continue their advance and capture the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. During the heavy fighting between this Line and the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE , "K" Battery moved closer to CAGNICOURT and opened fire on enemy Machine Gun Nests , S.-W. of the Village. This enabled the Infantry to continue their advance and capture the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE.

During this time , the Brigade on the right (XVII Corps) had been unable to move up , and a wide gap was left on our Right Flank. In pushing forward the Guns to cover this Flank , "K" Battery suffered heavy casualties inflicted by Machine Gun Fire on the high ground on our right , but in spite of losses , the Guns got into positions S. of CAGNICOURT , and maintained a heavy Fire on the enemy Machine Gun positions , until the Brigade on our right caught up. At this stage the strength of the Crews had been so reduced that only 5 Guns could be sent forward with the next advance of the Infantry to the BUISSY SWITCH and the QURANT-MARQUION RAILWAY. These 5 Guns took up defensive positions in depth to consolidate

our Line. On the arrival of reinforcements , later in the day , the remainder of the Guns were sent into forward positions.

On the left , “J” Battery jumped-off from their Assembly positions , N. of HENDRCOURT , followed closely behind the 13th C.I.Bn. Very little resistance was encountered until the last TRENCH of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE was reached , when the advance was held up by heavy Machine Gun Fire from the Support Line and by enemy Field Batteries firing at point-blank range from CAGNICOURT WOOD. The Battery was called upon for support by both the 13th and 16th C.I.Bns. and advanced to positions about 1000 yards W. of CAGNICOURT WOOD , from where direct Fire was obtained on enemy Batteries and Machine Gun Nests. While supervising this movement , the Battery Commander , R.H. MORRIS , was severely wounded , which left “J” Battery without an Officer. Sgt. E. C. MORBY immediately took charge and fired on numerous targets with good effect.

In order to engage the enemy more closely some of the Guns were moved slightly forward of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE and it was at this point that the Crews became involved in a hand-to-hand fight with the Personnel of the enemy Machine Gun Nest , which was eventually silenced. From these new positions the Guns were able to engage numerous hostile Machine Gun Posts . Our casualties from Snipers were very heavy at that time , but superiority of Fire was obtained and , under cover of Fire from the Battery , the Infantry continued their advance. When high ground in the BOIS de LOISON was reached the advance was again halted by heavy Machine Gun Fire from both Flanks. The 3rd C.I.B. Infantry had been more successful than the Units on their right and left , and both Flanks were in the Air. The assistance of the Machine Guns was again called for by the Infantry. No.1 Section , reinforced by men from the rear , was sent forward to establish a defensive and supporting Diamond S. of the BOIS de LOISON. From these positions , Fire was brought to bear on the enemy in BUISSY SWITCH. At this time the Battery replenished its supply of S.A.A. from the Limbers , which had been brought forward to just W. of CAGNICOURT.

Several times during the day our Infantry advanced on the enemy positions in BUISSY SWITCH , but , in spite of covering Fire from our Machine Guns , they were repeatedly driven back. However in the late afternoon a foothold was established , which was eventually made good. The situation was obscure until BUISSY SWITCH had fallen , and the Machine Guns were ahead of the Infantry on several occasions during the attack on BUISSY SWITCH LINE , thus being able to cover their withdrawal until our Line was eventually established. During the night , “J” Battery disposed their Guns for defense in depth on the high ground E. and S.-E. of CAGNICOURT.

45 minutes after Zero , “L” Battery moved up behind the supporting Battalion. Defensive positions in depth were taken up on reaching the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. When the right attacking Battalion advanced , the position of the Guns was so altered as to cover the right flank in case of a hostile counter-attack.

## **2nd C.I.B. , Attack.**

The 2nd C.I.B. attacked on the First Cdn. Division Left. The 7th C.I.Bn. was to attack and take the RED LINE. Here the 10th C.I.Bn. was to leap-frog the 7th , and carry through the attack on the GREEN LINE. The 8th C.I.Bn. was to support the attack of the 10th C.I.Bn. and on arrival at the Objective was to take up a Position of Support. The 5th C.I.Bn. was in Brigade Reserve. As we have already seen , the latter Battalion was continuously fighting during the night September 1st/2nd. The enemy was trying hard to regain the ground lost on the day previous. At Zero Hour the Battalion was still engaged in hand-to-hand fighting , on the Jumping-off Line , just E. of the HENDECOURT-DURY ROAD. The 7th C.I.Bn. passing through the 5th C.I.Bn. , took over the fight and , aided by the Shrapnel Barrage and Tanks , advanced rapidly and captured all Objectives. The attack was hard before the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE was reached , but , on arrival there , the Tanks came up and made the task of the Infantry infinitely easier. The 10th C.I.Bn. leapfrogging the 7th according to Program , attacked shortly after 8:00 A.M. , one Company working to the right down the BUISSY SWITCH and one Company on the left astride the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

At 8:45 A.M. the attack was held up a short distance beyond the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE. All Tanks were knocked out . Enemy Machine Guns were thick. Artillery and Light Trench Mortars were firing over open sights. Troops on the left flank had not come up. The enemy was bombing the BUISSY SWITCH very heavily. For these reasons a frontal attack was out of the question.

Instructions were accordingly received that the Companies should move forward slowly , taking advantage of all cover and flanking their Objectives. The area attacked was very formidable. VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT was strongly defended , as was the BUISSY SWITCH. Strong opposition was encountered in the Factory N. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. The attack moved forward slowly , our Infantry gradually gaining ground. When a General Line passing through the Eastern end of the Village had been established about 4:00 P.M. , a halt was called in order to reorganize and arrange Artillery Support for the continuation of the Attack.

A Barrage was arranged and under cover of this , the attack was renewed at 6:00 P.M. In spite of strenuous resistance the attack was entirely successful. The BUISSY SWITCH and the Sunken Road E. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT were cleared of the enemy and at 11:00 P.M. a Line of Outposts was established. Touch was effected with the 3rd C.I.B. on the right. On the left , the 8th C.I.Bn. threw out a screen of Posts well in advance of the BUISSY SWITCH and swung back a defensive flank to the W. along the line of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

### **Action of No. 2 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

3 Batteries of No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM , D.M.C.) First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , supported the advance of the 2nd C.I.B. "E" Battery was in Divisional Reserve. "G" Battery assembled N.-E. and S. of UPTON WOOD and at 5:15 A.M. moved forward in Diamond formation in support of the attack of the 7th C.I.Bn. This Battery had frequent opportunities of Direct Fire , and on numerous occasions were able to engage enemy Strong Points that were holding up the advance of the Infantry. At 5:45 A.M. Sgt. BILLINGTON rushed 2 Guns ahead of the Infantry and engaged a hostile Field Battery with direct Fire at a range of 800 yards. The enemy Crew retired in disorder.

At 6:00 A.M. our Line ran from 500 yards S. of the junction of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI and HENDICOURT-DURY ROADS , to the outskirts of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. On this Line 4 Guns opened fire on retiring enemy Infantry , with good observed results at ranges from 800 to 1000 yards.

Lieut. HARRIS brought his Guns into action against the enemy Field Battery which was holding up our left flank. He silenced the Battery , inflicting heavy casualties on the Gunners. At about the same time , the enemy endeavored to remove a Field Battery from the high ground E. of CAGNICOURT by means of horse transport. This provided an opportunity of direct Fire at 1000 yards . All the horses were killed or wounded. A Mounted Sgt.-Major endeavored then to take charge of the retirement. He was shot down and the German Gunners retired in disorder , leaving the Guns in our hands. At this point 6 enemy Machine Guns and about 10,000 Rounds of S.A.A. were captured. These were turned against the enemy and used with great effect on enemy Positions E. of CAGNICOURT. On Reaching the Objective (RED LINE) the Guns were mounted in Defensive Positions for Defense in Depth on the high ground W. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT , where they remained for 2 days. During the day (September 3rd) the Guns had many opportunities of engaging low-flying enemy Planes and succeeded several times in turning them back.

The 10th C.I.Bn. whose task was to leapfrog the 7th C.I.Bn. on the RED LINE , advanced from UNION TRENCH at 6:00 A.M. ; "F" Battery kept in close touch with them. The Guns worked their way up the VILLERS ROAD to the left of the Ridge N. W. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. At about 9:00 A.M. the O.C. , 10th C.I.Bn. informed the Battery Commander that he could not advance , his left Flank being subjected to heavy Fire as the Battalion on his left had not come up. The Guns of "F" Battery were brought into action against the enemy Batteries firing from N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. Our Guns were only carrying 2000 rounds per Gun and could not afford to use more than 1000 rounds apiece against this target , but at this point some enemy Machine Guns were salvaged and were used to good effect , about 5000 rounds being fired. At noon touch was established with the S.A.A. Limbers and a further supply of 3000 rounds per Gun was brought forward at 6:00 P.M.

The 10th C.I.Bn , supported by an Artillery Barrage , participated in the attack on the BUISSY SWITCH. One section of "F" Battery assisted by engaging selected targets , consisting of suspected enemy Machine Gun Positions , N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. The other section supported the Infantry , with Indirect Fire when they jumped off. By midnight the 10th C.I.Bn. had cleared the BUISSY SWITCH as far as their Objective , but could not advance on the left beyond the SUNKEN ROAD N. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. The Guns of "F" Battery were placed in Positions of Defense slightly to the N.-W. of the Village. "H" Battery , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. was in 2nd C.I.B. Reserve and moved in close support of the 5th C.I.Bn. On the 10th C.I.Bn. being held up , these Guns were brought forward to positions just E. of

the HENDECOURT-DURY ROAD and 1500 yards S. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. They were not brought into action. At night the Guns were disposed for Defense in these positions with a view to cover the left flank in case of a hostile counter-attack. These positions were in Shell-holes and very good Fields of Fire were obtained, The Battery remained here throughout the night September 2nd/3rd.

### **1st C.I.B. Operations.**

The 1st C.I.B. in Reserve , was in readiness at Zero on September 2nd to move forward and leapfrog the 3rd and 2nd C.I.B.s At 8:00 A.M. the 1st C.I.B. moved forward from its Assembly area. Owing to the heavy fighting encountered by the leading Brigades , E. of the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPOT LINE Troops of the 1st C.I.B. became merged with Troops of the 2nd and 3rd C.I.B.s and continued to the attack on CAGNICOURT and the BOIS de BOUCHE. These were withdrawn as soon as possible with the exception of the Troops of the 3rd C.I.Bn. which had advanced too rapidly and , at the end of the days fighting , held the Line of the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY , from the right Divisional Boundary to the BUISSY SWITCH , nearly 1000 yards. The 3 remaining Battalions of the 1st C.I.B. (1st , 2nd and 4th) were meantime held in hand , ready to leapfrog the 2nd and 3rd C.I.B.s immediately the BUISSY SWITCH was captured. The BUISSY SWITCH was not taken until 11:00 P.M. and this exploitation could then not be carried out.

Orders were then issued that the 1st C.I.B. was to relieve the 3rd C.I.B. in the area adjoining the Corps S. Boundary. The 4th C.I.B. was ordered to relieve elements of the 3rd C.I.B. and the 3rd C.I.Bn. in the Line going in on a 3-Company Front with 1 Company in support. This was done and the 1st C.I.B. was then disposed in Depth with the 4th C.I.Bn. in the Line , 2nd C.I.Bn. in support , and the 1st and 3rd C.I.Bns. in Reserve.

### **Action of No. 1 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

No. 1 Company (Major E. R. MORRIS) First Battalion C.M.G.C. advanced with the 1st C.I.B. rear of the assaulting Brigades. "A" Battery supported the 3rd C.I.Bn. on the right , and "B" Battery the 4th , on the left. "D" Battery was in Brigade Reserve , "C" Battery in Divisional Reserve.

"A" Battery in passing through CAGNICOURT came under intense Shell and Machine Gun Fire. The Officers , Capt. FERRIE and Lieut. HANCOCK , soon became casualties and Sgt.-Major WALKER took command. His work was excellent and it was largely due to him that the Battery suffered so few casualties. He had the Limbers unloaded immediately , and the Guns mounted , bringing Fire to bear on the enemy Machine Gun Nest , which was firing on the Battery at point blank range. After some Minutes of gruelling fire , the enemy fire from this Nest was beaten down and the transport enabled to retire with the loss of only 3 horses and 1 Limber. The remainder of the Guns of the Battery were then mounted in commanding Positions and Fire was brought to bear on targets of enemy Infantry , on the slopes in front of BUISSY. At 1 P.M. reinforcing Officers arrived and Lieut. DILLON , M.C. acting O.C. went forward to reconnoitre , as the situation was obscure. He found the 3rd C.I.Bn. advancing and occupying a position of the Railway Line about 1700 yards S.-E. of BOIS de BOUCHE. This Battalion had suffered heavily in the advance and was holding this Line with both flanks in the air. "A" Battery Guns were disposed for Defense of the high ground about 1700 yards S.-E. of BOIS de BOUCHE.

"B" Battery with the 4th C.I.Bn. came under heavy Shell and Machine Gun Fire about 10:30 A.M. , N. W. of CAGNICOURT WOOD. At this point the Guns and Equipment were unloaded and the Limbers sent back a few hundred yards. The Guns were immediately mounted in Defensive positions on high ground in and behind the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE , 1500 yards W. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. Enemy Machine Guns were firing heavily from VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT , and Lieut. DAVIES massed his Guns , together with 2 captured German Guns near the left , in commanding positions among the advanced Infantry , to deal with the situation. A heavy concentration of Fire was put down on an enemy Machine Gun Nest , silencing their Fire and enabling the Infantry to advance with only slight casualties. The Guns were then withdrawn to their former locations.

At 7:00 P.M. the G.O.C. , 1st C.I.B. issued instructions that the Guns of "D" Battery , in Brigade Reserve , be disposed to defend a section of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE , W. of CAGNICOURT. These Guns were in positions W. of CAGNICOURT and CAGNICOURT WOOD by 7:45 P.M.

### **First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Guns In Divisional Reserve.**

On September 1st the Guns of "C" , "E" and "M" Batteries were assembled together under orders of the First Cdn. Division at a point in Reserve almost 1000 yards W. of CHERISY. From this point a reconnaissance was made of Roads to the Forward Area , in order to be ready to go ahead quickly in case of enemy counter-attacks. At 8:10 A.M. when the attacking Battalions were on the RED LINE , orders were received to move to CROWS NEST and establish communications through the 1st Cdn. Divisional O. P. At that place ,the Batteries moved at 8:25 A.M. travelling Eastwards to CHERISY thence S.-E. to SUN QUARRY , thence down the CHERISY-HENDECOURT ROAD to a point about 800 yards N.-W. of HENDECOURT , and thence due E. by overland route to the CROWS NEST. Reconnecting parties immediately proceeded to select defensive positions on the high ground E. and S.-E. of CROWS NEST. Communication was here established with Battalion Headquarters through the 1st C.I.B. During the evening of September 2nd , a Reconnoitring Party went to the forward area in the vicinity of CAGNICOURT and positions were selected to which the Reserve Batteries could move their Guns in case of sudden need.

### **12th C.I.B. Attack.**

In the face of many difficulties , the Brigades of the Fourth Cdn. Division were in position before 4:00 A.M. September 2nd to attack on the left of the First Cdn. Division. On the right , the 12th C.I.B. attacked with 3 Battalions in the Line , the 72nd C.I.Bn. on the right , the 38th in the centre and the 85th on the left. The 78th C.I.Bn. was in support and detailed to attack beyond the RED LINE , leapfrogging the other Battalions when that Objective was gained. Initial fighting of a hand-to-hand nature took place as enemy Machine Gunners had established themselves strongly in various pockets on the CAMBRAI ROAD and near our Outpost Line. They were inside the area on which our Buttage fell , and had to be dealt with by the Infantry. The 85th C.I.Bn. in particular suffered heavy casualties in this task.

The DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE itself did not resist quite as strongly as was anticipated. It was heavily garrisoned , but at the approach of our Infantry with fixed Bayonets , masses of Germans surrendered. The DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE formed a very formidable obstacle. It was defended by a great number of Machine Gunners and frequently enemy Field Batteries , firing at point blank range over open sights contested our advance. On topping the ridge between the SUPPORT LINE and the RED LINE , too , our Infantry suffered heavy casualties. Enemy Machine Guns , at close , medium and long range swept across the DURY RIDGE with direct and indirect fire. It was the most severe Machine Gun Opposition that the Division had ever experienced. The 72nd C.I.Bn. suffered severely from Machine Gun Fire from the direction of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT : the 38th C.I.Bn. engaged by Machine Gun Fire as it stormed MONT DURY , and the 85th C.I.Bn. suffered from enemy Machine Gun Fire from MONT DURY.

By 7:30 A.M. the RED LINE was taken and the First Stage of the battle was successfully completed. At 8:00 A.M. the Second Stage opened with the advance toward the GREEN LINE. The 78th C.I.Bn. pushed forward on the right of the Divisional Front. They encountered terrific Machine Gun Fire from VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT on the right , and from the FACTORY on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , where the right flank was resting. The Canadian Independent Force operating down the road , made several unsuccessful attempts to expel the enemy from the FACTORY , and all attempts to advance further were unavailing. The Artillery Barrage had ceased at the RED LINE and it was realized it was quite impossible to make any further headway until the Artillery could be brought up and adequate support given the Infantry. At the close of the days fighting , our Line ran at the average distance of 500 yards E. of the RED LINE.

### **Action of No. 3 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

"M" Battery , Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. , was detailed to advance with the 72nd C.I.Bn. on the right of the Fourth Cdn. Division Frontage. During the night September 1st/2nd , the enemy made an attack against our positions. As the Germans came forward they afforded excellent targets to the Guns of "M" Battery mounted in Shell-holes , and 10 belts were got off with good effect. Our positions were subjected to heavy

Artillery Fire during the night. The arrangements made for the attack on September 2nd were that the Left Half-Battery would come along the CAMBRAI ROAD , with Transport , and join up with the Right Half-Battery on the way. Owing to heavy Shelling of all roads , this could not be done and the Left Half-Battery did not reach the RED LINE until 11:00 A.M. The Right Half-Battery went forward , carrying all their equipment and arrived at the RED LINE at 9:30 A.M. where they took up positions. During the advance Lieut. EATON , acting O.C. , "M" Battery was wounded and evacuated. Lieut. PATTERSON took command of the Battery.

"L" Battery was attached to the 85th C.I.Bn. attacking on the left of the 12th C.I.B. Frontage. At 10:00 P.M. September 1st the H.Q. of the 85th C.I.Bn. was in the QUARRY by TRIANGLE WOOD and the O.C. , "L" Battery Capt. W.G. WILLIAMS , reported personally to the O.C. 85th C.I.Bn. that "L" Battery was located near MARK ROAD , N.-E. of CHERISY. The O.C. 85th C.I.Bn. gave instructions that the Battery would not advance with the Infantry but would follow behind in time to establish Positions on MONT DURY , or in the vicinity , from which the Infantry , as it reached the RED LINE , could be assisted in consolidating the First Objective. These instructions were followed. To avoid casualties , Sections were moved off , independently , at 5:15 and 5:30 A.M. respectively. Limbers were taken right forward to just behind the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE , without any casualties. At 6:45 A.M. "B" Section had established 2 Guns in MONT DURY ready to fire on DURY , if required , and the other 2 Guns in the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. All Guns of "A" Section were established in the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. At 9:00 A.M. all Guns were in direct communications with the O.C. , 85th C.I.Bn. and , at his suggestion , the 2 Guns from MONT DURY were withdrawn and all 8 Guns mounted on the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE , in readiness to repel any organized counter-attack.

"K" Battery , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. was holding defensive positions in TRIANGLE WOOD. On September 1st Orders were received for the Operation to commence on the morning of September 2nd. The Battery was attached to the 78th C.I.Bn. At 2:00 A.M. on the 2nd , the Battery moved off to join this Battalion , between the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. Acting in accordance with instructions from the O.C. , 78th C.I.Bn. the Battery was held back for an hour and brought up to the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. It then passed over to the left of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and took up positions immediately S. of MONT DURY and very close to it , with the object of supporting the advance of the Infantry with Indirect Fire from there.

At this place , touch was lost with the Infantry. A reconnaissance by Lieut. CARPENTER , O.C. Battery , discovered that the Infantry were being badly cut up by Machine Gun Fire. The Guns were rushed forward to the right to a point S. of MONT DURY and 400 yards N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. Here 2 Guns got into action against moving targets from positions in a Communication Trench on the right slop of MONT DURY , about 500 yards N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. One of the Guns fired on an enemy Trench Mortar Battery in action on the right at a distance of about 1000 yards and this Unit was eventually silenced. From this point the Battery Commander pushed forward to the RED LINE and , observing 2 German Field Guns , operating within 1500 yards , to the left , he sent back for 2 Guns to be brought up immediately by way of the Communication Trench. These Guns were unable to get through , owing to intense Machine Gun Fire from both flanks. The Communication Trench , also , was crowded with our Infantry. On touch again being established with the O.C. , Battalion , the Battery was ordered to take up defensive positions in the rear , to repulse any Counter-attack , as the Infantry were being withdrawn to the Trench System to reorganize. The Guns remained in these positions for the night.

### **Operations of the 10th and 11th C.I.B.s.**

On the Fourth Cdn. Division Left , the 10th C.I.B. , attacked with the 47th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 50th C.I.Bn. on the left. The 46th C.I.Bn. was in support and detailed to attack DURY ; the 44th C.I.Bn. in reserve , was to exploit successes and to advance to the GREEN and BLUE LINES. The leading Battalions were well up at Zero Hour and escaped the enemy Barrage.

Considerable opposition was encountered. One enemy Patrol was found inside our Barrage Line , but owing to the darkness , was surprised before it could do any damage. Wire was in many places uncut and the Infantry had to wait until paths were cut to enable them to proceed. Their steadiness in face of this delay was admirable. The enemy put up a stubborn resistance , many detached bodies fighting to the last man. The leading Battalions reached their Objective and were leapfrogged by the 46th C.I.Bn. which advanced to the capture of the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE and the Town of DURY.

On reaching the SUPPORT LINE , the Troops were held up by intense Machine Gun Fire from the SUNKEN ROAD , S. of DURY and immediately N. of MONT DURY. This opposition was also holding up the left Battalion of the 12th C.I.B. on the right. By an outflanking movement , skillfully executed , the enemy position was captured and over 120 Prisoners taken , together with 2 Heavy and 7 Light Machine Guns. With the fall of this position , the defense of DURY collapsed and our Troops were able to enter the Villages , capturing the Area Commandant , his Assistant and 100 Prisoners. The advance was continued to the RED LINE , which was occupied at 7:30 A.M.

At 8:00 A.M. the Second Stage of the attack opened and the 78th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 11th C.I.B. on the left passed through the 12th C.I.B. Front whilst the 44th C.I.Bn. leapfrogged the 46th C.I.Bn. on the 10th C.I.B. Front. The Order of Battle of the Fourth Division was now : 78th C.I.Bn. on the right (their Operations have already been described) , the 11th C.I.B. in the centre , and the 44th C.I.Bn. on the left. In the centre the 11th C.I.B. attacked with the 54th C.I.Bn. on the right , the 75th in the centre and the 87th C.I.Bn. on the left , the 102nd C.I.Bn. was in support.

These Battalions met with the same difficulty which rendered impossible the advance of the 3rd and 2nd C.I.B.s on the right. Battalions on the right were held up within a few hundred yards of the RED LINE. Intense Machine Gun Fire swept the top of DURY RIDGE and no Battalions were able to advance without excessive casualties. Along the whole Front it was obvious that no further advance could be made , until Artillery and Tanks could be brought up to support the Infantry. The 44th C.I.Bn. on the left met with the same resistance and were unable to advance past the RED LINE. Consequently along the whole Fourth Divisional Front , the positions gained were consolidated prior to the continuation of the attack in the morning towards the GREEN LINE.

#### **Action of No. 1 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

No. 1 Company , (Major BRITTON) Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , was operating with the 10th C.I.B.

“C” Battery moved forward in support of the 47th C.I.Bn. , attacking on the right. Shortly before moving forward , the area in which the Battery was assembled was subjected to heavy Bombardment , Capt. RAINBOTH , M.C. , and 5 Other Ranks being wounded. Lieut. ALLAN took command of the Battery. The Battery moved along the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and then along the Road to DURY , through ST. SERVINS FARM. Touch was established in the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE , W. of DURY , with the O.C. , 44th C.I.Bn. who stated that his Battalion had taken and passed DURY and was going after RECOURT. It was accordingly arranged that the Battery should move up to positions immediately E. of DURY , to deal with any possible counter-attack. On investigation , however , the report proved inaccurate as the 44th C.I.Bn. were only advancing from the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE. The Battery was thereupon established in positions around the CHALK PIT on the DURY-ETERPIGNY ROAD , about 1000 yards N.-W. of DURY. The Guns stayed in these positions until the afternoon of September 3rd.

“A” Battery was detailed to support the advance of the 50th C.I.Bn. on the left of the 10th C.I.B. Front. During September 1st the Battery was ordered to move up to the VIS-en-ARTOIS RIDGE. Then on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD about 100 yards in front of SR ROHART’S FACTORY , near CRATER BRIDGE over the COJHUL RIVER , heavy Shelling was encountered , causing temporary disorganization. The Battery was reorganized and located for the night about 200 yards W. of the FACTORY. Early in the morning of September 2nd , the Battery moved with Limbers to the SUNKEN ROAD running W. from STRIPECORPS , ST. SERVINS FARM , and on receipt of further Orders , continued the advance still further to the Valley in rear of DURY , where positions were taken up for the night in an old Trench in rear of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE.

“B” Battery was to move at 8:30 A.M. September 2nd , from the Assembly Area beside the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , W. of HAUCOURT. At 8:00 A.M. on that morning , the enemy bombarded this area with Heavies. A number of casualties were inflicted and Lieut. GILL was killed. The wounded were evacuated , the Gun Crews organized and the Guns moved forward on Pack Mules. On reaching DURY it was found that the advance had been held up. The 44th C.I.Bn. had gone through the other Battalions , but the Line actually held was still the First Objective. It was found impossible to get in touch with the 44th C.I.Bn. and the Guns were unloaded from Pack Animals and sited , 4 in the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE , among the Troops of the 46th and 87th C.I.Bns. and the other 4 echeloned in rear about 500 yards behind. The guns remained in these positions during the night September 2nd/3rd.



### **Action of No. 2 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

No. 2 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. was attached to the 11th C.I.B. , "H" Battery on the right , with the 75th and 54th C.I.Bns. , "G" Battery on the left with the 87th and 102nd C.I.Bns. "F" Battery was in Brigade Reserve. The 3 forward Batteries were to be in position at 2:00 A.M. September 2nd.

Late in the night September 1st/2nd , while the Batteries were moving to assembly positions 3 Bombs were dropped by enemy Aeroplanes in the midst of "H" Battery Transport , 1 Driver was killed and 6 Men wounded. 16 out of 20 animals were killed or wounded. 3 Limbers were destroyed and 4 Guns and considerable Gun Equipment lost. This necessitated "F" Battery being detailed to act with the 75th and 54th C.I.Bns. "H" Battery proceeded to reorganize as quickly as possible in readiness to follow the attack in Brigade Reserve.

Battery Commanders of "F" and "G" Batteries kept in touch with the Infantry Battalions and had their Batteries and Transports moved up some distance in rear of the Infantry Battalions. Batteries were able to get Guns in position and engage live targets. 16000 rounds in all were expended during the first few hours of the attack and the support furnished to the Infantry was greatly appreciated by the Battalion Commanders. Lieut. LEACH , M.C. in charge of "G" Battery was killed by Shell Fire. The Battery was taken over by Lieut. FAIR. "F" Battery and Transport were in position soon after 8:30 A.M. E. of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE , immediately W. of DURY. The 75th C.I.Bn. was experiencing difficulty from MONT DURY RIDGE. Fighting was very severe , many enemy Machine Guns being encountered. Fire was coming on the right from the FACTORY on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and from the WOOD on the northern outskirts of VILLER-les-CAGNICOURT. All Guns of the Battery got into action , firing 8000 rounds on the FACTORY. The O.C. 75th C.I.Bn. expressed his satisfaction at the results obtained.

Later , this Officer stated that his Battalion was pushing forward towards RUMAUCOURT and was urgently in need of Machine Gun assistance. He asked that the Battery be pushed forward to fire on RUMAUCOURT. Orders were given that the Battery , with Transport , would advance if possible to a point 1000 yards S.-W. of SAUDEMONT , from where fire could be directed on RUMAUCOURT. In moving forward from the DROCOURT LINE , with the end in view , "F" Battery Transport came under direct Artillery and Machine Gun fire , which resulted in 6 Animals being killed and 2 Limbers being destroyed , 4 Guns being temporarily out of action.

Defensive positions were taken up by "F" and "G" Batteries and the remnants of "H" Battery which suffered by Bombing the previous night. Then the 4 Guns of "F" Battery were damaged , the 4 remaining "H" Battery Guns , from Brigade Reserve were moved forward and placed in defensive positions under "F" Battery on the right flank. These Guns were all in position by 3:30 P.M. September 2nd. , disposed as follows :- 4 Guns of "F" Battery were just in rear of the 75th C.I.Bn. covering the Slopes of MONT DURY. At dusk 2 "F" Battery Guns were recovered from the Transport Wreck. These Guns together with the 4 Guns of "H" Battery were placed in position on the forward Slopes of MONT DURY , on the right of the 54th C.I.Bn. protecting their right flank and guarding against possible counter-attack.

### **Barrage and Reserve Guns , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

"D" , "E" , and "J" Batteries , Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. reported to O.C. No. 3 Company (Major BAILEY , D.S.O. , M.C.) to receive orders for a Barrage to be laid down by Guns of these Batteries in support of the advance of the 72nd C.I.Bn. on the right of the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Frontage. These Batteries took up positions , "J" on the right , "D" in the centre and "E" on the left , in ORIX TRENCH about 1000 yards N. of UPTON WOOD. The main waves of the 72nd C.I.Bn. were jumping off from the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH and consequently "E" and "D" Batteries could not fire on the Barrage as the Infantry advancing were masking their Fire. "J" Batteries position was in ORIX TRENCH well to the right of the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Boundary and just in rear of the 5th C.I.Bn. On the way in , the enemy's Shelling was very heavy and considerable Gas was mixed with the H.E. "J" Battery fired 22000 rounds S.A.A. on this Barrage.

At 8:00 A.M. the 3 Batteries moved up to the DROCOURT LINE just N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and came into Divisional Reserve. At 10:00 A.M. "E" Battery was sent forward to join No. 2 Company. At the same time owing to very heavy shelling , "D" and "J" Batteries were withdrawn to a point S. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and behind the Jumping-off Line. In the evening , the Guns

were moved forward to defensive positions , in the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE defending positions in the DROCOURT-LINE , defending that LINE along with the Guns of “F” , “G” and “H” Batteries.

### **Operations , September 3rd to September 5th , 1918.**

#### **General.**

On the night September 2nd/3rd our Line was a little E. of the RED LINE , at places , the Infantry had penetrated 1000 yards , and even 1500 yards beyond this Line , but a Line parallel to the RED LINE , at a distance of 500 yards N. of it , would give the approximate Jumping-off Line for actions which took place on September 3rd. The Order of Battle of Infantry Battalions on September 3rd from right to left of the Canadian Corps Front , was as follows :-

First Cdn. Division -	1st C.I.B.	4th C.I.Bn.
	2nd C.I.B.	(10th C.I.Bn. ( 8th C.I.Bn.
Fourth Cdn. Division -	11th C.I.B.	(102nd C.I.Bn. (54th C.I.Bn. (87th C.I.Bn.
	10th C.I.B.	(46th C.I.Bn. (44th C.I.Bn.

The Operation carried out on September 3rd was more in the nature of an Advance than an Attack. At the end of the previous day , Infantry Units had been ordered to keep close watch of , and in constant touch with the enemy in front of them so as to be able to follow him up closely the moment he commenced to retire.

During the early morning of September 3rd , Aeroplanes reported that no enemy Troops were to be seen between our Line and the CANAL du NORD and it was suspected that he had withdrawn most of his Forces over the CANAL. Consequently , in place of an organized attack with Artillery preparation , the Battalions in the Front Line were ordered to push forward.

#### **First Canadian Division.**

On the right in front of the First C.I.B. the enemy was found to be holding on to the BUISSY SWITCH. The 4th C.I.Bn. was therefore ordered to attack his Line on the whole Brigade Front. The enemy offered very little resistance in the BUISSY SWITCH , but on topping the Ridge and going down the Forward Slope , severe Artillery and Machine Gun Fire was encountered. At the same time , British Troops attacked INCHY , on the right. About 3:30 P.M. it became apparent that the 4th C.I.Bn. had become deflected toward the left and the 2nd C.I.Bn. was accordingly ordered up from Support to establish touch between the 4th C.I.Bn. and Troops on the right. About 6:50 P.M. , the 2nd and 4th C.I.Bns. had reached the W. Bank of the CANAL and were everywhere held up by heavy Machine Gun Fire from the E. Bank.

Meanwhile , on the 2nd C.I.B. Front , considerable resistance was met from enemy Machine Guns and close-range Artillery Fire , but despite this fact , the advance was pushed slowly forward and the Line of the W. Bank of the CANAL du NORD was established about 5:00 P.M. Patrols sent forward , covering the whole Brigade Front , ascertained there were no enemy Troops W. of the CANAL. Companies were then rearranged in Defensive Positions and touch finally established with flanking Units. Immediately after dark , the 7th C.I.Bn. , having reorganized , relieved the 8th and 10th C.I.Bns. in the Front Line and the 5th C.I.Bn. came into Support. The 8th and 10th C.I.Bns. , on Relief came into Brigade Reserve.

From the high ground on the right , S. of BUISSY , evidence of great confusion on the part of the enemy E. of the CANAL was observed. Gun , Lorries and Transport could be seen moving Eastward along the roads

and Parties of enemy Infantry retiring , towards BOURLON WOOD. Mounted Officers could be seen endeavouring , without success to rally their Men. But in distinct contrast to this , Parties of enemy Machine Gunners could be seen moving Westward to the CANAL Bank apparently oblivious of the retirement going on about them. Plans were laid that the Brigades should assault the CANAL under cover of a heavy Artillery Barrage and attempt to cross over the remaining Bridges. During the night however , the enemy blew up 2 of the 3 Bridges on the right Brigade Front and all of these remaining on the left. More information brought in from Troops on both flanks proved that the attempt was not likely to succeed and orders came from Corps that the Division should stand fast.

The relief of the Troops in the Line was carried out , during the night September 3rd/4th , by the Second Cdn. Division, the 6th C.I.B. taking over from the 2nd C.I.B. Hardly had the relief commenced , when word was received that the enemy had regained possession of INCHY on the right. The relief was therefore checked and a defensive flank formed by the 1st C.I.Bn. The Sixty-third (Naval) Division afterwards succeeded in retaking INCHY.

During the days September 3rd and 4th , the 3rd C.I.B. was in Reserve with the 16th and 13th C.I.Bns. , right and left , respectively , in the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE , and the 15th and 14th C.I.Bns. , in the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. The Brigade withdrew to DAINVILLE on the evening of September 4th. Command of the First Cdn. Division Sector passed to the G.O.C. Second Cdn. Division at 5:00 P.M. September 4th.

#### **Fourth Canadian Division.**

On the Fourth Cdn. Division Front the day's fighting during September 2nd convinced all Commanding Officers along the Line that any further advance would be impractical without adequate preparations and ample Artillery arrangements. Plans were made to attack on September 3rd with the 11th C.I.B. on the right and the 10th C.I.B. on the left , these 2 Brigades to advance to capture the GREEN LINE. The Scheme of Operations included an attack by the 12th C.I.B. , Northwards , from the BUISSY SWITCH. Accordingly , the 12th C.I.B. was withdrawn from the Line and placed in Reserve in the Trenches of the DROCOURT-QUEANT SYSTEM. The 11th C.I.B. took over the Line to the Southern Divisional Boundary. Orders were issued to all Brigades that the attack would commence at 5:00 A.M. September 3rd , but these Orders were subsequently cancelled.

Patrols sent out early in the morning failed to get in touch with the enemy and , later in the day , low-flying Aeroplanes reported the enemy clear of the area W. of the CANAL. A general advance then commenced along the whole Divisional Front and no opposition was met with. The Villages of RUMAUCOURT , ECOURT-ST-QUENTIN , SAUDEMONT and RECOURT were occupied unopposed. By 3:00 P.M. all ground W. of the CANAL , except a small WOOD immediately N. of the CAMBRAI ROAD had been vacated by the enemy. Our Patrols were sent to Bridgeheads. All Bridges had been destroyed and the enemy held the Bridgeheads on the Eastern side. During our advance to the GREEN LINE throughout the afternoon of September 3rd our Troops were subjected to heavy Artillery Fire , particularly from the vicinity of OISY-le-VERGER , from which place the enemy had very good Observation. Our Artillery was brought up and to some degree neutralized the enemy Fire.

During the night September 3rd/4th our Post were established all along the W. Bank of the CANAL. The 102nd C.I.Bn. surrounded the small WOOD N. of the CAMBRAI ROAD and dealt with its German occupants. On September 4th , reports from the First Cdn. Division on the right indicated that a crossing might be forced by them. Orders were received to be ready to cross the CANAL as soon as the XVII Corps and the First Cdn. Division on our right had effected a crossing. There had been nothing on the Fourth Division Front to indicate that the enemy would not fight the CANAL LINE. Late in the day the idea of crossing was abandoned by the First Cdn. Division.

During the night September 4th/5th , the 6th C.I.B. took over part of the Fourth Divisional Southern Front from the 11th C.I.B. and the 9th C.I.B. , Third Cdn. Division , relieved the 10th C.I.B. on the left. Command of the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Front did not pass at this time. On the morning September 5th , following a report that a Patrol had succeeded in effecting a crossing of the CANAL on the left , several daring Reconnaissance's of the CANAL were made. One of these resulted in the wounding of the G.O.C. , 11th C.I.B. All Reconnaissance's established the fact that the enemy was still holding the Eastern Bank of the CANAL in force with Snipers and Machine Gunners. As orders were not to commit Troops to a fight , the idea of crossing was again abandoned. During the days September 3rd , 4th and 5th , the 12th C.I.B.

remained in Reserve in positions just E. of the RED LINE ,with the right flank on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

At 6:00 P.M. September 5th , the G.O.C. , Third Cdn. Division took over command of the Line from the G.O.C., Fourth Cdn. Division.

### **Operations of First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

At 10:30 P.M. , night September 2nd/3rd , instructions were received at H.Q. First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , that the 1st C.I.B. was to attack on the morning of September 3rd on the right of the First Cdn. Divisional Front. "A" and "B" Batteries of the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. were detailed to go forward with the 4th C.I.Bn. which was attacking on the Brigade Frontage. "D" Battery was moved to the rear and established in defensive positions W. of CAGNICOURT to operate with the 3rd C.I.Bn. in Brigade Reserve and ready to defend the BUISSY SWITCH in case of Counter-attack. "A" and "B" Batteries were withdrawn with their Transport to a Line just E. of CAGNICOURT and were in position behind the Infantry at 3:15 A.M. September 3rd.

About 2:00 P.M. September 3rd , the 4th C.I.Bn. moved to the attack from their assembly positions near the BOIS de LOISON. The Guns of "A" and "B" Batteries followed close behind , but no supporting Fire was given as the Infantry met with little resistance. On advancing down the Slope severe Artillery and Machine Gun Fire was encountered from the enemy who was holding the E. Bank of the CANAL in force. The Batteries were disposed for defense between the BUISSY SWITCH and the CANAL du NORD , and kept up heavy Fire on the E. Bank of the CANAL. The Infantry made many attempts to gain the Bridgeheads but these were not successful.

Meanwhile "D" Battery , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , in accordance with instructions from the G.O.C. , was moved to defensive positions in the BUISSY SWITCH. During the day , hostile low-flying Planes were extremely active and a great deal of Firing was carried out at these Machines many of which were driven back over their own Lines.

"C" Battery was in Divisional Reserve. No. 2 Company supported the 2nd C.I.B.

"F" Battery moved forward at 2:00 P.M. behind the 10th C.I.Bn. , on the right of the 2nd C.I.B. Frontage. The enemy had retired on this Front during the night and little resistance was encountered . The Guns kept in close touch with the Infantry. No targets were observed and the Guns finally took up positions in the SUNKEN ROAD S.-E. of BUISSY , between the Eastern edge of the Village and the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY. This Battery was withdrawn at 10:00 P.M. under instructions from the O.C. , 10th C.I.Bn. , and went into Bivouacs for the night in the vicinity of SUN QUARRY , 1000 yards S.-E. of CHERISY and the CHERISY-HENDECOURT ROAD.

"G" Battery remained in positions on the high ground W. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT where the Guns were established on the previous day.

"H" Battery supporting the 5th C.I.Bn. , had remained throughout the morning of September 3rd in positions near the HENDECOURT-DURY ROAD , occupied the previous night. Numerous targets of enemy Aeroplanes were engaged by this Battery. At 2:00 P.M. orders were received from the O.C. , 5th C.I.Bn. to "Stand To" as our Troops had reached the W. Bank of the CANAL. At 5:00 P.M. this Battalion moved forward and "H" Battery followed close behind. Limbers accompanied the Battery along the VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT ROAD , until the SUNKEN ROAD on the Western outskirts of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT was reached. At this place the Battery was halted and relief by the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , took place . On completion of the relief , the Battery bivouacked for the night and prepared to move out in the morning.

"E" Battery was in Divisional Reserve during this period.

### **Guns in Reserve , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

No. 5 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. was held in Reserve during September 3rd , with the 3rd C.I.B. The Men made the most of their opportunity and spent the day resting. "M" Battery of this Company was in Divisional Reserve.

The Guns of "C" , "E" and "M" Batteries in Divisional Reserve remained in their positions in the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE just E. of TRIGGER COPSE and about 1500 yards W. of CAGNICOURT. At 11:30 A.M. , September 4th , the Batteries were moved to a point across the SENSEE RIVER just W. of CHERISY-HENINEL ROAD , and at 2:00 P.M. they proceeded to WALRUS , arriving there at 10:00 P.M. September 4th.

On relief by the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , the whole of the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. assembled at WALRUS in Corps Reserve. No. 1 Company was relieved night September 4th/5th and reached WALRUS at 3:30 P.M., September 5th.

#### **Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , General.**

The Guns of the Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , advanced with the 11th and 10th C.I.B.s on the right and left of the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Frontage , respectively.

"E" , "F" and "G" Batteries of No. 2 Company (a/O.C. , Capt. HALL , M.C.) and "K" , "L" and "M" Batteries of No. 3 Company (Major Bailey , D.S.O. , M.C.) advanced with the 11th C.I.B. , "E" Battery utilizing Limbers and the remainder carrying Guns and Equipment. "A" , "B" and "C" Batteries of No.1 Company (Major BRITTON) advanced with the 10th C.I.B. carrying Guns and Equipment. No opportunities for supporting fire were offered. Some casualties were suffered from the heavy Artillery Fire encountered during the advance. These Batteries took up defensive positions in depth with "E" , "G" and "F" Batteries covering the CANAL from PALLUEL to SAUCHY-CAUCHY. Owing to Machine Gun and Artillery Fire , it was found impossible to push "K" , "L" and "M" Batteries over the Ridge on the extreme right of the GREEN LINE ; these Batteries , therefore , occupied positions on the W. side of the Ridge. During the afternoon of September 3rd and the night September 3rd/4th , the ground gained was occupied in depth as far back as the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE , these positions being maintained until the Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. was relieved by the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C.

#### **Action of No. 3 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

On the night September 2nd/3rd , it had been seen that the Mobile Batteries of No. 3 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. had established themselves in rear of the RED LINE in defensive positions . At 9:00 A.M. on September 3rd , instructions were given to "L" Battery to proceed with the 102nd C.I.Bn. This Battalion was pushing out strong Patrols and the task of "L" Battery was to follow this Battalion in close support and engage any enemy that appeared. This was done and 4 Guns went forward to the point where the Infantry dug in. This was on the extreme right of the GREEN LINE on the W. side of the Ridge , below the Crest. No Machine Gun targets were observed during the advance. From the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE to the Final Line , Guns , Tripods and 8 Belt-boxes of Ammunition were carried by the Crews , Limbers being left in the hollow behind the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. 3 mules were killed here by Shell Fire and the Transport was moved 600 yards further back and to the left of the Road.

On the morning of September 4th , the 27th C.I.Bn. , 6th C.I.B., side-slipped and took over the extreme right of the 11th C.I.B. Line reliving one Company of the 102nd C.I.Bn. Relief of "L" Battery by "F" Battery of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , took place at the same time and "L" Battery was withdrawn to the SUNKEN ROAD 1000 yards behind the GREEN LINE on the extreme right , 500 yards N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , where it remained until withdrawn the night September 5th/6th.

"M" Battery advanced from their defensive positions in the RED LINE at 11:00 A.M. September 3rd. The Guns were pushed forward in rear of "L" Battery , ready to support that Battery if necessary. Positions were eventually established in the SUNKEN ROAD referred to above. No targets presented themselves. The Battery remained in this position until relieved by "H" Battery of the Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , at 9:00 P.M. September 5th.

At 9:00 A.M. September 3rd , "K" Battery was ordered by the O.C. , No. 3 Company , to move from their defensive positions in the RED LINE and to get in touch with him along the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

In the evening this Battery was moved to the Crest of the Ridge on the 11th C.I.B. right overlooking the CANAL , in readiness to support an attack planned by the 102nd C.I.Bn. for the morning of September 4th. This was cancelled and the Battery was sent across to the left where it took up positions near the CHALK PIT , 1000 yards S.-E. of RUMAUCOURT , supporting the 102nd C.I.Bn. on the new Frontage taken over by that Battalion on relief of the right Company by the 27th C.I.Bn. On September 5th , "K" Battery

vacated its positions and was withdrawn to the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE , 500 yards N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. Here , the Battery bivouacked for the night , moving back to AGNY on the morning of September 6th.

“J” Battery of this Company was in Divisional Reserve during these operations and did not come into action.

In the evening of September 3rd , Major BAILEY, O.C. , No 3 Company while reconnoitring a position for a Sniping Gun with Lieut. PERKINS was severely wounded by enemy Machine Gun Fire. Lieut. PERKINS went back to the 102nd C.I.Bn. and obtained a Stretcher Party and some Riflemen for covering fire and , at great personal risk managed to bring Major BAILEY back. Capt. W.G. WILLAMS took command of the Company.

#### **Action of No. 2 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

No. 2 Company (a/O.C. , Capt. HALL , M.C.) continued in support of the 11th C.I.B.

“F” Battery supported the 54th C.I.Bn. in the centre of the 11th C.I.B. Frontage. At 10:00 A.M. on September 3rd , the O.C. 54th C.I.Bn. sent back word that the enemy was retiring on this Front. Guns were moved forward up to the Infantry , each Crew carrying Gun , Tripod , First Aid Kits , 1 can for Gun-water and 8 Belts of S.A.A. The O.C. , Battery , reconnoitred and found that the CANAL was being rapidly cleared. Scouts were being sent back and the Battery guided to OSVILLERS FARM , E. of RUMAUCOURT. The 54th C.I.Bn. was holding the Ridge overlooking the CANAL and at the request of the O.C. , this Battalion , the Guns were located on the forward Slope overlooking the CANAL and facing the VILLAGE of SAUCHY-CAUCHY. The Battery thus placed commanded the main Bridges in this area and filled in the Gap between the 54th C.I.Bn. and the 87th C.I.Bn. on the left. 4 Guns were actually mounted in this position , the other 4 being in close support 500 yards in the rear and just E. of OSVILLERS FARM. “F” Battery was relieved on the night September 5th/6th.

“E” Battery was moved forward to ECOURT ST. QUENTIN on September 3rd , supporting the 87th C.I.Bn. and protecting its left flank. In moving forward , this Battery suffered very heavy casualties , its effective strength being reduced to 2 Officers , 5 N.C.O.s (including B.S.M. White who was wounded but remained on duty) and 17 Other Ranks. Forward positions were reconnoitred and the Guns moved at dusk to positions N. of the GREEN LINE and on the extreme left of the 11th C.I.B. Front.

These two Batteries (“E” and “F”) from their positions controlled the CANAL on the Brigade Frontage.

“G” Battery , in Brigade Reserve , formed the rear defensive Line.

“H” Battery was in Divisional Reserve and did not come into action.

#### **Action of No. 1 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The Batteries of No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON) , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , were in support of the 10th C.I.B. on the left of the Divisional Front.

“B” Battery acted in co-operation with the right attacking Battalions , the 46th C.I.Bn. in front and the 47th C.I.Bn. in support. This Battery moved forward about 12:00 noon. Severe Shelling was encountered and great difficulty was experienced in bringing mules forward with Guns and Ammunition. 2 mules actually got away and returned to the Transport Lines. The remainder were unloaded and the equipment , etc. , carried to the Gun positions. These were established half-way between RECOURT and ECOURT ST. QUENTIN. No digging in was done on account of enemy Observation from OISY-le-VERGER. The Crews carried Gun Equipment to the positions and lay quietly until dusk , when Gun positions and individual “Funk Holes” were made. Guns were sited to command the ground down to the CANAL du NORD in the direction of PALLUSL and to protect the 10th C.I.B. right flank S. of the SENSEE RIVER.

“A” Battery supported the advance on the left of the 44th C.I.Bn. During the afternoon of September 3rd , positions were established midway between RECOURT and SAUDEMONT , guarding the left flank of the 10th C.I.B. Limbers were taken forward as far as DURY , where Shell Fire made use of Transport inadvisable. Equipment was carried from there to the Gun positions. In these positions “A” Battery was relieved on the night September 4th/5th by “J” Battery of the Third Battalion C.M.G.C.

“C” Battery had established positions in the CHALK PIT about 1000 yards N.-W. of DURY on September 2nd. At 1:00 P.M. September 3rd , the Battery was moved forward in support of the 50th C.I.Bn. which

was in support to the 44th C.I.Bn. on the left. Guns were located in positions immediately W. of RECOURT and remained there until relieved by the 3rd Battalion , C.M.G.C. , at 9:15 P.M. September 4th.

#### **Guns in Reserve ; Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

“D” , “H” and “J” Batteries of the Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. , in Divisional Reserve were moved on the morning of September 3rd to positions on the forward slope of the DURY RIDGE between the WINDMILL and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

At 4:00 P.M. September 5th , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Advanced H.Q. joined Battalion Rear H.Q. at AGNY CHATEAU , and by noon , September 6th all 3 Companies of the Battalion were in Rest Billets in the vicinity of AGNY.

#### **Redistribution of Frontage.**

Coinciding with the end of Phase II of the Battle of CAMBRAI , the Canadian Corps Frontage was shortened on the left. The Inter-Divisional Boundary was changed at the same time. These changes were effected during the Inter-Divisional Reliefs which took place at the end of the Phase. On the extreme left , the 1st Black Watch , of the First Brigade , 1st Division (British) took over the River Frontage to the N. from the 44th C.I.Bn. The adjustment of the Inter-Divisional Boundary was made on September 4th , when the 27th C.I.Bn. on the left of the Second Cdn. Division Front , on relieving the left Battalion on the First Cdn. Division Front , took over also from 1 Company of the 102nd C.I.Bn. on the extreme right of the Fourth Cdn. Division. On completion of this Relief the Inter-Divisional Boundary on the CANAL du NORD was a point 300 yards S. of the SAUCHY-CAUCHY CEMETERY. The Corps Southern Boundary was unchanged. The Northern Boundary was a Line running from the intersection of the HENDECOURT-DURY and ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROADS , N. of MONT DURY , S. of DURY , through RECOURT and thence (approximately) straight to the CANAL at PALLUEL.

## **CAMBRAI**

### **PHASE III : SEPTEMBER 5th to OCTOBER 1st , 1918.**

#### **Preliminary Period , September 5th to 26th , 1918.**

##### **General Situation ; Canadian Corps Policy.**

The end of the Second Phase of the Battle of CAMBRAI found the Canadian Corps established firmly on positions commanding the CANAL du NORD , Outpost Lines being from 500 to 1000 yards W. of the CANAL. The General Situation and Policy of the Corps is clearly defined in the following Letter addressed to Divisions by the B.G. , G.S. Canadian Corps and dated September 5th 1918 :-

“The present intention is that the Corps should mark time in its present position while operations are developed further South with a view to maneuvering the enemy out of his positions behind the Canal. Advantage must therefore be taken of this lull to reorganize , refit and rest the men as far as circumstances permit in order that the Corps may be ready to join the hunt as soon as operations elsewhere make the Corps fluid again.

“Our present Front is very strong defensively. On the North and East the enemy , by flooding the SENSEE marshes and destroying the bridges over the CANAL du NORD , had rendered it impossible for him to take any offensive action so long as we guard the possible crossings.

“Our extreme Right Flank is at present the only possible point at which the enemy can undertake offensive action.

“In view of the above , the Corps Commander wishes the Line to be held with the minimum number of men. The principals of outposts should be supplied in their entirety , i.e. a line of observation posts on the high ground by day with standing patrols pushed forward at night to watch crossings and reconnoitering patrols .

“Close watch over , and touch with , the enemy must be maintained so that any further retirements may be detected and followed up immediately.

“Movement in the forward area , which is very exposed , must be reduced to a minimum in order to save unnecessary casualties from shell fire.

“Divisions in the front line should be disposed in great depth so that the Reserve Brigades at least can carry on training in their own areas without risk of drawing shell fire.

“Every effort should be made to improve the accommodation in the forward area East of ARRAS : it will not be possible to provide tents or huts in any numbers , but much can be done to increase men’s comfort by covering in old trenches with corrugated iron and trench shelters.

“Special attention should be paid to securing protection for horses from weather and bombing : the fullest use should be made of sunken roads and old trenches for the latter purposes.

“G.O.C. , R.A. will arrange to withdraw a proportion of Artillery units in order that the men and horses may be given a certain amount of rest.

“O.C. will continue to push on work on light railways , roads and water supply , special attention to be paid to dry weather tracks for Infantry and horse transport in order to relieve the congestion on the main roads.

“He will also arrange for thorough reconnaissance of all bridge sited over the CANAL du NORD and storage of the necessary material in order that no time will be lost in opening up roads across the CANAL as soon as the advance is resumed. (X)

The Period September 5th to 26th can be discounted so far as active Operations are concerned. After the Mobile Actions of August 8th , S. of AMIENS , and of August 26th and September 2nd on this Front , it was as though conditions had suddenly reverted to the period of Trench Fighting , and yet , for the Machine Gun Units , this period represented very hard work , with very definite tasks to perform. Once again , Batteries had set up positions to occupy and set programs of night harassing Fire to carry out.



(X) Canadian Corps G. 79/2526-4 , dated September 5th , 1918.

**Dispositions , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

On the night September 3rd/4th No. 2 Company (Major Mc CORKELL) , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. relieved No. 2 Company of the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , in the Line. On relief , the Guns were distributed along the area taken over by the 6th C.I.B. during the same night from the 2nd C.I.B. , i.e. , the left Sector of the First Cdn. Divisional Front. On relief , the Batteries were disposed as follows : “H” Battery , on the right , “G” Battery in the centre and “F” Battery on the left , these Batteries being in positions 1000 yards to 1500 yards W. of the CANAL du NORD between the HOULIN de BUISSY on the right and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD on the left. “E” Battery was in support with all 8 Guns 500 yards W. of MOULIN d’en HAUT.

During the night September 4th/5th , the 6th C.I.B. relieved the 1st C.I.B. in the Right Section of the Divisional Front. At the same time in the same area , No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , relieved No 1 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , in the Line , and No 1 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , relieved No 3 Company , First Battalion C.M.G.C. , in Reserve. The Guns of No. 3 Company, Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , on completion of Relief were on the right of the Divisional Front. “K” and “L” Batteries being in forward positions around the MOULIN de BUISSY. “J” Battery in support , S. of BUISSY , and “M” Battery , in Reserve.

The Situation on the Second Cdn. Divisional Front on the morning of September 5th was as follows :-

Front Lines -	6th C.I.B. on Divisional Front. “K” and “L” Batteries , Second Bn. , C.M.G.C. on Right. “H” , “G” , “F” Batteries , Second Bn. , C.M.G.C. , on Left.
Support Area -	4th C.I.B. “J” Battery , Second Bn. , C.M.G.C. , on Right. “E” Battery , Second Bn. , C.M.G.C. , in Centre.
In Reserve -	5th C.I.B. No. 1 Company, Second Bn. , C.M.G.C. “M” Battery , Second Bn , , C.M.G.C.

**Second Canadian Division Boundaries Adjusted.**

On September 6th , the Divisional Boundaries were adjusted , the areas occupied by Brigades in Support and Reserve being clearly defined. The Second Cdn. Division was on the right of the Canadian Corps Front. On the right was the 57th Division (British) and on its left the Third Cdn. Division. Division were as follows :-

Right Boundary – Ran from a point just W. of CROISILLES , passing S. of RIENCOURT and continuing on this Line for 2000 yards past RIENCOURT , then turning E. to a point 200 yards S. of SAINS-les-MARQUION.

Left Boundary – From a point half-way between CHERISY and FONTAINE to just N. of CAGNICOURT WOOD ,Thence due N. to a point 500 yards N. of BARALLE QUARRY, thence N- E. to a point half-way between RUMAUCOURT and BARALLE , thence due E. to the CANAL du NORD.

The Western Boundary was a Line running just W. of FONTAINE-les-CROISILLES and CHERISY. The Reserve Brigade occupied this area between this Line and a Line drawn N. and S. between CAGNICOURT and VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. The Troops on Support occupied the area of the latter Line and W. of a Line drawn N. from CAGNICOURT. E. of this was the Forward Area.

Following this adjustment of Boundaries , the Guns of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. were redistributed. No. 2 Company took up positions in the Forward Area in Support of the 6th C.I.B. , its Guns being distributed in Depth along the whole Divisional Front. No. 3 Company moved back to the Support Area occupied by the 4th C.I.B. , and No. 1 Company remained in Reserve S.-E. of CHERISY with the 3rd C.I.B.

### **Conditions in the Line ; General Arrangements , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

Practically all the country E. of HENDECOURT was under observation from BOURLON WOOD , except the area between RIENCOURT and BOIS de BOUCHE , close to the Southern Divisional Boundary. From the Ridge just E. of the BOIS de BOUCHE , the ground sloped down to the CANAL. The Railway from QUEANT to MARQUION passed through a deep Cutting up to within 500 yards of the CANAL , and was constantly Shelled. The Village of BUISSY lay in a pocket which was kept under Gas Shelling by the enemy. These circumstances made the work of digging Emplacements difficult and hazardous and intensified the need for efficient use of Camouflage.

On the other hand , the Swamps along the CANAL Bank restricted the points at which the enemy could make an attack so that these points could be covered with comparatively few Guns , enabling one Company to hold the Line whilst the others got as much rest as conditions permitted. A certain number of "Bivvies" were issued to the Support Company and a few old Dugouts were available. Other shelters were constructed out of remains of old German Huts found in TRIGGER COPSE.

While the Infantry were digging Trenches , the Machine Gunners constructed positions sited under the personal supervision of Lieut.-Col. WEIR , M.C. Commanding the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. These positions generally consisted of carefully camouflaged Pits , with a shelter covered by a rubber sheet close by.

A complete System of Communication was established stretching from FONTAINE to CHERISY , thence to Battalion Headquarters at SUN QUARRY , 1000 yards S.-E. of CHERISY , thence to CAGNICOURT , where Report Centre was established with a Line running to the H.Q. of the Forward Company in VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT and to the 4 Battery H.Q. in MONT d'en HAUT , BARALLE , the crossroads one mile S. of BOIS de BOUCHE , and the Railway Cutting S. of BUISSY. Lines were duplicated , so that in spite of heavy Shelling in the forward area , Communications was maintained without interruption. As usual all Stations were connected with the Infantry Division , Brigade and Battalion H.Q. and the Formations were frequently able to use Machine Gun Lines when their own were down.

### **Activities of Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , September 5th to 13th.**

During this period , Indirect Harassing Fire was maintained by the Company in the Line , an average of 25,000 Rounds per night being fired. The enemy Artillery was very active. The forward area where the night-firing Guns were sited , was continually subjected to heavy H.E. and Gas Shelling and was constantly swept by enemy Machine Gun Fire. The Guns of No. 2 Company Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , in forward positions , carried out this night-firing.

The Batteries of this Company covered the whole Divisional Front. On the right , "H" Battery had 2 Guns within 200 yards of the MOULIN de BUISSY , 2 Guns 500 yards S. of these on the high ground overlooking SAINS-les- MARQUION and 1700 yards due W. of this Village , 2 Guns 700 yards W. and a little S. of the MOULIN de BUISSY , 200 yards S. of the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY , and the remaining 2 Guns 500 yards N.-W. of the MOULIN de BUISSY , midway between the MILL and BUISSY.

"F" Battery was in forward positions on the left , with 2 Guns at a point 200 yards N. of the Eastern outskirts of BARALLE and mid-way between BARALLE and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , 2 Guns were mounted 1000 yards due W. of these , 2 Guns were on the left boundary , 1500 yards W. of the CANAL , immediately opposite SAUCHY l' METREE , the remaining 2 Guns were about 200 yards N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , just E. of its junction with the RUMAUCOURT ROAD.

"G" Battery was on the southern boundary from 2500 to 3000 yards W. of "H" Battery , the Guns being disposed for defence on the right flank on the high ground between the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY and the QUEANT-BUISSY ROAD.

“E” Battery had its Guns disposed for defence in depth in the centre of the forward area. 4 Guns were in positions in the BUISSY SWITCH , 500 yards N.-W. of BUISSY and 4 Guns at a point 700 yards N. of BOIS de BOUCHE.

These Guns had excellent fields of fire. Their targets for the night-firing carried on during this period were , the Village of SAINS-les-MARQUION , MAQUION SAUCHY l’ ESTREE , SAUCHY-CAUCHY and all roads leading up to these Villages and forward to the E. Bank of the CANAL du NORD.

No. 3 Company Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. was in the Support Area , the Guns of “J” , “K” and “L” Batteries being disposed from right to left across the Divisional Support Area on a General Line about 1000 yards W. of CAGNICOURT. “M” Battery was in Brigade Reserve with Company Headquarters in TRIGGER COPSE.

No. 1 Company Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , was in Divisional Reserve 500 yards S.-E. of CHERISY.

On September 11th , the Fifty-seventh Division (British) attacked MORUVRES. The Guns of No. 2 Company , C.M.G.C. co-operated with the Artillery in support of this attack. The 28th C.I.Bn. , holding the extreme right of the Line , was to establish a Post 500 yards S. of SAINS-les-MARQUION and get into touch there with the 171st Brigade (British) on their right , in this way protecting the left flank of the Fifty-seventh Division (British). The Line on the right held by our Troops was from 500 to 1000 yards W. of the CANAL du NORD and this Post to be established was about half-way between our Line and the CANAL.

The enemy retaliated on the right and also on the Second Cdn. Division Front with very heavy Shelling for 2 hours. The task of the 28th C.I.Bn. was carried out successfully. The attempt of the Fifty-seventh Division (British) to reach the W. Bank of the CANAL was , however , not successful and the Outpost Line established by the 28th C.I.Bn. was withdrawn to the original Front Line. The area was Shelled at night very heavily with Gas. This was a nightly occurrence and many casualties were caused. Hostile Aerial activity at night was considerable and some casualties occurred from enemy Bombs.

On the night September 12th/13th the 6th C.I.B. was relieved in the Line by the 4th C.I.B. The Infantry Battalions took up positions as shown on the Table below. The 172nd Infantry Brigade (British) was on the right and the 8th C.I.B. on the left.

No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , relieved No. 2 Company in forward positions on the night September 13th/14th. At the conclusion of the relief No. 3 Company occupied positions almost identical to those held by No. 2 Company (detailed above) when this Company was in the Line. No. 1 Company in Support had its Guns along the whole Divisional Front in the area between BUISSY and CAGNICOURT. No. 2 Company was now placed in Divisional Reserve.

### **Disposition and Activities of Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , September 5th to 13th.**

The Machine Gun Operations during this period closely corresponded with those of the Spring and Summer of 1917 , Indirect Firing by night being the chief Task. On the Third Cdn. Division Front this was particularly noticeable. The report of the O.C. Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , covering this period reads in full :- “On the 5th (i.e. of September) No. 2 Company relieved No. 2 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , in the Line. There were no active Operations during this Tour which lasted until the 19th when we were relieved by the 56th M.G. Battalion.”

The Third Cdn. Division took over the Line on the left of the Second Division at 6:00 P.M. September 5th. Its northern boundary ran from la CHAUSSEE , 700 yards N. of PALLUEL , in a S.-W. direction straight through RE COURT and DURY to the Crossroads on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD at l’ ESPERANCE FARM.

The 7th C.I.B. Front , on the right of the Third Cdn. Division , was held by the 49th C.I.Bn. This Battalion had an Outpost Line about 700 yards W. of the CANAL du NORD and parallel to it , and a Support Line about 1000 yards W. of the Outpost Line and just E. of OSVILLERS FARM. From 1200 to 1500 yards W. of this again , the Line of Resistance was held by the R.C.R. The 42nd C.I.Bn. was in Support in an area immediately N. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT and the P.P.C.L.I. in Reserve about 2000 yards W. of the 42nd C.I.Bn.

On the left of the Third Cdn. Division Front , the 9th C.I.B. were in the Line. The 116th C.I.Bn. occupied an Outpost Line N. of ECOURT ST. QUENTIN. The 58th C.I.Bn. was in Support N. of SAUDEMONT ,

the 52nd C.I.Bn. in Reserve , around the MOULIN DAMIERS between DURY and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , and the 43rd C.I.Bn. also in Reserve , in the area around l' ESPERANCE FARM.

No. 2 Company , Third Battalion C.M.G.C. , held the Line along the 7th C.I.B. Front. "F" Battery covered the whole of the Brigade Frontage. "H" Battery , in Support covered the Brigade Frontage from a point N. of BUISSY on the S. Boundary to a point 700 yards S. of RUMAUCOURT. "G" Battery was in Support to "H" Battery and its Guns were placed in the Line of Resistance occupied by the R.C.R. "E" Battery in Reserve was located in the vicinity of la BRIOCHE FARM , immediately E. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT and on both sides of the ARRAS-CABRAI ROAD.

No. 3 Company , on the 9th C.I.B. Frontage , had its Batteries disposed in depth along the N. Boundary from E. to W. "K" Battery was in positions N. of ECOURT ST. QUENTIN with the 116th C.I.Bn. "J" Battery was in Support of "K" Battery with the 58th C.I.Bn. The Guns of "L" Battery were disposed along the N. Boundary between DURY and RE COURT , whilst "M" Battery was astride the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD in the area occupied by the 52nd C.I.Bn. , S. of DURY.

No. 1 Company was in Divisional Reserve , in ORIENT LARE , about 1000 yards S.-E. of CHERISY. Battalion H.Q. was at a point 500 yards N. of CHERISY.

During this period these positions remained more or less fixed. The 49th C.I.Bn. holding the Front , was relieved by the 42nd C.I.Bn. on the night September 9th/10th but the Machine Gun Dispositions were unaltered.

On the 9th C.I.B. Frontage No. 3 Company , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , was relieved by No. 1 Company of the same Battalion , "B" Battery taking over the forward positions from "K" Battery and "A" Battery , the support positions from "J" Battery. "C" Battery , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , relieved "L" Battery and "D" Battery took over the positions in rear from "M" Battery.

Consequently on the night September 11th/12th when the 8th C.I.B. relieved the 7th and 9th C.I.B.s , No. 2 Company , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. covered the right Frontage and No. 1 Company the left. No. 3 Company was in Divisional Reserve 1000 yards S.-E. of CHERISY.

#### **Canadian Corps Units Holding the Line , September 14th.**

The following table shows the Infantry and Machine Gun Disposition of Divisions holding the Line on September 14th :-

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Second Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Right	Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.
4th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Div. Front	No. 3 Company ; Forward Positions
19th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	No. 1 Company ; Support Positions
18th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	No. 2 Company ; Divisional Reserve
20th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
21st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
Third Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Left	Third Battalion C.M.G.C.
8th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Div. Front	No. 2 Company ; Division Right
1st C.M.R.	Brigade Right	No. 1 Company ; Division Left
2nd C.M.R.	Brigade Left	No. 3 Company ; Divisional Reserve
5th C.M.R.	Brigade Right Support	
4th C.M.R.	Brigade Left Support	

### **Canadian Corps Activities ; September 14th to 19th.**

From September 14th to September 19th , no event of particular moment took place. The enemy continued to bombard the area very heavily. A large proportion of his Shelling was with Gas and the whole Corps area was impregnated with Mustard Gas. Frequently during a cold night he would shell the area with Gas which would not be detected until towards noon on the next day when the Gas would commence to evaporate. This made it difficult to guard against.

On September 17th , Orders were received by the G.O.C. , Second Cdn. Division to readjust the Front. 600 yards on the N. was to be handed over to the Third Cdn. Division and 2700 yards to the S. was to be taken over from the Fifty-second Division (British) which had relieved the Fifty-seventh Division. This was a preliminary to the advance on CAMBRAI ; the new Frontage coming under the command of the G.O.C. , Second Cdn. Division was the Front on which the main attack of the Canadian Corps was to be made.

On September 18th , the 5th C.M.R. took over 800 yards on their right from 2 Companies of the 21st C.I.Bn. on the left of the Second Cdn. Division Front. On the same day the 5th C.I.B. relieved the 6th C.I.B. in the Reserve Area , the latter Brigade going back to HAUTE AVESHES. The 5th C.I.B. went forward on the night September 19th/20th and relieved the 157th Brigade , Fifty-second Division (British) in the Line immediately N. of MOEUVRES. On September 19th the 10th C.I.B. moved up in support of the 5th C.I.B. , coming under Orders of the Second Cdn. Division.

### **Changes in Dispositions and Boundaries ; September 20th to 22nd.**

On the night September 19th/20th the Fifty-sixth Division (British) relieved the Third Cdn. Division in the Line. The 157th and 168th Infantry Brigades (British) took over from the 8th C.I.B. and the Fifty-sixth Battalion , M.G.C. relieved the Guns of No. 2 Company , Third Battalion C.M.G.C. , on the right and of No. 1 Company on the left.

On September 20th , the Second Cdn. Division held the Canadian Corps Frontage , disposed as follows :- the 5th C.I.B. was in the Line on the right with the 10th C.I.B. , Fourth Cdn. Division , in support ; the 4th C.I.B. was in the Line on the left with the 1st C.I.B. , First Cdn. Division in support , both the 1st and 10th C.I.B.s being under Orders of the G.O.C. , Second Canadian Division.

The Corps Southern Boundary (i.e. , Right Boundary of the 5th C.I.B.) cut the CANAL at a point from 400 to 500 yards N. of MOEUVRES and ran W. from there towards QUEANT. The Boundary between Brigades cut the CANAL at a point 700 yards S. of SAINS-les-MARQUION , about half-way between that Village and INCHY. The N. Boundary of the Second Cdn. Division cut the CANAL at its intersection with the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY (i.e. , about 1800 yards N. of MARQUION) and ran thence between VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT and CAVNICOURT. The Fifty-sixth Division (British) was occupying the former Third Cdn. Division Front with the 167th and 168th Inf. Brigades in the Line.

On the night September 18th/19th No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , was relieved in the Line by No. 1 Company. No. 2 Company took up the positions vacated in the Support Area by No. 2 Company and No. 3 Company went into Divisional Reserve.

The following night , No. 3 Company took over from No. 2 Company the positions in Support of the 4th C.I.B. and on completion of this relief , No. 2 Company moved to the right and relieved the Guns of the Fifty-second Battalion , M.G.C. which were holding the Front taken over by the 5th C.I.B.

### **Canadian Corps Units Holding the Line , September 22nd.**

The Table below gives Disposition of Infantry and Machine Gun Units on September 22nd :-

<b>Infantry Units.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Second Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Front.	Second Battalion , C.M.G.C.
5th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Right	No. 2 Company
25th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"E" Battery
26th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"G" Battery
24th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"F" Battery
22nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	"H" Battery (at Company H.Q.)
4th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Left	Nos. 1 and 3 Companies
20th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"C" Battery
21st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"A" Battery
19th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"D" Battery (on Right)
18th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	"B" Battery (Support on Left)
		"L" Battery (Reserve on Right)
		"M" Battery (Reserve on Left)
		"J" and "K" Batteries , Reserve at 3 Company H.Q.
10th C.I.B. (X)	Second Cdn. Div. Right Support (att'd. from Fourth Cdn. Div.)	
1st C.I.B. (Y)	Second Cdn. Div. Left Support (att'd. from First Cdn. Div.)	
	(X) Machine Guns came into Line night 25th/26th. (Y) Machine Guns came into Line night 26th/27th.	

#### **Preparations for Attack , September 23rd to 25th.**

In the Assault that was to be launched in a very few days , the 10th and 1st C.I.B.s were to be the leading Brigades. From their positions in Support to the 5th and 4th C.I.B.s respectively , they were now able to arrange with these Brigades any preliminary work they wished carried out. The G.O.C. , 1st C.I.B. considered the Position on the 4th C.I.B. Front quite satisfactory and requested that the Troops in the Line should remain as quiet as possible.

The G.O.C. , 10th C.I.B. wished the enemy driven back slightly on the 5th C.I.B. front so as to give the 10th C.I.B. a good Line on which to form up and in order that his assembly for the attack might not be greatly interfered with. Accordingly , the 5th C.I.B. started a series of small Patrol Operations and Minor Attacks. This work was well organized and cleverly executed. A comparatively large number of the enemy were killed and wounded while our losses were slight. The 5th C.I.Bn. was fighting continuously for five days and nights in these Minor Operations.

The Machine Gun Batteries prepared for the coming attack. Large Dumps of Ammunition were established. One of 500,000 Rounds was established at a point 100 yards N. of the crossing of the BARALLE-INCHY ROAD and the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY ; another 500,000 Rounds , in INCHY and a third , of 300,000 Rounds on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , 1500 yards N. of the CANAL du NORD. All available Limbers were used in this work. At the same time all Batteries in forward positions were engaged in harassing the enemy and night firing was carried out systematically.

The minor operations of the 5th C.I.B. were carried out chiefly by the 25th C.I.Bn. and "E" Battery , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. was frequently called upon to support the attacks made by this Battalion. On the night September 23rd/24th Lieut. HOWARD took 2 Guns forward near ROLAND'S POST , 800 yards S.-E. of INCHY supporting one of these attacks. The Infantry reported that the Indirect Fire supplied by these Guns was very effective.

The following day , September 24th , movement was observed on the Bridge on the MARQUION-INCHY ROAD E. of INCHY and 2 Guns of No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , opened on this target

at 4:30 P.M. At the same time , the 25th C.I.Bn. made another daylight attack supported by the Guns of "E" Battery. One of the targets engaged by this Battery was the WOOD just S.-E. of INCHY and when the Infantry advanced to this place they found over 50 dead Germans who had been killed , chiefly by Machine Gun Bullets. "E" Battery was firing from ROLAND'S POST at point-blank range : one of the Guns was knocked out after 5 minutes rapid fire.

Barrage Practices were carried out daily by Batteries who were to be engaged in Overhead Fire in support of Major Operations. Harassing fire was increased. The Artillery had cut Gaps in the Wire and the Machine Guns had kept these Gaps open with their Fire , preventing enemy Working Parties from repairing them. A great deal of movement was also seen on the Bridge described above and this was covered night and day by Machine Guns. During the 3 days , September 23rd to 25th , 250,000 Rounds of S.A.A. were expended on Harassing Fire.

On the night September 25th/26th , the Second Cdn. Division was relieved in the Line by the Divisions who were to carry out the Major Operations. On the Infantry being relieved , the Second Battalion Machine Gunners remained in the Line and carried out Indirect Fire with a view to keep the Gunners of the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , as fresh as possible and to keep from the enemy the fact that a Relief was taking place. 2 Batteries of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. remained in the Line and took part in the initial Machine Gun Barrage for the Operation on September 27th.

### **Capture of CANAL du NORD LINE and BOURLON WOOD , September 27th , 1918.**

#### **Second Canadian Division Takes Over Line , September 26th.**

The Reliefs referred to above were completed during September 26th , the Second Cdn. Division being relieved in the Line by the Fourth and First Cdn. Divisions. The Line has already been described and had not materially changed during the fighting from September 5th to 26th. But although the Line remained fixed , our Troops were not inactive. Patrols had been busy all the time and skirmishes were frequent with hostile Patrols , more particularly on the extreme right where the 25th C.I.Bn. was endeavoring constantly to improve its position and to provide a satisfactory Jumping-off Line for the 10th C.I.B. attack.

On the extreme right the 5th C.I.B. was relieved by the 10th C.I.B. , the 25th C.I.Bn. on Brigade Right , being relieved by elements of the 44th , 46th and 47th C.I.Bns. and the 24th C.I.Bn. in Support , by the 50th C.I.Bn. The remainder of the 5th C.I.B. was relieved by the 1st C.I.B. , the 26th C.I.Bn. in the Front Line being relieved by the 4th C.I.Bn.

On the left the 4th C.I.B. was relieved by partly by the 3rd C.I.B. and partly by Regiments of the Fifty-sixth Division (British). The 20th C.I.Bn. (less 1 Company) was relieved in the Line by the 16th C.I.Bn. the remaining Company being relieved by a British Regiment. The 18th C.I.Bn. , in the BUISSY SWITCH , was relieved by the 14th , 13th and 15th C.I.Bns. from right to left. On completion of these Reliefs the 4th and 5th C.I.B.s went into Corps Reserve.

#### **General Plans of Operations : Corps Boundaries and Objectives.**

In the Operations about to follow , the Canadian Corps was to advance in such a way as to protect the left flank of the Third Army. These Operations were to take place in 2 Phases. The First Phase comprised the seizing of BOURLON WOOD and the high ground about PILGRIMS REST and la MAISON NEUVE with the left flank thrown back across the Plateau via SAUCHICOURT FARM to the CANAL du NORD. The Second Phase comprised the seizing of the Bridges over the CANAL de l' ESCAUT , N.-E. of CAMBRAI , and establishing the necessary Bridgeheads and at the same time capturing the high ground over looking the SENSEE VALLY between the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and the CANAL du NORD.

The right of the Canadian Corps Frontage was a Line crossing the CANAL du NORD , 300 yards N. of MOEUVRES then in a S.-E. direction to the BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD at ANUEUX CHAPEL (500 yards N. of ANUEUX) – thence along the BAPAUME ROAD to CAMBRAI but not including FONTAINE-notre-DAME. The left or N. Corps Boundary for the First Phase coincided with the

YELLOW LINE. For the Second Phase it side-slipped to the right , the general Line being from SAIN-les-MARQUION to the S.-E. corner of EPINOY.

The Corps Objectives for the Operation were as follows ;-

**RED LINE** – From the CANAL du NORD N. of SAIN-les-MARQUION southwards along the MARQUION LINE to the southern boundary ; - cutting that at a point 1500 yards S.-W. of BOURLON.

**GREEN LINE** – From the CANAL du NORD , 500 yards W. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , parallel to the ROAD for nearly 2000 yards , then southwards almost parallel to the RED LINE about 1000 yards E. of it , Bulging out a little to include BOURLON VILLAGE then curving in again on W. outskirts of BOURLON WOOD (i.e. the GREEN LINE included BOURLON VILLAGE but not BOURLON WOOD).

**BLUE LINE** – A Line drawn from FONTAINE-notre-DAME to SAUCHY l' ESTREE will coincide with the BLUE LINE except that from a point 1000 yards W. of SAUCHY l' ESTREE the BLUE LINE swept around westwards to the CANAL du NORD.

**YELLOW LINE** – 2 Lines drawn , one from FONTAINE-notre-DAME to HAYNECOURT , the second from HAYNECOURT to SAUCHY l' ESTREE will give the approximate YELLOW LINE. The actual Line is a wide curve drawn with these Lines as tangents , and curving about 500 yards W. of HAYNECOURT.

#### **Tasks of Divisions.**

At Zero the Corps Front was held by the Fourth Cdn. Division on the right , the First Cdn. Division in the centre and the Eleventh Division (British) on the left. The Third Cdn. Division was in the rear of the First and Fourth Cdn. Divisions , and the Second Canadian Division was in Reserve , in the rear of the Third Division.

In the First Phase , the Fourth Cdn. Division on the right and the First Cdn. Division on the left were responsible for capturing the BLUE LINE and for establishing Patrols on the YELLOW LINE , which include the bulk of the enemy Battery positions.

The Third Cdn. Division and the Eleventh Division (British) would advance in the First Phase in rear of the Fourth and First Cdn. Divisions respectively. This supporting advance had to be very carefully regulated in order to avoid congestion of the Troops should the attacking Divisions receive a check. In this way , definite boundaries were allotted and , until the various Objectives were taken , these supporting Divisions were to remain W. of given Lines. For this reason , the Third Cdn. Division was not to cross the CANAL Bank until the GREEN LINE had been captured.

In the Second Phase the Third Cdn. Division were to attack on the right , the Fourth Cdn. Division in the right centre , the First Cdn. Division in the left centre and the Eleventh Division (British) on the left. The Second Cdn. Division was in Corps Reserve.

The Operation presented many difficulties , notwithstanding that the enemy was not holding the Front in any great strength. The advance was to be made to the greatest possible depth , yet care was to be taken to form a defensive flank to the N. for protection against enemy Troops holding the refused flank.

The first serious obstacle was the CANAL du NORD and great difficulty was contemplated in forcing a crossing. On the Fourth Divisional Front 3 crossings appeared in evidence as used by the enemy , but did not appear fit for traffic , Craters having been blown by the enemy. On the First Divisional Front a great part of the CANAL contained water , in places 4 feet deep. Consequently , on the Canadian Corps Front the CANAL could only be crossed on a Frontage of approximately 2600 yards whereas the Frontage of the Third Objective (BLUE LINE) was approximately 10,000 yards. The passage of the whole First Cdn. Division through a narrow "defile" was the chief anxiety to the Divisional Commander , as it was realized that a heavy enemy concentration of Artillery and Gas in the congested forward Assembly Area , prior to Zero , would seriously affect the whole Operation.

Moreover the ground sloped on both sides of the CANAL du NORD , more steeply on the W. slopes. Consequently the preparations and assembly were under constant observation from the enemy. Numerous



ditches on both sides of the CANAL , strong Nests of Machine Gunners on the E. bank of the CANAL and the Belts of Wire immediately E. of it , all made the initial Operation one of great difficulty.

### **Canadian Corps Order of Battle and Machine Gun Tasks ; September 27th.**

The following Table shows the Infantry Order of Battle , from right to left of the Canadian Corps Front , and Tasks of the Machine Gun Units in the Operations of September 27th :-

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Fourth Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Right.	Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C.
10th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Div. Front to RED LINE	No. 1 Company
47th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	Barrage to GREEN LINE :
50th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	then in Defensive Positions
44th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	on RED LINE
46th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	No. 2 Company
11th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Div. Right from RED LINE	“E” , “F” and “G” Batteries
102 C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	supported 11th C.I.B. ;
87th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	“H” Battery Barrage to
75th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	GREEN LINE.
54th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	No. 3 Company
12th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Div. Left from RED LINE	“J” , “K” and “M” Batteries
85th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	supported 12th C.I.B.
38th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	“L” Battery ; Barrage to
78th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	GREEN LINE
72nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	
First Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Left.	First Battalion , C.M.G.C.
1st C.I.B.	First Cdn. Div. Right to BLUE LINE	No. 1 Company (less “B” Bty.)
4th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	supported 1st C.I.B.
1st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	No. 2 Company (less “H” Bty.)
2nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve Right	supported 2nd C.I.B.
3rd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve Left	No. 3 Company (less “K” Bty.)
3rd C.I.B.	First Cdn. Div. Left to BLUE LINE	“L” and “M” Batteries
14th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front to RED LINE	Barrage to GREEN LINE
13th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front from RED LINE	“J” Battery ; Brigade Reserve.
15th C.I.Bn.	to leapfrog 13th C.I.Bn.	“B” , “H” and “K” Batteries
16th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	Divisional Reserve.
2nd C.I.B.	First Cdn. Div. Support	
Third Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Right Support	Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. (X)
11th Division (British)	Canadian Corps Left Support	

(X) No. 1 Company , Third Bn. , C.M.G.C. fired Barrage for Fourth Cdn. Division to the GREEN LINE.

### **Tasks and Assembly : Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

Machine Gun Tasks on the Fourth Cdn. Division Front were allotted as follows :-

No. 1 Company , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , was attached to the Fourth Cdn. Division for the purpose of firing a Rolling Barrage in support of the advance of the 10th C.I.B.

No. 2 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , less "H" Battery , and No. 3 Company less "L" Battery , were detailed to advance with the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s respectively , with the purpose of overcoming enemy strong points when necessary by Direct Fire and of assisting the Infantry to consolidate the ground won.

No. 1 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , plus "H" and "L" batteries were to advance with the 10th C.I.B. to the GREEN LINE at which point they were to come into action and engage any targets of opportunity offered by the enemy and to supply Direct Overhead Covering Fire for the advance of the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s on BOURLON WOOD and VILLAGE. These 6 Batteries , in order to centralize control were divided into 2 Groups. "A" Group consisted of "A" , "B" and "H" Batteries under Captain K. WEAVER. "B" Group consisting of "C" , "D" and "L" Batteries under Captain A. G. SCOTT , M.C. On completion of this Task "H" and "L" Batteries were to join their respective Companies , coming into Reserve to the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s.

Nos. 2 and 3 Companies (less "H" and "L" Batteries) had joined their respective Brigades (11th and 12th C.I.B.s) on September 19th in order to train with the Battalions which they were affiliated. These Companies moved to the Assembly Area with their respective Brigades. No. 1 Company plus "H" and "L" Batteries assembled behind the 10th C.I.B. on the night September 25th/26th.

No. 1 Company , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , moved into Barrage Positions on night September 26th/27th. "A" Echelon Transport for each Battery was under the direct control of the Battery Commander concerned throughout the Operation.

A sufficient number of expendable Belts had been received to permit of 150,000 Rounds S.A.A. to be loaded before Zero Day. This was held at Rear Battalion Headquarters for the purpose of forming advanced Dumps as soon as the situation would permit.

Reinforcements and Rations were collected by the Battery Transport ("A" Echelon) and taken forward daily.

### **Action of Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , RED LINE.**

The 10th C.I.B. attacked on the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Frontage and captured the RED LINE. This involved the taking of the CANAL du NORD , the CANAL du NORD LINE and the MARQUION LINE. On the RED LINE , the 11th C.I.B. on the right and the 12th C.I.B. on the left leapfrogged the 10th C.I.B. to capture the GREEN and BLUE LINES.

The attack was launched at 5:20 A.M. , supported by a very thick Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage. There was no previous Bombardment , but considerable Wire-cutting was carried out prior to the assault. A percentage of our Artillery Barrage was composed of Smoke and screened the advance from the high ground which dominated the front and left flank.

During the night rain had fallen and the ground was very slippery . Although fine , the morning was dark and it was difficult to see the progress of the Troops.

The 10th C.I.B. attacked on a 2-Battalion Front , the 47th C.I.Bn. being on the right and the 50th C.I.Bn. on the left. The 44th C.I.Bn. supported the 47th and the 46 C.I.Bn. supported the 50th. The Barrage was effective and the leading Troops advanced across the CANAL with few or no casualties. On approaching the CANAL du NORD LINE considerable Machine Gun Fire was encountered and a party of the enemy , about 50 strong , made a stand , causing considerable casualties. This Line however , was captured and the Troops were able to keep up with the Barrage. The MARQUION LINE , through the Wire of which gaps had been cut by the Artillery , was captured and at 7:15 A.M. our Troops were reported digging in on the RED LINE.

No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON) , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , (plus "H" and "L" Batteries) moved forward in rear of the 10th C.I.B. , carrying Guns and Ammunition. 6-Men Crews were used. 4000 Rounds S.A.A. per Gun were carried.

On crossing the CANAL , Batteries were rested and reorganized. Small Battery-Dumps of Ammunition were formed in order to lighten the loads , Men being sent back afterwards from the RED LINE to bring this forward.

During the advance to the RED LINE , the Fifty-second Division (British) on our right experienced trouble with enemy Machine Gun Nests. "H" Battery (Lieut. RYLEY) came into action and did most efficient work expending 7,500 Rounds on these targets. This Battery when on the RED LINE , secured several good targets of enemy Artillery and Infantry in the ANNEUX VALLEY. It then moved forward and sited Guns to prevent the enemy concentrating in the Sunken Roads and in the Valley in the vicinity of ANNEUX. These positions were retained during the night.

The remaining Batteries came into action in the RED LINE , arriving at their positions with the leading Infantry. These Batteries secured good targets as far E. as BOURLON VILLAGE and WOOD.

Direct Covering Fire was employed with good results during the advance of the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s. On conclusion of this Task , "H" and "L" Batteries reported to their respective Companies and No. 1 Company occupied defensive positions on the RED LINE which they maintained during the night September 27th/28th.

### **Action of Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , GREEN and BLUE LINES**

The 11th and 12th C.I.B.s leapfrogged the 10th C.I.B. on the RED LINE according to schedule.

The 11th C.I.B. attacked with the 102nd C.I.Bn. on the right and the 87th C.I.Bn. on the left. The 54th C.I.Bn. was to skirt the WOOD to the N. passing through the 87th C.I.Bn. The 102nd C.I.Bn. was to keep pace with the attack of the British Battalions , protecting their left , and endeavor to work through the S. portion of the WOOD and join hands with the 54th C.I.Bn. on the BLUE LINE , E. of the WOOD. The 75th C.I.Bn. in Brigade Reserve , was placed behind the 102nd C.I.Bn. on the right.

Owing to the fact that the Sixty-third (R.N.) Division was encountering difficulty S. of the WOOD , the advance of the 102nd C.I.Bn. was temporarily checked. The 54th and 87th C.I.Bns. however were able to advance along the N. edge of the WOOD and the S. edge of BOURLON VILLAGE. The 54th C.I.Bn. met considerable opposition and suffered many casualties in taking the enemy positions.

At 10:45 A.M. the GREEN LINE was captured.

Troops on the right had not come up so that further advance by the 11th C.I.B. was difficult. At 6:50 P.M. enemy Troops were massing in front of the 11th C.I.B. A counter-attack was impending but it was crushed before it could develop. Three enemy Battalions were involved in this counter-attack with severe losses to themselves. The 54th C.I.Bn. then pushed on towards FONTAINE-notre-DAME and occupied Trenches W. of the VILLAGE. This attack was followed shortly afterwards by the advance of the 87th C.I.Bn. to a Sunken Road situated half-way between FONTAINE-notre-DAME and RAILLENCOURT , on a line drawn through these 2 Villages , about 1000 yards ahead of the YELLOW LINE. Owing to darkness Operations were then suspended for the day.

No. 2 Company (Major L. M. PEARCE , M.C.) , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. followed the 11th C.I.B. , jumping off at ZERO plus 2 hours. These Batteries employed Limbers as far forward as the RED LINE. "G" Battery under Capt. S. JOHNSON , worked around the N. side of BOURLON WOOD using Pack Animals for half the distance. From here the Battery worked forward and came into contact with the enemy at the end of a Sunken Road on the E. outskirts of the WOOD. The Guns were brought into action here. Numerous Parties of the enemy retiring over the open were engaged. This Battery also assisted by Flanking and Overhead Fire , the attack of the 75th C.I.Bn. on Trenches E. of FONTAINE-notre-DAME.

"F" Battery (Capt. HOPPER , M.C.) found that the 102nd C.I.Bn. had difficulty working around the S. side of BOURLON WOOD. The Guns of this Battery were brought into action on the Western outskirts of the WOOD. They were moved during dusk into defensive positions along the Southern end of the WOOD , touch being maintained with "G" Battery.

"E" Battery came into action behind "F" W. of BOURLON WOOD , and took up positions there in defence of the S. flank. On the left the 12th C.I.B. attacked with the 85th C.I.Bn. on the right , the 38th on the left , with the 78th and 72nd C.I.Bns. in the right and left Support.

The intention was that the Battalions in Support would leapfrog the leading Battalions on the GREEN LINE. Their advance met with considerable opposition. The left flank had to be refused along the Railway Running N. from BOURLON VILLAGE owing to the fact that the enemy held a strong position immediately E. of the Railway. Later on however the Brigade captured the BLUE Objective along the entire Divisional Front and the Troops exploited their success towards the YELLOW LINE.

During the evening, Orders were received from CORPS that the attack would be continued the next day by the Third Cdn. Division on the right and the 10th C.I.B. on the left. In order to provide suitable jumping-off positions, the Troops ahead of it were withdrawn to the BLUE LINE.

No. 3 Company (Capt. LOGAN), Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C., moved forward with the 12th C.I.B., several targets presenting themselves during the advance.

2 Guns of "J" Battery (Capt. HENDERSON), from positions just N.-E. of BOURLON WOOD successfully engaged an enemy Field Gun Battery firing over open sights from a point 1000 yards W. of RAILLENCOURT.

No. 3 Company occupied positions for defence in depth during the night September 27th/28th.

### **Tasks and Assembly of First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

Owing to the narrow Front available for the 1st C.I.B. to cross the CANAL du NORD, it was decided to attack to the RED LINE with the Battalions whose Task was to effect a crossing of the CANAL. This Task was assigned to the 4th C.I.B. The 1st C.I.Bn. in Brigade Support leapfrogged the leading Battalion on the RED LINE and advanced to the GREEN LINE. At this point the Brigade Frontage was considerably wider and so the 2 Battalions passed through the 1st C.I.Bn. on the GREEN LINE, the 2nd C.I.Bn. on the right and the 3rd C.I.Bn. on the left.

Just before Zero Hour the 1st C.I.B. was disposed as follows :- The 4th C.I.Bn. in the E. limits of INCHY-en-ARTOIS; The 1st C.I.Bn. in support in the lower end of the BUISSY SWITCH; The 2nd C.I.Bn. behind the 1st and the 3rd immediately behind the 2nd C.I.Bn.

The 3 Companies of the First Battalion C.M.G.C. had moved forward with their respective Brigade Groups to the HENDECOURT area on September 25th. During the night September 26th/27th, they moved by road into their Barrage positions and Assembly Area.

3 Batteries (1 from each Company) were retained in Divisional Reserve S.-E. of CAGINCOURT.

Battalion H.Q. moved with Divisional Headquarters.

Arrangements for the Machine Gun Barrage were made and coordinated by the Corps Machine Gun Officer. Nos. 1 and 2 Companies (each less 1 Battery) were not firing in the Barrage but were attached to the 1st and 2nd C.I.B.s, respectively, to support them closely throughout. No. 3 Company (less 1 Battery) was to fire in the Machine Gun Barrage and after completion of this Task, come under the Orders of the G.O.C., 3rd C.I.B. to assist as required.

### **Action of No. 1 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

At Zero Hour September 27th (5:20 A.M.), it was still dark. It had been raining all night and, although the morning was fine, the ground was wet and slippery and the going very hard. The Troops were thoroughly wet and cold. Hot food and rum was issued just before Zero. The Barrage opened sharp on time and the leading Troops moved forward. The enemy's Barrage fell behind the Assembly Area of the 4th C.I.Bn. and did not cause them any casualties.

The leading Company of the 4th C.I.Bn. attacked the CANAL in 4 places with one Platoon in support, each Party working right and left and mopping up the Garrison. The Company carried the attack to a point 100 yards E. of the CANAL where the 2 succeeding Companies leapfrogged the leading Company and with the Fourth Company in support, advanced to the RED LINE which was captured on time.

The First C.I.Bn. leapfrogged the 4th C.I.Bn. according to plan on the RED LINE. This Battalion pressed forward the attack vigorously, closely following the Barrage. The GREEN LINE was reached and captured on time, except on the right where the attack was held up by heavy fire from the Railway.

The 2nd and 3rd C.I.Bns. leapfrogged the 1st C.I.Bn. on its Objective on time. Their attack however , was held up soon after the jump-off by stiff resistance from the Railway about 2000 yards N. of BOURLON VILLAGE. To deal with this situation the G.O.C. , 1st C.I.B. asked that the Fourth Cdn. Division which could make progress where this Railway bent Eastward on their Front , should direct enfilade Fire on the resisting enemy. In the meantime however the 2 attacking Battalions of the First Division , with great drive and determination , had driven the enemy from the Railway at about noon and pushing forward , captured the BLUE LINE on their respective Fronts. Patrols were pushed out and the Line secured was consolidated. The 2nd and 3rd C.I.Bns. held the Front Line on the right and left respectively. On the right the Fourth Cdn. Division had not been able to take over the Front between the right boundary for the First Phase and the new Right Boundary for the Second Phase. Hence the 2nd C.I.Bn. had to remain in the Line on that Front and was responsible for its Defence until the following morning. On the left , the 2nd C.I.B. had leapfrogged the 3rd C.I.Bn. on the BLUE LINE according to program , and was relieved of the necessity of Front Line Vigilance.

All Batteries of No. 1 Company (Major E. R. MORRIS) First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , were in positions of assembly several hours before Zero. "A" Battery organized a covering Barrage in support of the 4th C.I.Bn. At the completion of this task , this Battery was to assist the 3rd C.I.Bn. to the BLUE LINE. "C" Battery was to assist the 4th C.I.Bn. to the RED LINE , the 1st C.I.Bn. to the GREEN LINE and finally to help consolidate the BLUE LINE in support to the 2nd C.I.Bn. "D" Battery was to move forward to the high ground about 1000 yards W. of BOURLON VILLAGE in support of the 1st C.I.Bn. and to employ Overhead Fire , after which this Battery was to assist in the consolidation of the BLUE LINE. "B" Battery was in Divisional Reserve.

At Zero Hour each Gun of "A" Battery (Lieut. DUDLY) fired approximately 1500 rounds in Direct Overhead Supporting Fire which was mainly put down on the CANAL du NORD LINE , E. of INCHY and was lifted to the Defence Line , which consisted of a series of connected Shell Holes. This Barrage lasted half an hour.

The enemy Barrage fell close to the Gun positions but the Battery suffered no casualties. At Zero plus 70 , "A" Battery moved off behind the 3rd C.I.Bn. and crossed the CANAL du NORD E. of the Village of INCHY in Artillery Formation , making their way rapidly forward with no trouble until they were about 1000 yards E. of SAIN-les-MARQUION. At this point the Battery came under heavy Machine Gun Fire. The 3rd C.I.Bn. being held up , 6 Guns of the Battery got into action and excellent targets were obtained along the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , where large Parties of the enemy were seen. Fire was carried out for approximately one hour when the enemy were seen to retire and the advance was continued.

This Battery followed the 3rd C.I.Bn. and took up positions from which they could assist in the consolidation of the BLUE LINE. During the "Hold Up" the Battery expended a large amount of S.A.A. , but at this juncture the Pack Mules arrived with further supply.

At Zero plus 7 minutes , "C" Battery (Capt. DEWART) moved forward with the 4th C.I.Bn. and crossed the CANAL du NORD with little opposition , entirely escaping the enemy Barrage. The Battery proceeded towards DELIGNY MILL and were met at this point by heavy Artillery and Machine Gun Fire. About 1000 yards W. of BOURLON VILLAGE 4 Guns of this Battery came into action firing on good targets , consisting of bodies of enemy Infantry in the direction of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. All Guns of the Battery came into action a little further forward and engaged Parties of the enemy Infantry and Machine Guns S. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. During this action Captain DEWART and Lieut. BRYNE were wounded. The Infantry was held up for a time at this point where the Railroad crosses the Sunken Road N. of BOURLON VILLAGE. As soon as the advance continued "C" Battery took up positions , assisting the Infantry to consolidate the BLUE LINE.

At Zero plus 15 minutes , "D" Battery (Capt. JORDAN) moved forward with the 4th C.I.Bn. , crossed the CANAL du NORD at several points and reassembled S.-E. of SAINS les-MARQUION. At this point Lieut. WHITHLAW went forward to reconnoitre and found the Infantry checked at the MAQUION LINE , in front of BOURLON VILLAGE.

No.1 Section of "D" Battery came into action from positions in Shell-holes W. of this LINE and engaged the enemy Infantry and Machine Gun Posts in the Trenches ahead. When No. 2 Section arrived at this point it was noticed that a Field Gun in the vicinity of DELIGNY MILL was holding up the advance.

Cpl. BEATIE moved 2 Guns forward and engaged this target while Lieut. Mc MULLEN and Sgt. COOMBE worked around the flank , rushed the Gun and captured it together with its Crew , which consisted of 10 Other Ranks.

No. 2 Section then moved forward to some deserted Gun Pits in the MARQUION LINE in front of BOURLON VILLAGE. From these positions about 3000 Rounds S.A.A. were fired at enemy Infantry and Machine Guns directly N. of the Village , thus covering the advance of the 1st C.I.Bn.

At this point No. 1 Section salvaged 2 enemy Machine Guns and fired some 3500 Rounds from them together with about 3000 Rounds from our own Guns. This fire was laid on targets in BOURLON VILLAGE on our right flank. Just forward of the MARQUION LINE an enemy Machine Gun strongly entrenched , was causing considerable trouble. Pte. HOLLOWAY went forward with a Tank , and bayoneted the Gunner , shot 2 of the Crew and took 6 prisoners.

No. 2 Section moved forward to some Gun Pits E. of the MARQUION LINE and some 2000 Rounds were expended along the Railway N. of these positions. After the resistance on the Railway had been overcome the Battery moved forward and took up their positions to assist in the consolidation of the GREEN LINE.

### **3rd C.I.B. Attack.**

On the 3rd C.I.B. Front the initial attack was to be made with one Battalion , owing to the narrow Front available. This task was assigned to the 14th C.I.Bn. who were also to capture and mop up the CANAL du NORD LINE , the RED LINE and to attack the Village of SAINS-les-MARQUION from the E. The 13th C.I.Bn. in support was to push forward and capture the GREEN LINE on the Brigade Front ; then to attack the CANAL du NORD LINE in enfilade and mop up as far N. as the GREEN LINE ; then turn W. and clean up KEITH WOOD and the WOODS E. of the CANAL and to capture the Village of MARQUION. The 15th C.I.Bn. was to leapfrog the 13th C.I.Bn. on the GREEN LINE and attacking N. to capture the BLUE LINE. The 16th C.I.Bn. was in Brigade Reserve.

Prior to Zero Hour September 27th , Units were in their Assembly Area , the 14th C.I.Bn. in PAVILAND WOOD and vicinity , the 13th C.I.Bn. back of the 14th in and in front of the BUISSY SWITCH , the 15th C.I.Bn. in the BUISSY SWITCH , N. of the 13th C.I.Bn. and the 16th C.I.Bn. N. of the 14th C.I.Bn. Assembly Area. The 14th C.I.Bn. attacked the CANAL du NORD with 2 Companies. The capture of the CANAL was in itself an extraordinary achievement. Ditches had to be forded and the W. Bank of the CANAL was cut square and stoutly defended by enemy Machine Guns. In spite of these difficulties , the CANAL was captured and the attacking Battalion moved Eastwards close behind the Barrage. The thick Belts of Wire were found to have been well cut by the Artillery and the RED LINE was captured on time. The Lock just E. of the CANAL caused considerable trouble , as enemy Machine Gunners were in strong positions which could not be attacked as the Barrage was still playing on the Lock. The Guns in these positions were finally silenced , 2 of the Crew being killed by Artillery Fire and the remainder by Snipers.

At 7:20 A.M. the internal Barrage , previously organized opened and the Reserve Company of the 14th C.I.Bn. followed it and attacked SAIN-les-MARQUION from the S.-E. This village was cleared of the enemy at 9:15 A.M. The 14th C.I.Bn. suffered many casualties , including the Commanding Officer , Major PRICE.

The 13th C.I.Bn. following closely behind the 14th C.I.Bn. waded the ditches W. of the CANAL and crossed the latter close to the Brigade Southern Boundary. The leading Company leapfrogged the 14th C.I.Bn. on the right and , attacking due E. kept pace with the Troops of the 1st C.I.B. on the right , capturing the GREEN LINE on time , after hard fighting.

The Companies following , turning N. met heavy opposition. The Wire was heavy and 2 Tanks that had been detailed to cut the Wire had not been able to come up. The WOODS on the E. Bank of the CANAL had not been cleared of the enemy between MARQUION and SAINS-les-MARQUION. The CANAL was impassable opposite these WOODS and this fact enabled the enemy in these positions to direct Machine Gun Fire on the 15th C.I.Bn. and the Eleventh Division (British) which was to cross the CANAL N. of SAINS-les-MARQUION.

Owing to this delay the enemy defence had stiffened considerably after the first onslaught. However the 15th C.I.Bn. and the 13th C.I.Bn. organized a joint attack and , with the assistance of 1 Company of the

MANCHESTERS (Eleventh Division) , cleared the balance of MARQUION and captured the GREEN LINE N. and E. of it. After this , the enemy resistance weakened considerably.

The 15th C.I.Bn. then leapfrogged the 13th C.I.Bn. on the GREEN LINE and pushing on, captured the BLUE LINE on the whole Brigade Front at 2:00 P.M.

Troops of the Eleventh Division (British) passed through the 15th C.I.Bn. on the BLUE LINE at 2:30 P.M. and advanced successfully. On this being evident , the 3rd C.I.B. was assembled in Bivouacs near SAINS-les-MARQUION ready to occupy and hold the Railway , in case of Counter-attack.

During the initial Phase the First Cdn. Divisional Artillery was employed on a special Barrage. At Zero the Barrage rolled forward to the Wire of the CANAL du NORD where it rested. At Zero plus 128 minutes the Barrage rolled back , the 14th C.I.Bn. followed it Westward as it unrolled. This is probably the first occasion on which an attack was carried out with the Barrage rolling back towards the Guns , and it was a great success.

### **No. 3 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The Guns of No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM , M.C.) First Battalion C.M.G.C. , did not come under Orders of the 3rd C.I.B. until the afternoon of September 27th. From Zero Hour “L” and “M” Batteries were employed on Barrage work. (X). “J” Battery was in Brigade Reserve W. of the BUISSY SWITCH. “K” Battery was in Divisional Reserve.

(X) See page 424.

### **Task of No. 2 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The task of the 2nd C.I.B. in the First Phase was to be carried out by the 7th C.I.Bn. , which would leapfrog the 13th C.I.Bn. on the GREEN LINE N. of the 1st C.I.B. and capture the BLUE LINE between the Brigade Boundaries. Strong Patrols would then be pushed out to the Line of Exploitation , the YELLOW LINE. The 5th and 10th C.I.Bns. were to cross the CANAL in their own time and assemble in the vicinity of the RED LINE , remaining there until the BLUE LINE was captured. They would not be employed in the First Phase.

Upon the capture of the BLUE LINE the 5th C.I.Bn. , followed by the 10th C.I.Bn. , would advance from the RED LINE and jump-off from the BLUE LINE through the 3rd and 7th C.I.Bns. in conjunction with the 32nd Infantry Brigade (British) on the left. The 5th C.I.Bn. would capture HAYNECOURT on the high ground immediately in front of it and the 10th C.I.Bn. would then carry the attack forward.

When the Troops of the Eleventh Division (British) passed through the 8th and 7th C.I.Bns. the 8th C.I.Bn. would pass through the 5th C.I.Bn. and come into support of the 10th C.I.Bn. The 7th C.I.Bn. would move an hour and a half after the 8th C.I.Bn. to the vicinity of HAYNECOURT in Reserve. This latter part of the Operation entailed a difficult side-slip on the part of the 2nd C.I.B.

No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM , D.C.M.) , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. was attached to the 2nd C.I.B. “E” , “F” and “G” Batteries were detailed to support the 5th , 10th and 7th C.I.Bns. respectively. They were to assist the advance by bringing Overhead Fire to bear on points of resistance and to dispose their Guns for Consolidation in Depth of all Objectives gained. “G” Battery was to watch particularly for any massing of the enemy’s Troops W. of EPINOY and would remain in position until the Eleventh Division (British) had passed through.

### **Attack of 2nd C.I.B. to BLUE LINE.**

The 7th C.I.Bn. started off 2 hours after Zero in order to reach the GREEN LINE at Zero plus 4 hours. No casualties were suffered until close to the CANAL itself. Crossing was affected near the Divisional S. Boundary and the advance was continued astride the Road S.-E. of SAINS-les-MARQUION. Enemy Shelling and Machine Gun Fire was considerable from the Village and all Companies suffered casualties.. At this time the 13th C.I.Bn. was held up in the Valley E. of KEITH WOOD and so the 7th C.I.Bn. could not get into their jump-off positions. The Barrage by this time had moved on and elements of the 13th

C.I.Bn. were doggedly trying to work their way forward . The 7th C.I.Bn. attacked , with their left in KEITH WOOD , and passing through the 13th C.I.Bn. on the GREEN LINE , took up the fight. The fighting at this time had developed into individual Rifle and Machine Gun Struggles against strong Bodies of the enemy along the CAMBRAI ROAD and in the Eastern outskirts of MARQUION. With the aid of a local Barrage , quickly organized , this resistance was beaten down and the advance continued. The ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD was crossed at noon and from here onwards the enemy resistance consisted only of isolated Machine Gun Nests and Trench Mortar Batteries N.E. of the BOIS du COORET. The BLUE LINE was captured at 2:00 P.M. and Patrols were pushed forward to the YELLOW LINE. The situation was quiet during the afternoon and at 4:00 P.M. the Eleventh Division (British) passed through the 7th C.I.Bn. attacking towards EPINOY , apparently without much opposition. The 8th C.I.Bn. followed the 7th in support throughout but was not called upon to assist. 2 Companies were ordered up to reinforce the 7th C.I.Bn. on the BLUE LINE.

#### **Attack of the 2nd C.I.B. to YELLOW LINE.**

In accordance with previous Instructions , the 5th and 10th C.I.Bns. moved forward in Reserve throughout the First Phase , marching to their Rendezvous on the RED LINE.

In the Second Phase of the attack the 5th C.I.Bn. swept across the BLUE LINE at 3:20 P.M. and advanced rapidly. HAYNECOURT and the high ground E. and N. of this Village were soon in our possession.

This advance met with no opposition frontally. On the left also the 32nd Infantry Brigade of the Eleventh Division (British) advanced quickly towards EPINOY and relieved us of anxiety on that flank. On the right , however , there was no sign of any attacking Troops and the enemy , un-attacked , brought very heavy enfilading Fire to bear on the First Division. As the advance continued this situation became increasingly serious. The fighting which followed was of a very strenuous nature. The 10th C.I.Bn. leapfrogged the 5th C.I.Bn. on the Road E. of HAYNECOURT. Enemy Machine Guns and Field Guns were firing point- blank into the advancing Companies from behind Wire on the high ground E. of HAYNECOURT. Battle Patrols with great dash swept around the fire and cleared the situation. Just W. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD a strong , thick , continuous Belt of Wire was encountered. This could not be flanked. In the teeth of enemy Machine Gun Fire the Troops commenced cutting this Wire by hand. Passages were eventually cut after severe casualties had been suffered. The enemy Machine Guns were disposed of and the Troops crossed the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. E. of the Road further Belts of Wire were encountered and heavy Machine Gun Fire from well concealed positions contested our advance. Enemy Artillery too was concentrated on our narrow Front.

Both flanks were in the air , particularly the right flank , the Fourth Cdn. Division being still on the BLUE LINE. All the high ground within the Divisional Boundaries had been captured. Consequently it was decided to consolidate the positions gained along the Sunken Road E. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD.

At dusk the enemy attacked the flank E. of HAYNECOURT , under covering Fire from Artillery and Machine Guns firing direct. The 5th C.I.Bn. gave a little ground but the attack was stopped by Rifle and Machine Gun Fire S. of the Village. The defence of the Line was then strengthened , the 10th C.I.Bn. held the Front Line facing E. the 5th C.I.Bn. held the defensive flank on the S. Boundary of HAYNECOURT and pushed out Battle Patrols in touch with the 10th C.I.Bn. E. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. The 8th C.I.Bn. had 2 Companies on the defensive flank S. and W. of HAYNECOURT ; the other 2 Companies being in close support N.-W. of HAYNECOURT. The 7th C.I.Bn. reorganized and came into Brigade Reserve in the vicinity of the YELLOW LINE.

At 11:00 P.M. an S.O.S. Line had been established around the Brigade Front and Flanks. Touch was established with the Eleventh Division (British) on the left at the S.-E. corner of EPINOY. Machine Guns were redistributed on the whole Brigade Front and everything possible was done to strengthen the positions.

#### **Action of No. 2 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. to BLUE LINE.**

No. 1 Section of "G" Battery (Capt. MAYNARD) , under Lieut. BALFE , M.C. , advanced with the leading Company of the 7th C.I.Bn. Passing through PAVILAND WOOD and crossing the CANAL at Lock 3 E. of INCHY , this Section halted on the Railway N. of SAINS-les-MARQUION. From here on the Section came under heavy Rifle and Machine Gun Fire. They pushed on through KEITH WOOD.



On the S. outskirts of MARQUION an enemy strong point held up the advance. Corporal WILSON immediately opened Fire at point-blank range. Two other Guns were pushed forward in Shell-holes and opened Fire. Corporal WILSON then rushed his Crew , to the flank and enfiladed the strong points. Severe casualties were inflicted and the Infantry coming up , the strong point was rushed. Over 50 prisoners were taken and 6 Light Machine Guns.

One Company of the 7th C.I.Bn. had pushed well over on the left to help the 3rd C.I.Bn. Lieut. BALFE followed closely behind this Company with his Section and came into action again on the MARQUION LINE , W. of DATFORD WOOD , firing on large bodies of the enemy in the vicinity of SAUCHICOURT FARM. 4000 Rounds of S.A.A. were expended and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The advance then continued in a N.-E. direction and the Guns went forward to positions in the Sunken Road 2000 yards W. of EPINOY.

No. 2 Section under Lieut. HARRIS , moved to INCHY and crossed the CANAL du NORD E. of this Village. The advanced about 2000 yards N.-E. and then pushed up the MARQUION LINE , coming into action on this LINE about 1000 yards S. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , firing at enemy positions Eastward along the Main Road. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The Guns then moved forward to their positions for defence S. of the BOIS du COORET.

Capt. MAYNARD , O.C. , "G" Battery was wounded in the face by a Shell when moving forward with the 7th C.I.Bn. Headquarters. Lieut. BALFE , M.C. , was placed in command of "G" Battery. During the night this Battery side-slipped into positions N. of HAYNECOURT.

#### **Action of No. 2 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. to YELLOW LINE.**

"E" Battery (Lieut. Mac INTOSH , M.C.) moved off with the leading Company of the 5th C.I.Bn. at 5:00 A.M. This Battery crossed the CANAL E. of INCHY , having met their Limbers at the cross-roads between CAGNICOURT and QUEANT. One of the Limbers was destroyed E. of SAINES-les-MARQUION. The Section then moved E. to the MARQUION LINE.

No. 1 Section under Lieut. GILLARD , moved N.-E. and halted just S. of the main ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. At this point the Limbers were unloaded and the advance continued E. until HAYNECOURT was reached. The Section skirted the Village on the S. side and the Guns came into action at this point. All 4 Guns got good targets of retreating Parties of the enemy. The Section then moved N. around the Village of HAYNECOURT and took up positions in the Sunken Road from where they fired on Parties of the enemy crossing the DOUAI ROAD. The Section was then moved back as they were too far ahead of the 5th C.I.Bn. and the left flank was exposed ; to protect this flank , the Guns were mounted W. of HAYNECOURT.

No. 2 Section under Lieut. BATTERSHILL , left No. 1 Section about 1000 yards E. of SAINES-les-MARQUION and moved N.-E. across the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , past the S. edge of LEEK WOOD where the Guns came into action , engaging retreating Parties of the enemy which were moving towards EPINOY. These Parties were thought to be Machine Gun Groups and many casualties were inflicted on them. The Section then continued to move along the Northern Divisional Boundary , 2 Guns firing on an enemy Battery moving behind EPINOY. The Gun under Sgt. KEARSE fired a burst on an enemy Wagon seen moving E. of HAYNECOURT. The Wagon turned and Pte. LUMSDEN and Cpl. ELLIS rushed out and captured the vehicle. The Drivers surrendered and our 2 men mounted the 2 pair of horses and brought the Wagon back to our Lines.

"F" Battery (Lieut. HERRIDGE) , moved off at 7:30 A.M. in front of the 10th C.I.Bn. At 10:30 A.M. the Battery crossed the CANAL du NORD and unloaded the Limbers N.-E. of INCHY. From here the Battery moved N.-E. in front of the Village of SAINES-les-MARQUION until the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD was reached. Here the Battery came under Shell and Machine Gun Fire.

Fire was directed against enemy Batteries of Field Guns between the Villages of HAYNECOURT and RAILLENCOURT. Fire was also brought to bear from the outskirts HAYNECOURT on enemy Batteries E. of HAYNECOURT and on Troops on the Road W. of the MARCOING LINE , beyond the Village of RAILLENCOURT. Over 5000 Rounds were expended and several casualties inflicted. Also a number of the Battery horses were seen to fall.

At 5:30 P.M. the Guns of "F" Battery were brought back N. of HAYNECOURT , as the position of the Front Line was indefinite , and the left flank was exposed. The Guns remained here for the night.

### **Batteries in Reserve , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

"B" , "H" and "K" Batteries were in Divisional Reserve for the First Phase of the BOULON WOOD Operations commencing September 27th.

These 3 Batteries were assembled in old Trenches , half-way between HENDECOURT and CAGNICOURT and at 6:00 A.M. they moved forward to a position immediately N. of BOIS d' INCHY. Capt. MATTHEWS was in command of the Reserve Batteries.

At 5:45 P.M. Orders were received from the O.C. , First Battalion C.M.G.C. , (Lt.-Col. WATSON , D.S.O.) , to move the Batteries forward to positions E. of SAIN-les-MARQUION. The Batteries were in these positions by 7:30 P.M.

At 8:55 P.M. , Orders were received from the First Cdn. Division to send 2 Batteries to defend the right flank of the 2nd C.I.B. which was situated at that time E. and S.-E. of HAYNECOURT. These Batteries were sent forward immediately and were disposed for Defence in Depth on the desired flank at 10: 40 P.M. They remained there during the night.

### **Organization of Machine Gun Barrage Batteries.**

A Machine Gun Barrage coordinated with the Artillery Barrage was organized , in support of the initial attack on September 27th , along the whole Corps Front. 24 Batteries , each of 8 Guns , were detailed to fire on this Barrage , which was extended by the XXII Corps on their Front.

Owing to the depth of the advance contemplated by the Infantry and consequent deep advance of the Machine Guns in support , the Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , did not participate in the Corps Barrage. For the same reason the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , supplied only 2 Batteries.

On the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Front , 4 Batteries (No. 1 Company) of the Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , fired a Barrage in support of the advance of the 10th C.I.B. For this Task , these Batteries came under the command of the Fourth Cdn. Division. From positions immediately S. of INCHY , these 4 Batteries laid a Barrage on a Line N. to S. which rested at Zero on the CANAL Bank on the left flank of the 10th C.I.B. Front , and 300 yards W. of the CANAL on the right flank. From that Line , the Barrage traveled Eastwards in Lifts of 100 yards every 4 minutes as far E. as QUARRY WOOD , roughly 1000 yards W. of the RED LINE.

This Barrage was the right wing of the Barrage which ran W. to E. extending as far as the RED LINE. It was continued on the left , in the First Cdn. Division Area by all 8 Batteries forming the right sub-groups , under Major TRENCH , and consisting of 4 Batteries of the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades.

The left sub-groups under Major GRANTHAM , M.C. , constituted as shown in the Table below , laid down a Barrage which opened at Zero plus 90 minutes on the RED LINE. The left of the Barrage rested on the CANAL du NORD and its average width was 2000 yards. It traveled almost N. (i.e. , in the direction of the CANAL du NORD) in Lifts of 100 yards through MARQUION , until at Zero plus 400 , it reached SAUCHY-LESTREE (i.e. , N. of the BLUE LINE) where it ended. The rate of progress of this Barrage varied. For 20 minutes from the RED LINE it lifted 100 yards every 4 minutes , then 100 yards every 10 minutes up to Zero plus 180 minutes. From the Southern outskirts of MARQUION to the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , the Barrage only traveled 400 yards in 70 minutes. From there Northwards to SAUCHY-LESTREE , it lifted 100 yards every 5 minutes.

### **Organization of Machine Gun Barrage ; September 27th.**

The following Table shows the Organization of the Machine Gun Barrage as coordinated by the Corps Machine Gun Officer , Brig.-Gen. BRUTINEL :-

<b>Divisional Front.</b>	<b>Sub-Group.</b>	<b>Battery No.</b>	<b>Unit.</b>	<b>Barrage Position.</b>
Fourth Canadian	A	1-4	Third Bn. , C.M.G.C.	S. of INCHY.
First Canadian	B	5-8	1st C.M.M.G. Bde.	N. of INCHY.
	C	9-12	2nd C.M.M.G. Bde.	S.-W. of SAINS-les-MARQUION.
First Canadian	D	13-16	2nd Bn. , C.M.G.C.	N.-W. of SAINS-les-MARQUION.
	E	17-20	2nd Bn. , C.M.G.C.	E. of BARALLE.
	F	21-22	11th Bn. , M.G.C.	N.-W. of MARQUION.
	G	23-24	1st Bn. , C.M.G.C.	2500 yards W. of SAUCHY CAUCHY.

Batteries No. 1 to 12 laid down the Barrage running W. to E. for the capture of the RED LINE ; Batteries 13 to 24 laid down the Barrage running S. to N. for the advance from the RED to the BLUE LINE.

The Barrage laid down by the Left Sub-Groups was arranged in such a way as to cover the swampy ground extending from just N. of SAINS-les-MARQUION to the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and N. of this to SAUCHY-LESTREE. This is practically the Basin of the AGACHE RIVER. In depth it extended over the CANAL du NORD and the MARQUION LINE , which was the enemy's main LINE of DEFENCE covering the CANAL du NORD.

The attack was planned with a view to leaving the Swamp as a pocket and the Machine Gun Fire was intended to keep down the Snipers from the trees and disorganize the defence , while the main attack proceeded S. of the Swamp over the dry part of the CANAL.

#### **Action of Barrage Machine Guns.**

At 5:20 A.M. , September 27th , all Guns in the Right Sub-Group opened Fire and followed out the programs as laid down , with the exception of a few short periods which Fire had to ease owing to our Infantry passing forward through the Guns.

Hostile Artillery was active during the first 60 minutes of the Barrage ; particularly around the positions occupied by "B" Sub-Group. Hostile Machine Gun Fire was not noticeable to any extent until Zero plus 90 , after which several Guns in the WOOD 500 yards N. of SAINS-les-MARQUION on the E. Bank of the CANAL du NORD were active and caused several casualties in "C" Sub-Group.

After the Firing Programs had been completed , Belts were refilled. At Zero plus 6 hours it was found possible to bring up the Transport to the Guns. Previous to that hour , no Transport except Ammunition and R. E. Stores was allowed forward. At Zero plus 7 hours , all Batteries rejoined their respective Brigades.

The total quantity of S.A.A. expended by these Sub-Groups was over 320,000 Rounds.

"D" , "E" and "F" Sub-Groups opened Fire on their allotted targets at the times specified , and having completed their various Tasks without difficulty withdrew according to Instructions. The Ammunition expended by these Sub-Groups was as follows :-

"D" Sub-Group	241,000 Rounds.
"E" Sub-Group	146,000 Rounds.
"F" Sub-Group	73,000 Rounds.
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>460,000 Rounds.</b>

"G" Sub-Group advanced with their Limbers at Zero plus 160 minutes and moved forward towards their Barrage positions which were very close to the W. Bank of the CANAL just N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. 3 Guns reached this location but the remainder were laid up 1000 yards W. by heavy Machine Gun Fire from the vicinity of MARQUION. These 3 Guns fired 2500 Rounds at Parties of the enemy moving on the other side of the CANAL. Several attempts were made to get more Ammunition to these Guns but every Man who started forward from the Dump , 1000 yards in rear of the Battery positions , became a

casualty. At 1:15 P.M. our Troops had reached their Objective and "G" Sub-Group assembled and withdrew to positions N. of BARALLE.

### **Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

Only 1 Company of the Third Bn. C.M.G.C. , Lt.-Col. MOORHOUSE was in action on September 27th. No. 3 Company , with the 9th C.I.B. , and No. 2 Company , with the 7th C.I.B. , crossed the CANAL du NORD in the afternoon and prepared to go forward on the following day.

## **Operations , September 28th , 1918.**

### **General.**

During the night September 27th/28th , the Third Cdn. Division relieved a portion of the Fourth Cdn. Division , and the Third , Fourth and First Cdn. Divisions and the Eleventh Division (British) took up their Battle positions from right to left of the Corps Frontage. The Third and Fourth Cdn. Divisions attacked at 6:00 A.M. September 28th. In view of the advanced position reached in the advance of the previous day , the First Cdn. Division did not attack until 9:00 A.M. September 28th. On the Third Cdn. Division Front the 9th C.I.B. attacked on the right , the 7th C.I.B. on the left. The 10th C.I.B. attacked on the Fourth Division Front , in the right centre of the Corps , and the 2nd C.I.B. on the First Division Front , in the Corps left centre.

The Third Cdn. Division succeeded in penetrating the MARCOING LINE and the Fourth Cdn. Division made good progress , our Troops pushing through RAILLENCOURT and SAILLY. Enemy Machine Gun Fire was intense and heavy fighting took place. Our Troops reached the Western outskirts of ST. OLLE on the right and captured RAILLENCOURT in the face of determined enemy opposition. During the evening , another attempt was made to push forward and our troops were reported to have reached the Western outskirts of ST. REMY and to be holding the Line along the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. The Eleventh Division (British) established Posts in AUBENCHEUL-au-BAC and captured BOIS de QUESNOY.

### **Canadian Corps Order of Battle; September 28th.**

The Order of Battle of Canadian Corps Infantry and Machine Gun Units attacking on September 28th is shown in the following Table :-

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Third Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right.	Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.
9th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Right	No. 3 Company
43rd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"M" Battery
52nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"L" Battery
58th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	"J" and "K" Batteries
7th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Left	No. 2 Company
R.C.R.	Brigade Right	"F" Battery
P.P.C.L.I.	Brigade Left	"G" Battery
49th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"H" Battery
42nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	"E" Battery
Fourth Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right Centre	Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.
10th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Front	No. 1 Company with
47th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"H" Battery from

50th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	No. 2 Company and "L" Battery
44th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	from No. 3 Company.
46th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	
First Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Left Centre.	First Battalion , C.M.G.C.
2nd C.I.B.	First Cdn. Division Front	No. 2 Company
10th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	
8th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
5th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
7th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
Eleventh Division (British)	Canadian Corps Left.	

### **Third Canadian Division , Infantry Action.**

It was intended that the Third Cdn. Infantry Division with 2 Brigades should take over the right Front of the Fourth Cdn. Division from the 11th C.I.B. on the morning of September 28th. This was not possible , however as , during the previous evening's fighting , all attempts of the 11th C.I.B. to reduce FONTAINE-notre-DAME were unsuccessful. It was arranged , therefore , that in place of relieving the 11th C.I.B. the Third Cdn. Division would attack through them.

The Third Cdn. Division attacked the MARCOING LINE and FONTAINE-notre-DAME at 6:00 A.M. September 28th , the 9th C.I.B. on the right and the 7th C.I.B. on the left.

The right flank of the 9th C.I.B. was exposed during the initial stages owing to the Division on their right being held up. The 10th C.I.Bn. (attached from the Fourth Cdn. Division) protected this flank with covering Fire from the Southern edge of BOURLON WOOD. Machine Gun Fire was also kept up on this flank.

By 9:00 A.M. the 43rd C.I.Bn. had captured the Village of FONTAINE. The 52nd C.I.Bn. attacked the MARCOING LINE but was held up by Machine Gun Fire before gaining their objective. At this stage , the Line ran from about 800 yards S.-E. of FONTAINE to the Eastern edge of the Village on the BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD , thence across the Front Line of the MARCOING System. Resistance encountered here was so strong that another attack was planned under cover of an Artillery Barrage for 3:00 P.M. Owing to difficulty of coordination and the supply of Ammunition , this was postponed to 7:00 P.M. The First Part of this Operation was successful. The MARCOING LINE as far S. as the CAMBRAI-BAPAUME ROAD was captured. The 116th C.I.Bn went through the MARCOING LINE and one Company reached the Western outskirts of ST. OLLE.

At 11:00 P.M. the 43rd C.I.Bn. were holding the Line facing S.-E. astride the CAMBRAI-BAPAUME ROAD , in touch with a Pocket of the R. I. Fusiliers on the right.

The 58th C.I.Bn. were in the MARCOING LINE , with the 52nd C.I.Bn. in close Support.

The 116th C.I.Bn. had 3 Companies in the MARCOING LINE in touch with the 7th C.I.B. on the left and one Company in the Western outskirts of ST. OLLE. During the day's Operations , very heavy casualties were suffered from Machine Gun Fire from the MARCOING LINE and from the Trench in front of ST. OLLE.

### **Action of 3 Company , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

No. 3 Company (Capt. BURNHAM) , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , was allotted to the 9th C.I.B. for the Operations on September 28th and crossing the CANAL in the afternoon of September 27th , bivouacked in QUARRY WOOD for the night.

"M" Battery (Lieut. GERMAN) went into action with the 43rd C.I.B. on the right of the 9th C.I.B. Front at 8:00 A.M. , September 28th. The Guns were disposed in positions near FONTAINE-notre-DAME to protect the right flank of the attack.

“L” Battery (Lieut. SHEARER) went forward on the left of the 9th C.I.B. with the 52nd C.I.Bn. at 6:30 A.M. September 28th. The Battery advanced in depth until the 52nd C.I.Bn. was held up in the Sunken Road near the MARCOING LINE. The Battery then took up positions commanding this Line with Direct Overhead Fire. From these positions 8000 rounds were fired. Two enemy Machine Guns were put out of action and numerous casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

“J” and “K” Batteries were in Brigade Reserve.

#### **Action of No. 2 Company , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The 7th C.I.B. attack on the left of the Third Cdn. Division , progressed favorably and the MARCOING LINE was captured at 8:50 A.M. Strong opposition was encountered in the MARCOING SUPPORT LINE and the attack was held up. At 11:20 A.M. , however the R.C.R. on the right of the 7th C.I.B. Front penetrated portions of this Line and worked forward along the Sunken Road on their right Front in order to destroy enemy Machine Guns. The P.P.C.L.I. assisted in this Operation from their positions on the left. Shell Fire and Machine Gun Fire was intense and many casualties were suffered.

At this Stage a second attack was planned under cover of Artillery Fire and this attack was launched at 7:00 P.M. The MARCOING LINE was captured right along the Front and the Light Railway , 1000 yards N.-E. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , was also reached.

At 11:00 P.M. the 49th C.I.Bn. had crossed the Light Railway just N. of ST. OLLE and the P.P.C.L.I. had 3 Companies on the S. side of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD with Patrols pushed out in front and were in touch with the Fourth Cdn. Division on the left.

No. 2 Company (Major FOWLER , M.C.) , Third Bn. , C.M.G.C. was detailed to cooperate with the 7th C.I.B. in these Operations. During the night September 27th/28th , “E” and “H” Batteries moved up to positions of Support , 500 yards N. of BOURLON VILLAGE. “F” and “G” Batteries moved forward to positions on the BLUE LINE from which the R.C.R. and P.P.C.L.I. were to jump-off in their attack on September 28th.

“F” and “G” Batteries pushed off with the Infantry. On the left , the P.P.C.L.I. were held up and “G” Battery did not get into action until later. “F” Battery , however succeeded in reaching a position just S. of RAILLENCOURT and brought Fire to bear on the MARCOING LINE , just S. of its junction with the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

Later on in the morning , the 49th C.I.Bn. attacked , supported by “H” Battery which moved forward with them , and by “F” Battery which took up positions E. of SAILLY. From these positions they supported the attack with good effect , sweeping the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and the VILLAGE of ST.OLLE with their Fire. “H” Battery assisted the Operations on the right by taking up positions in the MARCOING LINE , 1000 yards S. of SAILLY , and Firing on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and targets in the vicinity of ST. OLLE. “E” Battery was in Reserve with the 42nd C.I.Bn. during the day and did not participate in these Operations.

#### **No. 1 Company , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

No. 1 Company (Major HARTLEY M.C. , M.M.) , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. was with the 8th C.I.B. in Reserve during the day. Batteries were massed with Battalions behind BOURLON WOOD and were preparing to assist in the attack which was planned for September 29th.

#### **Action of Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

At 6:00 A.M. September 28th , the 10th C.I.B. Fourth Cdn. Division , attacked with the 47th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 50th C.I.Bn. on the left. Little opposition was encountered up to the MARCOING LINE and the outskirts on RAILLENCOURT where very heavy Machine Gun Fire was encountered. The attack progressed in spite of this opposition and the 47th C.I.Bn. passed around the N. of RAILLENCOURT and the 50th C.I.Bn. reached the MARCOING LINE after severe fighting.

These 2 Battalions were followed closely by the 44th and 46th C.I.Bns. which leapfrogged them on the SAILLY-HAYNECOURT ROAD , N. of SAILLY. 1000 Yards ahead of this , the attack was held up by

Fire from the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. The right flank was exposed owing to the fact that the Third Cdn. Division were unable to enter the MACOING LINE on the immediate right of SAILLY. Enemy concentration in the area S. of SANCOURT was noticed during the day and seemed to indicate a counter-attack. This developed on the right against the 44th C.I.Bn. and this Battalion was driven back to the Railway Line 700 yards E. of SAILLY. The 47th C.I.Bn. re-established the situation on this Line, but the enemy retained the Trenches in front of the Fourth Cdn. Division right, between 500 and 700 yards W. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD.

At 7:00 P.M. an organized attack was made in conjunction with that launched on the right by the 7th C.I.B. In spite of considerable opposition the Line was established on the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD and late at night touch was gained with the Third Cdn. Division on the right.

Instructions were issued for the 12th C.I.B. to pass through the 10th C.I.B. on the morning of September 29th, to continue the attack.

For the advance of the 10th C.I.B. it was considered necessary for No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON), Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., to go forward with the Infantry to engage targets of opportunity and to assist in the consolidation of ground won. "H" and "L" Batteries were attached from No. 2 and No. 3 Companies respectively, and were employed as a Brigade Reserve.

When the advance was held up in the vicinity of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD by enemy Machine Gun Nests, heavy casualties were suffered. All Batteries came into action, engaging these strong points.

"B" Battery assisted in breaking up an enemy counter-attack which was developing on the right. When the Infantry were no longer able to progress, the Guns were established in defensive positions and the Crews "dug in", Lieut. FRENCH, M.C., commanding "B" Battery was killed in these Operations.

During the day very heavy casualties amongst the Officers in both the Infantry and Machine Gun Batteries were suffered. In one case an Officer had command of 16 Machine Guns and a number of Infantry who had collected in the vicinity.

No. 3 Company (Capt. LOGAN), Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., was in Divisional Support throughout the day with the 12th C.I.B. "K" Battery during the morning fired 4000 Rounds in Indirect Fire on the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD in support of the 10th C.I.B. Lieut. STONEMAN, "M" Battery was killed by Shell Fire night September 28th/29th.

No. 2 Company (Major L.F. PEARCE, M.C.) was engaged in reorganizing the Batteries.

### **Infantry Action First Canadian Division.**

The attack of the First Cdn. Division on September 27th had progressed so much further than that of the Troops on their right flank that a defensive flank of 4000 yards had been formed along the S. Boundary. Consequently, when Orders were received that the Canadian Corps would attack along the whole Front and that the 2nd C.I.B. would attack on the First Division Front the G.O.C., 2nd C.I.B. requested that Zero Hour for this attack on this Front should be advanced 3 hours. The Third and Fourth Cdn. Divisions, who were attacking on the right at 6:00 A.M., would then have time to advance their Line and the Troops holding the defensive flank could be relieved of that duty and would be available to support the Troops detailed to carry out the attack. This request was granted.

The Fourth Cdn. Division advanced at 6:00 A.M. and by 8:45 A.M. the 8th C.I.Bn. was relieved in its defensive flank position and moved forward to support the 10th C.I.Bn. which attacked at 9:00 A.M.

When the 10th C.I.Bn. attacked it was met with very heavy Machine Gun and Artillery Fire from the high ground on both flanks. Troops on the right and left had not come up and the enemy on both sides was unmolested. It became apparent immediately that the attack could not succeed. In spite of this, the attacking Troops went bravely forward against the enemy entanglements and calmly commenced cutting passages through by hand. For 2 hours this unusual fight went on, in spite of swiftly diminishing numbers.

The Fourth Cdn. Division was still held up some distance W. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD and a considerable gap existed between their left and our right. The attempt of the 10 C.I.Bn. to push forward against such heavy odds was finally given up.

During the balance of the day heavy Artillery Bombardments were carried out against the enemy Wire on our Front, to cut it out. The enemy's Machine Gun and Artillery Fire remained strong against our forward

positions during the day , but his Fire was kept down considerably by our Artillery , Machine Guns and Snipers. Threatened enemy counter-attacks between 3:00 P.M. and 4:00 P.M. were crushed by Fire and did not develop. During the night September 28th/29th the 8th C.I.Bn. relieved the 10th C.I.Bn. in the Line , preparatory to carrying on the attack on the morning of September 29th.

#### **Action of First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The attached Machine Gun Batteries of No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM , D.O.M.) , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , cooperated in the attack.

No. 2 Section of "E" Battery , under Lieut. NORRIS , moved off in support of the right flank of the 10th C.I.Bn. until they reached the CAMBRAI-DOUAI ROAD , where they rested in a small Trench W. of SANCOURT. They then moved S.-E. towards the Sunken Road in this vicinity. Owing to the heavy Machine Gun Fire it was found impossible to advance and Lieut. NORRIS was killed in a daring attempt to push his Guns forward. The Guns were brought back W. of the CAMBRAI-DOUAI ROAD and mounted in commanding positions , from which Direct Fire was brought to bear on the enemy in the vicinity of SANCOURT.

No. 1 Section of "F" Battery , under Lieut. Mc CLELLAN , moved in support of the left flank of the 10th C.I.Bn. at 9:30 A.M. Heavy Artillery and intense Machine Gun Fire was encountered but the Gun Crews gained their positions in the Trenches , W. of the CAMBRAI-DOUAI ROAD , W. of SANCOURT , without sustaining a casualty. This Section remained here throughout the day and numerous moving targets of the enemy Infantry were engaged with good results. At nightfall , the Infantry again withdrew and this necessitated a redistribution of the Guns. Positions of defence of the left flank were eventually taken up N.-E. of HAYNECOURT.

During the early part of the night September 28th/29th the 8th C.I.Bn. relieved the 10th C.I.Bn. in the Line and "F" Battery was ordered to support the relieving Battalion.

At 5:00 P.M. September 28th , Lieut. BALFE , M.C. , in command of "G" Battery, received Orders to push ahead of the 7th C.I.Bn. After reconnaissance , positions were selected N. and E. of HAYNECOURT. "G" Battery remained in these positions until relieved on the night September 30th/October 1st.

"E" Battery (Lieut. Mac INTOSH , M.C.) , moved forward behind the 10th C.I.Bn. on its left and took up positions in the Trench System between the Villages of HAYNECOURT and EPINOY , protecting the left flank. The Battery remained in these positions until the morning of September 29th. Lieut. Mac INTOSH was wounded but did not go to the Dressing Station until ordered to do so by the O.C. , 8th C.I.Bn. Lieut. BATTERSHILL then took command.

"D" Battery went forward at 1:00 P.M. with the 1st C.I.Bn. to strengthen the Line W. of HAYNECOURT. The Battery took up positions to consolidate the ground held and to watch the flanks against expected counter-attacks. The remaining Batteries stayed in their positions throughout the day in Support with the 1st C.I.Bn. E. of SAINS-lez-MARQUION.

#### **Guns in Reserve , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The 3 Batteries (i.e. , less "K") of No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM , M.C.) , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , which were in Divisional Reserve with the 3rd C.I.B. moved from their positions in the vicinity of BUISSY to positions E. of SAINS-lez-MARQUION. The Batteries were ready to move forward in an hours notice. During the day , Battery Commanders made Reconnaissance of their area so as to be ready to take up defensive positions in case of hostile counter-attack.

"B" , "H" and "K" Batteries (i.e. , one Battery from each Company) remained during the day at the Divisional Report Centre W. of SAINS-lez-MARQUION.

Battalion Headquarters , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. remained at QUEANT. Orders were received during the evening of September 28th that the advance would be continued on the morning of September 29th. The 2nd C.I.B. would advance with the 1st C.I.B. in Support and the 3rd C.I.B. in Divisional Reserve. The Companies of the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , would remain attached as at present to their respective Brigades.



## Operations , September 29th , 1918.

### General Progress of Attack.

September 29th was a day of very severe fighting. At 6:00 A.M. the 32nd Infantry Brigade (British) attacked on the left but encountered stiff opposition and uncut Wire and was forced to give up the attempt to advance. The Cdn. Corps attacked at 8:00 A.M. along the whole Front. The Third Cdn. Division met with heavy resistance but progressed to a point 500 yards E. of the MARCOING LINE , 500 yards N. of the CANAL de l' ESCAUT , then on to the junction of the ARRAS and BAPAUME ROADS , taking the Village of PETIT-FONTAINE. The 7th C.I.B. made a slow progress but managed to reach the Western outskirts of NEUVILLE-ST. REMY and the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. At 9:45 A.M. the 18th C.I.B. , Fourth Cdn. Division captured SANCOURT and entered BLECOURT. A heavy counter-attack against this Brigade forced them back later to the Railway 500 yards S.-E. of SANCOURT. The 2nd C.I.B. , on the First Cdn. Divisional Front , fought hard but was unable to progress beyond ABANCOURT STATION , nearly 1000 yards S.-E. of ABANCOURT , as the Ridge attacked in the morning by the 32nd Infantry Brigade (British) , on the left was still held in force by the enemy who directed a murderous Fire from there on the advancing Troops of the First Cdn. Division.

### Canadian Corps Order of Battle September 29th.

The following Table shows the Order in which Troops attacked on the Canadian Corps Front and the disposition of the Machine Guns during the attack on September 29th :-

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Third Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right.	Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.
9th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Right	No. 3 Company (X)
43rd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	
52nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	
58th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	"K" Battery
116th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	"J" Battery
7th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Left	No. 2 Company
49th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	
42nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"G" and "E" Batteries
P.P.C.L.I.	Brigade Support	
R.C.R.	Brigade Reserve	
8th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Support	No. 1 Company
1st C.M.R.	Brigade Right	"A" and "B" Batteries
2nd C.M.R.	Brigade Left	
4th C.M.R.	Brigade Support	"C" Battery
5th C.M.R.	Brigade Reserve	"D" Battery
Fourth Cdn. Division.	Cdn. Corps Right Centre.	Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.
12th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Front	No. 3 Company
38th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"K" Battery
72nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"M" Battery
78th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	"J" and "L" Batteries
85th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	No. 2 Company , Brigade Support

First Cdn. Division.	Cdn. Corps Left Centre	First Battalion , C.M.G.C.
2nd C.I.B.	First Cdn. Division Front	No. 2 Company
8th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	“F” Battery
5th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	“E” Battery

Eleventh Division. (British)      Canadian Corps Left

(X) “L” and “M” Batteries in Brigade Reserve.

### **Action of Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The Third Cdn. Division attacked with the 9th C.I.B. on the right and the 7th C.I.B. on the left. The 8th C.I.B. came into the Line in the centre, between these 2 Brigades at 6:00 A.M. , with 2 Battalions in the Front Line. The 102nd C.I. Bn. , Fourth Cdn. Division , remained along the Southern end of BOURLON WOOD to act as a defensive flank in case of strong enemy counter-attacks. This Battalion came under the Orders of the 9th C.I.B.

The 43rd and 52nd C.I.Bns. were holding the Line on the 9th C.I.B. Front. The 58th and 116th C.I.Bns. passed through these Battalions and attacked on the right and left respectively. The 58th C.I.Bn. assaulted the MARCOING LINE as far S. as the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. The 116th C.I.Bn. attacked ST. OLLE and the junction of the ARRAS and BAPAUME ROADS. Both Battalions met with severe Shell and Machine Gun Fire and neither was able to advance quickly. “Ding-dong” fighting ensued and at 7:00 P.M. ST. OLLE , PETIT-FONTAINE and the MARCOING LINE were securely in our hands.

On September 29th “K” Battery (Lieut. J. HENRY) moved up into positions in Support of the advance of the 58th C.I.Bn. and Fired 10,000 Rounds Indirect and Direct fire during the attack. The 58th C.I.Bn. was held up in front of the MARCOING LINE between the BAPAUUME-CAMBRAI ROAD and the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. 2 Guns were placed in the MARCOING LINE on the BAPAUME ROAD which did great execution and assisted the Infantry very materially. After the attack this Battery took up defensive positions in depth.

“J” Battery went into action with the 116th C.I.Bn. Guns of this Battery fired 10,000 Rounds , Indirect and Direct Fire , on the enemy's Lines and took up frequent targets of opportunity during the attack , inflicting a great number of casualties on the enemy. 2 Guns were put out of action during the day by enemy Shell Fire. “L” and “M” Batteries , in Brigade Reserve did not come into action during the day.

In the early Stages , the 8th C.I.B. was held up by Machine Gun Fire W. of ST. OLLE and held a Line from that point to a point on the DOUAI ROAD just W. of NEUVILLE ST. REMY. They were in touch with the 9th C.I.B. at the junction of the BAPAUME and DOUAI ROADS.

“A” and “B” Batteries , No. 1 Company (Major HARTLEY , M.C. , M.M.) Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. were ordered to go forward with the 1st and 2nd C.M.R. Bns. to establish Posts along the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and to capture ST. OLLE and NEUVILLE ST. REMY. Orders were given to the Batteries to push forward 4 Guns with the assaulting Infantry to keep down enemy Machine Gun Fire and to advance 4 Guns about 400 yards in rear to provide a defence in depth if required. The Guns going forward with the assaulting Infantry carried Light Mounts only and did exceedingly good work.

One Gun of “B” Battery , when 500 yards N.-E. of St. OLLE , was met with heavy Machine Gun Fire from ST.OLLE Church and from the high ground in front. The Officer in charge of this Section was killed and all the Crew became casualties except Pte. DICK who pushed forward as far as possible , taking the Gun and 2 Boxes of Ammunition. He got into a commanding position and opened fire on the enemy Machine Guns , putting 2 Guns out of action and killing over 30 enemy Machine Gunners. This achievement was verified by eye-witnesses.

The advanced Sections of “A” and “B” Batteries inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and did good work in very materially neutralizing hostile Machine Gun Fire.

“C” Battery attached to the 4th C.M.R. , moved forward to the MARCOING LINE after its capture.

“D” Battery attached to the 5th C.M.R. , came into Reserve in the Sunken Road , 500 yards W. of FONTAINE-notre-DAME and were disposed finally for defence in depth.

The 7th C.I.B. attacked with the 49th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 42nd C.I.Bn. on the left. At 11:00 A.M. the 49th C.I.Bn. had reached the Line of the DOUAI ROAD and the 42nd C.I.Bn. was across it. Both Battalions were held up by fire from the Railway cutting. An enemy counter-attack was driven off and the 7th C.I.B. remained in possession of the Line on the DOUAI ROAD.

By midnight September 29th/30th, the Fifty-seventh Division (British) had taken over the Line S. of the BAPAUME ROAD from the 9th C.I.B. The remaining Troops of the 9th C.I.B. were relieved by the 8th C.I.B. and, on relief moved to the BOURLON area in Divisional Reserve.

On the morning of September 29th, "G" and "E" Batteries, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. moved off with the 42nd C.I.Bn. on the left of the 7th C.I.B. attack. This attack did not progress beyond the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD, being held up by Wire and intense hostile Fire. These 2 Batteries reached the Road, but suffered heavy casualties in doing so.

#### **Action of Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

On the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Front, Assembly on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD was not possible owing to Zero Hour being in daylight. The Jumping-off Line was the Road running N.-W. and cutting the MARCOING LINE 800 yards N. of SAILLY.

The 12th C.I.B. attacked with the 38th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 72nd C.I.Bn. on the left. The 78th C.I.Bn. followed the 38th C.I.Bn. and the 85th C.I.Bn. followed the 72nd.

The enemy Barrage opened almost simultaneously with our own and the 38th C.I.Bn. came under heavy Machine Gun Fire after crossing the CAMBRAI-DOUAI ROAD. This Fire came from the Ring Trench 1000 yards S. of SANCOURT, from the Railway and from the flanks. The Division on the right had not progressed E. of the DOUAI ROAD and this caused our right flank to be exposed.

With the help of an Artillery Bombardment on the Railway opposite their Front, the 78th C.I.Bn. passed through the 38th C.I.Bn. at 1:30 P.M. and established Posts on a Line due S. of SANCOURT and including the right Trench referred to above. The 72nd C.I.Bn. on the left passed through SANCOURT capturing 250 prisoners, and reached BLECOURT but were unable to hold the latter Village which was defended in great strength. The Line was established along the Railway Bank just E. and N.-E. of SANCOURT. The 72nd C.I.Bn. was again forced to withdraw their Line from the Railway on the left of their Line and this necessitated the cancellation of the proposed attack through them of the 85th C.I.Bn. The latter Battalion in defensive positions around SANCOURT, were withdrawn to the CAMBRAI-DOUAI ROAD.

"K" and "M" Batteries of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. attacked with the 38th and 72nd C.I.Bns. "K" Battery under Lieut. GUDGEON, with the 38th C.I.Bn. on the right, reached the DOUAI ROAD, but fell back when it was seen that the attack could not progress. The Guns were withdrawn to defensive positions in the Trench astride the Light Railway 1000 yards N.-E. of SAILLY. They remained in these positions until withdrawn from the Line 3 days later. "M" Battery under Lieut. RIDDELL, took up defensive positions behind the 72nd C.I.Bn. immediately W. of SANCOURT.

"L" Battery, under Lieut. KERR, in support, was brought up with the 78th C.I.Bn. at noon and positions were occupied in the MARCOING LINE, 1000 yards N. of SAILLY for defence in depth.

"J" Battery (Capt. HENDERSON) cooperated with the 85th C.I.Bn. and took up positions in the evening 800 yards W. and S.-W. of SANCOURT.

No. 2 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., during the day, was in support to the 12th C.I.B. and was concentrated N.-W. of BOURLON WOOD.

No. 1 Company as withdrawn to positions N. of BOURLON VILLAGE to reorganize.

#### **Action of First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The First Cdn. Division attacked with 8th C.I.Bn. of the 2nd C.I.B. at 8:00 A.M. September 29th. At first the attack progressed well but later the enemy Shell and Machine Gun Fire from the high ground in front and on the left became very intense. The Eleventh Division (British) on the left were obliged to give ground. The enemy made 3 counter-attacks on the 8th C.I.Bn. These were driven off, but the Battalion suffered many casualties.

At night the Battalion was in advance of their Jump-off positions but nothing of moment had been accomplished. The Front held was still practically that gained on September 27th and was still in advance

of both flanks. The 2nd C.I.B. withdrew into support positions during the night September 29th/30th , on being relieved in the Line by the 1st C.I.B.

“F” Battery , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. supported the attack of the 8th C.I.Bn. The Guns of No. 1 Section moved into positions S.-E. of EPINOY and came into action there , firing on an enemy Battery in the vicinity of BLECOURT. No. 2 Section , under Sgt. STONE took up positions for defence of the right flank and , finding it impossible to advance , established the Guns in strong defensive positions.

“E” Battery kept in touch with the attacking Battalion and pushed Guns forward to the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. As little progress had been made and the situation was obscure , the Guns finally took up defensive positions in the neighborhood of EPIOY. Lieut. BATTERSHILL , acting O.C. , “E” Battery was wounded during the afternoon and Sgt.-Major HUBBLE assumed command of the Battery until the arrival of Capt. MILNER who took over at 5:30 P.M.

Nos. 1 and 3 Companies , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. and the Batteries in Divisional Reserve remained all day in their defensive positions.

### **Operations , September 30th , 1918.**

#### **General.**

The Canadian Corps was to resume the Offensive at 6:00 A.M. September 30th. The Operations for the day were planned to be carried out in Two Stages. In the First Stage the Third and Fourth Cdn. Divisions were to capture Bridgeheads on the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. In the Second Stage the First Cdn. Division and the Eleventh Division (British) on the left , were to secure the high ground overlooking the RIVER SENSEE.

The attack commenced favourably , the Third Division taking TILLOY and the Fourth , BLECOURT. Heavy counter-attacks against the Fourth Cdn. Division and the left of the Third Cdn. Division drove the Line back to a general Line TILLOY-SANCOURT.

The First Cdn. Division endeavoured to get in touch with the left of the Fourth Cdn. Division , when it was found that the latter had been forced back. It was decided that the Second Phase as planned could not be successful and the Operation was cancelled.

The following Table gives the Troops holding the Line along the Canadian Corps Front during the day ; the actual attack was carried out by the 7th and 11th C.I.B.s.

#### **Canadian Corps Attacking Units and Units Holding the Line ; September 30th.**

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Third Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right.	Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.
8th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Right (did not attack)	No. 1 Company
7th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Left	No. 2 Company
P.P.C.L.I.	Brigade Right	“G” Battery
R.C.R.	Brigade Left	“F” Battery
42nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
49th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	“H” Battery
9th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Reserve	No. 3 Company

Fourth Cdn. Division	Cdn. Corps Right Centre	Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.
11th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Front	No. 2 Company
75th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	
54th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
87th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
102nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
12th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Support	No. 3 Company
10th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Reserve	No. 1 Company
First Cdn. Division	Cdn. Corps Left Centre (did not attack)	First Battalion , C.M.G.C.
Eleventh Division (British)	Cdn. Corps Left (did not attack)	

### **Action of Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The Third Cdn. Division had Orders to attack at 6:00 A.M. September 30th on the right of the Canadian Corps Front. The Objectives were the high ground N. of CAMBRAI and the CANAL Crossings at RAMILLIES. To effect this it was necessary for the Barrage to travel E. along the Ridge and then turn sharp to the right and travel down the hill to the CANAL. The 8th C.I.B. were not to attack but were to keep in close touch with the enemy in order to follow him up if he retired.

The 7th C.I.B. attacked with the P.P.C.L.I. on the right and the R.C.R. on the left. Before 7:30 A.M. the P.P.C.L.I. were well through TILLOY and the enemy were seen retiring from this place. A number of Prisoners , a Battery of 77mm. Guns and 60 Machine Guns were captured here. The R.C.R. on the left reached the Chapel on the BELCOURT-TILLOY ROAD but the Fourth Cdn. Division on the left was held up. This position became untenable , the R.C.R. withdrew to the Sunken Road just E. of the DOUAI Railway. The P.P.C.L.I. conformed to this withdrawal as their left flank had in turn become exposed to the intense Machine Gun Fire from the N. Eventually a Line of Posts was established from the junction of the Railway and the TILLOY ROAD due N. about 500 yards along the Road , then extending N.-W. and N. so as to include TILLOY FARM. The R.C.R. on the left were in touch with the Fourth Cdn. Division in the Sunken Road in front of the Railway.

By 5:15 P.M. the 8th C.I.B. had moved forward and in touch with the 7th C.I.B. just N. of NEUVILLE ST. REMY. Their Line ran from this place S.-W. to the Divisional Boundary on the Road S. of REMY , with Posts pushed out toward the CANAL and Patrols out ahead of these again.

The 9th C.I.B. was in Divisional Reserve all day but kept in very close touch with the 7th C.I.B.

At 11:00 P.M. Orders were received that the Corps would attack along their whole Front on the next day , October 1st. On the Third Cdn. Division Front the 8th C.I.B. would once again hold their ground , the 9th C.I.B. attacking through the 7th C.I.B. and the latter Brigade coming into Divisional Reserve.

The Guns of Nos. 1 and 3 Companies , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , remained in their defensive positions during September 30th , and did not participate in the Operation.

No. 2 Company (Major FOWLER , M.C.) Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. attacked the Railway and the Village of TILLOY in support of the 7th C.I.B.

“F” Battery gave covering Fire on NEUVILLE ST. REMY and the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. On one occasion , this Battery under the command of Lieut. ROE pushed 500 yards forward in front of the Infantry , killed an enemy Machine Gun Crew and drove them out of a Pill Box. The Battery then established itself in this Pill Box and Fired from there with Battle Sights at the enemy in front.

“H” Battery brought Indirect Fire to bear on the Road junction just N. of TILLOY with good results.

“G” Battery placed 3 Guns in the Railway E. of the DOUAI ROAD and brought deadly Fire to bear on Parties of the enemy who were making their way into TILLOY.

### **Action of Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The Fourth Cdn. Division attacked at 6:00 A.M. with the 11th C.I.B. in the direction of BLECOURT. The Objective was to gain the high ground S. of this place, then swing S.-E. from CUVILLERS and establish a Bridgehead at ESWARS. The left of this attack was to be supported by a heavy Bombardment and by Smoke in BLECOURT VALLEY.

The 11th C.I.B. attacked with the 75th C.I.Bn. , the 54th C.I.Bn. was in close support , ready to leapfrog the 75th. The 87th C.I.Bn. was to swing off S.-E. towards ESWARS. The 102nd C.I.Bn. was held in Reserve. The attack met with resolute Opposition from the outset. The 75th C.I.Bn. suffered heavy casualties. In spite of this , the Railway S. of SANCOURT , which had been the centre of an enemy resistance the preceding day , was captured. The enemy resistance increased with the advent of daylight and after suffering severe losses the attacking Battalions were withdrawn to the Railway Line. The attack was not successful for 3 reasons :-

- (1) The Left Flank was unprotected and heavy Enfilading Fire resulted.
- (2) The Smoke Screen was not sufficiently dense to enable the Infantry to advance against the numerous Machine Gun Nests.
- (3) The enemy threw a tremendous number of Troops into the Battle and clearly demonstrated his intention of holding the Line at any cost.

The 12th C.I.B. was in Support during the days Operations and the 10th C.I.B. was in Divisional Reserve N. of BOURLON.

No. 2 Company (Major L.F. PEARCE , M.C.) Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , advanced with 11th C.I.B. Very severe Machine Gun Fire was encountered from the left.

“F” Battery obtained good targets. On the Railway Cutting being captured , all Batteries moved forward and took up positions , numerous targets of opportunity were engaged with excellent results. A defensive Line was occupied for the night.

No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON) , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , was ordered up to support the 11th C.I.B. , they were moved back and resumed the positions vacated.

No. 3 Company remained in positions occupied the previous day.

### **First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

As has already been seen , the proposed attack of the First Cdn. Division and of the Eleventh Division (British) was cancelled owing to the failure of the Divisions to advance on the right. An attack along the whole Corps Front was planned for October 1st and the First Cdn. Division was to attack on the left on a 2-Brigade Front. During the afternoon of September 30th preparations were made for the attack. The 3rd C.I.B. moved forward and relieved the 2nd C.I.B. in Divisional Support , the latter going into Reserve. At dusk , the 3rd C.I.B. moved forward into assembly positions behind the 21st C.I.B. , Fourth Cdn. Division , through whom they were to attack in the morning.

On the night September 30th/October 1st , No. 1 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , relieved No. 2 Company in the Line. The Batteries of No. 1 Company were assembled in the area between SANCOURT , EPINOY and HAYNECOURT in readiness to support the attack of the First C.I.B. on the left of the First Cdn. Division on October 1st.

On completion of this relief , No. 2 Company came into Divisional Reserve.

No. 3 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , was to attack with the Third C.I.B. on the right of the Corps and Batteries of this Company were moved at 5:00 P.M. to assembly positions ,W. and S.-W. of SANCOURT , in readiness for the attack.

## Operations, October 1st , 1918.

### General Course of the Action.

Early in the morning of October 1st the Fifty-sixth Division (British) took over the left of the Front held by the Eleventh Division (British) on the Northern portion of the Canadian Corps Front.

The Canadian Corps renewed the attack along the whole Corps Front at 5:00 A.M. under cover of a heavy Artillery Barrage. The attack made excellent progress in the early Stages. At 8:00 A.M. the Line had been advanced to the CANAL Bank on the right , on the Northern outskirts of CAMBRAI , thence along the CANAL to MORENCHIES WOOD (inclusive). The Towns of CUVILLERS , BANTIGNY and ABANCOURT were captured.

Heavy counter-attacks developed at 10:00 A.M. from PAILLENCOURT up to the BANTIGNY Valley. Our Troops were driven back. The flank on the left of the 1st C.I.B. was exposed and this fact made progress difficult. The Third Cdn. Division also was held up definitely by heavy Artillery and Machine Gun Fire as they attempted to push down the Slopes towards the CANAL de l' ESCAUT.

Pockets of the enemy gave trouble in the Villages of BLECOURT , BANTIGNY , CUVILLERS and ABANCOURT as the counter-attack up the BANTIGNY Valley developed. Tremendously superior numbers compelled our Troops to withdraw , the enemy having 10 Divisions , 2 Regiments and a number of Marksmen Companies on this short Front. The enemy suffered very heavily from our Artillery Fire , especially in the BANTIGNY Valley where they were massed in preparation of the counter-attack.

The Second Cdn. Division , which was in close Support during the Operation , relieved all Troops in the Line N. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI Railway , S. of TILLOY to the Northern outskirts of BLECOURT. The Fourth Cdn. Division , on relief , withdrew to the INCHEY-QUEANT area. The 5th and 6th C.I.B.s took over the Line supported by the 4th C.I.B. Relief was complete at 5:00 A.M. October 2nd. The strenuous way in which the enemy fought and the large number of enemy Units identified made it very clear that he had absolutely no intention of withdrawing on this Front , but would resist our advance to the limit.

### Canadian Corps Order of Battle ; October 1st.

The following Table gives the Battle Order from Right to Left , of the Canadian Corps for Operations of October 1st :-

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Third Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right.	Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.
8th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Right (did not attack)	No. 1 Company
9th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Left	No. 3 Company
43rd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"M" Battery
52nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"L" Battery
58th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"K" Battery
116th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"J" Battery
Fourth Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right Centre	Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.
11th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Front	No. 2 Company
102nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	
87th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
85th C.I.Bn. (X)	Brigade Support	
First Cdn. Division.	Cdn. Corps Left Centre	First Battalion , C.M.G.C.
3rd C.I.B.	First Cdn. Division Right	No. 3 Company (less "K" Battery)

13th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	"M" Battery
16th C.I.Bn. )	Close Support to pass	"J" Battery
14th C.I.Bn. )	through the 13th C.I.Bn.	"L" Battery
15th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
1st C.I.B.	First Cdn. Division Left	No. 1 Company (plus "H" and "K")
1st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"H" and "K" Batteries
4th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"A" Battery
3rd C.I.Bn.		"D" Battery
2nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	"B" and "C" Batteries
Eleventh Division (British)	Canadian Corps Left	

(X) Attached from 12th C.I.B. , Fourth Cdn. Division.

### **Action of Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The Third Cdn. Division advanced on October 1st with 2 objects , firstly to capture the high ground E. of TILLOY , secondly to wheel to the right down the Slope towards the CANAL de l' ESCAUT , and capture the Bridgeheads at PONT d' AIRE and RAMILLIES.

The 8th C.I.B. did not attack but , during the day , established Posts along the CANAL Bank from ST. OLLE to NEUVILLE ST. REMY and on the high Railway embankments E. of NEUVILLE ST. REMY.

The 9th C.I.B. attacked with the 43rd C.I.Bn. on the right , advancing on RAMILLIES , and the 32nd C.I.Bn. on the left. The 58th C.I.Bn. followed the 52nd C.I.Bn. , then swung to the right and endeavoured to work down the Slope from the N. to capture the Bridgehead at PONT d' AIRE. The 116th was to follow the 58th C.I.Bn. and capture the RAMILLIES Bridgehead.

The first part of the action was quite successful. The enemy Barrage fell along the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD and was very heavy. The attacking Troops , however did not suffer many casualties until the high ground forming the First Objective was taken.

The 58th and 116th C.I.Bns. passed through according to plan and commenced to work their way down the Slope towards the CANAL. They were held half-way down the hill by intense Machine Gun Fire and by Artillery Fire from the high ground N. of RAMILLIES. The enemy counter-attacked heavily from PONT d' AIRE in the afternoon and drove our Outposts in.

The Line held by the 9th C.I.B. , when relieved by the 5th C.I.B. , during the night October 1st/2nd was on the CANAL de l' ESCAUT at MORENCHIES. From there it ran along the Ridge overlooking RAMILLIES , thence N.-W. towards the Southern edge of BLECOURT.

The Guns of No. 3 Company (Capt. BURNHAM) , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , operated with the 9th C.I.B. on October 1st.

"M" Battery laid down a Barrage on suspected strong points in the Front of the 43rd C.I.Bn. from Zero to Zero plus 15 minutes , Firing 16,000 Rounds. This Battery then advanced with the 43rd C.I.Bn. and after going through heavy Shelling and Machine Gun Fire , arrived at a point 1000 yards W. of RAMILLIES at 10:00 A.M. On the Infantry being compelled to withdraw owing to the enemy counter-attack , the Battery withdrew to positions in the Practice Trench , 1000 yards E. of TILLOY. The Firepower of "M" Battery was augmented by 4 German Machine Guns , with a plentiful supply of Ammunition.

Lieut. W.N. SMITH did splendid work and it was chiefly through his initiative and resource that an enemy counter-attack was beaten off. About 3000 Rounds (mostly German) were fired during this attack.

On the night October 1st/2nd , the 43rd C.I.Bn. was relieved in forward positions by the 24th C.I.Bn. , 5th C.I.B. The Machine Guns remained in their positions and the Officers of this Battery were able to render material assistance to the incoming Battalion through their knowledge of the ground on the Battle Front.

One Section of "L" Battery went forward with the 52nd C.I.Bn. , employing Field Mounts , and occupied positions 1500 yards N.-E. of TILLOY. Their Tripods were brought up later. The other Section remained in Reserve at 52nd C.I.Bn. H.Q. The forward Section under Lieut. Mc CALLUM , was of great assistance



when the Troops on the left withdrew. This Section fired 7500 Rounds at opportunity targets and accounted for a large number of the enemy.

“K” Battery was in support positions close to the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD about 500 yards N.-W. of NEUVILLE-ST.-REMY.

“J” Battery was in Brigade Reserve W. of ST. OLLE.

Nos. 1 and 2 Companies , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , remained in their positions in support of the 8th and 7th C.I.B.s respectively , during the day.

#### **Action of Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The Fourth Cdn. Division attacked on October 1st with the 11th C.I.B. The 102nd C.I.Bn. led the attack as far as CUVILLERS where it was leapfrogged by the 87th C.I.Bn. , which was to push forward to ESWARS. The 34th and 75th C.I.Bns. were in Reserve.

The 102nd C.I.Bn. gained the First Objective which was the Road running S.-E. from BLECOURT and numerous Prisoners began to come in. The First Cdn. Division on the left were seen to have passed beyond BLECOURT and ABANCOURT and at an early hour were moving on BANTIGNY. Indications , however , confirmed the belief that the enemy was still holding BLECOURT. The 87th C.I.Bn. pushed on to the outskirts of ESWARS , but in the face of heavy opposition were forced to withdraw. It became evident that the situation on the left could not be cleared up while the Division on the right was enable to secure RAMILLIES and the Line of the CANAL.

The 85th C.I.Bn. was placed at the disposal of the 11th C.I.B. and Instructions were received to hold CUVILLERS Salient.

At night a strong Line was established from a point 500 yards S.-E. of SANCOURT to a point 500 yards S.-E. of BLECOURT thence S.-W. along the BLECOURT-MORENCHIES ROAD. On this Line the 11th C.I.B. was relieved by the 5th C.I.B. during the night October 1st/2nd.

On relief the 11th C.I.B. withdrew to the QUARRY W. of BOURLON Village and the Fourth Cdn. Division came into Corps Reserve.

No. 2 Company (Major PEARCE , M.C.) Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , supported the attack of the 11th C.I.B. The Batteries of No. 2 Company went forward with the attacking Battalions and secured good targets , but suffered heavy casualties. The left flank was in a critical condition at one time and the O.C. No. 2 Company received Orders to arrange for a disposition of Machine Gunners to conform to the present Line of the Infantry which was facing N. After a Reconnaissance of the area , 10 Guns were placed along the Railway Embankment from 500 to 1000 yards S. of SANCOURT , 4 Guns , 500 yards E. of SANCOURT and 8 Guns , 1000 yards S.-E. of SANCOURT. The remaining 10 Guns of No. 2 Company were out of action.

Besides these 32 Guns , there were 36 Guns of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. now in the Line. 8 of these Guns were sited about 500 yards E. of the CHAPEL between BLECOURT and TILLOY ; 8 Guns were 500 yards W. of the CHAPEL ; the other 20 were placed in the area S. of the CHALEL.

These positions provided a very powerful Machine Gun Defence in Depth and Guns remained here until the night October 2nd/3rd.

Nos. 1 and 3 Companies , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. remained in their former positions during the day.

Battalion H.Q. was at a point near INCHY on the W. Bank of the CANAL du NORD.

#### **Infantry Attack , First Canadian Division.**

The First Cdn. Division attacked with the 3rd C.I.B. on the right and the 1st C.I.B. on the left. On the 3rd C.I.B. Front , the 13th C.I.Bn. attacked. This Battalion , in spite of heavy Fire , forced its way on the right beyond BLECOURT and commenced to dig in. Another Company forced its way through BLECOURT but met very strenuous resistance and was unable completely to clean up the Village on account of very heavy Fire from the direction of ABANCOURT. The Company attacking on the left cleaned up SANCOURT and the Railway Embankment on the N. whilst the Fourth Company took up positions on the Railway S.-E. of SANCOURT.

E. of BLECOURT , the 16th and 14th C.I.Bns. leapfrogged the leading Battalion , on the right and left , respectively. The 16th C.I.Bn. pushed on rapidly towards CUVILLERS and the 14th , towards BANTIGNY. From this point on the enemy resistance increased. Artillery and Machine Gun Fire became intense , enemy Machine Guns being disposed in very great numbers on the high ground on the left beyond CUVILLERS and BANTIGNY. The 16th C.I.Bn. pushed on and captured CUVILLERS and actually worked its way 1000 yards N.-W. towards PAILLENCOURT. The 14th C.I.Bn. captured BANTIGNY. At this point the left flank was very exposed and was being cut up by Machine Guns and by Artillery firing at point-blank range. 3 enemy counter-attacks were beaten off by the 14th C.I.Bn. , by Rifle and Machine Gun Fire , many casualties being inflicted on the enemy. The position being held by 2 Battalions became untenable and in the face of enemy counter-attacks and under severe Fire from ABANCOURT , the Battalions withdrew until the Eastern outskirts of BLECOURT were reached. Orders were received that the Village of BLECOURT was to be held and a Company of the 15th C.I.Bn. was sent up to assist the 13th C.I.Bn. to do this. The enemy attacked again in force and our Line was forced back just W. of the Village where a strong stand was made. The Line so established was held and handed over , on relief , to the 6th C.I.B.

The 1st C.I.B. attacked on the left with the 1st C.I.Bn. and the 4th C.I.Bn. , right and left respectively. The 1st C.I.Bn. was held up on the Railway. The Eleventh Division (British) had been held up from the beginning by the Wire and the left flank of the 1st C.I.B. , was absolutely exposed and at the mercy of devastating Machine Gun Fire from the left. It was impossible to attempt to push forward and the Troops dug in. After dark the 1st C.I.B. was withdrawn to a Line 400 yards W. of the Railway where it was relieved by the 2nd C.I.B. during the night October 1st /2nd. The First Cdn. Division continued to hold the Line on a one Brigade Front , the 3rd C.I.B. on the right being relieved by the 6th C.I.B. during the night October 1st/2nd.

### **Action of No. 3 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM , M.C.) , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , supported the 3rd C.I.B. in their attack on October 1st and played an important part in the days Operations.

“M” Battery (Capt. DONALD) pushed forward with the 13th C.I.Bn. to positions E. of BLECOURT. When the counter-attacks compelled the Infantry to withdraw , the Guns of “M” Battery protected the endangered left flank and fired 6,000 Rounds covering the withdrawal. The Battery was subjected to very severe Artillery Fire during this action. 2 Guns were put out of action and casualties were heavy. “M” Battery withdrew to positions S. of SANCOURT , secured a fresh supply of Ammunition and disposed the Guns for defence against expected counter-attacks.

“J” Battery , (Lieut. WARNER) moved forward with the 16th C.I.Bn. and encountered heavy Fire E. of BLECOURT , one Gun being put out of action by Shell Fire. The remainder continued to advance to points just S. of CUVILLERS. When the Infantry withdrew , the Guns of this Battery assisted by providing covering Fire. In moving back , one of the Guns was nearly surrounded and after all the S.A.A. was expended , had to be abandoned. The Lock and Feed Block were first removed.

“L” Battery (Capt. PARKER) jumped-off with the 14th C.I.Bn. and advanced on the right of the Brigade area. One Section advanced to a point 500 yards N.-E. of BLECOURT. Low-flying enemy Aeroplanes were engaged with a captured enemy Machine Gun , 1000 Rounds being fired at these targets.

During the advance one Gun was put out of action , 1000 yards S. of BLECOURT. Another Gun got as far as 1000 yards E. of BLECOURT and fired 750 Rounds at Groups of Hostile Infantry assembling near ABANCOURT. This Gun was put out of action by a Shell which wounded the whole Crew , with the exception of one man.

2 Guns pushed forward to the Northern outskirts of CUVILLERS , from which place they engaged Parties of the enemy in BANTIGNY. On the enemy attacking in force , the Guns of “L” Battery continually covered the withdrawal of our Troops. Establishing positions N.-E. of SANCOURT , 4 of the Guns fired 4000 Rounds in a protective Barrage and enabled the Infantry to withdraw to the W. of BLECOURT. The other 4 Guns assembled just E. of BLECOURT , and finding 7 Officers and 125 O. R.s of the Infantry with 2 Lewis Guns at this point , Capt. PARKER , formed a Strong Point here. 5 enemy Machine Guns were brought in by Sgt. Mc CALL and mounted in defence. This point was strongly attacked by the enemy but held out for 4 hours. Runners were sent back to get assistance , but this was not forthcoming.

The Ammunition was all expended and the Troops holding this point withdrew to the Railway Line just E. of SANCOURT.

“L” Battery then took up defensive positions which they held until relieved by Guns of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. on October 3rd.

#### **Action of Reserve Guns , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

The advance of the 1st C.I.B. on the left of the Canadian Corps Attack was supported by No. 1 Company , C.M.G.C. , and by “B” , “H” and “K” Batteries from Divisional Reserve.

“H” and “K” Batteries advanced with the 1st C.I.Bn. on the right of Brigade Front.

“H” Battery under Lieuts. SHERINGHAM and CARTER encountered an enemy strong point 900 yards N.-E. of SANCOURT and the same distance N.-W. of BLECOURT. It engaged this at close range and expended 1500 Rounds in silencing its 4 Machine Guns. Two of these captured Guns were manned and fire was opened with 10 Guns on ABANCOURT STATION and Church and on numerous targets in the vicinity of ABANCOURT. Lieut. SHERINGHAM had gone forward to reconnoitre but was not seen again. Lieut. CARTER was wounded. The 2 Sections were now commanded by Sgt. CUTHBERTSON and Sgt. BOULET.

2 enemy Machine Guns firing from a small Trench were rushed and captured by Sgt. BOULET and Cpl. COLLYER who killed the Gunners with their Revolvers. 1500 Rounds were fired from these 2 captured Guns at enemy Planes which , lying low , had opened fire on our Guns and Crews. At dusk , our attack being held up and the flanks insecure , the Infantry withdrew under cover fire from the Guns of “H” Battery to a Road running N. from SANCOURT. When the Troops had established their Line on this Road , the Guns of “H” Battery were sited in defensive positions. 4500 Rounds were fired on the Railway as far as ABANCOURT STATION. Targets in the vicinity of ABANCOURT were also engaged with good effect.

“K” Battery (Lieut. KNILL) also advanced with the 1st C.I.Bn. , and in the face of enemy Machine Gun Fire came into action , expending 3000 Rounds on Enemy Machine Guns firing from BLECOURT , ABANCOURT and the Railway rear ABANCOURT STATION. 1500 Rounds were fired at an enemy 7.7 Battery firing from N. of BLECOURT. Lieut. KNILL was wounded here , as was Lieut. TURK , both by Machine Gun Fire. Sgt. FELL took charge of No. 2 Section. 2 Guns of “K” Battery were destroyed by enemy Shell-fire at 6:30 P.M. The others remained in positions until 6:00 P.M. when they withdrew to SANCOURT.

By 7:15 A.M. , 4 Guns of “K” Battery had been put out of action by Shell and Machine Gun Fire. The remaining 4 Guns , together with a captured German heavy Machine Gun were reorganized by Lieut. MORE and took up defensive positions in the Road running N. from SANCOURT. From these positions Parties of the enemy advancing from ABANCOURT were engaged and disposed after 500 Rounds had been Fired.

During the time the Battery was being reorganized , Lieut. MORE and Sgt. MANLEY encountered a Party of 40 Germans making their way towards ABANCOURT STATION. With some Men of the 1st C.I.Bn. they engaged this Party with Revolvers and Rifles , killing and wounding about 20 , the remainder escaping. A short time afterwards , Lieut. MORE and Sgt. MANLEY charged a small Trench , 1000 yards N.-E. of SANCOURT , with their Revolvers and captured 1 Officer and 17 men.

“B” Battery was held in Brigade Reserve N. of HAYNECOURT until 8:15 A.M. when 2 Guns were sent up to support the 3rd C.I.Bn. who were advancing to assist the 1st C.I.Bn. These Guns advanced to the N.-W. of SANCOURT and were later taken over by Lieut. FREEMAN to reinforce “H” Battery. At 10:45 P.M. the remaining 6 Guns of “B” Battery were disposed for defence N. and N.-E. of HAYNECOURT.

#### **Action of No. 1 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

“A” Battery , (Lieut. SHAUGHNESSY) moved forward with the 4th C.I.Bn. Heavy Machine Gun Fire was encountered after crossing the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. This advance continued for another 400 yards when it was found necessary to form a defensive flank , as the Division on the left was held up. Guns were mounted 1000 yards E. of EPINOY and 4000 Rounds were fired at Parties of the enemy on the left Divisional Front. The advance continued to the Sunken Road 1500 yards E. of EPINOY. At this place Sgt. HOLMES turned a captured Field Gun around and fired 20 Rounds point-blank at Parties of the enemy.

When the Infantry attack was held up the Battery Commander moved his Guns back to a point 500 yards W. of the Road running N. from SANCOURT , about 700 yards N.-W. of the Village. Good Fields of Fire were obtained here and 8000 Rounds were fired at Parties of the enemy about 1700 yards S.-W. of FRESSIES. At dusk the Guns took up positions for defence in depth of the high ground gained.

“D” Battery advanced with the Reserve Company of the 4th C.I.Bn. , No. 1 Section encountered severe Machine Gun Fire coming from the Railway Embankment W. of ABANCOURT. Guns were mounted and these targets engaged. The advance continued by short rushes from Shell-hole to Shell-hole , covered by the Guns of “A” Battery. 2600 Rounds were fired during this advance. No. 2 Section advanced on the right and , when about 1000 yards N.-E. of SANCOURT , brought 2 Guns into action against enemy Machine Guns in the Railway Embankment E. of ABANCOURT. This Section also advanced by rushes to the Sunken Road N. of SANCOURT , firing 1000 Rounds during the advance . on the advance being held up the Guns of “D” Battery took up defensive positions N.-E. of SANCOURT , which they held until relieved on October 3rd.

“C” Battery was in Brigade Reserve N. of HAYNECOURT throughout the day and furnished Carrying Parties to supply S.A.A. to “A” and “D” Batteries. At 4:15 P.M. , 3 Guns of “C” Battery fired on low-flying enemy Aeroplanes. After these 3 Guns had fired 7 Belts , Pte. J. W. Mc CARTHY , in charge of No. 8 Gun , succeeded in bringing down an enemy Plane flying at about 800 feet. This Plane crashed in flames on the S.-E. outskirts of EPINOY. At night , the Guns of “C” Battery were disposed for the defence of HAYNECOURT.

#### **No. 2 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

No. 2 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. was in Divisional Reserve. The Guns of this Company were sited in position for defence of the BLUE LINE of the attack on September 27th.

Headquarters , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , (Lieut.-Col. WATSON , D.S.O.) remained in the vicinity of QUEANT during the day.

#### **General Situation , Night , October 1st/2nd.**

The Operations of October 1st mark the end of Phase III of the Battle of CAMBRAI. At the conclusion of the day’s fighting , the 8th C.I.B. were holding the ground in the area between ST. OLLE and NEUVILLE-ST.-REMY to the E. and the MARCOING LINE as far N. as SAILLY to the West.

Guns of the Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. were disposed for defence in depth of this area.

The 5th and 6th C.I.B.s held the Front Line from the high ground overlooking MORENCHIES on the right , then bulging out into a Salient S. of CUVILLERS , then Northwards along the Road from MORENCHIES to BLECOURT to a point about 700 yards S.-E. of BLECOURT , thence W. of BLECOURT and E. of SANCOURT.

Guns of the Second , Fourth and First Battalions , C.M.G.C. were disposed for defence of this part of the Line.

The 2nd C.I.B. held the left of the Canadian Corps Front Line which ran in a Northerly direction about 400 yards W. of the Railway N. of SANCOURT.

Guns of No. 2 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. were disposed for defence behind the 2nd C.I.B.

The Infantry Reliefs , night October 1st/2nd had thinned out the Infantry strength very considerably and for this reason a very large number of Machine Gun Batteries were placed in the Line in anticipation of possible Counter-attacks. The Machine Guns attached to Units relieved remained in the Line also , practically doubling the normal Fire Power of the Defensive Batteries.

## **CAMBRAI**

### **PHASE IV : OCTOBER 2nd to OCTOBER 12th , 1918.**

#### **Introductory.**

##### **General Outline of Period.**

Phase III of the Battle of CAMBRAI ended with the relief in the Line of the Fourth Canadian Division and parts of the First and Third Canadian Divisions by the Second Canadian Division during the night October 1st/2nd. The remainder of the First Cdn. Division was relieved by the Eleventh Division (British) on the night October 2nd/3rd. The Canadian Corps Front was now held as follows :-

The Third Cdn. Division on the right with 1 Brigade in the Line from the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD to the CAMBRAI-DOUAI RAILWAY S. of TILLOY ; the Second Cdn. Division in the centre with 2 Brigades in the Line which extended to the Northern outskirts of BLECOURT ; the Eleventh Division (British) on the left continuing the Line to 1000 yards S. of AUBENCHEUL-au-BAC.

The First and Fourth Cdn. Divisions were in Corps Reserve.

The following few days , nothing occurred of particular moment on the Corps Front. The enemy counter-attacked once or twice but was usually beaten off. Our Machine Gun Batteries kept up Harassing Fire by day and night and close touch was maintained with the enemy by Infantry Outposts and Patrols.

The THIRD ARMY had crossed the CANAL de l' ESCAUT S. of CAMBRAI between CREVECOEUR and PROVILLE. Plans were now made to take CAMBRAI by Envelopment. This would be achieved in 2 Stages. The First Stage , the XVII Corps was to capture AWOIGNT from the S. The Canadian Corps assisted in this Operation by an Artillery Demonstration. In the Second Stage , the Canadian Corps was to cross the CANAL de l' ESCAUT , capture ESCAUDEUVRES , and join hands with the XVII Corps N.-E. of CAMBRAI.

This attack was launched on October 9th and was completely successful. Zero Hour was at 1:30 A.M. in order that the attack should be a complete surprise and at 3:35 A.M. the Third Division was in CAMBRAI. By 8:00 A.M. CAMBRAI was completely cleared of enemy Troops.

On October 10th , the Third Cdn. Division was relieved in the Line and withdrew to the INCHY-QUEANT area to rest and refit. The attack was continued by the Second Cdn. Division and the Eleventh Division (British) also by the Forty-ninth Division and Fifty-first (Highland) Division , which had come under the Canadian Corps. The enemy delivered a very strong counter-attack at 10:30 A.M. October 11th , supported by 7 Tanks. 6 of the Tanks were put out of action and the attack beaten off.

Meanwhile , during the night October 7th/8th , the First Cdn. Division relieved the Fourth Division (British) in the Line between PALLUEL and the RIVER SCARPE , coming under Orders of the XXII Corps. On October 11th , the Canadian Corps Front less the portion held by the Eleventh Division (British) , was handed over to the XXII Corps , the Second Cdn. Division , Forty-ninth and Fifty-first Divisions coming under command of the G.O.C. , XXXI Corps. At the same time , the G.O.C. , Canadian Corps took over the former XXXI Corps Front , the Fifty-sixth Division (British) and the First Cdn. Division coming under Canadian Corps. During the night October 11th/12th , the Second Cdn. Division was relieved E. of the IWUY-DENAIN Railway by the Fifty-first (Highland) Division. This was the situation on October 12th at the completion of the BATTLE of CAMBRAI.

#### **Preliminary Period , October 2nd to 8th , 1918.**

##### **Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 2nd to 8th.**

On the Canadian Corps Right , the 9th C.I.B. , Third Cdn. Division , on completion of relief by the 5th C.I.B. at 8:00 A.M. October 2nd , moved out to the area W. of the MARCOING LINE. At the same time , the 7th C.I.B. moved further W. to the area just W. of BOURLON WOOD.

From this time until the morning of October 9th , the 8th C.I.B. continued to hold the Line on a 2-Battalion Front , practically without change. During this period the Third Cdn. Division was holding , with their

Outposts , the CANAL just W. of CAMBRAI while the flank Divisions by a series of Minor Operations, gradually enveloped CAMBRAI from the N. and S.

When the Infantry of the Second Cdn. Division had settled down in their new positions , the Guns of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. relieved the Guns of the Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. supporting that portion of the Front taken over by the 5th C.I.B. This relief took place during the night October 2nd/3rd. At the conclusion of this relief the Guns of the Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. were disposed as follows :-

NO. 1 Company (Major HARTLEY , M.C. , M.M.) was in Forward Position supporting the 8th C.I.B. Its Guns were disposed as follows :-

“A” Battery – 800 yards W. of the junction of the BAPAUME and ARRAS ROADS , defending the right of the Brigade Front.

“B” Battery – 2 Guns 500 yards N.-E. of NEUVILLE-ST. REMY on the left of Brigade Front , the other 6 Guns being sited for Defence in Depth W. of these , the most Westerly Guns being about 1500 yards W. of NEUVILLE-ST. REMY.

“C” Battery – Behind “A” Battery , E. of the MARCOING LINE and N. of the BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD.

“D” Battery – from 800 yards to 1600 yards N.-E. of FONTAINE-notre-DAME , W. of the MARCOING LINE and N. of the BAPAUME ROAD.

No. 3 Company (Capt. BURNHAM) was in the Support Area and was disposed as follows :-

“J” Battery – In rear of “A and “C” Batteries , 4 Guns being 500 yards E. of SAILLY and 4 Guns from 500 to 1000 yards W. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , just E. of the MARCOING LINE.

“L” Battery – In rear of “B” Battery , just N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD , 1000 yards N.-W. of ST. OLLE.

“M” Battery – In rear of “D” Battery , about 1700 yards S.-W. of RAILLENCOURT.

“K” Battery – 1500 yards W. of RAILLENCOURT.

No. 2 Company (Major FOWLER , M.C.) was in Divisional Reserve , W. of BOURLON VILLAGE.

These Dispositions remained until October 8th. During the intervening period , the situation on the Divisional Front was unchanged and the Guns were not actively engaged.

### **Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 2nd to 6th.**

The Second Cdn. Division relieved a portion of the Third Cdn. Division , the whole of the Fourth Cdn. Division and a portion of the First Cdn. Division in the Line , on the night October 1st/2nd. On the right , the 5th C.I.B. took over the Line from the CAMBRAI-DOUAI Railway , 500 yards S. of TILLOY , to a point about 800 yards S. of CUVILLERS. The 6th C.I.B. took over the Line from this point N. to a Line through BLECOURT and SANCOURT , both inclusive.

The situation on the Second Cdn. Division Front remained unchanged until the evening of October 6th. At 6:00 P.M. October 5th , the enemy delivered an attack in considerable strength against the positions held by the 5th C.I.B. , W. of PONT d’ AIRE. This attack was repulsed without any of the enemy reaching our Line. A previous counter-attack had been made on October 4th at 10:00 A.M. This was directed against the Front held by the 6th C.I.B. and was delivered down the BANTIGNY RAVINE. This attack was also repulsed with very heavy losses to the enemy.

“ From October 2nd to October 6th the Infantry Troops worked hard in the Line , both in constructing Lines of Defence and in gaining control of No Man’s Land and pushing back the enemy’s Outposts and Patrols. There is no doubt that the Operations carried out by the Division in the Final Phase of the Battle of CAMBRAI , would have been much more difficult if it had not been for the extremely fine work by the Patrols during these days.” (X)

(X) From the Second Cdn. Division “Report on Operations” carried out during the period 13th March to 11th November , 1918.

No Machine Gun Reliefs took place during the night October 1st/2nd but the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , was required to supply 1 Company to each of the relieved Brigades. During the night October 2nd/3rd , the Guns of the First , Third and Fourth Battalions , C.M.G.C. , occupying positions along the Second Cdn. Division Front were all relieved. At the conclusion of the relief , the Batteries of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , were disposed as follows :-

No. 1 Company – With the 5th C.I.B. on Second Cdn. Division Right.

“D” Battery , on right of 5th C.I.B. Front , 1000 yards E. and S. of TILLOY.

“C” Battery , on left of 5th C.I.B. Front , 1000 yards N.-E. and N. of TILLOY.

“A” Battery , 2 Guns on extreme left Front ; the other Guns in depth W. of these along the Brigade Northern Boundary.

“B” Battery , in rear 1500 yards E. of SAILLY.

No. 2 Company – With the 6th C.I.B. , on Second Cdn. Division Left.

“E” Battery , along the right of 6th C.I.B. Front near CHAPEL , 1500 yards S. of BLECOURT.

“G” Battery , along the left of the 6th C.I.B. Front from 1500 yards S.-E. to 500 yards S. of SANCOURT.

“F” Battery , along the Brigade Front , behind “G” Battery.

“H” Battery , in Reserve in the area S. and S.-W. of HAYNECOURT , N. and N.-W. of RALLEN COURT.

No. 3 Company – In Reserve , with the 4th C.I.B.

“J” Battery , between RAILLENCOURT and BOURLON.

“K” Battery , 1500 yards N.-E. of SAILLY.

“L” Battery , 500 yards N. and N.-E. of SAILLY.

“M” Battery , 2500 yards S.-W. of SANCOURT.

In addition to these , the Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade were mounted for defence in the Second Cdn. Division area. 3 Batteries held positions immediately S. of SANCOURT , from 500 yards to 1000 yards from that Village. 8 Guns were mounted just W. of the MARCOING LINE , 1500 yards S.-W. of SANCOURT , and 4 Guns just W. of these again. One Battery of the 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade was in Mobile Reserve , 2000 yards N. of BOURLON WOOD.

These dispositions ensured a very strong Defence in Depth in case of any powerful counter-attack. During the period which elapsed prior to the capture of CAMBRAI , the Batteries were not called on to do much Firing.

Lt.-Col. WEIR , M.C. , left the Battalion on October 2nd to proceed to ALDERSHOT to attend the Senior Officers Course. Major BASEVI , was temporarily in command of the Battalion until October 4th , when Major SANSOM , from the Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. arrived and assumed command.

Owing to the activity of our Infantry Patrols and owing to the width of No Man’s Land , the amount of Harassing Fire carried out by the Batteries was very small. Much work was done in preparing for the attack which was to take place shortly. Large Dumps of Ammunition were established along Roads in the Support Area , in convenient locations in the MARCOING LINE between SAILLY and SANCOURT and W. of RAILLENCOURT. During this period , there were many casualties. Hostile Shelling of the area was very heavy and , in the forward area , low-flying Bombing Planes were active.

#### **First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 2nd to 4th.**

During the night October 1st/2nd , the 3rd C.I.B. on the right of the First Cdn. Division Front , was relieved by the 6th C.I.B. On the left the 2nd C.I.B. took over the Line from the 1st C.I.B. During the night and the following day , no Machine Guns were withdrawn. On the contrary , the Batteries in Reserve were moved up into the Line and on the one-Brigade Front there were no fewer than 112 Machine Guns disposed in Depth. The Front Line held by the 2nd C.I.B. was from a point 800 yards W. and a little N. of

BLECOURT to a point W. and a little N. of ABANCOURT. On October 2nd , Patrols succeeded in pushing forward to the Railway from 500 to 1000 yards E. of this Line but were held up there by Machine Gun Fire from BLECOURT. During the night October 2nd/3rd , the 2nd C.I.B. was relieved by the 33rd Infantry Brigade of the Eleventh Division (British).

The Guns of No. 1 Company (Major E. R. MORRIS) , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. (less "B" Battery) remained in their positions in the vicinity of SANCOURT throughout the day. Several Thousand Rounds were expended in Harassing Fire , directed on enemy movement in the neighborhood of BLECOURT and also on Machine Gun Nests at ABANCOURT STATION and the Village of ABANCOURT. The Guns remained in their positions during the night and until 4:00 P.M. October 4th , when they were relived by Batteries from the Fourteenth Battalion , M.G.C. On relief , the Company (less "B" Battery) withdrew to the area W. of CAGNICOURT where they went into Bivouacs.

No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM , D.C.M.) , (less "H" Battery) , took up defensive positions for the protection of the BLUE LINE (Phase III) in case of hostile counter-attacks. At 8:15 A.M. October 3rd , this Company (less "H" Battery) moved off with Transport and proceeded by Route March to the Bivouacking area near CAGNICOURT which they reached at 11:00 A.M.

No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM , M.C.) , (less "K" Battery) , had been very hotly engaged in the fighting on October 1st. In some cases , whole Gun Crews had become casualties. In other cases the Crews had lost touch with their Batteries during the withdrawal. During the night October 1st/2nd , "L" and "M" Batteries had each recovered one Gun whose Crew had all become casualties. Early in the morning of October 2nd , another Gun and Crew of "L" Battery , which had lost its way during the withdrawal reported to Company Headquarters. Still another Gun of this Battery , with the only remaining Man of its Crew , was recovered during the day.

At 12:30 P.M. October 2nd , a Runner reported from Lieut. PALMER. This Officer had taken up positions with 3 Guns and Crews of "J" Battery W. of SANCOURT , when the withdrawal commenced , and had been trying to get in touch with his Battery H.Q. by means of Runners. He was immediately sent forward to "J" Battery. This gave each of the Batteries 7 Guns which were brought out on completion of the relief. "J" , "L" and "M" Batteries withdrew at 11:00 P.M. and marched to Bivouacs in the area between BUISSY and CAGNICOURT , arriving at 10:00 A.M. October 3rd.

The Guns in Divisional Reserve ("B" , "H" and "K" Batteries) remained in positions occupied in the evening of October 1st. During the day Sgt. CUTHBERTSON in charge of No. 1 Section employed a captured Heavy Machine Gun and fired 1000 Rounds on enemy movement N. of BLECOURT. 2000 Rounds were fired from a captured Light Machine Gun against low-flying Planes. These Batteries withdrew from their positions at 7:30 P.M. October 3rd on completion of relief by the Fourteenth Battalion M.G.C. They then proceeded by Route March to the Bivouacking Area in the vicinity of CAGNICOURT , where they rejoined their respective Companies.

In the Battle of CAMBRAI the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. took no further part. When the First Cdn.

Division came into the Line again , it was further N. , off the immediate Front of the CAMBRAI Attack.

(X)

(X) See Pages 489 , ff

### **The Capture of CAMBRAI , October 9th , 1918.**

#### **Preparations.**

The part played by the Third Cdn. Division in the actual Capture on CAMBRAI was the protection of the Right Flank of the Second Cdn. Division. Consequently , Zero Hour for the Third Cdn. Division Attack was decided by the G.O.C. , Second Cdn. Division. He in turn was guided by the movements of the XVII Corps of the Third Army which was attacking CAMBRAI from the S.

About 4000 yards S.-E. of CAMBRAI is the NIERGNIES-AWOIGNT SPUR. This was one of the Objectives of the XVII Corps. During the night following the capture of this SPUR , the Second Cdn.



Division would attack with the object, first , of crossing the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and then joining up with the XVII Corps E. of CAMBRAI. To achieve this , the 5th C.I.B. would attack through MORENCHIES to the CANAL Crossing at PONT d' AIRE and the 6th C.I.B. would secure the Bridgehead at RAMILLIES.

In support of this attack , the Third Cdn. Division would advance at the same hour as the Second and would capture the Railway Embankment and Slag Heap E. of NEUVILLE ST. REMY and some houses situated W. of MORENCHIES. In this way the right flank of the Second Cdn. Division would be protected. To ensure the complete protection of this flank , the 7th C.I.B. was moved to the area occupied by the Reserve Brigade of the Second Cdn. Division prior to the attack. In case of an enemy counter-attack , the 7th C.I.B. would come under Orders of the G.O.C. , Second Cdn. Division. In addition to this , the Third Cdn. Division would establish Bridgeheads over the CANAL wherever possible in order to allow the Engineers to commence working on the repair of the permanent Bridge.

On the morning of October 8th , word was received that the Twenty-fourth Division (British) on our left had commenced their attack on the S. of CAMBRAI. The NIERGNIES-AWOIGNT Bridge was captured by the XVII Corps , although AWOIGNT was not held. It was expected then that the attack on the CANAL would be made soon after dark on October 9th but this was not done.

The enemy maintained very heavy Fire on our forward positions up to Midnight. The W. Bank of the CANAL was subjected to an intense Bombardment by Trench Mortars located in CAMBRAI. After several changes , Zero Hour was finally fixed for 1:30 A.M. October 9th. The heavy Harassing Fire maintained by the enemy on our forward area slackened perceptibly soon after Midnight and by 1:00 A.M. the situation was quiet.

### **Third Canadian Division Attack.**

At 1:30 A.M. our Barrage opened and the Troops of the Third and Second Cdn. Divisions attacked. The Order of Battle is shown in the Table which follows :-

#### **Canadian Corps Order of Battle ; October 9th.**

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Third Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right.	Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.
8th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Front	Nos. 1 and 2 Companies with Indirect Fire.
5th C.M.R.	Brigade Right	
4th C.M.R.	Brigade Left	
Second Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Left.	Second Battalion , C.M.G.C.
5th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Right	Nos. 1 and 2 Companies "L" Battery "B" Battery "D" Battery
26th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	
25th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	
22nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
24th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
6th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Left	No. 2 Company "E" Battery
31st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	
29th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	
27th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	
28th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	

On the Third Cdn. Division Front , the 4th C.M.R. attacked at Zero Hour , 1:30 A.M. October 9th , and by 2:30 A.M. had reached all of its Objectives , via , the Railway Embankment and the Slag Heap , E. of NEUVILLE ST. REMY and the houses W. of MORENCHIES. Immediately after the commencement of

the attack it was obvious that the enemy had withdrawn and that no great resistance would be encountered. No Flares were sent up by the enemy and there was practically no retaliation to our Barrage either from his Machine Guns or Artillery. The G.C.O. , 8th C.I.B. decided to ignore the Artillery , Machine Gun and Smoke Barrages that had been organized and at 2:30 A.M. ordered the 5th C.M.R. on the left to push forward and cross the CANAL. These Battalions advanced and no opposition was met with. At 5:30 A.M. the leading Troops of the 8th C.I.B. entered CAMBRAI.

At 8:00 A.M. the Third Cdn. Division had gained the Eastern end of CAMBRAI without casualties. Before mid-day , a Line of Posts was established running N. and S. along the Eastern outskirts of CAMBRAI , and during the evening the 8th C.I.B. were notified that they might withdraw. No relief was necessary , and the Plan of Attack had resulted in the Divisions on our right and left coming together E. of CAMBRAI.

On October 10th , the Third Cdn. Division withdrew from the Line , the Fifty-first Division (British) taking over their area. The 7th C.I.B. withdrew to the area just W. of QUEANT , the 9th C.I.B. to the neighborhood of PRONVILLE N. of QUEANT and the 8th C.I.B. to the area W. of INCHY-en-ARTOIS.

#### **Action of Third Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

In connection with the attack of the 8th C.I.B. on CAMBRAI , Nos. 1 and 2 Companies , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. were detailed to carry out Indirect Fire on targets in CAMBRAI from Zero Hour to Zero plus 90 minutes. From the statement of Prisoners and from the lack of enemy opposition , it was from the first apparent that the enemy had retired from CAMBRAI. Consequently , this Program was abandoned and the Guns did not shoot.

On October 10th , Battalion H.Q. and all Companies of the Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. moved back to the rear , concentrating at a point about 2000 yards N.-E. of QUEANT.

#### **Second Canadian Division Attack.**

On the Second Cdn. Division Front , there were no indications up to Zero Hour that the enemy resistance would not be considerable. During the morning and afternoon of October 8th , a large number of Troops had been seen entering CAMBRAI. Reports from the XVII Corps on the right stated that stubborn resistance had been encountered in their attack on the NIERGNIES-AWOIGNT RIDGE. It appeared probable that the enemy would strongly resist any efforts to cross the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and a counter-attack from ESWARS and CUVILLERS might be expected. Every precaution was taken against these eventualities. A strong Machine Gun protection of the left was arranged , the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade being attached to the 6th C.I.B. for this purpose. The 7th C.I.B. of the Third Cdn. Division was also brought up in readiness to support the Second Cdn. Division in case of need. During the night October 8th/9th 1000 Gas Drums were projected into the BANTIGNY Valley and this effectually prevented any concentration of Troops in that area.

At 1:30 A.M. October 9th the attack was launched. The 5th C.I.B. attacked with the 26th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 25th C.I.Bn. on the left. The 22nd C.I.Bn. followed in the rear of the 26th and formed a defensive flank facing CAMBRAI. The Bridges at PONT d' AIRE were rushed. The Bridge over the Western Spill-way had been destroyed but our Troops managed to scramble across and save the remaining Bridges from destruction. At 3:35 A.M. the 5th C.I.B. was well established on the Eastern Bank of the CANAL and at 8:00 A.M. held positions on the high ground E. and N.-E. of CAMBRAI and E. of ESCAUDOEUVRES.

At 10:00 A.M. this Brigade advanced in a N. Easterly direction towards NAVES. At this time , the Southern Boundary of the Second Cdn. Division was changed to the CAMBRAI-NAVES Road. The 5th C.I.B. was held up in front of NAVES and S.-E. of THUN-ST. MARTIN. There was a Gap on the left of their Line between their left flank and the right flank of the 6th C.I.B. This Gap was filled by Guns of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C.

#### **Action of Nos. 1 and 3 Companies , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C.**

Nos. 1 and 3 Companies , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. were attached to the 5th C.I.B. for the Operation of October 9th. These Guns were allotted the following special Tasks :-

“L” Battery (No. 3 Company) was to operate at Zero Hour with the 26th C.I.Bn. on the right. When this Battalion had made good its Objectives , “L” Battery was to take up positions N.-E. of CAMBRAI to protect the right flank of the Battalion and to cover the Eastern exits of CAMBRAI. On the 4th C.I.B. passing through , “L” Battery would advance in support of the 20th C.I.Bn. and assist the Battalion in protecting the left flank of the 4th C.I.B.

“B” Battery (No. 1 Company) was to operate in conjunction with the 25th C.I.Bn. on the left of the 5th C.I.B. Front. When this Battalion reached its Objective , “B” Battery was to take up two 4-man Gun positions E. of ESCAUDOEUVRES , 4 Guns N. of the CAMBRAI-DENAIN Railway to fire N. to N.-E. , and 4 Guns S. of the Railway firing N.-E. , E. and S.

“D” Battery (No. 1 Company) from its present position E. of TILLOY , was to protect the right flank of the 22nd C.I.Bn. by Harassing Fire during the night October 8th/9th , and by taking advantage of all targets of opportunity during the advance.

No. 3 Company was to cooperate also with the 4th C.I.B. which was to advance through the 5th C.I.B. and to attack S. Eastward to connect up with the THIRD ARMY on the right. This Second Phase was not carried out owing to the rapidity of the advance of the Troops on the right.

The Guns of “A” , “C” and “D” Batteries remained in the positions occupied by them on October 6th and described above. (X)

The 2 Mobile Batteries (“B” and “L”) with Guns and Equipment on Pack Animals , followed the 25th C.I.Bn. closely until the low ground near the CANAL was reached. Here , they remained until the 25th C.I.Bn. was firmly established on its Objectives. The Batteries then moved forward.

“B” Battery (Lieut. CREIGHTON) took up positions on the high ground in the vicinity of the HALT on the Railway E. of ESCAUDOEUVRES.

“L” Battery was established on the Spur running N.-E. from CAMBRAI STATION , to protect the Southern flank of the 5th C.I.B. This Battery engaged numerous targets and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. “L” Battery also supported by Direct Overhead Fire the attack of an Infantry Company on the FACTORY 2500 yards S.-E. of ESCAUDOEUVRES. At 12:30 P.M. , “L” Battery was withdrawn from the 5th C.I.B. as No. 3 Company at this time came under Orders of the 4th C.I.B.

During the afternoon “A” and “B” Batteries pushed on and occupied positions on the high ground 1500 yards S.-W. of NAVES , just N. of the NAVES ROAD and on the high ground S.-W. of ST. HUBERT. At 4:00 P.M. the Guns of No. 1 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , and the Guns of BRUTINEL’S Brigade supported the 5th C.I.B. in their attack on the Line of Rifle Pits in front of NAVES. The enemy Wire was too strong here and the Infantry were held up . The 4th C.I.B. received Orders to attack from this Line on the morning of October 10th.

(X) See Page 469.

## **6th C.I.B. Attack.**

The 6th C.I.B. launched their attack at 1:30 A.M. October 9th. The enemy was completely surprised and was caught in the midst of a withdrawal across the CANAL de l’ ESCAUT. Resistance was slight , RAMILLIES was captured at 2:25 A.M. Patrols were in BLECOURT , BANTIGNY and CUVILLERS by 6:00 A.M. and at 11:15 A.M. ESWARS was clear of the enemy. The right flank was pushed out and touch was gained with the 5th C.I.B. The Eleventh Division (British) on the left had encountered strong resistance from ABANCOURT and the vicinity of BANTIGNY. This for a time , threatened to expose the left flank of the 6th C.I.B. The resistance was overcome however , and the Eleventh Division (British) advanced rapidly. The 29th C.I.Bn. on the 6th C.I.B. left was squeezed out and came into Support. At 6:00 P.M. a firm Line was established.

The general situation at night , October 9th/10th was that the attack was held up E. of a Line CARNIERES-CAGNONCLES-NAVES and S. of THUN-ST. MARTIN. On the right the 5th C.I.B. held the Line in front of NAVES with the 26th C.I.Bn. and the 25th C.I.Bn. The 6th C.I.B. was astride the CANAL , its right flank , the 27th C.I.Bn. resting on the CAMBRAI-IWUY ROAD , 1000 yards in rear of the 5th C.I.B. The Gap thus formed was covered by the Batteries of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. From here the Line continued in a North-westerly direction to ESWARS , the left of the Line being held by the 31st C.I.Bn. The Eleventh Division (British) continued the Line N. to PAILLENCOURT (inclusive). Patrols of the 6th C.I.B. were in THUN-LEVEQUE.

### **Machine Guns Cooperating With 6th C.I.B.**

No. 2 Company (Major Mc CORKELL) , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , (32 Guns) together with 40 Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade supported the attack made by the 6th C.I.B. No Rolling Barrage was arranged. The Artillery was firing a series of "Crashes" into localities where an organized resistance was expected and the Machine Guns were to engage selected targets with Harassing Fire.

"E" Battery , No. 2 Company was detailed to advance with the 6th C.I.B. , in close support of the 27th C.I.Bn. Its Guns were placed on the Spur formed by the high ground between CUVILLERS and RAMILLIES. The closest liaison was established between Machine Gun Companies and Infantry Brigades.

The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade Guns carried out vigorous Harassing Fire during the night October 8th/9th on BANTIGNY Village and CUVILLERS firing from positions 1000 yards N. of SANCOURT. At 1:30 A.M. , "D" Battery , 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade took up positions 1000 yards S.-E. of SANCOURT and opened Fire on BANTIGNY until 6:00 A.M. At 8:30 A.M. , "A" and "C" Batteries of this Brigade moved to positions on the N.-W. outskirts of ABANCOURT , protecting the left flank of the 6th C.I.B. At 9:30 A.M. , "D" Battery moved again to positions 1000 yards S. of CUVILLERS , protecting the right flank of the 6th C.I.C.

At 10:00 A.M. October 9th , Orders were received to relieve the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade. At 12:30 P.M. , No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. was carrying out this relief. The rapid retirement of the enemy obviated the necessity for the completion of the relief and the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade was ordered to withdraw.

### **No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Joins 4th C.I.B.**

As already stated the 4th C.I.B. was originally intended to follow the 5th and 6th C.I.B.s across the CANAL and , attacking S.-E. to join up with the THIRD ARMY on the right. The rapid advance of the latter however rendered this Operation unnecessary. Consequently the 4th C.I.B. moved forward to the area MORENCHIES-RAMILLIES and took up positions E. of the CANAL. This Brigade had not rested during the night October 8th/9th and was now ordered to take all the rest possible prior to launching an attack on the morning of October 10th.

No. 3 Company (Major Mc CAMUS) , M.C.) , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. was withdrawn to the 4th C.I.B. area in readiness to go forward in support to this Brigade on the morning of October 10th.

"L" Battery , during the night October 9th/10th was protecting the left flank of the 4th C.I.B. and was heavily Shelled. The Order to withdraw was given after 18 casualties had been suffered and 3 Machine Guns put out of action. Pte. A. TOROUX made several trips carrying wounded comrades to the rear. ESCAUDEUVRES was reeking with Gas and many houses were burning. Despite this , he made one last trip back through the Village to find a Man who was reported mortally wounded. He found him in a locality which was being bombarded with Gas Shells. Working without his Gas Mask , he improvised a Tourniquet , bound the wounded Man's leg thus saving his life. He then carried him to the rear and collapsed from exhaustion and the effect of Gas.

## **Operations , October 10th and 11th , 1918.**

### **Plan of Attack for October 10th.**

Orders were issued for the Canadian Corps to attack at 6:00 A.M. October 10th. On the right , the Twenty-fourth Division (British) was attacking at 5:30 A.M. The Second Cdn. Division held the whole of the Canadian Corps Front. The 4th C.I.B. was to attack on the right and the 6th C.I.B. on the left. The right flank of the 4th C.I.B. rested on the CAMBRAI-SAULZOIR ROAD , inclusive , and the left flank of the 6th C.I.B. was on the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. The First Objective was the Village of NAVES and the SPUR 1000 yards E. of it , the junction of the RIVER ERCLIN and the GRAND RIOT and thence the RIVER ERCLIN to its junction with the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. The Second Objective was the Ridge 1,1/2 miles N.-E. of the RIVER ERCLIN (i.e. , the IWUY SPUR) and the Village of IWUY , inclusive.

BRUTINEL'S Brigade was to cooperate with the Second Division , pushing along the main road towards SAULZOIR and N. of IWUY , if practicable. Prior to Zero the 31st C.I.Bn. entered the Village of THUN-LEVEQUE. This Battalion quickly cleared the enemy from this Village and established Posts along the Western Bank of the CANAL. The following Table shows the Battle Order of attacking Battalions on October 10th :-

**Canadian Corps Order of Battle ; October 10th.**

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Second Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Front.	Second Battalion , C.M.G.C.
4th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Right	No. 3 Company
19th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"J" Battery
18th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"M" Battery
20th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	"K" Battery
21st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve Left	"L" Battery
6th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Left.	No. 2 Company
28th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"F" Battery
29th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	
31st C.I.Bn. (X)	Brigade Support	
27th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
5th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Reserve	No. 1 Company
(X)	Engaged in Minor Operation Prior to Zero.	

**Action of No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 10th (with 4th C.I.B.)**

The attack was launched at 6:00 A.M. with the 19th C.I.Bn. on the right , attacking in a Northeasterly direction towards NAVES and supported by Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage. Very little resistance was met until reaching old Trenches 1000 yards S.-E. of THUN-ST. MARTIN , where heavy Machine Gun Fire made further advance impossible until the Brigade on the left was able to push forward. The 18th C.I.Bn. was held up by this Fire and could not cross the River. Orders were sent to the 19th C.I.Bn. which pushed forward and crossed the River on the extreme right and gained the Road running W. from the BEETROOT FACTORY , just E. of the River. Here again very severe Machine Gun Fire was encountered from strong enemy positions E. of IWUY.

The 20th C.I.Bn. in support on the right , closely followed the 19th C.I.Bn. and when the latter had secured the Objective , via the high ground 1500 yards S.-E. of IWUY , the 20th C.I.Bn. established itself in strong positions along the Road 500 yards E. of the RIVER ERCLIN.

On the left , the 18th C.I.Bn. improved its positions and established itself along the W. Bank of the RIVER immediately S. of IWUY with its left flank on the CAMBRAI-IWUY ROAD. The 21st C.I.Bn. in Reserve took up positions behind the 18th C.I.Bn. along the CAMBRAI-IWUY ROAD from 1000 to 1500 yards N.-W. of NAVES. The 4th C.I.B. advanced during the day a distance of 5000 yards.

No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. cooperated with the 4th C.I.B. During the early Stages of the advance , the right of the 4th C.I.B. was covered by "K" Battery , which filled in the Gap existing between this Brigade and the Twenty-fourth Division (British) on its right. "M" Battery moved to the Railway S. and S.-W. of IWUY , from where it could enfilade the EROLIN RIVER. "J" Battery in support of the 19th C.I.Bn. occupied the high ground N.-W. of NAVES between the NAVES-IWUY and the NAVES-SAULZOIR ROADS. "M" Battery was also able to cover the Dump S.-W. of IWUY at which place the enemy was resisting strongly and was inflicting many casualties on the 6th C.I.B. Captain NORRIS , O.C. "M" Battery opened up with 4 of his Guns on this point and the situation was cleared.

At 1:30 P.M. , "J" and "M" Batteries supported the Battalions attacking E. from the ERCLIN RIVER. This attack was held up , the enemy's positions being exceedingly strong and the ground favouring the Defence.

The 21st C.I.Bn. had pushed through on the left to a point half-way between IWUY and RIEUX. The 18th C.I.Bn. came up and, passing on the right of the 21st C.I.Bn. went forward to attack the IWUY SPUR. "L" Battery supported this advance. The Guns of "K" Battery and one Battery of BRUITEL'S Brigade which had taken up a position on the SAULZOIR ROAD E. of RIEUX, also fired in support of this attack. No appreciable advance was made before nightfall, owing chiefly to lack of Artillery Support.

#### **Action of No. 2 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. (with 6th C.I.B.)**

Prior to Zero the 31st C.I.Bn. drove the enemy out of THUN-LEVEQUE, captured the Town, and established their Line along the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. The 28th and 29th C.I.Bns. were to attack right and left respectively. Their jumping-off point was the Line reached by the 27th C.I.Bn. E. of the CANAL on the evening of October 9th. The distance to be covered by these Battalions made their arrival at the Assembly Area late. On account of this the 27th C.I.Bn. moved off at Zero Hour keeping touch with the 4th C.I.B. on the right, until overtaking the other 2 Battalions which passed through. THUN-ST. MARTIN was captured by the 29th C.I.Bn. but the whole Line was held up about 10:30 A.M. 1000 yards W. of the RIVER ERCLIN by Machine Gun Fire from enemy Dumps on the W. Bank of the River and in IWUY. On word being received that the 4th C.I.B. had crossed the River the 28th C.I.Bn. was sent forward to attack N.-W. along the Bank of the River. If this attack proved successful the 29th C.I.Bn. and the other 2 Companies of the 28th C.I.Bn. were to cross the River and take IWUY, supported on the left flank by the 31st C.I.Bn. Owing to the strength of the enemy's resistance, however, this attack did not progress and at nightfall the attacking Battalions were very little E. of the ERCLIN RIVER.

No. 2 Company (Major Mc CORKELL), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. assisted the 6th C.I.B. in their attack. "F" Battery left its positions just S.-E. of SANCOURT and proceeded to RAMILLIES, crossing the CANAL de l' ESCAUT at 7:00 A.M. Touch was established here with the Infantry Battalions in a Sunken Road 1500 yards E. of the CANAL at RAMILLIES. At 3:30 P.M. No. 1 Section of "F" Battery supported a flank attack on IWUY from a point 2000 yards S.-E. of that Town. No. 2 Section of this Battery, at the same, supported a frontal attack on THUN-ST. MARTIN. The enemy was holding IWUY in strength and it was decided to await Artillery Support before renewing the attack. At this time Lieut. PRICE was wounded and Lieut. URQUHART assumed command of "F" Battery. The Infantry was held up by German Machine Gun Fire just S. of THUN-ST. MARTIN and our Machine Guns engaged these Nests. The enemy retired in the direction of IWUY. Although it was impracticable at this time to continue the attack on IWUY, the enemy's position there was precarious and it was obvious that he would have to retire or surrender. Our Line at nightfall October 10th, was at a point not more than 1500 yards S.-E. of IWUY and from that point almost encircled the Village, the left flank resting on the CANAL de l' ESCAUT 1500 yards N.-W. of IWUY.

#### **Plan of Attack for October 11th.**

During the fighting of October 10th, the Eleventh Division (British) on the left had made good the ground from PAILLENCOURT to ESTRUN and the whole area between the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and the CANAL de la SENSEE was free of the enemy. This rendered the left flank of the Second Cdn. Division secure and Troops were able to advance along the Western bank of the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and enfilade the enemy's defences S.-W. of IWUY. On the right the twenty-fourth Division (British) had taken the Village of RIEUX, but had not been able to advance very far beyond it. Orders were issued for the advance on the Second Cdn. Division Front to be resumed at 9:00 A.M. October 11th.

The 4th C.I.B. on the right was to advance on AVESNES-le-SEC (inclusive) and LIEU-ST. AMAND (exclusive) and then continue toward NOYELLES and make good the Crossing over the RIVER SELLE in the vicinity. The 6th C.I.B. on the left was to attack IWUY and then advance on HORDAIN and LIEU-ST. AMAND both inclusive. The 5th C.I.B. remained in Support. The Forty-ninth Division (British) on the right of the 4th C.I.B. was to establish a Bridgehead over the RIVER SELLE. The Eleventh Division (British) on the left of the 6th C.I.B. was to advance N.-W. and clear up the ground between the IWUY-DENAIN Railway and the CANAL de l' ESCAUT as far as BASSEVILLE. BRUTINEL'S Brigade was to cooperate. During the night October 10th/11th, the Fifty-ninth Division (British) relieved a portion of the 4th C.I.B. and was in position to attack at 9:00 A.M. October 11th.

The Order of Battle for October 11th is shown on the following Table :-

**Canadian Corps Order of Battle ; October 11th.**

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Second Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Front.	Second Battalion , C.M.G.C.
4th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Right	No. 3 Company
21st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"L" Battery
20th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"K" Battery
18th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"M" Battery
19th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
6th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Left	No. 2 Company
28th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	
29th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	
27th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve Right	
31st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve Left	
5th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Reserve	No. 1 Company

**Action of No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. (with 4th C.I.B. October 11th.)**

The attack started at 9:00 A.M. Almost immediately , the enemy Barrage came down across the whole Front , being particularly severe in the vicinity of THUN-ST. MARTIN. The enemy's Machine Gun Fire was also intense. This lasted for less than half an hour when his Fire slackened and he was reported to be in retirement E. From IWUY. At 11 A.M. the enemy counter-attacked in strength with Infantry supported by 7 Tanks against the 4th C.I.B. and the Forty-ninth Division (British). The latter Division was driven back almost to their Jumping-off positions and the Front of the 4th C.I.B. was pushed back slightly. The 4th C.I.B. threw out a defensive flank and assisted the Forty-ninth Division to reorganize their attack.

"Thanks to the good work done by a Battery of the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , which engaged the enemy's Tanks with 3 Guns , and the accompanying Infantry with 4 Guns , at a range of rather less than 600 yards , the surviving Tanks finally retired to the N.-W. of the Ridge behind which they took up a defensive position and allowed their Infantry to reform." (X)

Artillery was then brought up and the situation on the right flank was re-established. At 8:00 P.M. the 4th C.I.B. in spite of heavy casualties , had made good the top of the IWUY SPUR and were in touch on their right with the Forty-ninth Division (British). During the night October 11th /12th , the 4th C.I.B. was relieved by Brigades of the Fifty-first (Highland) Division and moved into Billets in ESCAUDOEURES.

(X) Second Cdn. Division Narrative of Operations , March 13th to November 11th , 1918.

No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. supported the attack of the 4th C.I.B. Owing to the strength of the enemy's position in IWUY , the right of the 4th C.I.B. advanced faster than the left. "L" Battery in support of the 21st C.I.Bn. on the right , took up positions on the CAMBRAI-DENAIN Railway , 200 yards S. of IWUY Station , and from this commanding position endeavoured to silence the enemy's Machine Gun Fire. Many casualties were suffered here. The O.C. "L" Battery , Capt. FROST was wounded in the head by a Machine Gun Bullet. Lieut. GARNEAU assumed command of the Battery. On the left , "K" Battery in support of the 20th C.I.Bn. obtained Direct Fire on enemy Machine Gun Nests and silenced them. Direct targets were also obtained around the Dump N.-E. of IWUY Station.

As the Infantry advanced up the IWUY SPUR , the enemy's resistance increased and , shortly after the Crest was passed , a counter attack supported by 7 Tanks developed as already described. Lieut. GARNEAU , in command of "L" Battery had 7 Guns left , one having been knocked out. He halted these Guns in a Turnip Field and went forward to reconnoitre. He found that one Tank , supported by about 700

Infantry , was advancing in his direction. Mounting his Guns in the lowest possible position he brought the Fire of the 4 right Guns to bear on the Tank while his 3 Guns on the left were directed on the Infantry accompanying the Tank , to the left of it. This arrangement brought Cross-Fire to bear of the approaching enemy Formation at a range of about 500 yards. The enemy's Infantry quickly broke and fled. The Tank fired a few Shells and a few bursts from its Machine Guns and then turned and followed its own Infantry to cover. During this Action , the Battery lost 2 Men killed. The casualties inflicted on the enemy numbered about 40. Our Infantry , meanwhile , formed up behind "L" Battery which took up defensive positions.

Shortly after noon , the Village of IWUY was finally cleared of the enemy and occupied by the 6th C.I.B. The Line of the 4th C.I.B. ran from here in a South-Easterly direction along Sunken Roads near the top of the SPUR. The Forty-ninth Division (British) were somewhat in rear on the right. The Gap was held by "K" Battery until 2:30 P.M. when the Forty-ninth Division drew up level.

At 3:30 P.M. another attack was made and , although suffering many casualties the 4th C.I.B. made good the Crest of this SPUR. This concluded the Operations for the night. The final positions held by the Batteries were :-

"L" Battery , on the right , close to the Crest of the Hill , 2000 yards S.-E. of IWUY.

"K" Battery , 1000 yards to the left of "L" Battery and just S. of IWUY Station.

"M" Battery , 4 Guns close to "K" Battery and 4 Guns 1000 yards S.-W. of these.

"J" Battery , in Reserve , 1500 yards N.-E. on NAVES.

No. 3 Company was relieved during the night October 11th/12th by the Fifty-first Battalion M.G.C. On relief , the Company withdrew to ESCAUDOEUVRES.

#### **Attack of the 6th C.I.B. October 11th.**

The 6th C.I.B. attacked at 9:00 A.M. October 11th. The General Plan was that the 28th C.I.Bn. on the right was to attack IWUY while the 29th C.I.Bn. , holding the Line to the CANAL on the left , made a demonstration to distract the enemy. When the 28th C.I.Bn. was firmly established in IWUY , the 29th C.I.Bn. was to advance to the RIVER ERCLIN , mopping up the area and then coming into Brigade Reserve. Meanwhile the 27th and 31st C.I.Bns. were to follow up the 28th C.I.Bn. closely and then attack through this Battalion , the 27th C.I.Bn. , advancing on the right to capture LIEU-ST. AMAND and the 31st on the left to take HORDAIN.

The 28th C.I.Bn. advanced and , by 11:00 A.M. had captured IWUY. The enemy put down a heavy Barrage as soon as the attack commenced and this caused the 27th and 31st C.I.Bns. some casualties in their Assembly Areas , just S.-W. of THUN-ST. MARTIN. These 2 Battalions could not move forward to their Jumping-off Line for the Second Stage of the attack as the 4th C.I.B. had been held back by the counter-attack already described. At 3:20 P.M. these Battalions were disposed in the Railway Cutting N.-E. of IWUY and on the N.-E. outskirts of the Village. Subsequently , as the 4th C.I.B. advanced , the 27th and 31st C.I.Bns. pushed forward their Line. At dusk , the Line ran about 1000 yards beyond IWUY on the N. and then turned S. where the 27th C.I.Bn was in touch with the 4th C.I.B. Meanwhile the 29th C.I.Bn. pushed forward and established their Line on the E. Bank of the RIVER ERCLIN.

The 6th C.I.B. was relieved during the night October 11th/12th by the 154th Brigade of the Fifty-first (Highland) Division. Relief being complete at 4:00 A.M. October 12th. On relief the 6th C.I.B. moved into Divisional Reserve in the ESWARA area.

The attack of the 6th C.I.B. was supported by No. 2 Company (Major Mc CORKELL) , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. Headquarters of this Company was moved during the early morning , October 11th , to CROIX ST. HUBERT , 500 yards S. of THUN-ST. MARTIN. The 6th C.I.B. was on the left of the Second Cdn. Division Front , and its advance was slow. The Batteries supported the attack on IWUY.

During the night October 11th/12th , No. 2 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. was relieved by Guns of the Fifty-first Battalion , M.G.C. On relief , the Company withdrew to RAMILLIES.



### **Line Redistributed ; Situation Night October 11th/12th.**

The relief of the 6th and 4th C.I.B.s by the Fifty-first (Highland) Division took place along the whole Second Cdn. Division Front. The actual Line handed over only extended as far W. as the IWUY-DENAIN Railway. The Second Cdn. Division was ordered to attack on the Front from this Railway W. to the CANAL de l' ESCAUT on October 12th in conjunction with the Fifty-first Division. It was arranged that the British troops should relieve the whole Front as detailed above and that the 5th C.I.B. from Reserve should attack through the Fifty-first Division on their Front , between the IWUY-DENAIN Railway and the CANAL de l' ESCAUT at 12:00 noon October 12th. The 5th C.I.B. marched up to their Assembly positions during the night October 11th/12th and the attack was launched as arranged.

When Nos. 2 and 3 Companies , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. were relieved No. 1 Company was already in Billets in MORENCHIES. During the morning of October 12th , this Company moved forward in readiness to support the attack of the 5th C.I.B. The Acting O.C. , Capt. STONEHEWER , established his Headquarters in the Chateau N.-W. of THUN-ST. MARTIN.

### **First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 3rd to 12th , 1918.**

#### **October 3rd to 7th.**

The First Cdn. Division was relieved by the Eleventh Division (British) at 11:45 P.M. October 2nd/3rd. On relief the 1st C.I.B. withdrew to the HENDECOURT-CAGNICOURT Area , the 2nd C.I.B. to the BUISSY-BARALLE Area and the 3rd C.I.B. to MARQUION.

No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM , M.C.) First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , withdrew their Mobile Batteries at 11:00 P.M. October 2nd and proceeded to the area between BUISSY and CAGNICOURT.

No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM , M.C.) withdrew the 3 Mobile Batteries at 8:00 A.M. October 3rd and proceeded to the Bivouacking Area in the vicinity of CAGNICOURT.

No. 1 Company (Major E. R. MORRIS) was relieved by the Fourteenth Battalion , M.G.C. at 7:30 P.M. October 3rd , and on relief proceeded to CAGNICOURT , where the Company arrived at 4:00 A.M. October 4th.

“B” , “H” and “K” Batteries , in Divisional Reserve withdrew at 7:30 P.M. , on relief by Guns of the Fourteenth Battalion , M.G.C. On relief , these Batteries rejoined their respective Companies in the neighborhood of CAGNICOURT.

On October 3rd , Orders were received that the First Cdn. Division was to relieve the Fourth Division (British) in the Line from PALLUEL to BIACHE-ST.-VAASTE , i.e. on a Frontage of about 14,000 yards between the CANAL du NORD and the RIVER SCARPE. The Front was separated from the enemy by the flooded Valley of the TRINQUIS and SENSEE RIVERS. For this reason , it was thought that this relief would give the Division a Period of Rest.

On October the 6th the 2nd C.I.B. moved to the right of the Line on the SENSEE Front , relieving the 11th Brigade (British). The same day , the 3rd C.I.B. took over the left of the Line from the 12th Brigade (British). The 1st C.I.B. remained in Divisional Reserve in the HENDECOURT-CAGNICOURT Area. The command of the new Divisional Front passed from the G.O.C. , Fourth Division (British) to the G.O.C. , 1st Cdn. Division on October 7th at 10:00 A.M. , the 1st Cdn. Division coming under the Tactical Control of the XXII Corps. During the afternoon the 1st C.I.B. moved into the VIS-en-ARTOIS Area.

During these days , Companies of the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , (Lieut.-Col. WATSON , D.S.O.) remained in Billeting Areas , refitting and cleaning up. On being warned of the coming Infantry Relief , the new Area was reconnoitred and Bivouacking Areas arranged in the vicinity of CHERISY and VIS-en-

ARTOIS. No. 2 Company moved to Bivouacking Area in MONCHY during the afternoon of October 6th. At the same time , No. 3 Company moved to the Area between CHERISY and VIS-en-ARTOIS. No. 1 Company left CAGNICOURT at 2:00 P.M. October 7th and reached their Bivouacking Area on the Eastern outskirts of CHERISY at 7:00 P.M.

At 7:30 P.M. October 7th , No. 2 Company relieved “C” and “D” Companies of the Fourth Battalion , M.G.C. in the Line E. of ETAING. At 11:30 P.M. night October 7th/8th , No. 3 Company relieved “A” and “B” Companies of the Fourth Battalion , M.G.C. , in the Left Front Line. No. 1 Company was placed in Divisional Reserve. At 8:30 A.M. October 8th , Battalion Headquarters was established at les FOSSES FARM on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD S.-W. of MONCHY.

### **Operations , October 8th.**

The First Cdn. Division carried out a “Chinese” Attack under Instructions from the XXII Corps at 5:30 A.M. October 8th. This consisted of a Rolling Barrage commencing in front of our Outpost Line and moving forward to the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. Under this Barrage , the 13th C.I.Bn. pushed forward with the objective of enlarging a Bridgehead handed over to us N.-W. of ETAING. This was accomplished. A complete enemy Outpost consisting of 1 Officer and 23 Other ranks was captured and our Outposts were established in favourable positions.

In connection with this “Chinese” Attack , No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM , D.C.M.) First Battalion , C.M.G.C. fired 32,000 Rounds on enemy positions on the N. Bank of the River. There was no retaliation to this Barrage. On completion of their Barrage Tasks the Batteries were disposed behind the 2nd C.I.B. from right to left as follows :-

“G” Battery , defending the area from ECOURT-ST. QUENTIN to 200 yards S.-E. of LECLUSE.

“E” Battery , defending the area behind LECLUSE and including BOIS de RECCOURT.

“F” Battery , defending the area behind ETAING to ETERPIGNY.

“H” Battery , in rear of “F” Battery , covering DURY.

No. 2 Company’s H.Q. was at LECLUSE.

The Batteries of No. 3 Company fired 27,000 Rounds on their allotted Barrage Line between the hours of 5:30 A.M. and 6:30 A.M. October 8th. The enemy retaliation was slight. At the completion of the Barrage Tasks the Batteries were disposed as follows :-

“K” Battery , about 1000 yards E. of BOIRY-notre-DAME.

“L” and “M” Batteries , W. of JIGSAW WOOD.

“J” Battery , in rear at Eastern outskirts of BOIS du VERT.

No. 3 Company’s H.Q. was 1000 yards S.-E. of MONCHY.

### **Infantry Action , October 9th to 12th.**

The situation was normal during the day October 9th. A Barrage was put down at daylight , to feel out the strength of the enemy and to observe movement. Enemy retaliation to this Barrage was slight. Early in the morning of October 10th , the 3rd C.I.B. pushed out Patrols with the object of discovering the enemy’s Dispositions and , if possible , entering the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE and gaining touch with the 23rd Brigade (British) at VITRY. The 13th C.I.Bn. succeeded in penetrating the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE and SAILLY was taken. The 15th C.I.Bn. in endeavouring to effect a crossing on the Tow Path at BIACRE-ST. VASST , encountered heavy Machine Gun Fire and withdrew. In retiring to our Line , one Party of the 13th C.I.Bn. was cut off and overrun by the enemy , 2 Officers and about 50 O.R.s being taken prisoners.

At daybreak on October 11th , the Eight Division (British ) on our left , started an attack with the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE as their Objective. At 9:00 A.M. word was passed to all Units in the First Cdn. Division that the enemy was in full Retreat. The Brigades were ordered to push forward across the SENSEE and TRINQUIS RIVERS , drive in the enemy Rearguard and capture the high ground S. of the SCARPE.

The 2nd C.I.B. immediately sent the 7th C.I.Bn. forward. This Battalion made a bold attempt to cross the River on the LECLUSE-TORTEQUENNE ROAD but was met with heavy Machine Gun Fire. After 15 minutes Bombardment by our Artillery , under cover of which a Foot-bridge was thrown across the River ,

our Troops again pushed forward and the whole of the 7th C.I.Bn. was across the River and in touch with the 3rd C.I.B. on the left.

The 3rd C.I.B. advanced on the left of the 2nd C.I.B. with the 16th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 15th C.I.Bn. on the left.

From the time that the Brigades got in touch on the N. Bank of the River , the advance was steady. Slight resistance was encountered , this being from isolated Machine Gun Posts. By dusk , the First Cdn. Division was established on a Line , HAMEL-ESTREES-NOYELLE , all inclusive . thence to the SCARPE , about 1000 yards W. of BREBIERES.

At 5:00 P.M. October 11th , the XXII Corps Frontage passed to the Canadian Corps and the First Cdn. Division once again came under Orders of the G.O.C. , Canadian Corps. During the night October 11th/12th , the situation was quiet on the Corps Front. The 2nd and 3rd C.I.B.s were ordered to be in readiness to continue Operations in the morning of October 12th with the Objective of gaining Bridgeheads over the SENSEE CANAL.

#### **Action of First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 9th to 12th.**

Units of the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. had conformed to and assisted Infantry movements during this period. On October 9th , the situation was normal. Nos. 2 and 3 Companies , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. remained in their positions. No. 1 Company came into Divisional Reserve and remained in their Bivouacking Area E. of CHERISY.

During October 10th , "E" and "F" Batteries of No. 2 Company , located Night-firing positions and positions for 2 Sniping Guns. 2 of the Night-firing Guns were located at the Cemetery E. of ETAING and 2 more , about 500 yards E. of the first 2. These positions were complete at 7:00 P.M. and 27,500 Rounds S.A.A. were fired between 8:30 P.M. and 3:30 A.M. night October 10th/11th , on enemy Tracks , Cross-roads and Exits from TORTEQUENNE.

No. 3 Company remained in their positions during the day , October 10th.

At 8:00 P.M. October 11th , No. 1 Company in Divisional Reserve , moved to RECOURT , arriving there at 1:45 A.M. October 12th.

In connection with the advance of the Infantry on October 11th , No. 2 Company supported the 2nd C.I.B. "E" Battery moved forward with the 7th C.I.Bn. , one Section covering the advance with Direct Fire. When MONT BEDU was captured "E" Battery took up positions in front of TORTEQUENNE and MONT BEDU. At 6:40 P.M. this Battery was in touch with the 7th C.I.Bn. in LECLUSE and all the Guns were moving forward. At 10:15 P.M. , "E" Battery was disposed for defence in depth in positions in front of TORTEQUENNE.

"F" Battery with the 5th C.I.Bn. moved off at 10:00 P.M. October 11th , passing through ETERPIGNY , REMY and LONG LANE , to the Bridge E. of VALLEY WOOD. At 1:00 A.M. October 12th a halt was made about 500 yards W. of LECLUSE , where the Battery remained for the night.

"G" Battery assembled in the BOIS de RECOURT , with Orders to keep in touch with the 8th C.I.Bn.

"H" Battery , in Brigade Reserve was ordered to "Stand To". These 2 Batteries remained in their positions throughout the day.

On receiving word that the enemy was withdrawing , No. 3 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. was ordered to be in readiness to cross the River in support of the 3rd C.I.B. attack.

"J" and "L" Batteries concentrated with Transport at a location half-way between BOIRY and ETAING.

"J" Battery moved forward at 10:00 P.M. to the Pontoon Bridge at SAILLY. At 11:45 P.M. a halt was called at the Crossroads N. of SAILLY where the Limbers were unloaded and the stores man-handled up to positions about 1000 yards W. of NOYELLE where the Battery arrived at 1:45 A.M. October 12th.

"K" , "L" and "M" Batteries concentrated at their respective Battery Headquarters , ready to move forward at dawn October 12th.

No. 1 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. remained at RECOURT , preparing to go into the Line to relieve No. 3 Company on the relief of the 3rd C.I.B. which would probably take place during the night October 12th /13th.

### Casualties , Machine Gun Battalions , Battle of CAMBRAI.

The following Table shows Casualties suffered by the 4 Battalions of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps during the BATTLE of CAMBRAI , August 26th to October 11th inclusive.

Unit	Killed Officers - O.R.		Wounded Officers - O.R.		Missing Officers - O.R.		Total Officers - O.R.	
First Bn. C.M.G.C.	5	59	22	449	1	5	28	513 = 541
Second Bn. C.M.G.C.	3	58	12	389		12	15	459 = 474
Third Bn. C.M.G.C.	2	98	8	234		5	10	357 = 367
Fourth Bn. C.M.G.C.	5	52	17	351			22	403 = 425
<b>TOTAL</b>	15	267	59	1443	1	22	75	1732 = 1807

The following Table shows Casualties to Canadian Machine Gun Battalions during various Periods of the BATTLE of CAMBRAI.

Date (inclusive 1918)		Killed Off. – O.R.		Wounded Off.- O.R.		Missing Off. – O.R.		Total for Period. Off.– O.R.		Total for Battle. Off.- O.R.	
First Battalion C.M.G.C.	Aug. 26th to 31st.	1	9	2	67			3	76		
	Sept. 1st to 30th.	2	17	16	250			18	267		
	Oct. 1st to 11th.	2	33	4	132	1	5	7	170	28	513
Second Battalion C.M.G.C.	Aug. 26th to 31st.	3	24	8	163		12	11	199		
	Sept. 1st to 30th.		11	2	104			2	115		
	Oct. 1st to 11th.		23	2	122			2	145	15	459
Third Battalion C.M.G.C.	Aug. 26th to 31st.		22	2	59		3	2	84		
	Sept. 1st to 26th.		48		20				68		
	Sept. 27th to Oct. 2nd.	2	28	6	175		2	8	205	10	357
Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C.	Aug. 26th to 31st.										
	Sept. 1st to 30th.	5	48	17	319			22	367		
	Oct. 1st to 11th.		4		32			36		22	403
<b>TOTAL</b>		15	267	59	1443	1	22			75	1732

### Reinforcements.

During the BATTLE of CAMBRAI , August 26th to October 12th , Machine Gun Reinforcements were supplied to Active Units from an Advanced Reinforcement Depot. This Depot was established at AGNEZ-les-DUISANS for the early Phases , and later moved forward , with Canadian Corps Headquarters , to the QUEANT Area. As our Line advanced the Lorries of the C.M.M.G.M.T. Company were employed to convoy Reinforcements forward to Units.

In order to avoid unnecessary delays , the Advanced C.M.G.C.R.D. during this period was administered directly by the G.O.C. , C.M.G.C , and not , as in the AMIENS Operations , through the O.C. , Advanced C.C.R.C. An Administrative and Training Staff with Equipment was provided for the Advanced Machine Gun Depot from the C.M.G.C.R.D. at AUBIN-ST.-VAAST. Estimated Casualty Wires , as formerly , were sent by Units in the Field direct to the G.O.C.C.M.G.C. , who issued Orders direct to the Advanced Reinforcement. A copy of these dispatch Wires was forwarded to the O.C.C.M.G.C.R.D. , who at once sent forward Replacements to the Advanced Depot.

## DOUAI TO MONS

October 12th to November 11th , 1918.

### General Situation October 12th to 16th.

#### Introductory.

Operations of the Canadian Corps during the Period were divided into 3 stages, viz. , (1) the Advance from the CANAL de la SENSEE to VALENCIENNES-CONDE , October 12th to 29th , (2) the Operations leading up to and including the capture of VALENCIENNES , October 29th to November 2nd , (3) the Advance from VALENCIENNES to MONS , November 3rd to 11th.

The Battle Order of Canadian Corps through successive Periods from October 12th to November 11th is shown as follows:-

	LEFT		RIGHT
<b>OCT. 12th</b>	1st Cdn. Div. 56th Div. (British)	11th Div. (British)	2nd Cdn. Div.
<b>12th / 13th</b>	1st Cdn. Div.	56th Div. (British) 10th C.I.B. (4th Cdn.)	2nd Cdn. Div.
<b>14th / 15th</b>	1st Cdn. Div.	4th Cdn. Div.	2nd Cdn. Div.
<b>19th P.M.</b>	1st Cdn. Div.		4th Cdn. Div.
<b>22nd A.M.</b>	3rd Cdn. Div.		4th Cdn. Div.
<b>Nov. 7th to 11th</b>	3rd Cdn. Div.		2nd Cdn. Div.

On October 12th , the Corps was holding the front from the IWUY-DENAIN Railway at a point just E. of IWUY , W. and N.-W. along the CANAL de la SENSEE , to the RIVER SCARPE. 2 Canadian Divisions and 2 British Divisions were in the line: The Second Canadian Division on the Corps Right held the short Frontage between the IWUY- DENAIN Railway and the CANAL de l'ESCAULT; the Eleventh Division (British) continued the line from ESTRUN to FRESSIES; the Fifty-sixth Division (British) carried the Line on from FRESSIES to PALLUEL , and the First Canadian Division , on the Corps Left , held the Frontage from Palluel to the Left Corps Boundary , 2 miles S.-W. of DOUAI. The XXII Corps was on the Right of the Canadian Corps , and the VIII Corps on the Left.

During the last few days of the CAMBRAI Battle , our Line on this Section of the Front had been almost stationary , but it became increasingly apparent that the enemy was preparing to carry out a withdrawal on a large scale. Prisoners reported the evacuation of civilians and the removal or destruction of all Stores ; also that Roads and Railways had been prepared for demolition. These statements were confirmed by our Observers who reported numerous explosions and Fires behind the enemy lines.

Constant touch was maintained with the enemy to the N. Side of the CANAL de la SENSEE , and every sign of his impending withdrawal noted. Between October 12th and 16th the Divisions in the Line were rearranged , and , on October 17th , when our advance commenced , the Canadian Corps Front was held by the Second Cdn. Division on the Right , the Fourth Cdn. Division in the Centre and the First Cdn. Division on the Left.

### **Advance Begun Oct.17th.**

On October 17th , the enemy attitude was unusually quiet ; on the Front of the First Cdn. Division no reply was made to our daily Artillery Test Barrage. Patrols sent out on this Front succeeded in crossing the CANAL in several places , meeting with slight opposition. Attempts of the Second and Fourth Divisions to effect a crossing were met with considerable hostile Machine Gun Fire , but , by the evening of October 17th , all three Divisions had made good the N. Bank of the SENSEE CANAL. The enemy retired rapidly on the left on this day , and by nightfall the Fourth and First Divisions had penetrated an average depth of 3 ½ miles into the German Lines.

The Advance continued with varying speed on the following days. On October 19th , the Second Canadian Division squeezed out at NEUVILLE-sur-l'ESCAULT by the Fifty-first Division (British) on the Right and the Fourth Cdn. Division on the Left. On the morning of October 22nd , when the Canadian Corps had reached the General Line of the VALENCIENNES-ST. AMAND Road , the Third Cdn. Division passed through the First Cdn. Division. On the following day the Fourth and Third Divisions reached the line of the CANAL de l' ESCAULT from TRITH-ST.LEGER to its junction with the CANAL du JARD and the CONDE-MONS CANAL S. of CONDE.

The Canadian Corps Right or Southern Boundary during this Advance was the IWUY-DENAIN Railway from IWUY to NEUVILLE-sur-l'ESCAULT and the CANAL de l' ESCAULT from this point to TRITH ST.LEGER. The Corps Left or Northern Boundary was roughly a line drawn through CORBEHEM-S.E. outskirts of DOUAI-MARCHIENNES (incl.) – along the SCARPE RIVER to ST.AMAND (excl.) – ODOMEZ (excl.) the CANAL du JARD S. of CONDE (excl.)

### **Capture of VALENCIENNES , November 1st to 2nd.**

At the Line of the CANAL de l' ESCAULT W. of VALENCIENNES , a pause of over a week occurred , during which time our own Rear Lines of Communication were improved and the Flanking Corps established themselves in Line with the Canadian Corps. Preparations were also undertaken for the Crossing of the Canal , the capture of VALENCIENNES and the continuation of our Advance. On November 1st , the enemy Positions S. of VALENCIENNES were taken by the Fourth Canadian Division , and early the following morning the entire City was in our hands.

### **November 3rd to 11th.**

From this time until the signing of the Armistice , our Advance was rapid and continuous. The Southern Corps Boundary was a Line running E. from the Railway S. of MARLY to a point 1000 yards. E. of ESTREUX; thence N.-E. to ST. SYMPHORIEN (incl.). The Northern Corps Boundary followed the CONDE-MONS CANAL to a point 4 miles W. of MONS where it turned N.-E. to GHLIN and on to MAISIERES.

The Fourth Cdn. Division carried our Line forward on the Right crossing the Belgian Border on November 6th. On the night of November 6th/7th , the Second Cdn. Division relieved the Fourth Cdn. Division. The Third Division made its way forward across the difficult flooded area on the Corps Left , E. of the CANAL de l'ESCAULT and S. of the CONDE-MONS CANAL: its right crossed into BELGIUM on November 6th, in touch with the Fourth Cdn. Division.

The Second and Third Divisions moved rapidly Eastwards , through the thickly-populated mining district W. of MONS reaching the outskirts of the city itself on November 10th. At 11.00 A.M. November 11th , when Hostilities ceased , the Canadian Corps was established on a line 4 to 5 miles E. of MONS.

### **Machine Gun Operations.**

During the entire Period from October 12th to November 11th , our operations consisted for the most part of desultory Fighting with enemy Rear Guards. The only Operation of any magnitude was the Attack on

MONT HOUY and VALENCIENNES on November 1st. Machine Guns moved forward with Infantry Units , giving Covering Fire where required and engaging enemy Machine Gun Nests and other Targets of Opportunity. A considerable amount of Harassing Fire was done at night on enemy Communications , particularly during the time our Line was stationary W. of VALENCIENNES , our Machine Guns fired an effective Enfilade Barrage from the W. Bank of the CANAL de l'ESCAULT. At the end of each day's Advance , Machine Guns were placed in Forward Defensive Positions , and on the morning of November 11th , the Guns of the Second and Third Battalions , C.M.G.C. , were placed for Defense in Depth of our line E. of MONS.

## **DOUAI TO MONS.**

### **FIRST STAGE.**

#### **CANAL DE LA SENSEE TO VALENCIENNES.**

**Second Battalion , C.M.G.C.; October 12th to 19th (-Nov. 6th) , 1918.**

##### **Infantry Operations October 12th to 13th.**

On the night October 11th/12th , the Fifty-first Division (British) relieved the Second Cdn. Division E. and N.-E. of IWUY. The Machine Gun Relief was reported complete at 3.15 A.M. , the Infantry Relief , at 4.20 A.M. At 12.00 Noon October 12th , the 5th C.I.B. attacked through the 154th Brigade , Fifty-first Division , between the IWUY-DENAIN Railway and the CANAL de l'ESCAULT , the Fifty-first Division attacking on the Right. An Advance of 2000 yards. was made with slight Opposition , the Village of HORDAIN was captured and our Line established N. of the Village between the Railway and the Canal. This was the extent of the Second Cdn. Division Frontage on October 12th.

During the night October 12th/13th the Second Division extended its front across the CANAL de l'ESCAULT , relieving the Eleventh Division (British) between ESTRUN and FRESSIES (exclusive) along the S. Bank of the CANAL de la SENSEE. ESTRUN is situated at the junction of these two Waterways. The 5th C.I.B. was now on the Right , the 4th C.I.B. in the Centre and the 6th C.I.B. on the Left , in touch with the Fifty-sixth Division (British).

##### **Second Battalion ,C.M.G.C. , Oct. 12th to 13th.**

The Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , on completion of Relief by the Fifty-first Battalion , M.G.C. night October 11th/12th was disposed as follows in the vicinity of CAMBRAI on October 12th. Advanced Battalion H.Q. was at ESCADOEUVRES , Rear H.Q. at MORENCHINES , No. 1 Company was in Billets at MORENCHIES , No. 2 Company , at RAMILLIES , No. 3 Company at ESCADOEUVRES. At 12.00 Noon , No.1 Company (Major BASEVI) attacked with the 5th C.I.B. , "D" Battery advancing on the Right with the 24th C.I.Bn. , "C" Battery on the Left with the 22nd C.I.Bn. "B" Battery was in Brigade Support , "A" Battery was in Brigade Reserve. After the Attack , positions were occupied for Defense of the new Frontage; "D" Battery Guns were placed between the IWUY- DENAIN Railway and HORDAIN , "C" Battery , on the Left between the Village and the CANAL de l'ESCAULT , "B" Battery E. of the CANAL , opposite ESTRUN , "A" Battery in the CHATEAU N. of IWUY in Reserve.

The Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , relieved the Eleventh Battalion , M.G.C. , on October 13th , No. 3 Company (Major McCAMUS , M.C.) supporting the 4th C.I.B. , in the Centre Divisional Sector , completed relief of Eleventh Battalion Guns at 6:15 P.M. No.2 Company , (Major McCORKELL) placed Guns in Position in Support of the 6th C.I.B. on the Divisional Left. Battalion Rear H.Q. moved to SANCOURT. Dispositions night 13th/14th were as follows:-

No.1 Company - In Positions occupied on October 12th. H.Q. , THUN-ST. MARTIN.

No.3 Company - H.Q. , CUVILLERS.

"K" Battery , 4 Guns , between THUN-ST. MARTIN and PAILLENCOURT, near top of spur.

4 Guns , Reserve at CUVILLIERS.

"J" Battery , in Positions S.-W. of PAILLENCOURT.

"L" and "M" Batteries , Brigade Reserve at CUVILLIERS.

No.2 Company - H.Q. at SANCOURT.

"E" Battery , 1200 yards , N.-W. of BANTGNY

"F" Battery , N.-W. outskirts of ABANCOURT

"H" Battery , along the AUBENCHEUL-au-BAC-CAMBRAI Road , E. of EPINOY.



“G” Battery , SANCOURT , in Brigade Reserve.

**Operations And M.G. Dispositions Oct. 14th To 17th.**

The 4th C.I.B. relieved the 5th C.I.B. on October 14th , extending its Right across the ESCAUT CANAL to the Railway. Machine Gun Reliefs conformed. “L” and ”M” Batteries , No.3 Company , relieved “C” and “D” Batteries , No.1 Company: 4 Guns of “J” Battery relieved the 4 Guns of “K” Battery at the THUN-ST. MARTIN-PAILLEN COURT SPUR. “K” Battery was then placed in 4th C.I.B. Reserve at CUVILLIERS. “A” and “B” Batteries were withdrawn and the whole of No.1 Company passed into Divisional Reserve on completion of Relief at 8:10 P.M. Guns of No.2 Company were rearranged on October 14th with a view to strengthening the 6th C.I.B. Machine Gun Defenses. 2 Guns “E” Battery replaced the 4 “J” Battery Guns which had taken over “K” Battery Positions. 4 Guns “G” Battery from Brigade Reserve , and 2 Guns “F” Battery were placed in Positions 1000 to 1500 yards S.-E. of HEM-LENGLET.

On October 15th , No.1 Company moved to billets in MARQUION with the 5th C.I.B.; Battalion Advanced H.Q. moved to SANCOURT. Machine Gun Dispositions remained unchanged throughout the 16th and 17th. These 2 days were marked by considerable enemy Shelling. On the 16th , there was heavy Gas Shelling along the Divisional Front ; Battalion H.Q. at SANCOURT was shelled from 6:00 to 6:30 P.M. On the 17th , Bridgeheads were established by the 4th C.I.B. , S. of WASNES-au-BAC , and by the 6th C.I.B. at HEM-LENGLET , and it was learned that the Germans were withdrawing.

**The Advance Oct. 18th.to 19th.**

The 19th C.I.Bn. (4th C.I.B.) and the 29th C.I.Bn. (6th C.I.B.) crossed the CANAL de la SENSEE on the morning of October 18th and , moving forward in touch with the Fourth Cdn. Division on the Left , established the Line WAVRECHAIN-sous-FAUX-MARQUETTE by the evening. “H” Battery , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , supported the 29th C.I.Bn. , crossing the CANAL S. of WASNES-au-BAC in the early afternoon. Positions were occupied for the night on the Ridge N. of WASNES-au-BAC. The remaining Guns of No.2 Company remained in Positions already occupied as follows:-

“E” Battery , (2 Guns , S.W. of PAILLEN COURT.  
6 Guns , 1500 yds. N.-E. of BANTIGNY  
“G” Battery , (4 Guns , 1500 yds. S.-E. of HEM-LENGLET  
4 Guns , SANCOURT , in 6th C.I.B. Reserve.  
“F” Battery , (2 Guns , 1000 yds. S.-E. of HEM-LENGLET  
6 Guns , on N.-W. outskirts of ABANCOURT  
No. 2 Company H.Q. moved to HEM-LENGLET.

Batteries of No.3 Company remained in Positions as follows:-

“M” and “L” Batteries , on the Right and Left of HORDAIN , respectively.  
“J” Battery , 4 Guns on THUN-LEVESQUE-PAILLEN COURT SPUR.  
4 Guns , S.-W. of PAILLEN COURT.  
“K” Battery , CUVILLIERS , in 4th C.I.B. Reserve.

On October 19th the Second Canadian Division advanced with the 4th and 6th C.I.B.s on either side of the CANAL de l’ESCAULT , through BOUCHAIN , BASSEVILLE and BOUCHENEUIL as far as NEUVILLE-sur-l’ESCAUT. At this point , the Advance of the Fifty-first Division (British) on the Right and the Fourth Cdn. Division on the Left converged , and the Second Cdn. Division was withdrawn to Canadian Corps Reserve.

No.3 Company supported the 4th C.I.B. through BOUCHAIN to NEUVILLE-sur-l’ESCAUT. “G” Battery , No.2 Company , joined “H” Battery N. of the SENSEE CANAL: “E” and “F” Batteries were moved up close to the S. Bank of the CANAL. The Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. , passed into Corps Reserve with the Second Cdn. Division in the evening and remained out of the Line until November 6th.

### **Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Corps Reserve , Oct. 20th to Nov. 6th.**

The Battalion now came under the direct orders of Lieut.-Col. WEIR, M.C. , and assembled on October 20th , Battalion H.Q. , with Nos. 1 and 3 Companies , at WASNES-au-BAC , No.2 Company at MARQUETTE. The 21st was spent in re-equipping , cleaning Guns and Equipment and clearing debris from Billets. The C.M.G.C. Concert Party and Band joined the Battalion at this time and gave a number of concerts and entertainment's during the following days. On October 22nd , the Battalion marched to Billets in EMERCHICOURT , where it was visited on the 23rd by Brig.-Gen. BRUTINEL , G.O.C. Canadian M.G. Corps. On Oct 25th H.R.H. The Prince of Wales inspected the Battalion , and expressed his pleasure at the smart appearance of all Ranks. From October 25th to November 3rd , the Battalion remained in this Area , Battalion H.Q. , with Nos. 1 and 3 Companies , at EMARCHICOURT , No.2 Company at AZINCOURT FARM , 2500 yds. N.-E. of EMERCHICOURT. On November 4th , the Personnel moved by Lorry to la SENTINELLE 3000 yds. W. of VALENCIENNES. Battalion H.Q. went on the same day to ST. SAULVE , E. of VALENCIENNES on the MONS Road. The whole Battalion moved up to St. SAULVE on November 5th and 6th , in readiness to take over the Line from the Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.

### **Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Oct. 12th to 29th.**

#### **Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , In Reserve.**

The Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. , was still in Rest at ANZIN-ST.AUBIN , on October 12th , with the Fourth Cdn. Division , in Corps Reserve. The time here was spent in Training , Route Marching , Sports and Entertainment's. The C.M.G.C. Concert Party visited ANZIN on October 12th. On the following day , Lieut.-Col. SCOTT issued Orders for a move toward the Line and for the Relief of the Fifty-sixth Battalion , M.G.C. , by Nos. 1 and 2 Companies. Companies were detailed to Brigades for the move , and at Noon No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON) marched off to ARRAS , a mile to the S.-E. , where the Personnel embarked with the 10th C.I.B. for MARQUION , 15 miles E. on the CAMBRAI Road. On arrival here , the Company marched to Billets in SAUCHY-LESTREE and SAUCHY-CAUCHY , No.2 Company (a/OC. , Capt. HALL , M.C.) detailed to the 11th C.I.B. , proceeded to MARQUION by Train on the 14th , and were billeted in ECOURT-ST.QUENTIN. No.3 Company (Capt. LOGAN) moved to SAUCHY-LESTREE , and Battalion H.Q. , to VILLIERS-lez-CAGNICOURT on the 16th.

#### **Line Taken Over , and Advance Begun.**

The Fourth Cdn. Division relieved the Fifty-sixth Division (British) night October 14th/15th and 15th/16th, taking over that portion of the Line between the Second and First Cdn. Divisions , along the S. Bank of the SENSEE CANAL between FRESSIES (inclusive) and PALLUEL. Machine Gun Reliefs took place 24 hours after Infantry Reliefs. No.1 Company , supporting the 10th C.I.B. in the Divisional Right Sector , relieved Guns of the Fifty-sixth Battalion , M.G.C. , between FRESSIES and ABB. du VERGER FARM , S. of AUBENCHEUL-au-BAC , night October 15th/16th. No.2 Company , in Support of the 11th C.I.B. , took over Positions in the Left Sector night 16th/17th. No.3 Company , with the 12th C.I.B. remained in Divisional Reserve.

The Advance of the Fourth Cdn. Division began on October 17th. The 10th and 11th C.I.B.s crossed the SENSEE CANAL in the evening. The 10th C.I.B. took AUBIGNY-au-BAC , and established a line to the E. and N. of the Village. The 11th C.I.B. in touch with the Fourth Cdn. Division on its Left , captured BUGNICOURT and during the night , advanced the Line E. of VILLERS-au-TERTE.

Orders for the Advance of Machine Guns were issued by Lieut.-Col. SCOTT , instructing Companies in the Line to detail 2 Batteries , each , to go forward with the Infantry , the remaining 2 Batteries of each Company to be held in Reserve under the O.C. , Company. No.3 Company , in Divisional Reserve , was prepared to move at 1 hours notice. Under this arrangement "A" and "C" Batteries , No.1 Company ' and "E" and "F" Batteries , No.2 Company , went forward in close Support of the leading Infantry Battalions of their respective Brigades. No.3 Company moved to SAUCHY-CAUCHY.

### **Advance , October 18th to 19th.**

On October 18th , the Fourth Division , advancing between the Second and Third Divisions , reached the Line MARQUETTE-EMERCHICOURT.

“A” , “C” , “E” and “F” Batteries were with the forward Infantry Battalions , “B” , “D” , “G” and “H” Batteries were ordered to join No.3 Company which crossed the CANAL in the afternoon , and bivouacked for the night in a field , 1500 yds. N. of AUBIGNY-au-BAC , to the Right of the AUBIGNY-au-BAC-BUGNICOURT Road. Fourth Machine Gun Battalion H.Q. moved to ECOURT-ST. QUENTIN.

The following day , October 19th , the 10th and 11th C.I.B.s advanced their Line to DENAIN-BELLEVUE , both inclusive. Our troops were greeted with enthusiasm and affection by the French civilians in the captured Towns and Villages. In the late afternoon the Second Cdn. Division was withdrawn and the Fourth Cdn. Division gained touch with the Fifty-first Division (British) S. of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT. Machine Gun arrangements were altered on October 19th. Lt.-Col. SCOTT detailed Companies to Brigades , No1. Company to the 10th C.I.B. , No2. Company to the 11th C.I.B. , No3. Company to the 12th C.I.B. , to operate in accordance with orders from their respective Infantry Brigades. “A” and “C” Batteries continued to operate with the 44th and 47th C.I.Bns. respectively. “E” and “F” Batteries with the 54th and 102nd Bns. “B” , “D” , “G” and “H” Batteries returned to their respective Companies. Inter-Battery Reliefs were carried out and the Advance proceeded , to conform with Infantry Inter-Battalion Reliefs. No.3 Company advanced to MONCHECOURT with the 12th C.I.B.

2 Batteries of the C.M.M.G. Bde. and 2 Armoured Cars were attached to the Fourth Cdn. Division on October 19th and were placed for disposal under Lieut.-Col. SCOTT who divided them equally between attacking Brigades , 1 Battery and 1 Armoured Car being attached to each Brigade. (X)

(X) For the operation of these Batteries and Armoured Cars see pp. 624 , ff

### **Events Oct. 20th to 22nd.**

The advances made by the Forth Cdn. Division on October 20th (Line WAVRECHAIN-HAVELUY) and 21st (Line , TRITH-ST. LEGER- la SENTINELLE - PETITE FORET - AUBRY) , brought our Front on the Canadian Corps Right , to the W. Bank of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT opposite VALENCIENNES. ANZIN and BEUVRAGES were taken on October 22nd , and the Fourth Division was established on a Line which remained stationary until the German Defenses E. of the CANAL were captured on November 1st. The 12th C.I.B. relieved the 10th C.I.B. night October 22nd/23rd.

On Oct 20th , “B” and “D” Batteries , No.1 Company , relieved “A” and “C” with the leading Infantry. No.2 Company with Forward Guns were advanced to HAVELUY. No.3 Company marched to Billets in ABSCON. Battalion H.Q. moved with Fourth Cdn. Division H.Q. to ABERCHICOURT. In the evening of October 21st , “B” and “D” Batteries , No.1 Company , were placed along the high ground over looking the CANAL , between ROUVIGNIES and la SENTINELLE. Company H.Q. was established at WAVRECHAIN , No.2 Company forward Guns were in the vicinity of AUBRY , No.3 Company H.Q. remained at ABSCON. In view of the impending relief of No.1 Company , Batteries joined the respective Infantry Battalions with which they normally co-operative , as follows:-

“J” Battery ,	78th C.I.Bn.	ESCAUDAIN.
“K” Battery ,	38th C.I.Bn.	ROEULX.
“L” Battery ,	72nd C.I.Bn.	ABSCON.
“M” Battery ,	85th C.I.Bn.	MASTAING.

After dusk on October 22nd , Batteries of No.3 Company , supporting the 12th C.I.B. , moved up with Infantry Battalion and relieved the corresponding Batteries of No.1 Company which went into Divisional Reserve with the 10th C.I.B.

#### **Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Dispositions October 22nd to 23rd.**

On completion of this Relief , the Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , was disposed as follows:-

<b>M.G. Battalion Unit.</b>	<b>Infantry Affiliation.</b>	<b>Location.</b>	<b>Task.</b>
Bn. Advanced H.Q. Bn. Rear H.Q.		ESCAUDAIN AUBERCHICOURT	
No. 3 Company	12th C.I.B.	H.Q. WAVRECHAIN	Defense of R. Divl. Sector.
“M” Battery	85th C.I.Bn.	Guns in houses and open Emplacements	R. Front Line
“J” Battery	78th C.I.Bn.	along High ground W. of CANAL	L. Front Line
“K” Battery	38th C.I.Bn.	Guns dismounted at ROUVIGNIES	R. Support.
“L” Battery	72nd C.I.Bn.	Guns dismounted near WAVRECHAIN	L. Support.
No. 2 Company	11th C.I.B.	H.Q. AUBRY	Defense of L. Divl. Sector.
“F” Battery)	75th and	Vicinity of BEUVRAGES.	R. Front Line
“H” Battery)	87th C.I.Bns.	Vicinity of RAISMES	L. Front Line
“E” Battery )	54th and	with Company H.Q. at	Bde. Reserve
“G” Battery )	102nd C.I.Bns.	AUBRY	
No. 1 Company	10th C.I.B.	H.Q. DENAIN	Div. Reserve
“A” Battery	44th C.I.Bn.	LOURCHES	
“B” Battery	46th C.I.Bn.	DENAIN	
“C” Battery	47th C.I.Bn.	ESCAUDAIN	
“D” Battery	50th C.I.Bn.	DENAIN	

These Dispositions remain generally unchanged until October 30th.

Batteries of No.3 Company relieved one another in accordance with Inter-Battalion Infantry Reliefs. Harassing fire was carrying out nightly. Some Sniping was done by Forward Guns. On October 24th , “K” Battery Guns mounted in houses in TRITH-ST LEGER , fired from 4:00 to 7:00 A.M. , on the ground between MAING and FAMARS , in support of an Attack by the Fifty-first Division (British) , 50,000 Rounds were expended. Preparation were made to support Brigade Operations of the 38th , 85th and 78th C.I.Bns. on October 24th and again on the 25th , but , owing to enemy vigilance , the Operations were finally cancelled on each occasion.

#### **First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Oct. 12th to 21st (-Nov.11th , 1918.**

##### **Situation and M.G. Dispositions ; Oct.12th.**

The First Cdn. Division , on October 12th , had reach the Line of the SENSEE CANAL from PALLUEL and the CANAL du NORD junction , to the RIVER SCARPE at CORBEHEM , 2 Miles S.-W. of DOUAL. The 2nd C.I.B were on the Right , in touch with the Fifty-sixth Division (British) the 3rd C.I.B. were on the Left. The VIII Corps held the Line N. of the SCARPE. In accordance with Canadian Corps Policy , daily Artillery Barrages were fired to test the enemy strength and discover his attitude and Dispositions , and attempts were made to establish Bridgeheads over the SENSEE CANAL.

First Battalion , C.M.G.C. was disposed on this date as follows:-

<b>M.G. Battalion Unit.</b>	<b>Infantry Affiliation.</b>	<b>Location.</b>	<b>Task.</b>
Battalion H.Q.		Les FOSSES FARM , on ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road S.-W. of MONCHY le PREUX.	
No.2 Company	2nd C.I.B.	H.Q. LECLUSE	Divl. Right Sector.
“G” Battery	8th C.I.B.	4 Guns , in Front of ARLEUX , 4 Guns , ESTREES.	Bde. Right
“E” Battery		Vicinity of ESTREES.	Bde. Centre
“F” Battery		4 Guns between ESTREES and GOUY , 4 Guns E. of GOUY.	Bde. Left
“H” Battery		BOIS de RECOURT 1000 yds. N. of RECOURT.	Bde. Reserve
No. 3 Company	3rd C.I.B.	Company H.Q. Vicinity of NOYELLES	Divl. Left Sector.
“J” Battery	16th C.I.Bn.	Immediately W. of GOUY	Bde. Right
“L” Battery	15th C.I.Bn.	S.-E. of BREBIERES.	Bde. Left
“K” Battery		Line , NOYELLE-BREBIERES	Bde. Support
“M” Battery		Mont-Notre-Dame 1500 yds. W. of NOYELLE	Bde. Reserve
No. 1 Company	1st C.I.B.	RECOURT	Div. Reserve

Machine Gun Batteries were in Defensive Positions. Night Firing was carried on , harassing the enemy approaches to and exits from CANTIN, GOEULZIN and FERIN E. of the SENSEE CANAL. At 6:00 A.M. October 12th . “F” Battery fired in Support of a Minor Operation carried out by the 3rd C.I.B.

#### **Oct. 12th to 15th.**

During the night October 12th/13th the 1st C.I.B. relieved the 3rd C.I.B in the Line. In the evening of the 13th , No.1 Company (Major DENHOLM , D.C.M.) , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , relieved No.3 Company (Major GRANTHAM , M.C.) in the Divisional Left Section , establishing Company H.Q. in the vicinity of NOYELLE. “B” , “D” and “C” Batteries took over the Line from Right to Left , between GOUY and BREBIERES: “A” Battery relieved “M” Battery in Brigade Reserve on the W. Slope of MONT NOTRE DAME. On completion of Relief at 7:30 P.M. No. 3 Company proceeded to Billets at TORTEQUENNE , passing into Divisional Reserve with the 3rd C.I.B. The O.C., “J” Battery and 4 Other Ranks remained in the Line with No.1 Company to assist in firing a Barrage which has already been arranged for the following morning. During the night October 12th/13th , No. 2 Company expended 29,000 Round of S.A.A. in Harassing Fire.

Battalion H.Q. moved on the 13th to RECOURT , where they were established at 11.45 A.M. During the night 13th/14th No.2 Company expended 22,000 Rounds in Harassing Fire. 1st C.I.B. Patrols succeeded in crossing the CANAL by Cork Bridges , in the early morning of the 14th , and entered FERIN. The crossing was supported by an Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage , our Artillery firing from 5:00 to 6:30 A.M. A Battery of No.1 Company (Major DENHOLM , D.C.M.) expended 14,000 Rounds S.A.A. at this time. Our Infantry Patrols later returned with 4 Prisoners and 2 Machine Guns. No.2 Company had 3 Other Ranks wounded on the 14th. No.3 Company remained at TORTEQUENNE.

There were no Infantry Actions on the 15th and 16th. Enemy Artillery was active on the CANAL du NORD LINE , W. of ARLEUX , on ESTREES, GOUY and NOYELLE: considerable Yellow Cross Gas Shelling was directed against NOYELLES and its vicinity on the 15th. Machine Gun Dispositions remained virtually unchanged. “H” Battery in 2nd C.I.B. Reserve , moved up to quarters E. of TORTEQUENNE on the 15th and , on the following day relieved “F” Battery on the Brigade left front. “F” Battery then replaced “H” Battery in Brigade Reserve , E. of TORTEQUENNE.

### **Advance , October 17th to 18th.**

The advance of the First Canadian Division from the SENSEE CANAL began on October 17th. The 2nd and 1st C.I.B.s crossed the CANAL and , advancing on the left of the Fourth Canadian Division , had established the Line ERCHIN-LEWARDE-GUESNAIN-SIN-le-NOBLE by evening.

“G” and “H” Batteries moved forward with the 8th and 10th C.I.Bns. , 2nd C.I.B. , crossing the CANAL in the vicinity of le MOULINET and took up defensive positions between ERCHIN and LEWARDE. These positions were occupied by 9:00 P.M. “E” Battery Guns with the 7th C.I.Bn. were disposed for defence on the right flank , E. of CANTIN. “F” Battery in Brigade Reserve advanced with the 5th C.I.Bn. at 8:00 P.M. and reached Billets in GOEULZIN at 1:30 A.M. October 18th.

“B” , “C” and “D” Batteries , No. 1 Company accompanied the 2nd , 3rd and 4th C.I.Bns. , 1st C.I.B. respectively. “B” and “C” Batteries occupied forward defensive positions for the night : “D” Battery , in Brigade support , parked Limbers with Guns in the vicinity of le RAQUET , 2000 yards S. of DOUAI. “A” Battery in Brigade Reserve crossed the CANAL at 1:45 A.M. and assembled with the 1st C.I.Bn. in the Eastern outskirts of FERIN. No. 3 Company remained at TORTEQUENNE on the 17th.

The advance on the 18th brought the First Division to a Line extending from the Western edge of AUBERCHICOURT , on the right E. of ECAILLON and PECQUENCOURT to the Left Corps Boundary. Machine Gun Batteries conformed to the movements of the Infantry Battalions which they were co-operating.

Forward Batteries of No.2 Company , in Divisional Right Sector had their Guns in defensive positions for the night 18th/19th between AUBERCHICOURT and ECAILLON. Company H.Q. was established at ROUCOURT at 1:30 P.M.

“A” and “D” Batteries advanced with the leading Battalions of the 1st C.I.B. and took up positions between the DOUAI-VALENCIENNES Railway and the left Corps Boundary in the vicinity of PECQUENCOURT. “B” Battery in Brigade Support , reached MONTIGNY , 4 miles E. of DOUAI at 6:15 P.M. “C” Battery in Brigade Reserve spent the night 18th/19th in the vicinity of LOFFRE where No. 1 Company H.Q. was established.

No. 3 Company marched to Billets in GOEULZIN arriving at 11:00 P.M.

First Battalion C.M.G.C. Headquarters moved at 11:30 A.M. to TORTEQUENNE and on to GOEULZIN at 7:30 P.M.

“D” Battery on the 1st C.I.B. left fired 8000 rounds in harassing fire on the exits from MARCHIENNES from 11:00 P.M. October 18th to 6:00 A.M. October 19th.

### **October 19th.**

On October 19th the First Canadian Division , with the Fourth Canadian Division on its right advanced an average depth of 6 miles to a Line E. of HELESMES-les-SARTS-WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE-WARLING. The 3rd C.I.B. passed through the 2nd C.I.B. in the morning.

No. 2 Company moved forward with the 3rd C.I.B. , “C” and “H” Batteries cooperating with the 14th and 16th C.I.Bns. on the Brigade right and left respectively. “G” Battery occupied positions for the night 19th/20th with 4 Guns E. of HELESMES-les-SARTS. 4 Guns were kept in Limbers at HELESMES. “H” Battery , for the protection of the 16th C.I.Bn. left flank , placed all Guns along the HELESMES-HASNON Road just N. of the DOUAI-VALENCIENNES Railway. “E” Battery had 4 Guns in positions S. of HORNAING-HELESMES on the Brigade right flank and 4 Guns in Limbers at HORNAING. Orders were issued for the Relief of No. 2 Company by No. 3 Company on the morning of the 20th , and “F” Battery in Brigade Reserve was ordered to proceed to FENAIN to secure Billets for the Company at 7:00 P.M.

“B” and “C” Batteries , No. 1 Company advanced with the leading Infantry Battalions of the 1st C.I.B. on the Brigade right and left respectively , and took up defensive positions for the night 19th/20th on a Line BOIS ST.-AMAND-WARLING , 1500 yards E. of WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE. “A” Battery in Brigade Support parked for the night along the MARCHIENNES-VILLE-SOMAIN Road; “D” Battery in Brigade Reserve was Billeted in RIEULAY. No. 1 Company H.Q. moved to WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE.

No. 3 Company marched to GUESNAIN arriving at 11:00 A.M. and moved up in the evening ready to pass through No. 2 Company next day. Battalion H.Q. moved forward by Lorries to LEWARDE at 11:00 A.M. H.R.H. the PRINCE OF WALES , accompanied by Brig.-Gen. BRUTINEL lunched at Battalion H.Q. The

advance on the 19th was made with great difficulty as all Transport was delayed by numerous Mine Craters on the Roads.

#### **October 20th.**

As on the Fourth Divisional Frontage , considerable enemy resistance was encountered on the 20th and the difficulties were increased by rain and fog. The Infantry made less progress than on the preceding days. Enemy Artillery , Machine Gun and Rifle Fire was severe , and the advance was not pressed. The First Division Line was established in the evening E. of the WALLERS-HASNON Road.

No. 3 Company , with "J" and "K" Batteries in front , on the 3rd C.I.B. right and left respectively , passed through No. 1 Company at 9:00 A.M. , "J" Battery Guns were sited in pairs E. and N. of WALLERS. "K" Battery Guns were mounted along the HELESMES-HASNON Road between the Railway and BOIS des ECLUSETTES. "L" and "M" Batteries were kept in Brigade Reserve at HELESMES-les-SARTS. No. 3 Company H.Q. was established at HELESMES in the morning.

"A" and "D" Batteries (right and left) , No. 1 Company , took the lead on the 20th. "A" Battery was sited in positions in the N. of BOIS des ECLUSETTES , and during the night 20th/21st expended 10,000 Rounds Harassing Fire on the Railway E. of the WOOD. "D" Battery Guns were mounted in the vicinity of the MOULIN a VENT , E. of CATAINE and engaged Opportunity Targets on the W. edge of the BOIS de VICOIGNE. 3000 Rounds were fired also during the night. "C" Battery parked for the night at CATAINE. "B" Battery in rear , at WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE , No. 1 Company H.Q. was at FORESTERS HOUSE on the N.-W. edge of BOIS des ECLUSETTES. When No. 3 Company had passed through on the morning of the 20th , No. 2 Company assembled in Billets at FENAIN. Battalion H.Q. opened at SOMAIN at 11:00 A.M.

#### **October 21st to 22nd , First Canadian Division Relived.**

The First Canadian Division , advancing rapidly on October 21st through the FORET de VICOIGNE , reached the ST. AMAND-VALECIENNES Road where the Third Canadian Division passed through on the 22nd. The First Division then went into Corps Reserve.

No. 3 Company advanced on the Divisional Right with "J" and "K" Batteries in front. 4 Guns of "J" Battery on the right were mounted in the BOIS LECAT , the remaining 4 being kept in Reserve at AREMBERG. "K" Battery had 4 Guns sited in the vicinity of GRAND ROND , BOIS de VICOIGNE; the other 4 Guns were in Reserve at MAISON FRE , du BASSY. "L" and "M" Batteries in Brigade Reserve moved forward with Company H.Q. to AREMBERG arriving at 12:00 Noon.

No. 1 Company advanced on the Divisional Left , with "B" and "C" Batteries in front. 6 "B" Battery Guns were pushed forward into the FORET de VICOIGNE in the vicinity of le CHAMP du CARME; the remaining 2 Guns were mounted S. of GRAND BRAY. 2 of the Guns in the WOOD expended 3000 Rounds in Harassing Fire between 6:00 P.M. October 21st and 3:00 A.M. , 22nd. "C" Battery Guns were placed in positions on the 1st C.I.B. left flank along the S. Bank of the SCARPE where it bends N. towards ST. AMAND at the N.-W. edge of the FORET de VICOIGNE. "D" Battery in Brigade Support parked for the night at la CROIX , W. of HASNON. "A" Battery spent the day in Reserve in the Southern outskirts of HASNON. Company H.Q. moved to CATAINE at 10:00 A.M. October 21st. No. 2 Company remained at FENAIN throughout the day of the 21st in Divisional Reserve.

#### **First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 22nd to November 11th.**

Companies of the Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , passed through the First Battalion Companies in the morning of October 22nd , and the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. was placed in Corps Reserve. When the Line had been handed over , No. 1 Company assembled in HASNON , No. 3 Company in AREMBERG. On October 23rd , No. 1 Company marched to Billets in ERRE , No. 3 Company to SOMAIN; NO.2 Company remained in FENAIN and Battalion H.Q. in SOMAIN. The Battalion retained these Dispositions until November 11th.

Daily Syllabus of Training was carried out during this period , and a program of Sports arranged. On November 2nd the G.O.C. First Canadian Division inspected the Battalion. The Canadian M.G. Corps Band and Concert Party visited the Battalion and gave a series of concerts and entertainment's. The period

of rest was much appreciated by all Ranks of the Battalion who had been continuously in the Line since their Relief of the Fourth Battalion , M.G.C. , night October 7th/8th.

### **Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 12th to November 2nd , 1918.**

#### **Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 12th to 21st.**

On October 12th the Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. was in Corps Reserve with the Third Canadian Division in the QUEANT area , where it had been since its withdrawal from the Line on October 10th. Battalion H.Q. was located 1 mile N.-E. of QUEANT. Here the Battalion remained until October 20th , carrying on Training and Recreation. The Canadian Machine Gun Corps Band and Concert Party visited the Battalion and gave several entertainment's , during this rest period.

Lieut.-Col. MOORHOUSE handed over command of the Unit to Lieut.-Col. BALFOUR , D.S.O. , on October 13th and proceeded on the following day to England to assume command of the Canadian Machine Gun Depot at SEAFORD.

The move towards the Line began on October 20th. On this date No. 1 Company (Major WHITAKER) with the 8th C.I.B. embussed at QUEANT for LEWARDE and marched from there to Billets in MASNY; No. 2 Company (Major BURNHAM) embussing with the 7th C.I.B. at QUEANT proceeded to Billets in AUBERCHICOURT. On the following day , October 21st , Battalion H.Q. moved to SOMAIN , No. 1 Company to BRUILLE , and No. 2 Company to CATAINE. No. 3 Company (a/O.C. Capt. GARRISON) with the 9th C.I.B. , embussed at QUEANT , debussing at HORNAING and marching to Billets in ERRE.

#### **Third Canadian Division Operations , October 22nd to November 2nd.**

The Third Canadian Division , with the 9th C.I.B. on the right , the 7th C.I.B. on the left and the 8th C.I.B. in Reserve , passed through the First Canadian Division on the Line of the ST.-AMAND-VALENCIENNES Road in the morning of October 22nd , and continued the Advance in touch with the Fourth Canadian Division on the right and the 8th Division , VIII Corps on the left. By the evening our Troops had pressed on to the Railway which skirts the Southern edge of FORET de RAISMES. Our Line followed this Railway from N. of BEUVRAGES in a N.-E. direction to FOSSE LAGRANGE where it turned almost due N. passing through the FORET de RAISMES , 1000 yards from its Eastern edge to the Left Corps Boundary at a point 500 yards S. of ODOMEZ. From here the Line bent back to the W. along the Northern Corps Boundary to MONT des ERUYERES and the RIVER SCARPE. It was necessary to hold this flank as the VIII Corps had been unable to get forward in touch with the Third Division Left. The Line was pushed forward on October 23rd to the CANAL de l' ESCAUT at BRUAY , on the right ; thence along the CANAL to FRESNES , inclusive , where it bore to the N. and followed the ESCAUT RIVER to the Northern Corps Boundary S. of ODOMEZ.

Along this Line the Third Division Frontage remained stationary until November 3rd , when the German Defences E. of the CANAL had been captured by the Fourth Canadian Division. On October 27th the 8th C.I.B. relieved the 7th C.I.B. and on October 30th took over the entire Divisional Frontage.

#### **Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 22nd to 23rd.**

The Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. supported the Infantry Advance on October 22nd and 23rd with No. 3 Company on the right , No. 2 Company on the left and No. 1 Company in Divisional Reserve.

No. 3 Company operating with the 9th C.I.B. passed through No. 3 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. on the morning of the 22nd. "J" and "K" Batteries were in front , with the 52nd and 43rd C.I.Bns. respectively. "L" and "M" Batteries were held in Brigade Reserve. No. 2 Company moved forward through No. 1 Company , First Battalion , C.M.G.C. "E" Battery operated with the R.C.R. "F" Battery with the 42nd C.I.Bn. "G" and "H" Batteries were in Brigade Reserve. Forward Batteries of both Companies occupied defensive positions for the night 22nd/23rd.

No. 1 Company billeted at ERRE during the 22nd , and marched to WALLERS on the 23rd. Battalion H.Q. moved from SOMAIN to WALLERS on the same day.



On the same evening of October 23rd , the Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. was disposed as follows :-

<b>Machine Gun Battalion Unit.</b>	<b>Infantry Affiliation.</b>	<b>Location.</b>	<b>Task.</b>
Battalion H.Q.		WALLERS	
No. 3 Company.	9th C.I.B.	H.Q. ARENBERG.	
“J” Battery.	52nd C.I.Bn.	Along the CANAL de l’ESCAUT between BRUAY and TEIERS.	Defence of Brigade right.
“K” Battery.	43rd C.I.Bn.	Near S.-E. edge of FORET de RAISMES at FOSSE LAGRANGE.	Defence of Brigade left.
“L” Battery.) “M” Battery.)			Brigade Reserve.
No. 2 Company.	7th C.I.B.	H.Q. , N.-W. corner of FORET de RAISMES near ST. AMAND-VALENCIENNES Road.	
“E” Battery.	R.C.R.	St. AMAND-VALENCIENNES Road E. of le CHAMP du CARME.	
“F” Battery.	42nd C.I.Bn.	4 Guns MONT des BRUYERES , 4 Guns near N.-E. edge of FORET de RAISMES along the Railway running through the N. Portion of the Wood.	Defence of Brigade and Divisional left.
“G” Battery.) “H” Battery.)			Brigade Reserve.
No. 1 Company.	8th C.I.B.		Division Reserve.

### **Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. Operations October 23rd to November 2nd.**

During the following days , when our left flank had been secured by the VIII Corps , “E” and “F” Batteries were moved forward to positions E. of FORET de RAISMES , commanding the Front from FRESNES to the Divisional Left Boundary S. of ODOMEZ.

No. 1 Company with “L” Battery , No. 3 Company , took over the Machine Gun Defences of the entire Third Divisional Front on October 28th. “L” Battery was in positions on the right in the vicinity of BEUVRAGES; “A” , “B” , “C” and “D” Batteries from right to left , occupied forward positions from BEUVRAGES to the Divisional Left Boundary. No. 3 Company , less “L” Battery , on Relief by No.1 Company went into Brigade Reserve in RAISMES. No. 2 Company , on Relief , marched to WALLERS , where it remained in Divisional Reserve.

These Dispositions remained unchanged until the Advance of the Third Division began on November 3rd. Forward Batteries established Observation Posts and fired by day on Targets of Opportunity. Harassing Fire was carried out each night on suitable targets on the enemy Line. Captain GERMAN assumed command of No. 3 Company on November 2nd.

## **DOUAI TO MONS.**

### **SECOND STAGE.**

#### **CAPTURE OF MONT HOUY AND VALENCIENNES.**

**Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , October 30th to November 2nd , 1918.**

##### **General Situation.**

The ground opposite the Corps Front E. of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT was naturally divided into 2 Sectors. VALENCIENNES and the ground to the N. of the City is low and subject to inundation from the CANAL. The Germans had taken advantage of this and had flooded all the country between VALENCIENNES and the Northern Corps Boundary at CONDE. These floods also extended Eastward , so that large tracts of ground between the VALENCIENNES-MONS Railway and the CONDE-MONS CANAL were under water.

S. of VALENCIENNES the ground rises steadily between the ESCAUT CANAL and the RHONELLE RIVER , reaching its highest point at MONT HOUY , 1500 yards N. of FAMARS Village. E. of VALENCIENNES and the RHONELLE RIVER , the ground is undulating and well drained by numerous Rivers.

The area N. of VALENCIENNES was , for the most part impassable owing to Floods , and could be easily by isolated Machine Gun Posts. S. and E. of the City the Germans possessed a strong natural Line of Defence , and it was clear , from their determined stand against the attack of the Fifty-first Division (British) , and from the statement of prisoners , that they had resolved to fight this Line stubbornly. Owing to the presents of civilians in VALENCIENNES , the City could not be bombarded by our Artillery : for this reason , the enemy were able to reinforce their Line , debouching from VALENCIENNES , without suffering casualties from our Artillery Fire.

##### **Plan of Attack.**

Careful preparations were made for the capture of MONT HOUY and VALENCIENNES in a set-piece attack. Attempts to cross the CANAL from the West had made it clear that the City could be taken only from the direction of MONT HOUY. So long as the Germans were strongly entrenched here , they could easily defeat our Bridgehead Operations. Once our Troops were S. of VALENCIENNES and the enemy attention diverted to this flank , a frontal crossing of the CANAL might be forced from the W.

Owing to the necessity for close liaison between the Troops operating on both sides of the CANAL it was decided that the Fourth Canadian Division should take over the line E. of the CANAL , and carry out the attack on MONT HOUY , in conjunction with their own Troops attempting to cross the CANAL from the W. In accordance with these plans , the 10th C.I.B. relieved the 154th Brigade , Fifty-first Division (British) night October 29th/30th , S. and E. of the CANAL , from FAMARS VILLAGE to POIRIER FARM , opposite TRITH-ST. LEGER. The 12th C.I.B. was holding the Left Front of the Fourth Division , W. of the CANAL. The 11th C.I.B. which had been on the extreme left of the Fourth Division was relieved by the 9th C.I.B. , night October 28th/29th , and on October 31st moved to the THIANT-PROUVY-ROUVIGNIES Area in Divisional Reserve.

Plans for the Operation were completed on October 30th following upon a conference convened by the G.O.C. , Fourth Canadian Division and attended by the Brigadiers , the C.R.A. , the C.R.E. , the D.M.G.C. , the Brigade Majors and Divisional Staff. The 10th C.I.B. was to carry out the main attack from the S. on November 1st. As this attack developed , the 12th C.I.B. was to force its way across the CANAL from the W. into VALENCIENNES. The 11th C.I.B. was held ready to exploit the success of the 10th C.I.B.

3 Objectives were fixed for the Main Attack , viz. ,

- (1) The RED LINE , about 2000 yards from the Jumping-off Line. It was the intention that Units should leapfrog one another on this Line.
- (2) The BLUE LINE , along the Southern outskirts of VALENCIENNES and MARLY. This was to be the Final Objective for November 1st.
- (3) The GREEN LINE , 2000 to 3000 yards beyond the BLUE LINE. The Area between the BLUE and GREEN LINES included MARLY VILLAGE but excluded VALENCIENNES.

The City itself was not taken by assault , but would be cut off when the GREEN LINE was reached. If enemy resistance proved slight in the advance to the BLUE LINE , it was intended to exploit to the GREEN LINE on the first day. Otherwise , its capture would be undertaken by the 11th C.I.B. on November 2nd.

The attack was to be carried out under an Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage , and synchronized with an attack of the Forty-ninth Division , XXII Corps , on our right.

The 10th C.I.B. assembled for the attack as follows :- The 44th C.I.Bn. on the right , the 47th C.I.Bn. on the left , the 46th C.I.Bn. in rear of the 44th C.I.Bn. , and the 50th C.I.Bn. , less 1 Company in Brigade Reserve. The 46th C.I.Bn. was ready to go through the 44th , on the RED LINE , to the Final Objective. The 4th C.I.Bn. was to attack right on to the BLUE LINE , assisted by 1 Company of the 50th C.I.Bn. , detailed for mopping-up duties.

#### **Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. Preparations.**

Machine Gun Preparations were hurried forward on October 30th and 31st. Batteries on No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON) , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. took up positions in the Line on the night 29th/30th with the Infantry Battalions which they normally cooperated with as follows :-

<b>Unit.</b>	<b>Infantry Affiliation.</b>	<b>Location.</b>	<b>Task.</b>
"A" Battery.	44th C.I.Bn.	Between FAMARS and la FONTENELLE.	Brigade Right.
"C" Battery.	47th C.I.Bn.	Between la FONTENELLE and POIRIER FARM.	Brigade Left.
"B" Battery.	46th C.I.Bn.	In Rear of "A" Battery.	Brigade Support.
"D" Battery.	50th C.I.Bn.	In Rear of "C" Battery.	Brigade Reserve.

Details of the Action of Batteries was arranged direct between Officers Commanding Infantry Battalions and Battery Commanders. Major BRITTON established his Headquarters at THAINT on October 30th.

An Enfilade Machine Gun Barrage coordinated with the Artillery Barrage was provided. All arrangements for this Barrage were made by Lieut.-Col. SCOTT , D.S.O. , commanding the Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.

9 Batteries of 8 Guns each were detailed for this purpose as follows :-

"A" , "B" , "C" , "D" and "E" Batteries , 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

"F" and "H" Batteries , No. 2 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.

"J" and "M" Batteries , No. 3 Company , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C.

Barrage positions were reconnoitred W. of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT , and Batteries so placed as to be able to observe their Fire Effect , should conditions of visibility permit. S.A.A. Dumps were established convenient to the Barrage positions under arrangements made by the O.C. , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. Final Machine Gun preparations were made on October 31st. Batteries of No. 1 Company assembled with the Infantry.

"F" Battery , No. 2 Company (a/O.C. , Capt. HALL , M.C.) had been relieved in positions in front of BEUVRAGES by Guns of the Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. night 29th/30th. "H" Battery Guns were withdrawn on October 31st and moved with "F" Battery to Barrage positions under Capt. JOHNSON , E. of la SENTINELLE. "E" and "G" Batteries moved with No. 2 Company H.Q. to THAINT.

”J” and ”M” Batteries , No. 3 Company (Capt. LOGAN) took up their Barrage positions under Capt. HENDERSON , on October 31st N. of la SENTINELLE.

”K” Battery under Lieut. GUDGEON and ”L” Battery commanded by Capt. W.G. WILLIAMS , M.C. made preparations to support the 38th and 72nd C.I.Bns. respectively in crossing the CANAL de l’ESCAUT.

1st C.M.M.G. Batteries occupied Barrage positions in the vicinity of TRITH-ST. LEGER , ”A” , ”B” and ”D” Batteries under Lieut. H. SMITH , M.C. , M.M. , ”E” and ”C” Batteries under Capt. F.F. WORTHINGTON , M.C. , M.M.

### **Operation November 1st.**

Our Barrage opened at 5:15 A.M. November 1st and the attack proceeded according to plan. All Objectives of the 10th C.I.B. were gained on time. The German retaliation to our Barrage was prompt and severe , but slackened considerably shortly after Zero. Enemy Machine Gunners offered a resistance but their Infantry gave up in large numbers. Considerable heavy fighting took place , especially among the houses along the FAMARS-VALENCIENNES Road and in AULNOY.

During the advance of the 10th C.I.B. , Patrols of the 38th C.I.Bn. crossed the CANAL and moved N. with them. The 72nd C.I.Bn. also affected a crossing immediately N. of the VALENCIENNES Railway Station , and by noon the greater part of both Battalions were established on the E. Bank of the CANAL.

Batteries of No.1 Company kept up with the Infantry Advance. ”A” Battery under Capt. WEAVER occupied positions for the defence of the 10th C.I.B. with 6 Guns on the high ground N. of AULNOY , between the AULNOY-VALENCIENNES Road and the RHONELLE RIVER. These Guns accompanied the right forward Company of the 44th C.I.Bn. , Capt. WEAVER placed the remaining 2 Guns of his Battery in front of the left Company , 400 yards W. of la BRIQUETTE CHURCH.

Lieut. YOUNG , commanding ”B” Battery moved his Guns forward with the 46th C.I.Bn. , through the 44th C.I.Bn. to positions for the defence of the right flank near the Final Objective. These Guns were in position at 10:40 A.M.

”C” Battery under Lieut. WOODWARD , advanced with the 47th C.I.Bn. to the Final Objective to positions near the Railway S. of VALENCIENNES defending the Brigade left.

”D” Battery commanded by Capt. WARD , M.C. , occupied positions for defence in depth of the Left Brigade Area.

No. 1 Company H.Q. moved to CHATEAU des PRES , N. of MAING in the evening.

The Forty-ninth Division (British) , attacking on the right had been unable to reach the BLUE LINE , and in order to increase the Machine Gun Defences of the 10th C.I.B. Area , ”E” and ”G” Batteries , No. 2 Company , were placed in positions in front of MONT HOUY along the AULNOY-POIRIER STATION Road in the course of the morning.

”K” Battery , No. 3 Company , meantime fired 25,000 Rounds in support of the 38th C.I.Bn. crossing on the 12th C.I.B. right. Capt. WILLIAMS detailed 3 ”L” Battery Guns to cross the CANAL with the 72nd C.I.Bn. on the Brigade left ; with the remaining 5 Guns , he fired a most effective 20 minute Barrage to cover the 72nd C.I.Bn. CANAL crossing , expending 15,000 Rounds. The 3 forward Guns were mounted E. of the CANAL near the VALENCIENNES Railway Station. No. 3 Company H.Q. moved to la SENTINELLE at 8:00 P.M.

The Barrage Guns of No. 2 Company rejoined the 11th C.I.B. on completion of the Barrage. ”J” and ”M” Batteries , No. 3 Company remained in positions during the day for defence against possible enemy counter-attacks. These Batteries rejoined the 78th and 85th C.I.Bns. respectively during the night November 1st/2nd.

During the firing of the Barrage , the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade Batteries suffered 1 Officer and 45 Other Ranks casualties by Gas , due largely to cordite fumed from the Guns which were situated in buildings. This necessitated the reorganization of this Brigade into 4 Batteries instead of 5. On completion of this Barrage , 2 Batteries and 1 Armoured Car were ordered to report to the G.O.C. , 10th C.I.B. for exploitation purposes. (X) The remaining 2 Batteries were placed in Divisional Reserve at MAING. In the evening these Batteries relieved ”E” and ”G” Batteries , Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. in positions in front of MONT HOUY.

### **November 2nd.**

The 11th C.I.B. relieved the 10th C.I.B. on the right portion of their Front in the evening of November 1st , and by 10:00 P.M. their Patrols were through the Village of MARLY. The advance was continued at 5:30 A.M. November 2nd in an Easterly direction , and a Line was reached by the evening 1500 yards E. of VALENCIENNES. 12th C.I.B. Patrols pushed into VALENCIENNES during the night November 1st/2nd , and at 9:50 A.M. November 2nd , the 38th and 72nd C.I.Bns. joined hands on the Eastern outskirts of the City. The Germans were driven out of ST. SAULVE in the afternoon by the 72nd C.I.Bn. and the 12th C.I.B. Line was linked up with the 11th C.I.B. on the right and the 8th C.I.B. , Third Canadian Division on the left. The 10th C.I.B. was pinched out by the advance of the 11th and 12th C.I.Bs. and placed in Divisional Reserve.

2 Batteries of No.2 Company advanced with the 54th and 102nd C.I.Bns. on November 2nd ; 2 Batteries were kept in Brigade Reserve. "J" , "K" and "L" Batteries , No. 3 Company moved forward across the CANAL , through VALENCIENNES and took up defensive positions in the evening in the Eastern outskirts of the City. "M" Battery was held in Brigade Reserve at ST. WAAST-la HAUT. No. 3 Company H.Q. moved to ANZIN. No. 1 Company was ordered into Divisional Reserve with the 10th C.I.B. in the vicinity of THIAN.

### **Complete Success of Attack.**

The completeness and thoroughness with which this Operation was carried out is witnessed by the large number of killed and captured Germans , which exceeded 2100. This total is greater than the number of our own Assaulting Troops. There was abundant evidence of the effectiveness of our Machine Gun Barrage.

Our own Machine Gun casualties were small. No.1 Company had 2 Officers and 21 Other Ranks wounded. No. 3 Company suffered no casualties during the attack. Casualties of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade as already stated were 1 Officer and 45 Other Ranks wounded. 2 Guns of No. 1 Company were put out of action.

Infantry Battalion Commanders commented quite generally on the hearty and quick cooperation of our Machine Guns in this Operation. On November 2nd , Lieut.-Col. M.A. SCOTT , D.S.O. , received the following letter of appreciation from Brig.-Gen. J.M. ROSS , D.S.O. , commanding the 10th C.I.B. :-

"Just a line to express the appreciation of the 10th Brigade for the magnificent work done by your people who were working with us in yesterdays Operation. All my Battalions have expressed their satisfaction , and I wish you would let those under your command , who were acting with us yesterday , know how we felt about it."

Lieut.-Col. SCOTT replied to this letter as follows :-

"Many thanks for your letter of appreciation of the work done by the Machine Gun Batteries and Armoured Car attached to your Brigade during the recent operations. It is a great satisfaction to me to know that the Battalions who achieved the success feel as they do with regard to the Machine Gun cooperation. I have communicated to the Units concerned your letter of appreciation , and I trust that in all future operations the same success will be attained."

## **DOUAI TO MONS.**

### **THIRD STAGE.**

## **VALENCIENNES TO MONS.**

**Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. : November 3rd to 6th (-11th) , 1918.**

### **The Advance , November 3rd to 4th.**

The Fourth Canadian Division Line was pushed forward on November 3rd on the right to a Line 1000 yards E. of ESTREUX , which was captured by the 75th C.I.Bn. The 12th C.I.B. advanced the right of their Frontage in touch with the 11th C.I.B. On November 4th the Division reached the Line , ROMBIES (exclusive) – RUISSEAU RIVER W. of QUAROUBLE , capturing the Village of ONNAING. The Third Canadian Division relieved the Fourth Canadian Division on that part of their Front N. of the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road night November 4th/5th.

“F” Battery , No. 2 Company took the lead on November 3rd and was replaced by “G” Battery on November 4th. The remaining Batteries of No. 2 Company went forward in Brigade Support and Reserve.

“K” and “L” Batteries advanced with the 38th and 72nd C.I.Bns. respectively during November 3rd and 4th. On the night November 4th/5th they were placed in defensive positions E. of ONNAING , on either side of the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road. Here they were relieved by “M” and “J” Batteries with the 85th and 78th C.I.Bns. respectively. 4 Guns of “L” Battery remained in the Line until the early morning of November 5th to support the 5th C.M.R. , being withdrawn on completion of their task.

Capt. W.G. WILLIAMS , M.C. , accompanied by the Intelligence Officer of the 72nd C.I.Bn. carried out a valuable reconnaissance on November 3rd thereby establishing touch with the 8th C.I.B. on the Fourth Division Left.

No. 3 Company H.Q. moved to VALENCIENNES on November 3rd. Battalion H.Q. opened in VALENCIENNES with Divisional H.Q. on November 4th.

### **November 5th.**

Progress on November 5th was slow. At night our Line had reached the AUNELLE River on the right including the Village of ROMBIES. Thence it ran E. to a point on the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road midway between QUAROUBLE and QUIEVRECHAIN. “G” Battery attacked at dawn with the 75th and 87th C.I.Bns. under an Artillery Barrage. “M” and “J” Batteries cooperated with the 85th and 87th C.I.Bns. Heavy Machine Gun Fire was encountered and the attack was not pressed. All forward Batteries occupied defensive positions night 5th/6th , 4 Guns “J” Battery were held in Brigade Reserve. No. 1 Company in Divisional Reserve at THIANT were Relieved on November 5th by the Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , and moved to Billets in VALENCIENNES.

### **Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Relieved Night November 6th/7th.**

The Fourth Canadian Division crossed into Belgium on November 6th along the entire Divisional Front , reaching the Line of the GRANDE HONELLE River and capturing the Villages of MARCHIPONT , BAISIEUX and part of QUIEVRAIN. Along this Line the Division was relieved night November 6th/7th by the Second Canadian Division and passed into Corps Reserve.

Machine Guns advancing under the leading Infantry Battalions were disposed in defensive positions. “G” Battery was on the right with the 87th C.I.Bn. , “M” and “J” Batteries on the left with their respective Infantry Battalions in positions S. and E. of QUIEVRECHAIN. The remaining Batteries of Nos. 2 and 3 Companies were in Brigade Reserve. The Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , took over the Line November 6th/7th ; Fourth Battalion Guns were withdrawn and the entire Battalion assembled on November 7th in Billets in ST. WAAST-la HAUT where it remained until November 11th.

## **Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , November 7th to 11th , 1918.**

### **The Advance , November 7th to 8th.**

The Advance of the Second Canadian Division into Belgium was rapid and continuous. The 5th C.I.B. taking the lead on November 7th pushed the Line forward E. of ELOUGES. On the 8th DOUR was captured and the Line advanced to the Western edge of BOIS de LEVEQUE thence due N. to the inter-Divisional Boundary.

The Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , were assembled at ST. SAULVE on November 6th. (X) Nos. 1 and 2 Companies took over the Machine Gun Defence of the Line from the Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. night November 6th/7th and advanced with the 5th C.I.B. on the 7th and 8th. One Battery from each Company moved with the leading Infantry on either flank of the Brigade and occupied forward defensive positions each night. "E" Battery was on the right , "A" Battery on the left. The other Batteries of each Company were held in Brigade Reserve in the vicinity of their respective Company H.Q. No. 1 Company H.Q. moved forward to QUIEVRAIN , No. 2 Company H.Q. to MARCHIPONT on November 7th. In the evening of November 7th "E" and "A" Batteries , right and left , were in position on a Line 500 yards W. of the ELOUGES-THULIN Road.

During the night November 7th/8th No. 3 Company H.Q. with "J" and "K" Batteries moved to ELOUGES. "M" Battery to BAISIEUX , "L" Battery to QUIEVRAIN. On November 8th "E" and "A" Batteries were replaced in the lead by "F" and "B" Batteries respectively. No. 1 Company H.Q. with "A" , "C" and "D" Batteries proceeded to ELOUGES. No. 2 Company H.Q. with "G" and "H" Batteries moved forward to HOUILLERE FERRAND , 1000 yards S.-W. of ELOUGES. No. 3 Company remained at ELOUGES prepared to advance with the 4th C.I.B. on the following day. Battalion H.Q. was established at QUIEVRECHAIN.

(X) See Page 507.

### **November 9th to 10th.**

The 4th C.I.B. passed through the 5th C.I.B. in the early morning of November 9th and carried the Line forward to a maximum depth of 6 miles through the densely populated Mining Area of MONS. WARQUIGNIES , WASMES , PATURAGES and FRAMIRIES were freed in the course of the day. By the evening the Second Canadian Division Right rested just N. of GENLY : from here the Line bore to the N.-E. to NOIRCHAIN and CIPLY , whence it bent to the N.-E. along the Railway , linking up with the Third Canadian Division Right. Progress on November 10th brought the 4th C.I.B. to MESVIN , HYON and the Southern outskirts of MONS.

No. 3 Company , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. passed through Nos. 1 and 2 Companies in close support of the 4th C.I.B. on the morning of November 9th. No. 1 Company H.Q. was established in FRAMERIES. When No. 3 Company had gone forward , No. 1 Company moved to PATURAGES where it remained under Orders of the 4th C.I.B. in case of need. No. 2 Company remained in ELOUGES.

No. 3 Company continued the Advance with the 4th C.I.B. on November 10th. Considerable Machine Gun Fire came from NOUVELLES

on our immediate right flank. "J" Battery kept the vicinity under Fire while the 18th C.I.Bn. worked round the position. Here the Battery lost Lieut. M.A. SCOTT who was killed by a Shell while directing the Fire of his Guns. Lieut. SCOTT was the last Officer casualty in the Battalion.

No. 1 Company remained at PATURAGES during November 10th. No. 2 Company moved forward from ELOUGES , under Orders of the 6th C.I.B. Battalion H.Q. and moved to FRAMERIES.

### **November 11th.**

The 6th C.I.B. passed through the 4th C.I.B. at 8:00 A.M. November 11th at 11:00 A.M. when Hostilities ceased. The Brigade stood fast on the Line then reached E. of BOIS du RAPOIS.

Batteries of No. 2 Company advanced with the 6th C.I.B. , 2 Batteries in front , 2 Batteries in Brigade Reserve. Some Machine Gun Fire was encountered during the Advance on November 11th , coming from BOIS d'HAVRE , BOIS du RAPOIS and from VILLERS-ST. GRISLAIN on the right. Lieut. LAYTON

with 4 "F" Battery Guns covering the right flank of the 31st C.I.Bn. assisted in effectually neutralizing this Fire , keeping his Guns up with the Right Forward Infantry Company and giving invaluable covering fire when occasion offered.

When the Armistice came into force at 11:00 A.M. , the Right Forward Battery with the 31st C.I.Bn. had reached PETIT HAVRE , E. of BOIS du RAPOIS , 9000 yards E. on MONS ; the Left Forward Battery with the 28th C.I.Bn. was in the N.-E. outskirts of HAVRE , S. of the CANAL du CENTRE ; 2 Batteries in Reserve were located in CHEMICAL WORKS on the S. edge of BOIS d'HAVRE.

### **Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , November 3rd to 11th , 1918.**

#### **Infantry Advance , November 3rd to 5th.**

The Third Canadian Division carried forward our Line on the Canadian Corps Left from November 3rd to 11th. The 8th C.I.B. was in the Front Line until night November 7th/8th , when it was relieved by the 7th C.I.B. which carried forward our Advance until the Armistice put an end to Hostilities. On November 1st a crossing of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT was secured N. of VALENCIENNES and a Post of the 8th C.I.B. pushed forward on November to BAS MARAIS HALTE , N. of ST. SAULVE where touch was established with the Fourth Canadian Division. On November 3rd the THIERS-VICQ Railway Bridge over the CANAL at THIERS was secured and a Line of Infantry Posts established from this point through CHATEAU de ROUCOURT to the Fourth Division Left. The Line was advanced on November 4th to the THIERS-VICQ Railway. The Railway Bridge over the CANAL at ESCAUPONT was captured the same day , and on November 5th the Third Canadian Division advanced to the Line of the ESCAUPONT-QUIEVRECHAIN Railway. During the night November 4th/5th the Division extended its Front to the right taking over from the Fourth Division the ground between the VALENCIENNES-MONS Railway and the Main Road.

#### **Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. , November 3rd to 5th.**

The whole of No. 1 Company , and "L" Battery , No. 3 Company , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. were in the Line in support of the 8th C.I.B. on November 2nd. (X)

On November 3rd , "D" Battery and 4 Guns of "C" Battery were withdrawn to Billets in RAISMES : "J" and "M" Batteries , No. 3 Company reported to the 5th C.M.R. Bn. at BRUAY to support the advance of this Battalion.

On November 4th , 4 "M" Battery Guns proceeded to ST. SAULVE and advanced with the 5th C.M.R. Bn. to positions E. of ONNAING. "L" Battery fired 9000 Rounds on observed targets at 10:45 A.M. Battalion H.Q. moved on this day to RAISMES.

On November 5th , "L" Battery with the 2nd C.M.R. Bn. on the Brigade right , "M" Battery with the 5th C.M.R. in the centre , and "B" Battery with the 1st C.M.R. on the left , supported the Infantry Advance. "A" , "D" and 4 Guns of "C" Battery , No. 1 Company were in Billets in RAISMES , in Brigade Reserve. The remaining 4 Guns of "C" Battery were still kept in positions W. of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT. "J" and "K" Batteries , No. 3 Company were held in Brigade Reserve. No. 2 Company in Divisional Reserve marched from WALLERS to RAISMES.

(X) Se Page 523.

#### **November 6th to 8th.**

The Third Division advanced its Right across the Belgium Border on November 6th , and by the evening of the 7th had reached a Line extending from the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road S. of THULIN , thence to la CROIX-MONTROEUL sur HAINE : here the Line bent back due W. , N. of HENSIES S. of THIVENCELLE , thence to the CANAL at CONDE.

Up to this time the VIII Corps on our left had been unable to pass the CANAL du JARD. The Third Canadian Division was therefore ordered to bring forward its left flank , clear the ground S. of the CONDE-MONS CANAL and secure the CANAL Crossing. The 7th C.I.B. relieved the 8th C.I.B. night November 7th/8th , and when the Advance was continued on the 8th , our Troops were pushed to the N. ,



and by noon had secured the Villages of THIVENCELLE and ST. AYBERT. Later in the day , a Foot-bridge was constructed across the CANAL , and a Bridgehead established under cover of darkness. On the Division right the Line was advanced E. of BOUSSU from the inter-Divisional Boundary to HANIN , thence it ran W. along the HANIN River to the CANAL E. of ST. AYBERT.

On November 6th , "B" Battery which had operated with the 8th C.I.B. since the Advance recommenced , was definitely attached to No. 3 Company , and remained so attached until November 11th. "E" Battery was , during the same time attached to No. 1 Company in Divisional Reserve. No. 3 Company advanced with the 8th C.I.B. on November 6th and 7th. "J" Battery , with the 4th C.M.R. , "L" Battery with the 2nd C.M.R. , "M" Battery , with the 5th C.M.R. , and "B" Battery with the 1st C.M.R. The 1st C.M.R. was relieved on the 7th and "B" Battery remained in support of the 6th Battalion Highland Light Infantry. No. 2 Company marched to Billets in ONNAING on November 6th and on the following day , "G" and "H" Batteries joined the 49th C.I.Bn. and the P.P.C.L.I. , respectively , in QUIVRAIN ready to take the lead with the 7th C.I.B. on November 8th. Company H.Q. with "E" and "F" Batteries moved to QUIEVRECHAIN.

The 4 Guns of "C" Battery , still in the Line , were withdrawn on November 6th , and No. 1 Company (less "B" Battery) , with "K" Battery marched from RAISMES to Billets in VALENCIENNES. The Third Battalion H.Q. was established at VALENCIENNES on the same day.

No. 2 Company advanced with the 7th C.I.B. on November 8th. "G" and "H" Batteries were disposed for the night on positions between BOUSSU and HENSIES for the protection of the extended left flank : "H" Battery expended 5,500 Rounds Direct Fire. Company H.Q. and "F" Battery moved to THULIN. "E" Battery remained at QUIEVRECHAIN.

No. 3 Company with the 8th C.I.B. was in support to the 7th C.I.B.

No. 1 Company and Battalion H.Q. remained in VALENCIENNES.

#### **November 9th.**

A deep Advance was made on November 9th bringing forward the Third Division Front E. of JEMAPPES , to within 1 ½ miles of MONS. N. of the CONDE-MONS CANAL the 49th C.I.Bn. cleared the area on a Front of 4000 yards bringing the Line forward to the outskirts of GHLIN.

"H" Battery supporting the P.P.C.L.I. on the 7th C.I.B. right , left BOUSSU at 6:30 A.M. 4 Guns were pushed well forward , 2 Guns on each side of JEMAPPES. An enemy Machine Gun Nest was silenced by these Guns and 2 prisoners taken. "E" Battery operating with the R.C.R. mounted 2 Guns at night to defend the Bridgehead over the CANAL , N. of JEMAPPES. "F" Battery advanced with the 42nd C.I.Bn. "G" Battery moved forward N. of the CANAL with the 49th C.I.Bn. No. 2 Company H.Q. was established in JEMAPPES.

Batteries of No. 3 Company (less "K" Battery) moved up in support with the 8th C.I.B.

No. 1 Company (less "B" Battery) and "K" Battery , in Divisional Reserve with the 9th C.I.B. , marched from VALENCIENNES to BOUSSU. "B" Battery Guns were withdrawn to VALENCIENNES on the 9th and rejoined No. 3 Company at HORNU on the following day.

#### **November 10th.**

Our Advance on the 10th carried the Third Division Right to the western edge of MONS , and the City was half encircled. N. of MONS the Line paused on the GHLIN-MONS Railway.

"E" Battery , with the R.C.R. placed 4 Guns S. of the CANAL , 1000 yards W. of MONS to cover the R.C.R. right flank. Sniping was done by 2 Guns on targets in MONS from 5:30 to 10:30 A.M. with good effect. The other 4 Guns of "E" Battery were sited 1000 yards N. of the CANAL. "G" Battery occupied positions N. GHLIN between the Village and the JURBISE-MONS Railway. 5000 Rounds were expended on opportunity targets in BOIS de GHLIN. The Battery was withdrawn to JEMAPPES in the evening. "F" and "H" Batteries operated with the Infantry Battalions with which they were affiliated.

No. 3 Company (less "K" Battery) and "B" Battery assembled during the day in HORNU.

No. 1 Company (less "B" Battery) and "K" Battery marched to Billets in QUAREGNON , Battalion H.Q. moved to JEMAPPES.

## November 11th.

During the night November 10th/11th the Division resumed the Advance. The Villages of NIMY and PETIT NIMY were captured with little opposition and the 7th C.I.B. effected an entry into MONS by way of the Railway Station before midnight. Stubborn Machine Gun Resistance of the German Rearguard was broken down by 6:00 A.M. November 11th, the City was entirely in our hands.

At 11:00 A.M. the Third Canadian Division had reached a Line running from the inter-Divisional Boundary N. of the CANAL du CENTRE, S.-E. and E. of ST. DENIS, thence N.-W. to the NIMY-CASTEAU Road, thence S.-W. back along this Road through MAISIRES to its junction with the NIMY-JURBIESE Road. The Division was in touch with the Second Canadian Division on the right, and the Fifty-second Division (British) on the left. At 8:45 P.M. the 9th C.I.B. relieved the 7th C.I.B. and the Cavalry Outpost Line held by the Squadron of 5th Lancers, attached to the Third Canadian Division.

Batteries of No. 2 Company cooperated with the 7th C.I.B. in the capture of MONS. "E" Battery with the R.C.R., "F" Battery with the 42nd C.I.Bn. The Guns were sited on the Main Line of Resistance E. of MONS between FAUBOURG ST. LAZARE and the CANAL du CENTRE, W. of NIMY. "G" and "H" Batteries were in Reserve and moved into MONS with Company H.Q.

At 6:00 A.M. word was received by No. 1 Company at QUAREGNON that the 9th C.I.B. would relieve the 7th C.I.B. E. of MONS. "C" Battery was detailed to support the 58th C.I.Bn. on the right, "D" Battery, the 116th C.I.Bn. on the left. These Batteries moved off at 8:30 A.M. and were eventually placed for defence of the Third Divisional front. No. 1 Company H.Q. with "A" and "K" Batteries proceeded to Billets in MONS and were among the first Troops to enter the City after the leading Battalions had passed through.

On November 12th Battalion H.Q. and No. 3 Company moved to MONS.

## Casualties and Communications.

### Casualties.

Casualties to the 4 Battalions of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps during the Advance from the CANAL de la SENSEE to MONS are shown in the following Table :-

	Officers		Other Ranks		Total	
	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded	Officers	Other Ranks
<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>						
First Bn. C.M.G.C.						
Oct.12th to 22nd				3		3
Second Bn. C.M.G.C.						
Oct.12th to 19th			3	12		15
Nov.7th to 11th	1		1	5	1	6
Third Bn. C.M.G.C.						
Oct.23rd to Nov.11th		1	1	23	1	24
Fourth Bn. C.M.G.C.						
October	1	1	14	151	2	165
November		2	1	56	2	57
Total	2	4	20	250	6	270

**Communications.**

Communications presented a great difficulty during the period of our rapid Advance in October and November. While the Line was stationary , from October 12th to 17th , and again from October 23rd to November 1st , Telephone Communications were established from Battalion H.Q. to Companies and in many cases down to Batteries. But it was found impracticable to maintain Wire Communications when Headquarters were moving from day to day. Divisional and Brigade Wires were used under these circumstances. In the Fourth Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Signallers were attached to Infantry Brigade Signalling Staffs to assist in relaying messages.

To supplement this service , 4 Motor-cycle Dispatch Riders were attached from the Motor Machine Gun Brigades to each Machine Gun Battalion. In spite of the destruction of roads so systematically carried out by the Germans , and despite the bad weather conditions during the last 5 days of Operations , these Dispatch Riders did yeomen service in keeping up Communications between Machine Gun Battalion Headquarters and their respective Companies.

**Reinforcements.**

Early in the final period of Operations , the Advanced Machine Gun Reinforcements Depot was disbanded. The breakdown of enemy Operation and the consequent diminution of casualties made it unnecessary to maintain a Reinforcement Depot in proximity to the Battle Area. Machine Gun Reinforcements maintained at QUEANT during the later Phases of the CAMBRAI Battle , were returned to the C.M.G.C.R.D. at AUBIN-ST. VAAST , whence , until November 11th Reinforcement Personnel was sent direct to Units in the Field.

**CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.**

**JULY 30th to NOVEMBER 11th , 1918.**

**I  
AMIENS**

**Introductory.**

**Object of Operation.**

Towards the end of July , 1918 the Fourth Army , under the command of SIR HENERY RAWLINSON , holding the northernmost portion of the British Line , began to make preparations , in conjunction with the First French Army , for a surprise attack at an early date on the German Forces E. of AMIENS. The object of the Operation was to reduce the Salient created by the successful German Offensive of March 21st , 1918 , and also to facilitate the Operations of the French on the MONT DIDIER – NOYON Front. The Canadian Corps , then with the First Army , was detailed to participate in the attack , in cooperation with the Australian Corps on its left and the French on the right.

The initial attack of the Canadian Corps was carried out by the Third Canadian Division on the right , the First Canadian Division in the centre , the Second Canadian Division on the left in touch with the Australian Corps , and the Fourth Canadian Division in Reserve.

The following Troops were placed under the Tactical Control of the Canadian Corps for this Operation :-

5th Squadron R.A.F.  
4th Tank Brigade.  
3rd Cavalry Division.

A Mobile Force , called the Canadian Independent Force , was also organized to cooperate with the Cavalry in the neighbourhood of the AMIENS-ROYE Road , to cover the right flank of the Third Canadian Division and to maintain liaison with the French.

**Tasks of Canadian Divisions.**

The Task in brief , of the First , Second and Third Canadian Divisions on the first day was to capture the RED LINE. The Second Canadian Division was also responsible for the capture of part of the BLUE LINE. The Third Cavalry Division with Whippet Tanks was to pass through the Infantry at the RED LINE and proceed to capture and hold the BLUE DOTTED LINE , northward from the ROYE Road , at the same time exploiting their success E. of the BLUE DOTTED LINE. The Forth Canadian Division was to pass through the First and Third Divisions in the RED LINE , and relieve the Cavalry in , or assist them in capturing the BLUE DOTTED LINE. The French on the right were to bombard MOREUIL WOOD for 45 minutes , beginning at Zero Hour , before their Troops moved to the assault.

**The Attack.**

The attack was a success. The enemy was taken by surprise and his forward defences were rapidly overrun by our Troops. By the afternoon of August 8th , 1918 the first day of the Battle , the Canadian Corps had gained its Objectives for the day , with the exception of a small bit of ground adjoining the AMIENS-ROYE Road , near le QUESNEL , where unexpected Reserves were encountered. On the second day the advance was resumed and very satisfactory progress was made. Our Line was further pushed forward on the third day. At this point the old Trench Systems of the 1916 SOMME Battle was reached. The obstacle

to our advance provided by these defences considerably helped the enemy to reorganize his defeated Divisions and to stiffen them with fresh Reserves. But by this time the Canadian Corps had penetrated the enemy's territory to a depth of about 11 or 12 miles. Many prisoners and numerous guns of all calibres had been captured.

### **Canadian Corps Moves South.**

On July 29th , 1918 , the XVII Corps received Orders to relieve the Canadian Corps in the Line ; and the following Units began to move from the ARRAS Sector to a Concentration Area west of AMIEN.

### **Move of Canadian Mobile Units.**

At this time the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade was in G.H.Q. Reserve at TILLOY-les-HERMAVILLE. The 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade had 3 Batteries at HERMAVILLE in Corps Reserve and 2 Batteries in the Line between WILLERVAL and BAILLEUL , N. of ARRAS. On the night of the 30th/31st July , 1918 the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades moved respectively , to the Villages of COURCELLES and PRISCAMPS , in the Fourth Army Area , about 13 miles S.-W. of AMIENS. The following night , the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion moved to the same Area and were allotted Billets in the Village of THIKLOY-l' ABBAYE.

## **FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE.**

### **Formation.**

Owing to the extensive Operations which were being undertaken by the French further S. , it was thought quite probable that in the event of initial success the Battle would develop into one of considerable magnitude. To follow up success , if the Germans were taken by surprise and allowed our Infantry to rapidly overrun their forward defences , it would be necessary to have a Mobile Force to pursue the enemy , to watch our flanks and to maintain liaison with our dismounted Troops. Further the French Attack was timed to take place 45 minutes after the British , a fact which rendered our right flank more vulnerable. It was therefore decided to form for this Operation , in addition to the Cavalry , a Mobile Force , composed of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades , the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion , and one Section of 6-inch Newton Mortars , to operate on the main AMIENS-ROYE Road , the right boundary of the Canadian Corps. This Force was named the Canadian Independent Force and was commanded by the G.O.C. Canadian Machine Gun Corps , Brigadier-General R. BRUTINEL , C.B. , C.M.G. , D.S.O. (X)

(X) Cdn. Corps , G. 94/26-a dated Aug. 2nd , 1918.  
And Cdn. Corps , G. 135/2523-4 dated Aug. 3rd , 1918.

### **Training.**

From August 2nd , when the Canadian Independent Force came into being , until August 8th , the Units were busy training , allocating duties , overhauling Equipment and Transport , fitting 2 Machine Gun Mountings on every Fighting Lorry , and generally preparing to go into Action. Parts of 3 or 4 days were spent in combined Tactical Exercises in which all Units of the Force participated.

### **Tactical Exercises.**

The purpose of these Exercises was to practice and promote useful and successful cooperation with the Motor Brigades in the exploitation of success , in forming defensive flanks , in the use of the Armoured Cars as a Mobile Reserve or as an Advanced Guard on the Roads while the Batteries were taking up positions , in outflanking and overcoming Strong Points , and in holding and consolidating ground won. The necessity of close cooperation with the Cavalry and Artillery and maintaining good liaison with the Infantry was emphasized. These Exercises also served to illustrate the importance of the proper employment of the Cyclists as Scouts , Patrols , Escorts to Machine Guns , Snipers , etc. The tactical

handing of the Lewis Guns , the value of Smoke as a screen to the advancing of Batteries , how to take advantage of Cover , and many other points were brought out and discussed.

### **Task.**

The Task of the Canadian Independent Force was to pass through the Third Canadian Division and make good the Line of the ROYE Road between the RED LINE and the BLUE DOTTED LINE forming a flank to the Third Cavalry Division towards the S. and cover the right flank of the Third Division. As the Fight made progress , the Independent Force was to continue exploitation of success down the ROYE Road , acting at the same time as a link between the most advanced Cavalry and leading Infantry. Close liaison with the Third Cavalry Division and the French was to be maintained.

### **Composition and Organization.**

The initial Organization of the Canadian Independent Force was as follows :-

Composition :-

Headquarters C.M.G.C.

1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade. (40 Vickers Machine Guns)

2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade. (40 Vickers Machine Guns)

Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion. (9 Lewis Guns)

1 Trench Mortar Section , 5th C.D.A. (2 – 6 inch Newton Mortars)

1 Continuous Wave Wireless Detachment.

Canadian Motor Machine Gun , Mechanical Transport Company.

The Force was organized as follows :-

Commander - Brigadier-General R. BRUTINEL , C.B. , C.M.G. , D.S.O.

Headquarters - Major W.B. FORSTER , M.C. , Brigade-Major.

Lieut. P.M. HUMME , Reconnaissance Officer.

Armoured Car Detachment - O.C. , Captain R.C. CLARK , 1st C.M.M.G.B.

4 Armoured Cars. (2 from each Motor Brigade)

1 Platoon Cyclists.

10 Motor Cyclists. (Scouts and Liaison)

Trench Mortar Section - O.C. , Captain J.N. Mc EACHERN , 5th Cdn. Div. Artillery.

2-6 inch Newton Mortars mounted on 2 Lorries, each of which carried 60 Rounds of T. M. Ammunition.

No. 1 Group – 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

O.C. , Lt.-Col. W.K. WALKER , D.S.O. , M.C.

5 Motor Machine Gun Batteries. (40 Guns)

2 Platoon Cyclists.

20 Motor Cyclists.

No. 2 Group – 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

O.C. , Major H.F.V. MEURLING , M.C.

5 Motor Machine Gun Batteries. (40 Guns)

2 Platoon Cyclists.

20 Motor Cyclists.

No. 3 Group – Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion.

O.C. , Major R. HUMPHREY , D.S.O.

2 Armoured Cars. (1 from each Motor Brigade)  
4 Platoon Cyclists.  
10 Motor Cyclists.

Supply Section. – O.C. Lieut. G.H. MAY , C.M.M.G. , M.T. Company.

1 Ration Lorry	1 Water Lorry
1 Ammunition Lorry	1 Fuel and Oil Lorry
2 First Aid Lorries	5 Motor Cyclists

C.L.H. Hotchkiss Guns. – The Hotchkiss Detachment , Canadian Light Horse , was placed on August 9th , at the disposal of the G.O.C. , Cdn. Independent Force. The 12 Hotchkiss Guns were ordered to join No. 3 Group , which was then placed under command of Lieut.-Col. LEONARD , O.C. , C.L.H.

### **Plans of Engagement.**

Arrangements for 2 possible eventualities were made :-

1 – In the event of the Cavalry getting through and the Road being clear up to le QUESNEL –

The Armoured Car Detachment to move rapidly to positions of observation E. of le QUESNEL followed by 1st and 2nd Groups. The 1st Group to get into position and consolidate while the 2nd Group remained in observation ready to move forward through the first group on receipt of Orders.

2 – In the event of the Cavalry being delayed and resistance expected from le QUESNEL – BRAUCOURT - FRESNOY – Groups to move into positions , with the M.G. Batteries leapfrogging under the protection of the Armoured Cars. If required broad use was to be made of medium and long range Overhead Machine Gun Fire. If strong resistance were encountered in le QUESNEL and the Woods to the S. , the 1st Group was to support the attack of the Cavalry and Tanks by Direct or Indirect Fire.

### **Trench Mortars.**

If the Armoured Car Detachment were unable to reduce by its own Fire isolated Machine Gun Nests or other local Points of Resistance it would call , by signal or message , for Newton Mortars , which were to move with the leading Machine Gun Battery.

### **Smoke.**

Smoke Grenades were to be used to neutralize enemy observation while the Trench Mortars and Machine Gun Batteries were getting into action.

### **3rd Group.**

The 3rd Group , was to be held in Reserve and used only if the situation demanded and on direct Orders from the G.O.C. , Canadian Independent Force.

### **Exploitation of Success.**

Groups were warned that should the initial Assault prove successful , after the capture of the BLUE DOTTED LINE , the Independent Force , in liaison with the Cavalry on the left and the French on the right , would probably operate in the triangle HANGEST-en- SANTERRE – ROYE – VRELY.

### **Other Arrangements.**

Detailed arrangements were made for liaison with the Cavalry , the French , the Third , and Fourth Canadian Divisions , for co-operation with the R.A.F. and Artillery , for proper and continuous supply of

Ammunition , Rations and Water , and for the establishment of First Aid Posts and evacuation of the wounded.

## **THE BATTLE**

### **Concentration of Independent Force.**

At Zero Hour , 4:20 A.M. , August 8th-1918 , Headquarters Independent Force opened along the ROYE Road in the BOIS de GENTELLES about 400 yards S.- E. of the western edge of the Wood. By 5:00 A.M. all the Groups , in the order enumerated above , had concentrated on the ROYE Road with the head of the Column in rear of Headquarters.

### **Force Moves Forward , August 8th.**

After the Road to DOMART was reported clear the Column commenced to move forward at 7:33 A.M. , passing through DOMART at 9:10 A.M. Headquarters C.I.F. was established at the intersection of the AMIENS-ROYE and DEMUIN-MOREUIL Roads. From that point the Armoured Car Detachment , which had been reinforced by 2 Armoured Cars from No. 3 Group , went forward to get in touch with the enemy.

### **Situation.**

MAISON BLANCHE , and the BRICKFIELD near it , had been captured by the Infantry , BEAUCOURT appeared empty , but MEZIERES was still in the hands of the enemy offering strong resistance to the French. At 11:00 A.M. , 4 Platoon Cyclists were placed in Artillery Formation on the S. side of the main Road and about 1000 yards in front of Headquarters. This was a precaution against a counter-attack by the Germans from the direction of MEZIERES. "C" and "E" Batteries of No. 1 Group which had followed the Armoured Cars , took up positions along the southern edge of VALLEY WOOD to cover the right flank of the Canadian Corps.

### **Capture of Mezieres.**

When the Armoured Car Detachment reached the MAISON BLANCHE Crossroads , Capt. CLARK ordered 2 of his Cars and 1 Section of Cyclists S. towards MEZIERES. The enemy was encountered on the northern outskirts of the Village. The Guns of the Cars opened Fire on groups of the enemy and on the Crew of a German 5.9 inch Gun in action near the Cemetery. The Gun and about 30 prisoners were captured and a number of casualties were inflicted. At the same time Lieut. WORTHINTON , M.M. , in charge of "E" Battery , 1st C.M.M.G.Bde. in close cooperation with the French , moved his Guns forward into positions from which he kept MEZIERES under Fire until the French Infantry began to dribble into the Village. The work of this Battery and the Armoured Cars greatly facilitated the task of securing a footing in the houses and streets of the Village. As the French Troops were unable to debouch from MEZIERES , owing to the resistance offered by a cluster of German Machine Guns E. of the Village , Major MEURLING (O.C. , No. 2 Group) arranged with the O.C. , 94th French Infantry Regiment , a combined minor operation to take place at 2:00 P.M. to overcome the enemy at this point.

This arrangement proved unnecessary. Captain W.T. TRENCH , in command of "C" Battery , No. 1 Group , noticing the situation at MEZIERES , independently manoeuvred his Battery , outflanked the enemy positions round the Village and forced the German Machine Gunners and Infantry to surrender to the French. A Section of the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion covered the approach of this Battery in a very skillful manner and by Rifle Fire inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.

### **Action of Armoured Cars Between Beaucourt and le Quesnel.**

While 2 of the Armoured Cars and 2 of the Machine Gun Batteries were co-operating with the French near MEZIERES , the remainder of Captain CLARK's Detachment was operating along the AMIENS-ROYE Road in conjunction with the Cavalry and Whippets in CLAUDE WOOD , 1500 yards to the left of the Road. The Cars advanced with little opposition as far as the CHALK PIT S. of BEAUCOURT , where



touch was obtained with our Cavalry on the left. The progress of the Cars was for a short time held up at this point by enemy Machine Gunners and Hand Grenades. This opposition was soon overcome by our Machine Guns, and the Cars then proceeded towards le QUESNEL encountering heavy Machine Gun Fire as they reached the high point on the Road beyond the CHALK PIT. The Detachment, however, went ahead engaging at short range groups of enemy Infantry and Machine Guns on both sides of the Road, inflicting many casualties. They continued to operate between the CHALK PIT and the Road from le QUESNEL to FRESNOY-en-CHAUSSEE until the Machine Gun Batteries had come forward and taken up positions in the vicinity of the CHALK PIT. After successfully screening the move of the Batteries the Armoured Cars were withdrawn behind the Batteries in the afternoon as the advance of our Infantry on the left and that of the French on the right had been temporarily held up.

### **Headquarters Force.**

Early in the afternoon, Headquarters of the Canadian Independent Force was established in a Dugout S. of the Main Road, about 600 yards E. of MAISON BLANCHE.

### **Action of 1st Group South of Beaucourt.**

As soon as the French entered MEZIERES, Lieut.-Col. WALKER, commanding No.1 Group took his other 3 Batteries, "A", "B" and "D" forward along the ROYE Road, each Battery in turn leapfrogging the Batteries in front of it. Covered by the Armoured Cars in front, they advanced as far as the CHALK PIT, S. of BEAUCOURT, but were unable to advance beyond this point owing to heavy Artillery and Machine Gun Fire. Our Infantry had not been able to make much progress beyond BEAUCOURT (X) and the French Line, in the early part of the afternoon, still ran along the eastern outskirts of MEZIERES. The Batteries, therefore, took up positions S. and N. of the Road, acting as connecting links between the Canadian Corps and the French. On completion of their work with the French, "C" and "E" Batteries also took up positions S. of BEAUCOURT. Throughout the afternoon the Guns Fired on many enemy Parties which were seen round le QUESNEL and FRESNOY. Late in the afternoon "C" and "E" Batteries assisted with their Fire, the French in their attack on FRESNOY. The Village was held in strength by the enemy and the French failed to capture it.

(X) See Page 244.

### **Disposition of 1st Motor Brigade, Night August 8th/9th.**

In the evening, the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade Batteries took up the following defensive positions for the night on the right of the Canadian Corps :-

"C" and "E" Batteries – On the right of the AMIENS-ROYE Road, S. of BEAUCOURT covering FRESNOY, which was strongly held by the enemy. "C" Battery was in touch with the 11th C.I.B., N. of the Road and "E" Battery with the French.

"D" Battery - On the left of the Road covering le QUESNEL.

"B" Battery – In support S.-W. of BEAUCOURT.

"A" Battery – In reserve close to the Independent Force H.Q., MAISON BLANCHE.

No.2 Group, the Armoured Car Detachment and the Trench Mortar Section were withdrawn for the night to VALLEY WOOD.

### **Attack on le Quesnel and Fresnoy, August 9th.**

Very early on August 9th-1918 "A" and "B" Batteries, No.1 Group, took up positions astride the AMIENS-ROYE Road to assist the 11th C.I.B. in the attack on FRESNEL. The French attacked FRESNEL at the same time. The 2 Batteries leapfrogging forward to the western edge of le QUESNEL making good the ground on the right flank as they proceeded, and cooperated successfully with both attacks. They succeeded in inflicting many casualties on the enemy and "B" Battery (Lieut. H. SMITH,

M.M.) was partly responsible for the capture by the French of a large number of prisoners. Both le QUESNEL and FRESNOY were captured.

#### **Action of Armoured Cars South and East of le Quesnel.**

The Armoured Cars also cooperated in this attack. They met with a stiff resistance from the Woods S. of le QUESNEL and LE PT. HANGEST. These localities contained enemy Machine Guns , which greatly hindered the work of “B” Battery and the French on the right of the Road. After a personal reconnaissance by Captain CLARK , the Armoured Cars again went forward and cleared the enemy out of the WOODS. During this action , the Gunners on the Cars obtained excellent targets , killing and wounding many Germans and capturing a few prisoners. The Cars then proceeded along the Road in the direction of BOUCHOIR. They encountered intense Artillery Fire as they approached the Railway Crossing E. of le QUESNEL. After making 3 attempts to advance , they were forced back , but not before 1 of the Cars received a “direct hit” and all the other Car Crews had sustained several casualties. The Armoured Car Detachment was relieved before Noon by the 2nd Group , which leapfrogged the 1st Group.

#### **No.1 Group Withdrawn.**

The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade , which , since the morning of August 8th , had suffered 32 casualties , and the Armoured Cars were withdrawn to the CHALK PIT , S. of BEAUCOURT , as soon as No.2 Group had completed the taking over of all the ground which had been won by the Armoured Cars. In the afternoon , enemy Artillery concentrated on this point causing a few casualties and wounding Captain CLARK , O.C. Armoured Car Detachment. To avoid this Shelling the 1st Brigade and the Cars were moved further back to MAISON BLANCHE.

#### **Trench Mortars Silence Enemy Field Battery.**

The Trench Mortar Section , which was now operating with the 2nd. Group , was brought into action against an enemy “Whizz-Bang” Battery behind the Railway Embankment and against Machine Guns located in the Wood just E. of the Railway Crossing. The Mortars fired 25 Rounds obtaining very good hits and silencing the enemy. The advance which had been temporarily checked , was then resumed by the 5th C.M.R. , N. of the Road and the 55th Regiment of French Infantry on the S. assisted by Tanks.

#### **No. 2 Group in Action.**

“A” Battery , 2nd C.M.M.G.Bde. , cooperating with the Cavalry pushed on through FOLIES and took up positions E. of the Village from where it inflicted heavy casualties on the retiring enemy. “B” and “C” Batteries of this Group , which were operating S. of the Main Road , entered ARVILLERS ahead of the French and captured a large number of prisoners. Pte. H. McCORKELL , 2nd C.M.M.G.Bde. displayed great courage by pushing into the Village and capturing 15 Germans single handed. “D” and “E” Batteries , supported by a Platoon of Cyclists , worked their way S.-E. of FOLIES and in cooperation with the Infantry , entered BOUCHOIR in the evening.

#### **Dispositions of No. 2 Group , Night , August 9th/10th.**

The Dispositions of No. 2 Group for the night were as follows :-

“A” and “B” Batteries – N.-E. of BOUCHOIR.

“C” Battery – Eastern Edge of ARVILLERS.

“D” Battery – In BEETROOT FACTORY , N. of ARVILLERS , protecting the flank of the 5th C.M.R. and acting as a connecting link between the Canadian Corps and the French.

“E” Battery – 800 yards E. of BOUCHOIR.

### **Motor Machine Gun Transport Moves Infantry.**

During the night the Transport of the 2nd C.M.M.G.Bge. moved the 2nd C.M.R. from le QUESNEL to BOUCHOIR in preparation for an attack on le QUESNOY at dawn the following morning.

### **Attack on le QUESNOY , August 10th.**

Early on the morning of August 10th "A" and "B" Batteries of No. 2 Group supported the advance of the 2nd C.M.R. on le QUESNOY. These Batteries had gone along the ROYE Road as far as la CAMBUSE , S.-W. of DAMERY , when the Canadian Independent Force was ordered to withdraw to rest and reorganize.

### **Canadian Independent Force Withdrawn.**

No. 1 and No. 3 Groups concentrated in VALLEY WOOD , No. 2 Group was withdrawn to HAMON WOOD , and the Supply Section was in le QUESNEL.

### **No. 1 Group Moves Forward , August 16th.**

On August 16th , it was reported that the enemy Resistance was weakening in front of the French. Expecting our Allies to advance , No. 1 Group together with the Armoured Cars and the Trench Mortars moved to BOIS-en-Z and the Hotchkiss Detachment to the Woods W. of la CAMBUSE , ready to take advantage of any opening to exploit success. Motor Cyclists and Armoured Cars reconnoitred all the Roads leading E. from ANDECHY and DAMERY. The French , however , were held up in front of GOYENCOURT and were unable to pierce the enemy Line , which had been established in the old Trench System in that area. In the evening of August 17th , No. 1 Group and the Hotchkiss Detachment were withdrawn to le QUESNEL WOOD and CAIX , respectively. The following day Lieut.-Col. WALKER moved his Command back to VALLEY WOOD.

### **Independent Force Disbanded.**

The Cavalry Machine Gun Detachment and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion ceased to form part of the Canadian Independent Force on August 19th. The former rejoined its Regiment and the latter was placed under Orders of the D.A. and Q.M.G. , Canadian Corps. The 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades were held in Corps Reserve in their Bivouacs in VALLEY and HAMON WOODS under General BRUTINEL.

### **Acts of Bravery.**

The following are a few brief accounts of splendid work and acts of bravery performed by some of the Officer , N.C.O.s and Men of the Canadian Independent Force:-

On the morning of August 9th , Lieut. F. WAGHORN , D.C.M. , M.M. , was in charge of "B" Battery , 1st C.M.M.G.Bge. , filling a gap between the French and the Canadian Corps , S. of le QUESNEL. A German Strong Point opposite this Half-Battery was holding up the advance of the French , 2 Tanks and a WHIPPET were put out of action while attempting to overcome this point. Lieut. WAGHORN with great coolness and disregard for his own safety , skillfully handling his Machine Guns and the Detachment of Cyclists attached to him , captured and held the Strong Point. This action considerably helped the French in their advance.

No. 45578 , Corporal G.C. KIRKHAM , in charge of an Armoured Car , showed conspicuous skill in handling his Car on August 8th and in the morning of August 9th. He repeatedly penetrated the enemy's Lines on the AMIENS-ROYE Road , near BEAUFORT , le QUESNEL , and ARVILLERS , bringing back valuable information as to the enemy's Dispositions. After the driver had been badly wounded on August 9th , Corporal KIRKHAM drove the Car himself for 4 hours under heavy Fire , between le QUESNEL and

the Railway Crossing. By skillfully manoeuvring his Car his 2 Gun Crews were able to Fire effectively on many Groups of German Infantry and Machine Guns.

As a Motor-Cyclist Scout , No. 16399 , Pte. A.L. BEBEAU , M.M. , showed conspicuous bravery on August 8th and 9th. He rode through the enemy's Lines no less than 10 times with the object of drawing the enemy's Fire. He would then give the location of the German Machine Guns to the Gun Crews of the Armoured Cars. On the morning of August 9th , Pte. BEBEAU particularly distinguished himself by riding right through the enemy's positions S. of le QUESNEL and bringing back information about the location of Machine Gun Nests. His report was of great value to the French and to the Motor Batteries operating S. of the Road.

In the Operations in the vicinity of le QUESNEL WOOD , No. 45628 , Pte. R.W. CRUSE , the driver of one of the 2nd. C.M.M.G.Bge. Armoured Cars displayed great gallantry and devotion to duty. His Car was hit on the side by an Anti-Tank Shell. Two of the Crew were killed and the others wounded. Driver CRUSE . although suffering from a very severe wound which almost severed his arm from his body , drove the Car back with one hand , thus saving the lives of his wounded comrades. Unfortunately this gallant soldier , who had been in France since 1915 , died from his wounds after driving the Car back into safety.

### **2nd Motor Machine Gun Brigade Lorry.**

After midnight , August 9th/10th , a No. 2 Group Ration Lorry , by mistake , passed through our Outposts into No Man's Land. A strong enemy Patrol attacked it with Bombs , wounding the driver and assistant driver , who managed to walk back to our Lines. Sgt. MORRISON of the 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade Train was sent forward on a Motor Cycle to investigate. With great courage he crept up to the Lorry , examined it , effected some small repairs and brought it back under Shell and Machine Gun Fire. The 3 or 4 men who were in the Lorry at the time it was assaulted , managed to escape , but the German Patrol took all the Rations with them.

## **GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.**

### **Task Fulfilled.**

The Canadian Independent Force fulfilled its primary Task , which was to form a flank for the Cavalry and to act as a connecting line between the advanced Cavalry and the Infantry. The scope of the Operations of the Cavalry was , however , very restricted by circumstances , and the ground they had overridden before noon , August 8th , was soon occupied by our Infantry. The Independent Force then covered the flank of the 4th Canadian Division and later the 3rd Canadian Division , and also tried to make headway.

### **Cooperation with the French.**

The C.I.F. had occasion to be of considerable assistance to the French 42nd and 126th Divisions by outflanking some Strong Points , which were giving trouble. The tendency of the French was to swerve to the right and our Troops swerved to the left , so that probably a Gap would have been left between the 2 Armies.

### **Armoured Cars.**

The Armoured Cars , though of an obsolete type , proved very valuable and the results would have been more pronounced had they tried , to a larger measure to cover and facilitate the progress of the Batteries and Lorries instead of working individually.

### **Trench Mortars.**

The 6 inch Newton Mortars were of great value. When employed their action was decisive. Throughout the whole Operation they acted as an Independent Unit , being attached to Groups as required by the Tactical Situation.

### **Hotchkiss Detachment.**

The Hotchkiss Cavalry Detachment arrive too late to be needed , and undoubtedly would have been of great value in the action against MEZIERES.

### **2 Motor Brigades and Cyclist Battalion.**

The work of the 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Cyclist Battalion was carried out in a highly creditable manner. Their cooperation with Troops of the other Branches of the Service and the French produced excellent results. Owing to their hasty organization and the little opportunity they had for combined training , perhaps the Units did not make full use of the power of manoeuvre , which the addition of Cyclists and Trench Mortars gave them.

The following extracts from letters received by Brigadier-General R. BRUTINEL , distinctly show the appreciation of the work done by the Canadian Independent Force in protecting the flank of the Canadian Corps and in their cooperation with the French Forces.

### **Letter from Canadian Corps Commander.**

General Sir ARTHUR W. CURRIE , the Canadian Corps Commander wrote on August 15th:

“ I have just finished reading with most intense interest your report on Operations conducted by the Independent Force , from the 8th August to the 10th inclusive. In addition to the Special Order which I am publishing , I consider that special praise is due to the Officers and Men of your Command.....

“ I congratulate you most heartily on the success achieved.”

### **Letter from 42nd French Division.**

On August 11th , General DEVILLE , Commanding the 42nd French Infantry Division , quick to recognize the valuable assistance given him , sent to General BRUTINEL , 10 Croix de Guerre , accompanied by the following letter:-

42 ' D.I.  
ETAT-MAJOR

P.C. , 11 Aout.1918.

Mon cher General,

Je savais , a n'en pas douter , depuis votre visite au P.C. Jeanne d'Arc que la 42' D.I. pourrait , en toutes circonstances , compter sur l'appui des "Forces Canadiennes Independantes".

L'evenement a encore depasse mes previsions et , au lendemain de in glorieuse journee ou lorsque votre Detachement a prete a ma Division un concours si genereux et si efficace , je tiens a vous adresser mes plus sincereres felicitations pour la magnifique conduite de vos Unites et l'expression de mes remerciements pour qu'alles vous ont donnee votre aide.

De tous cotes dans les rapports qui me parviennent de mes chefs de Corps , et des chefs de Btn. , sont mises au en relief votre intervention ai intelligemment efficace et l'ardeur de vos troupes a souder leur action a la notre.

Aussi , en souvenir de ces combats si glorieusement arrives en commun , je vous cite a la'Ordre de la 42' D.I. , pour le motif suivant:- "Officier General de hauts valeur , commandant une Unite d'elite qui a fait preuve au coure de la bataille du 8 aout , 1918 de la plus hautes qualites militaires – et a constamment prete a la 42'D.I. un appui aussi genereux qu'efficace."

Je mets de plus a votre disposition dix Croix de Guerre , avrc citation a l'ordre de la 42' D.I. , en vous priant de les repartir , dans votre Detachement , a ceux que vous jugerez les plus dignes de cette distinction.

J. DEVILLE.

**Translation.**

42nd Infantry Division Headquarters.

Battle Post , 11th August 1918.

My Dear General:-

From the moment of your visit to the Joan of Arc Battle Post , I knew , without any possible doubt , that the 42nd Infantry Division could at all times rely upon the support of the Canadian Independent Force.

The event more than justified our expectations and , on the morrow of that glorious day when your body of troops lent to my Division such generous and efficient co-operation , I hasten to send you my very sincere congratulations and thanks for the splendid behaviour of your Units and the assistance they gave us.

In every direction there come from my Officers of Corps and Battalions reports that give prominence to your efficient and skillful intervention and to the furore of your Men welding their Operations to ours.

In remembrance , therefore , of those battles gloriously fought in common , I cite you in the Order of the 42nd Infantry Division for the following reasons :-

“ General Officer of great valor , commanding a choice Unit , who has shown during the Battle of the 8th August 1918 the highest Military qualities , and who gave to the 42nd Infantry Division with unshaken determination a most “generous and efficient support”.

I also put at your disposal ten Croix de Guerre , with citations in the Order of the 42nd Infantry Division , and beg that you will award them to those in your Detachment whom you consider to be most worthy of the distinction.

J. DEVILLE

**Letter from 126th French Division.**

The general officer commanding the 126th French Infantry Division , General MATHIEU , awarded the Croix de Guerre to 6 Officers and Other Ranks of the Canadian Independent Force , and addressed the following letter to General BRUTINEL :-

126 Division d'Infanterie

S.P.

16 Aout , 1918.

General MATHIEU.

Mon General ,

Comme je vous l'ai dit hier de vive voix , je suis tres heureux que le quiproquo auquel vous faites allusion , aifacilite l'avance de nos troupes dans les lignes boches.

Je serais tres content si en appreciant cette petite recompense , ils se rendaient compte que nous voulons toujours marcher avec vous la main dans la main , pour le succes final de notre juste cause , d'autant plus que nousavens pu juger de visu de la haute valeur de vos troupeset des heureux resultats de leur efficace co-operation.

Avec l'expression de mes meilleurs compliments et , salutations.

T. MATHIEU.

**Translation.**

126th Infantry Division

16th August 1918

P.S.

General MATHIEU ,

Dear General :-

As I said during our conversation of yesterday , I rejoice at the opportunity which offers , thanks to the “qui pro quo” to which you refer , of giving pleasure to some of your gallant Men whose invaluable support to my Troops facilitated our advance into the Bosche Lines.

I would be very happy if , in accepting this little reward , they would realize our earnest desire to go hand in hand with you to the final success of your just cause , the more so now that we have the occasion to appreciate “de vien” the great valor of your soldiers and the good results of their effectual cooperation.

With my very best regards and both hands in yours. T. MATHIEU.

#### **Extract from 11th C.I.B. Report.**

The following are extracts from the 11th C.I.B. Narrative of Operations on August 8th and August 9th (G. 413 , dated August 29th , 1918) :-

“The Motor Machine Guns (No. 1 Group) were held up in D. 28. b. (S. of Beaucourt) but they formed a protective flank for the Brigade right rear and connected it with the French who were still fighting in the vicinity of MEZIERES. The Motor Machine Guns did valuable protective work , but at no stage were they able to get far enough forward to help the Brigade in its advance. “

“ The Motor Machine Guns , too , gave great assistance and relieved me of anxiety concerning my right rear.”

#### **Presentation of French Decorations.**

On August 20th , 1918 , General CURRIE presented the CROIX de GUERRE to the Officers , N.C.O.s and Men of the Canadian Independent Force , who had been awarded the decorations by the General Officers Commanding the 42nd and 126th French Infantry Divisions. The Corps Commander then inspected the 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion , who were assembled in a field N.-E. of VALLEY WOOD.

#### **Canadian Corps Returns to the First Army.**

#### **Units Move North.**

After August 19th the Canadian Units began to move N. , back to the ARRAS Sector , in the First Army Area. The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade and the Canadian Motor Machine Gun , Mechanical Transport Company , moved on August 24th to TILLOY-les-HERMAVILLE and HABARCQ , respectively.

#### **2nd C.M.M.G.B. with Fourth Canadian Division.**

The 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade remained on the AMIENS Front and went into Divisional Reserve under Orders of the Fourth Canadian Division on August 21st. The following day the Brigade went into the Line , in support to the Fourth Division , with “A” , “B” and “C” Batteries , under Captain O'REILLY , M.C. , occupying positions N.-W. of WARVILLERS , and “D” and “E” Batteries under Captain LEARY , M.C. , in front of ROSIERES. (X) These Batteries were relieved 2 days later by Machine Gunners belonging to the XXXVI French Corps. The 2nd Motor Brigade then moved N. and reached its old Billets in HERMAVILLE on the morning of August 26th.

(X) See Page 283.

# **THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE AND BRUTINEL'S (COMPOSITE) BRIGADE.**

## **II CAMBRAI , PHASE I : AUGUST 26th to 30th , 1918.**

### **Introductory.**

#### **Operations August 26th , 1918 ; General.**

As already stated , the Canadian Corps had begun to move back to the First Army Area on August 19th , 1918. By August 24th the Second Canadian Division was in the Line in the NEUVILLE VITASSE-TELEGRAPH HILL Sector , ARRAS Front : and the Third Canadian Division held the Line from the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road to the SCARPE RIVER.

The First and Fourth Canadian Divisions joined the Canadian Corps on August 25th and 28th respectively. The Operations which the Canadian Corps was detailed to carry out on this Front in successive rapid stages beginning on August 26th were part of the Allied General Offensive which eventually forced the Germans to ask for the Armistice signed on November 11th , 1918. The Tasks assigned to the Canadian Corps in these Operations may be roughly outlined as follows :-

- 1 – To capture the very well organized defences W. and E. of MONCHY-le-PREUX , and to seize the FRESNES-ROUVROY LINE.
- 2 – To break and push through the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE , which formed part of the famous HINDENBURG System of Defences.
- 3 – To overcome enemy resistance in the CANAL du NORD LINE.
- 4 – To continue with the Offensive Operations until the Germans were forced to acknowledge defeat.

#### **Plan of 1st Operation.**

A Canadian Corps Operation Order issued on August 23rd , 1918 , stated that the First of these Operations was to be carried out in conjunction with the VI Corps on the right. With the Fifty-first Division (British) which had been placed under the Tactical Control , of the Canadian Corps with 3 Divisions in the Line was to maintain touch with the advancing Troops of VI Corps and gain ground wherever possible. The 1st C.M.M.G.B. , the First Life Guards M.G. Battalion , the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion , and the XVIII Corps Cyclist Battalion were to be in Corps Reserve , under the G.O.C. , in readiness to move at 4 hours notice. (X)

The initial assault took place on August 26th , 1918 at 3:00 A.M. (Y)

The attack was carried out , under cover of an Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage , by the Second Canadian Division on the right , the Third Canadian Division in the centre , and the Fifty-first Division (British) holding the Line N. of the SCARPE RIVER , on the left.

#### **Machine Gun Barrage.**

The Machine Gun Barrage applied on the Front of the 2 Canadian Divisions was prepared by General BRUTINEL , and carried out under the control of Divisional Machine Gun Commanders. To obtain a Barrage density of 1 Machine Gun for every 35 yards of Front , the Machine Gun Resources of the Divisions were supplemented by Guns from the 1st C.M.M.G.B. and the 1st Life Guards M.G. Battalion. 4 Batteries of the Motor Brigade and 2 Batteries (16 Guns) of the Life Guard Battalion were placed under the Orders of the O.C. , Second Battalion , C.M.G.C. , and 2 more Batteries of the Life Guards Battalion , under the O.C. , Third Battalion , C.M.G.C. In addition to these Batteries 32 Guns of the Life Guards were placed under the Fifty-first Division to co-operate with the Third Canadian Division by Direct Flanking Fire on the Northern Slopes of ORANGE HILL , and by Neutralizing Fire on MOUNT PLEASANT.



(X) Cdn. Corps O.449 , dated August 23rd , 1918. (Y) See Page 296 , ff

### **Machine Gun Batteries take up Barrage Positions.**

On August 25th , “A” , “B” “C” and “D” Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. moved to their Barrage positions with 2 Batteries on the N. and 2 Batteries on the S. Slope of TELEGRAPH HILL. The First Life Guards M.G. Battalion had 2 Batteries in position just S. of TILLOY-lez-MAFFLAINES. These 6 Batteries formed the C.M.M.G. Group of the Second Division Barrage Guns. Major R.D. HARKNESS , M.C. , 1st C.M.G.B. was in command of the Group , with Headquarters in RONVILLE.

## **THE BATTLE.**

### **Barrage Fire.**

At Zero Hour , 3:00 A.M. , August 26th , all the Guns opened Fire and the Barrage Scheme was carried out successfully. Immediately after the capture of the First Objective the 4 Life Guard Batteries and “C” and “D” Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. were withdrawn to Corps Reserve. “A” and “B” Batteries remained in position to support the attack of the 6th C.I.B. by Direct Fire on the ground E. of NEUVILLE VITASSE. These 2 Batteries rejoined their Unit in the afternoon. The Guns attached to the Fifty-first Division were withdrawn after the capture of the Second Objective. The First Life Guards M.G. Battalion was then transferred from the Canadian Corps to the “Composite Force” commanded by Col. LINDSAY , D.S.O. , First Army M.G. Officer.

### **Attack Makes Good Progress.**

Early reports indicated that the attack was progressing favourably. Both Canadian Divisions had captured their Objectives by 11:00 A.M. and MONCHY-le-PREUX and GUEMAPPE were in our hands.

### **Canadian Independent Force Reformed.**

The Canadian Independent Force was then reformed , under Brigadier-General R. BRUTINEL , with the 2 Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades , the Canadian Corps Cyclists and XVIII Corps Cyclist Battalions , which were assembled on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road. The Task of the Force was to exploit success down the CAMBRAI Road as soon as an opportunity occurred.

### **Patrols Sent Out.**

Officer and Motor Cyclist Patrols were immediately sent forward to get in touch with the advancing Infantry and to reconnoitre all the roads leading Eastward. The enemy resistance had stiffened E. of MONCHY and GUEMAPPE and the roads were found to be in poor condition.

### **Machine Gun Batteries Fill In Gap.**

In the evening 2 Batteries of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. , accompanied by 2 Platoons of Canadian Corps Cyclists took up positions astride the Main Road to fill a Gap that existed between the Second and Third Canadian Divisions. After the Infantry had established a Line for the night and the flanks of the 2 Divisions were in touch with one another the Units of the Canadian Independent Force were withdrawn at midnight to the CITADEL , ARRAS. The XVIII Corps Cyclists Battalion was withdrawn from the Independent Force and placed in Army Reserve.

### **Infantry Resumes Attack.**

The Second and Third Canadian Divisions resumed the attack on August 27th and captured BOIS du SART , VIS-en-ARTOIS and CHERISY. The Infantry were held up at this Line by the enemy holding the Trenches in front of the 2 Villages. (X)

### **2nd Motor Brigade and Cyclists Concentrate.**

During the afternoon , the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. , 6 Armoured Cars , and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion were concentrated on the NEUVILLE VITASSE-WANCOURT Road in readiness to exploit success beyond VIS-en-ARTOIS , should the enemy resistance weaken in the evening or early the following morning. Patrols which had been in close touch with the forward Troops throughout the day reported that the enemy had launched an unsuccessful counter-attack S.-E. of VIS-en-ARTOIS. A very large Mine Crater on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road , W. of the Village , and numerous Shell-holes on all the other Roads leading to it blocked all M.T. Traffic in that direction. The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and the Cyclist Battalion remained concentrated in WANCOURT until the following day.

### **The Line , Night August 27th/28th.**

That night the Canadian Corps Front ran approximately , E. of the SENSEE RIVER to VIS-en-ARTOIS (inclusive) , then the Line bent North-Westward and continued along the Eastern edge of BOIS du VERT and the BOIS du SART to the SCARPE RIVER , W. of PHLEVES. (Y) N. of the River both ROEUX and GAVRELLE were in our hands : but GREENLAND HILL was still held by the enemy.

(X) See Page 322.

(Y) See Page 324.

## **BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE (COMPOSITE BRIGADE).**

### **Composite Brigade.**

An Operation Order issued by the Canadian Corps on August 27th , (X) stated that , on the night of August 28th/29th , the First Canadian Division was to relieve the Second Canadian Division and that the Fourth Division (British) would relieve the Third Canadian Division which was holding the Sector immediately S. of the SCARPE RIVER. It also Ordered a "Composite Brigade" commanded by General BRUTINEL , and consisting of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. , the 101st M.G. Battalion (less 1 Company) , the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion , to be at the disposal of the Fourth Division (British). The Task of the Composite Brigade was to form a flank S. of the SCARPE. The Fourth Division (British) now formed part of the Canadian Corps.

(X) Canadian Corps G. 642.

### **1st Motor Brigade in Corps Reserve.**

The 1st C.M.M.G.B. (Lt.-Col. WALKER) was held in Corps Reserve in ARRAS ready to operate down the CAMBRAI Road if an opportunity occurred.

### **Concentration of Composite Brigade.**

Early in the afternoon of August 28th , the Units of the Composite Brigade were concentrated in the Area between FRUCHY and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road.

### **Brigade's Task.**

The Composite brigade was allotted by the Fourth Division (British) the Tasks of relieving the 7th C.I.B. in the Line , forming a defensive flank along the RIVER SCARPE , and at the same time conforming with the movements of the other Troops of the Division.

### **Organization.**

For this purpose the Brigade was organized into 3 Groups :-

No. 1 Group – 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

O.C. , Lieut.-Col. W.J.A. LALOR , M.C.

5 Motor Machine Gun Batteries (40 Guns).

2 Platoons Cyclists.

3 Trench Mortars.

No. 2 Group – 101st Machine Gun Battalion.

O.C. , Lieut.-Col. F.H. CHIPPS , D.S.O.

101st M.G. Battalion , 2 , 1/2 Companies (40 Guns).

3 Trench Mortars.

No. 3 Group – Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion.

O.C. , Major HUMPHREY , D.S.O.

5 Platoons Cyclists.

Detachment from 101st M.G. Battalion (8 Guns).

Detachment from Armoured Cars (12 Guns).

### **Boundaries.**

The SCARPE RIVER formed the Northern Boundary of the Brigade , and the Southern Boundary was determined by a Line running due E. through a point 500 yards N. of MONCHY-le-PREUX and a point 250 yards N. of BOIRY-notre-DAME. General BRUTINEL divided his Brigade Area into 2 Sectors by a Line running along the Northern edge of JIGSAW WOOD in a North-Easterly direction to the cross-road S. of HAMBLAIN-les-PRES.

### **Line Taken Over By Brigade.**

The Line taken over from the 7th C.I.B. ran approximately from ARTILLERY HILL , N. of BOIRY , along the Eastern and Northern edges of JIGSAW WOOD to the SAND PIT on the BOIRY-PELVES Road and thence N. to the River E. of PELVES. The Relief which was completed at 6:00 A.M. , August 29th proved very exhausting and difficult. This was due to the darkness of the night , the uncertainty of the whereabouts of the Line , the long distance all Machine Gun Equipment had to be carried , and to continuous never ending Shelling of ARTILLERY HILL , JIGSAW WOOD and the River Valley.

### **Tasks of Groups.**

No. 1 Group relieved the 42nd C.I.Bn. , the P.P.C.L.I. and other elements of the Third Canadian Division which were in the Brigade Right Sector. Touch was at once obtained with the left Battalion of the 11th Brigade (British) , on the right. No. 2 Group relieved the 49th C.I.Bn. and other elements of the 7th C.I.B. which were in the Brigade Left Sector. This Group extended its left to the SCARPE RIVER and kept the River Valley and the Southern Slopes of GREENLAND HILL under Observation. The 3rd Group was held in FACTION TRENCH , 1500 yards behind the Front Line , in Support to the other 2 Groups.

### **Communications and Medical Arrangements.**

All Groups were connected by Telephone with one another and with Brigade Headquarters , which had been established in a Dugout on ORANGE HILL. First Aid Posts were also established by the Medical Officer of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B.

### **Brigade's Name Changed.**

A Canadian Corps Order issued on the evening of August 28th , stated that the Composite Brigade was to be known as BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE. The reason for the change in nomenclature was , perhaps , to avoid confusion with the Composite Force commanded by Col. LINDSAY , D.S.O. , First Army Machine Gun Officer.

### **Policy of Divisions in the Line.**

The policy of the Divisions in the Line was to secure a Jumping-off Position for the capture of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. With this object in view Local Operations were undertaken every day to force the enemy back until we had reached a satisfactory position from which to launch the next attack. As soon as the Line was advanced at any point by a Unit , the flanking Troops immediately took steps to conform to this movement.

### **Brutinel's Brigade Attack.**

An early morning reconnaissance on August 29th made it apparent to the G.O.C. , Brigade that the enemy was not holding in strength his positions opposite the Brigade Frontage but was keeping this part of the Front under heavy Shell Fire. The Line taken over by the Brigade was irregular and therefore unnecessarily long and very hard to hold. Both No. 1 and No. 2 Groups were therefore ordered to push forward with a view of straightening the Line and thus conforming with the positions held by the Fourth Division (British) Troops on the right.

The right Sector Group immediately sent small Patrols forward . The Guns of the 2nd Motor Machine Gun Brigade Batteries under Major MEURLING followed them moving by bounds , from Shell-hole to Shell-hole. Owing to the necessity of concealing this movement from the high ground N. of the River , which still in German hands , the Machine Gunners had to advance by rushing forward 1 Gun Crew at a time. The heavy Machine Gun Equipment made this task very difficult and tiresome. No organized resistance was met with and by 11:00 A.M. August 29th , No. 1 Group had occupied a new Line running from the N.-E. corner of BOIRY , E. of BENCH FARM and VICTORIA COPSE , and then back to JIGSAW WOOD , where No. 2 Group was preparing to advance.

Early in the afternoon No. 2 Group attacked the enemy positions in front of the left Sector with the object of capturing the Trench System N. of QUARRY WOOD and establishing Posts in BONS and DUKE Trenches. The attack was carried out successfully by 4 Platoon Cyclists (Major HUMPHRY) , supported by the Machine Guns of the 101st Machine Gun Battalion. "E" Battery of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. on the left of No. 1 Group conformed with this movement and obtaining good targets on the enemy retiring from the Front attacked by the Northern Group.

The Brigade Line was straightened. In the evening it ran from the Brigade Right Boundary to the E. of BENCH FARM , thence in a North-Westerly direction to the E. of VICTORIA COPES and on to a point on the SCARPE RIVER immediately S. of the Western edge of BIACHES.

The Fifty-first Division captured GREENLAND HILL during the day ; but the British Front E. of the SCARPE was still 2000 yards W. of the Line held by BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE. To secure the left flank 4 Platoons Cyclists and 20 Machine Guns were placed forward along the River Valley facing E. and Posts were established E. of PICADDILLY and DUKE Trenches , which formed the Northern half of the Brigade Front Line.

### **Tasks Carried Out Successfully.**

Great credit is due the Commanding Officers for the arrangements and plans of the Operations , and to the Machine Gun Batteries and Cyclists for carrying out the attack , with out Artillery support and in broad daylight , over ground that was being Shelled by the enemy. Our Troops suffered very few casualties and captured about 20 prisoners.

### **Relief of Brutinel's Brigade by 11th Division Troops.**

The 11th Division (British) was transferred , on August 29th , from the 1 British Corps to the Canadian Corps and during the night August 29th/30th the 32nd Brigade (British) took over BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Front. The 101st Machine Gun Battalion remained in action under Orders of the Eleventh Division. On completion of Relief at 7:30 A.M. August 30th the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. moved to the CITADEL , ARRAS. The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion and the Trench Mortar and the Armoured Car Detachments concentrated temporarily W. of ORANGE HILL and along the FEUCHY-FEUCHY CHAPEL Road. In the afternoon , they to proceeded to the CITADEL ,ARRAS.

### **New Task of Brutinel's Brigade.**

BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE , when relieved , remained with the Fourth Division (British) and was ordered to take over the Front of the 11th Brigade (British) and fill any Gaps between the Fourth and Eleventh Divisions. For this purpose the 39th Army Machine Gun Battalion had been placed , on August 29th , under the control of General BRUTINEL.

During the night 29th/30th August , 3 eight Gun Batteries of the 39th Machine Gun Battalion were in positions between BOIRY and the COJEUL RIVER. The following day 1 Machine Gun Company (16 Guns) of this Battalion supported by 1 Company of the 1st Kings Own Regiment (12th Brigade , British) , which had been placed at the disposal of General BRUTINEL , was ordered to push forward and make good a Line about 2000 yards E. and N.-E. of BOIRY. From this Line the Machine Guns were to cover by Fire the North-Eastern Flank of the 11th Brigade (British) , and the Crossings of the COJEUL RIVER to its point of junction with the SENSEE RIVER at ETAING and the Crossing of the TRINQUIS RIVER S. and W. of SAILLY-en-OSTHEVENT. At the same time , the 11th Division , on the left , was requested to conform with this movement.

### **New Line Occupied and Brigade Relieved.**

The Operation was successfully carried out during the afternoon and evening and touch was obtained with the 11th Brigade on the right and with the 32nd Brigade on the left. The XXII Corps took over the Front between the SCARPE and COJEUL Rivers on the night August 30th/31st. The 32nd Brigade (British) extended to the right and relieved BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE holding approximately the following Line :-

From a point in GALLEY WOOD , 500 yards E. from its Western edge , N. to a point on the BOIRY-SAILLY-en-OSTREREVENT Road , 950 yards E. of KASHMIR WOOD , along the Northern edges of UGANDA and TRIG COPSE , to a point on the HAMBLAIN-les-BOIRY Road , 800 yards N.-E. of BENCH FARM.

The 39th Machine Gun Battalion remained in the Line and was transferred to the XXII Corps.

### **Brutinel's Brigade Disbanded.**

General BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE , consisting chiefly of Machine Gun Units , was disbanded on the completion of this Relief , after it had accomplished all its Tasks by successfully cooperating with the Infantry in establishing a Jumping-off Line for the next Operation.

# **THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE AND BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.**

## **III CAMBRAI , PHASE II : AUGUST 31st to SEPTEMBER 4th , 1918.**

### **Introductory.**

#### **Canadian Independent Force Reformed.**

The Canadian Corps Operation Order (X) , which detailed the taking over by the XXII British Corps of that portion of the Canadian Corps Front N. of the COJEUL RIVER , also contained instructions for the reorganization of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE on completion of Relief. The 2 Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion were to be withdrawn to Corps Reserve and regrouped into the Canadian Independent Force under Brigadier-General BRUTINEL for the forthcoming Operation. The following day , August 31st , 1918 , the 10th Royal Hussars , the Canadian Light Horse (less 1,1/2 Squadrons) , 6 Heavy Armoured Cars of the 17th Tank Battalion , the 30th Battery of Canadian Field Artillery , 2 Sections Medium Trench Mortars , 1 Wireless Detachment , and 1 Supply Column were added to General BRUTINEL's Command.

(X) G.765 Dated August 30th , 1918.

#### **Assaulting Divisions.**

The active preparations of the Canadian Corps at this time led to the capture of the famous DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE on September 2nd , 1918. The initial attack was carried out by the First Canadian Division on the right , the Fourth Canadian Division in the centre , and the Fourth Division (British) on the left. The First Division (British) and the Canadian Independent Force were held in Corps Reserve to exploit success.

#### **General Plan of Attack.**

The general idea of the Operation was to break through the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE on a narrow front astride the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road , and swing onwards rolling up the flanks to the N. and S. This having been accomplished , the advance was to be resumed at Zero plus 3 hours , the high ground overlooking the CANAL du NORD seized , and , if possible the CANAL was to be crossed and our Line established on the high ground on the E. Bank. This last Task was allotted to the First Division (British). The Canadian Independent Force was to pass the first Objective with the Infantry at Zero plus 3 hours and advance to the CANAL along the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road.

#### **Organization of Canadian Independent Force.**

Subject to alterations which the Tactical Situation might demand during the Battle , the initial Operations of the Canadian Independent Force for the attack was as follows :-

Commander – Brigadier-General R. BRUTINEL , C.B. , C.M.G. , D.S.O. , G.O.C. , Cdn. M.G. Corps.

Headquarters – Captain M.R. LEVEY , M.M. , Brigade Major.  
Lieut. P.M. HUMME , Reconnaissance Officer.  
1 Platoon Canadian Corps Cyclists.  
10 Motor Cyclists.  
1 Continuous Wave Wireless Detachment.

Leading Group – O.C. , Lieut.-Col. F.H.D.C. WHITMORE , C.M.G. , D.S.O. , 10th Royal Hussars.

10th Royal Hussars.  
Canadian Light Horse. (less 1,1/2 Squadrons)  
1 Section , 30th Battery C.F.A.  
6 Heavy Armoured Cars , 17th Tank Battalion.  
2 Light Armoured Cars , 2nd C.M.M.G.B.  
10 Motor Cyclists (for inter-communications) , C.M.M.G.Bdes.

2nd Group – O.C. , Lieut.-Col. W.K. WALKER , D.S.O. , M.C. , 1st C.M.M.G.B.  
1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.  
4 Light Armoured Cars.  
Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion. (less 1 Platoon)  
1 Section , 30th Battery , C.F.A.  
2 Sections , Medium Trench Mortars.  
20 Motor Cyclists.

3rd Group – O.C. , Lieut.-Col. F.F.V. MEURLING , M.C. , 2nd C.M.M.G.B.  
2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.  
1 Section , 30th Battery , C.F.A.  
20 Motor Cyclists.

Supply Column – O.C. , Major G. ARNOLD, C.M.M.G. , M.T. Company.  
1 Water Lorry.                      1 Fuel and Oil Lorry.  
1 Ammunition Lorry.              Train of 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G.Bs.  
1 Supply Lorry.                    5 Motor Cyclists for Inter-liaisons.

### **Plans of Engagement.**

#### **First Objective.**

The RED LINE , which was the First Objective , was to have been reached by the Infantry 3 hours after Zero. It was expected that by that time the enemy would be considerably shaken and his resistance beyond the Line would therefore be desultory and weak.

#### **Tasks Assigned to Groups.**

The Leading Group was then to cross the RED LINE , move as rapidly as possible down the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road towards MARQUION , seize the Bridge by a quick and bold action , and hold the Bridgehead until the arrival of the 2nd Group. Any resistance by weak Garrisons was to be overcome with Machine Gun Fire and if necessary the Section of Field Artillery was to be brought into action. If determined resistance were encountered strong reconnoitring Patrols were to be sent along the Line of the CANAL du NORD , S. of MARQUION , with a view of turning the latter , and seize in the meantime portions of the GREEN LINE on both sides of the CAMBRAI Road , as a “Ligne de repli”.

The Second Group was to move in support of the Leading Group. If the Bridgehead was captured by the Leading Group , it would enlarge and consolidate the gains already made. If necessary , it would engage with all the means at its disposal , Garrisons or other unorganized defences , and endeavour to force the crossing of the bridge in conjunction with the 1st Group. But if owing to determined resistance , the leading Group were unable to reach the neighbourhood of the CANAL , the 2nd Group would occupy the GREEN LINE astride the Main Road , extend its gains N. and S. and relieve the Leading Group.

The 3rd Group was to be in reserve and would support or pass through the other 2 Groups in accordance with the requirements of the situation.

The Supply Column was to assemble on the night previous to the attack in the CITADEL , ARRAS. Its movements were to be regulated according to circumstance. The Commanding Officer was to be personally at the Headquarters of the Force.

#### **Precautions Against Possible Enemy Action.**

At all Stages of the Operation all groups were to exercise a great vigilance on their flanks pushing Patrols N. and S. and were to be prepared to come into immediate action on either side of the CAMBRAI Road.

A certain amount of unorganized resistance was expected to be encountered beyond the RED LINE chiefly from the Artillery and Machine Gun elements known to be echeloned in depth along the Main Road. These obstacles were to be dealt with by determined and bold action and the utmost vigor. The Motor Machine Gun Brigades were to be prepared to come into action mounted or dismounted and , if necessary , advance by bounds combining Fire and Movement.

#### **Other Arrangements.**

Arrangements were made with the Artillery for amending their Fire Barrage Schemes to conform to the proposed movements of the Independent Force and to place special Concentrations in BARALLE WOOD and Village , and also on MARQUION.

A Contact Plan for the 5th Squadron , Royal Air Force , was to report from time to time the position of the Head of the Column. To facilitate the work of the Pilot and his Observer , all the Mechanical Transport Vehicles of the Force were marked with a White Band 18 inches wide across the Bonnets.

2 Light Box Cars and 2 Motor Cyclist Orderlies were placed at the disposal of the Medical Officers of the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G.B.s who were to establish at a convenient point a Medical Aid Post to clear all Casualties of the Force.

### **THE BATTLE**

#### **Concentration and Forward Move of C.I.F.**

At 5:00 A.M. (Zero Hour) September 2nd , 1918 , the Canadian Independent Force Headquarters opened on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road near ST. ROHART FACTORY , W. of VIS-en-ARTOIS. The assembly of the 3 Groups , on the WANCOURT-GUEMAPPE Road , was completed at the same time , with the Head of the Column resting just S. of the CAMBRAI Road.

The Contact Patrol Plane dropped 4 messages between 5:30 and 8:25 A.M. keeping General BRUTINEL informed as to the position of our own and the enemy's Barrage , and giving the most advanced places where our Infantry had been seen. Unfortunately after dropping its last message , the Aeroplane was brought down by a hostile Fighting Scout.

Early reports indicated that the attack was progressing according to time and the enemy was surrendering without much resistance. At 8:45 A.M. , however , the attack appeared to have been held up astride the CAMBRAI Road , approximately at the RED LINE.

#### **The Force Moves Forward.**

The Leading Group , which had been considerably delayed by congested traffic in VIS-en-ARTOIS , commenced to move forward from its Concentration Point at 8:00 o'clock , followed , a few minutes later by the 2nd Group. Lieut.-Col. MEURLING's Group was ordered to remain on the WANCOURT-GUEMAPPE Road until the situation cleared. The 3 Sections of Artillery joined the Groups to which they were attached at about the same time , after they had completed the Task allotted to them in the Initial



Artillery Barrage. Canadian Independent Force Headquarters moved forward with the first 2 Groups and opened on the CAMBRAI Road , 700 yards S.-E. of ST. SERVINS FARM.

#### **Action of Leading Group.**

Lieut.-Col. WHITMORE's Group got in touch with the enemy at about 9:00 A.M. The leading Squadron of the 10th Royal Hussars supported by the Heavy Armoured Cars had reached the high ground E. of the DURY-HENDECOURT Road , but were held up there by heavy Artillery and Machine Gun fire coming from the direction of SAUDEMONT and VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT. Patrols were then sent N. toward DURY , which was still held by the enemy , and S.-W. towards VILLERS. No progress was made. The Leading Group reported at 9:30 that the Cavalry and Armoured Cars had returned after making unsuccessful attempts to reach the VILLERS-SAUDEMONT Road . The 10th Royal Hussars had suffered no casualties ; the Heavy Armoured Car Detachment had 1 man wounded.

#### **30th Battery Canadian Field Artillery.**

The artillery Sections were withdrawn from the Groups and came into action about 800 yards S. of the Force Headquarters. Throughout the day and night the 30th Battery fired effectively on enemy Artillery Batteries and small German Infantry Concentrations. It also answered numerous calls from No. 2 Group and from our Infantry to fire on enemy Machine Gun Nests and Trench Mortars which were greatly annoying our Troops.

#### **Advance Held Up.**

The Situation at the Corps front was not very clear for a few hours after our Troops were due to advance from the RED LINE. The enemy was offering very strong resistance to the Fourth Canadian Division in the neighbourhood of DURY. The First Canadian Division was making very slow progress , particularly on its left flank. The repeated attempts of the Canadian Independent Force to push forward were being frustrated by flanking Artillery and Machine Gun Fire from both sides of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road. Almost all the Tanks which had gone forward had been put out of action.

#### **Enemy Resistance.**

The enemy had a great number of Machine Guns advantageously placed. With these , he brought Direct Fire to bear on our advancing Troops. This made a Frontal Attack very difficult. Several Batteries of German Field Artillery and Trench Mortars were firing over open Sights from the high ground between SAUDEMONT and BUISSY. The Village of VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT had been fortified by the enemy by placing Machine Guns and "Minewerfers" in the houses. The Factory on the CAMBRAI Road , N. of the Village , and the Sunken VILLERS-SAUDEMONT Road were strongly held by the enemy and proved formidable obstacles. Even after their capture later in the day , the enemy Gunners still commanded all the approaches from the W. to all these positions.

#### **2nd Group Takes the Lead.**

It was of the utmost importance to the Canadian Independent Force that the Cross-roads N. of VILLERS should be captured. To carry out their mission the Mobile Forces depended to a very large extent in the use of Roads. The Cavalry could not get into action until the determined enemy resistance in front of the RED LINE had been overcome. The O.C. , 2nd Group was , therefore ordered to take the lead. The Heavy Armoured Cars were placed under his command. Officers Patrols were immediately sent out and these reported that the Infantry had been held up about 800 yards E. of l'ESPERANCE FARM by Machine Gun Fire coming from the direction of the buildings at the Cross-roads N. of VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT.

#### **"E" and "D" Batteries , 1st C.M.M.G.B. in Action.**

Lieut.-Col. WALKER sent forward "E" Battery (Capt. WORTHINGTON , M.M.) , 1st C.M.M.G.B. , to take up positions in front of the Infantry. The Battery supported by 2 Platoons Cyclists passed through the

32nd C.I.Bn. and set up their Guns on both sides of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road , about 1300 yards E. of the DURY-HENDECOURT Road. Here they met with considerable Artillery and Machine Gun Fire. The Gunners of this Battery and the Cyclists operating with them remained here throughout the day and engaged many good targets , with their Machine Guns and Rifles. By crawling and dragging their Guns with them , 2 Gun Crews managed to move further forward to a position from which they opened Fire on an enemy Field Battery in action S.-W. of SAUDEMONT. They also Fired very effectively on a number of German Gun-Limbers concealed behind trees S.-W. of SAUDEMONT causing casualties amongst the Drivers and stampeding the horses.

“D” Battery (Capt. BERRSFORD) with 2 Platoons Cyclists then went ahead and leapfrogged “E” Battery , aiming at the concentration of buildings on the CAMBRAI Road , N. of VILLERS. Machine Gun and Artillery Fire from the left flank held up the Gunners and Cyclists about 500 yards short of their Objectives. The Guns were set up on both sides of the Road while waiting for the situation to clear a little.

### **Trench Mortars in Action.**

A Section of Trench Mortars , in the charge of Lieut. P.B. STAIRS , was very skillfully manoeuvred forward and brought into action within 3 or 400 yards of the enemy. By their accurate Fire , the Mortars dispersed small enemy concentrations killing and wounding many Germans. Targets engaged also included enemy Machine Gun Nests and Snipers , and the buildings at the Cross-roads , which were several times hit. The Guns of Lieut. STAIRS , being mounted , each on a Motor Lorry , were exposed clearly to enemy observation and formed an excellent target for German Field Guns , which engaged the Lorries at close range over open Sights. When the entire Crew of one of the Trench Mortars became casualties , Lieut. STAIRS kept their Gun firing until it was put out of action by an enemy Shell , which also wounded Lieut. STAIRS and set fire to the Lorry. A considerable amount of Trench Mortar Ammunition , on the Lorry itself and in the vicinity endangered the lives of the wounded members of the Gun Crew , and Lieut. STAIRS despite his own wounds , and at the imminent risk of his life , helped his Men to a place of safety , and endeavoured to extinguish the fire. During this time , he was again wounded but carried on until the Ammunition exploded , destroying the Lorry. Unfortunately this gallant Officer died from the effects of the wounds sustained during this action.

### **Action of Armoured Cars.**

When No. 2 Group took the lead in the morning Lieut.-Col. WALKER sent 2 Light Armoured Cars down the CAMBRAI Road with Orders to reach , if possible the Intersection of VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT – SAUDEMONT Road with the CAMBRAI Road. Fallen trees , however , blocked the Road. As soon as the Cars returned a Platoon of Cyclists went ahead and cleared the way. 2 Heavy Armoured Cars were then sent forward to get in touch with the enemy and bring back information as to his Strength and Disposition. “Direct Hits” destroyed both Cars while carrying out their Task.

### **2 Light Cars Sent Forward.**

Early in the afternoon , “A” Battery (Capt. INCH) with 2 Platoons Cyclists reinforced “D” and “E” Batteries. At the same time 2 more Light Armoured Cars were sent down the CAMBRAI Road to try and push through to the SAUDEMONT-VILLERS Road. One of these Cars , under Corporal E.E. Mc GILL , engaged a Group of the enemy at close range with good effect. On its return journey this Car was hit by an enemy Shell and destroyed. All but 1 of its Crew were killed. At the same time , 2 Tanks moving N. of VILLERS were put out of action by enemy Shells.

### **Situation , Afternoon , September 2nd.**

The 2nd Group had now 3 Machine Gun Batteries and 6 Platoons Cyclists in positions on both sides of the Main Road , between DURY and VILLERS. Their repeated attempts to reach and go beyond the SAUDEMONT-VILLERS Road met with success. Their left flank was exposed and the ground over which they had to advance was under the direct observation of German Artillery and Machine Gun Batteries in SAUDEMONT and in commanding positions S. of the Village. As the afternoon wore away it

became quite evident that an organized Infantry attack on both sides of the Area occupied by the Canadian Independent Force would be necessary to overcome the enemy resistance.

### **Independent Force Withdrawn.**

The Cavalry was withdrawn in the evening to Watering Points. No. 2 Group in co-operation with the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s took up defensive positions for the night. A message from Canadian Corps received at a later hour, ordered the withdrawal of the Canadian Independent Force from the Line. At midnight September 2nd/3rd, the disposition of Units was as follows :-

Headquarters Cdn. Ind. Force.	CITADEL, ARRAS.
10th Royal Hussars	WAILLY.
Canadian Light Horse	WANCOURT-GUEMAPPE Valley.
Heavy Armoured Cars	ST. SERVINS FARM.
1st C.M.M.G.B. )	
Trench Mortar Section )	WANCOURT-GUEMAPPE Road.
Cdn. Corps Cyclist Bn. )	
2nd C.M.M.G.B.	FEUCHY – FEUCHY-CHAPEL Road.
30th Battery, C.F.A.	In positions about 1600 yards S. of ST. SERVINS FARM.
Supply Column	CITADEL, ARRAS.

### **2 Motor Brigades Held In Reserve.**

The 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades had Orders that in case of enemy counter-attacks during the night they were to support the First Canadian Division and the Fourth Division (British), respectively.

### **Casualties.**

On September 2nd, enemy Aircraft had been audacious. They repeatedly came over in large numbers dropping “EGG” Bombs and firing their Machine Guns into the positions occupied by the Motor Machine Gun Batteries and Cyclists. This and the intense German Artillery Shelling in the afternoon caused considerable casualties. The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade during the day had 5 Other Ranks killed, and 4 Officers and 30 Other Ranks wounded. It also had 20 of its Motor Vehicles either permanently or temporarily put out of action.

### **September 3rd, 1918.**

During the night September 2nd/3rd, the enemy withdrew to the E. Bank of the CANAL du NORD, and destroyed all the Bridges. On the 3rd, Headquarters Cdn. Ind. Force, the 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion moved to points astride the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road, about 2000 yards E. of VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT. The Heavy Armoured Cars patrolled the CANAL LINE.

### **Enemy Holds East Bank Of Canal.**

An early morning reconnaissance on September 4th by General BRUTINEL and 2 Officers of his Staff found the enemy clear of the W. Bank of the CANAL and holding the E. side with strong Posts. The Germans were taking advantage of this water barrier to reorganize their Forces and Defences. No further attempts to advance could now be made without securing Crossings over the CANAL. Complete plans for a well-organized attack that would take our Troops over the marshy land and the high ground E. of the CANAL would have to be prepared.

### **Canadian Independent Force Withdrawn and Disbanded.**

The Canadian Independent Force was withdrawn from the Line on the evening of September 4th and the Units were disposed of as follows :-

The 10th Royal Hussars rejoined the 6th Cavalry Brigade.  
The Heavy Armoured Car Detachment returned to the 17th Tank Battalion.  
The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. was withdrawn to the CITADEL , ARRAS.  
The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion went to Billets at WAGNONLIEU.  
On September 6th the Canadian Light Horse moved to HABARCQ.  
The 30th Battery , Cdn. Field Artillery returned to its Wagon Lines to await Orders from the G.O.C. , R.A.  
The 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades proceeded to their old Billets in TILLOY-lez-HERMAVILLE , and HERMAVILLE respectively. The 1st Motor Brigade moved to MAZIERES on September 8th but it returned to TILLOY on the 20th.

The Canadian Independent Force was disbanded : but the 2 Motor Brigades and Cyclist Battalion remained in Corps Reserve under the G.O.C. , Cdn. M.G.C.

### **Observations.**

The following quotations and remarks are drawn from “Notes on Recent Fighting” written by General BRUTINEL , at the conclusion of the above Operation :-

### **Task and Battle Action.**

The Task given to the Canadian Independent Force on September 2nd , 1918 was consistent with the Strength and Composition of the Independent Force , and within its scope.

“It consisted in the main , to advance , arrow-like to a depth of 6000 to 7000 yards in front of the Infantry Line , and at 8:00 A.M. , in an endeavour to seize the Bridgeheads of MARQUION , or failing this , to capture and hold the GREEN LINE and harass the retreating enemy until the arrival of our Infantry following closely , in accordance with the Program of Attack.

“This Task was , broadly speaking , similar to the performance accomplished on August 8th , 1918 , by the Canadian Independent Force , and the measure of success attained there justified the belief of the Operation contemplated.

“The Canadian Independent Force , however , failed to accomplish its mission.

“It advanced astride the CAMBRAI Road , fighting foot by foot , to a depth of about 1800 yards in front of the Infantry as at 10:00 A.M. , but this participation in the fight could not create the opportunity required to put the Force through.”

The opportunity to debouch could perhaps have been forced between 8:00 A.M. and 9:30 A.M. when , although the advance of our Infantry had been checked , the enemy was seriously shaken and the situation was obscure to him. A few of his Field Batteries and a number of Machine Guns were in action , but most of the German Artillery was trying to withdraw towards RECOURT and ECOURT.

From the detail given above of the part played by the Leading Group during the battle , it can be deduced that the enemy resistance was not at that time properly tested. By 10:00 A.M. the opportunity had passed. German Infantry , Machine Gunners , and Artillery were dribbling forward. The rest of the morning and throughout the afternoon the enemy was most active with Machine Gun and Artillery in positions S. and S.-W. of SAUDEMONT , causing considerable casualties to No. 2 Group.

There was no occasion in the following 2 days to engage the Independent Force , which was withdrawn from the Line on the night September 4th/5th.

### **Organization.**

“The Independent Force was fairly well balanced , and except for its weakness in Infantry elements (too few Cyclists) , was strong enough to overcome patchy resistance. Its Firepower was sufficient to enable it to hold captured ground until the arrival of the Infantry.

“It was not however properly welded , and its various elements were not endowed to an equal extent with the boldness and resolution which should characterize such a Force.

“This is not surprising in view of the fact that it was put hastily together 24 hours before zero day.

“These imperfections will always be present in Forces put together at the last minute , and the question arises as to whether Mobile Independent Forces should be spasmodic extemporizations , or should be given a degree of permanency.

“In view of the depth and elasticity of the German Defences , it is believed that the employment of Mobile Forces , approximating the composition of the Canadian Independent Force , will in the battles of the future bear better results than the early employment of large bodies of Cavalry , because more than the latter they can prolong and help forward action of the Infantry

“The Composition of such Mobile Independent Force should be approximately as follows :-

4 Squadrons of Cavalry.

1200 Cyclists.

2 Batteries Field Artillery.

2 Sections Trench Mortars in Lorries.

2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades.

8 Armoured Cars (belonging to the Brigades).

1 Signal Section.

“The Squadrons of Cavalry and the Batteries of Field Artillery give to the Force the ability to manoeuvre , and would correct the road limits of the M.M.G. Brigades.

“The Cyclists dismounted would give the power to overcome by manoeuvre and assault , in conjunction with the Fire Power of the M.M.G. Brigades and Trench Mortars , serious local resistance.

“Such a Force , owing to its great Mobility and Fire Power , would be able to take advantage of opportunities to increase the depth of our penetration in the course of our attacks.

#### **Time and Method of Engagement.**

“Such an Independent Force should not be engaged too early and in any event not before the coordinated M.G. Defences of the enemy have been overrun ; this implies a penetration of about 80,000 yards.

“In that respect the engagement of the Canadian Independent Force on the 8th of August was well timed.

“It was a little premature the 2nd of September on account of the check suffered by our Infantry astride the CAMBRAI Road.

“The engagement by scheduled time should not be attempted. It has the effect of paralyzing the initiative of the Leader , and to a large extent of making the engagement of the Force dependent on the success of operations in an area localized beforehand.

“The Mobile Force should be thrown in at the point where the penetration is the deepest , with due regard to road limitations of some of the elements. In a ‘break-through’ it should proceed and support the engagement of large bodies of Cavalry,

“The Point of concentration of a Mobile Force should be equidistant (in time) from all points of the Corps Front , and complete arrangements should be made to keep in constant touch with the situation.

“Standing Patrols of Cavalry and Motor Cyclists with each Infantry Brigade , specially detailed Contact Plans , etc. , would probably answer the purpose.

“Special arrangements would also have to be made regarding the action of the Heavy Artillery.

“To illustrate what is meant , the following example is given :-

“AT 6:00 A.M. , the 2nd September , the 1st Canadian Division was definitely in possession of the BUISSY SWITCH. It would have been possible at that time , and probably earlier , to throw , say 2 Squadrons of Cavalry to operate in the Northerly direction towards SAUDEMONT and 2 Squadrons to operate towards MARQUION. The engagements of the first 2 Squadrons would have enabled the Motor Machine Gun Brigade headed by Armoured Cars to debouch from the Cross-roads North of VILLERS , and probably reach MARQUION , or at worst the GREEN LINE , concurrently with the 2 Squadrons moving in that direction.

“In the present conditions it would have been impossible , to carry out such Action , because the elements of the Independent Force were foreign to one another.

### **Training and Morale.**

“Combined Training , in which Units learn their possibilities and limitations , acquire mutual confidence and unity of purpose , is indispensable to a Force of opportunity.

“The chief elements which are essential to the morale of such a Force are confidence in the support that they will receive promptly , unselfishness and devotion to duty , based on a broad and comprehensive Esprit de Corps. This can only be obtained if the Troops of the Independent Force belong to the Corps under which they fight.”

### **Organization of Brutinel’s Brigade on a Semi-permanent Basis.**

#### **Organization.**

A Canadian Corps Letter issued on September 19th , 1918 ,with reference to the future “Employment of Corps Mobile Troops” contained the following :- (X)

“The Canadian Light Horse , less 1,1/2 Squadrons , the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion , and the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades will be grouped into a Mobile Brigade under the G.O.C. , C.M.G.C. , and will be known as BRUTINEL’S BRIGADE.

“Whenever the situation permits , the G.O.C. , R.A. will arrange for 1 Battery Cdn. Field Artillery and 1 or more Sections 6 inch Newton Mortars to be attached to the Brigade.

“The A.D. Signals will arrange to provide a Wireless Set for the purpose of communication between the Brigade and Corps Headquarters. (X) Cdn. Corps G. 528/3-53 Dated August 19th, 1918.

#### **General Tasks of Brigade.**

“The Brigade will operate directly under the Order of Corps Headquarters who will allot tasks as required by the situation.

“The following are some of the tasks which may be allotted :-

“At the commencement of offensive operations , the Brigade may be employed to thicken up the initial Machine Gun Barrage.

“When the fight commences to become fluid , the Brigade will be ordered to push through with a view to seize tactical features in advance of our Line and holding them until the arrival of the Infantry.

“When absolutely open warfare conditions are reached , the Brigade will be employed normally as Protective Mounted Troops , and may be required to act as a General Advanced Guard for the Corps.

“In defensive Operations necessitating a withdrawal over some distance the Brigade will be employed as part of the Rear Guard.

The Brigade was to be organized at once and Tactical Schemes carried out ‘based on the different tasks which it may be called upon to undertake.’

The above Organization did not include all the Troops suggested by General BRUTINEL , but it gave the Brigade , what it so far lacked , a semi-permanent form. Instead of grouping and disbanding Units at the beginning and end of every Operation , they were , in the future , to be controlled by the same Commander when out of the Line as well as when in Action.

**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.**

**IV  
CAMBRAI , PHASE III : SEPTEMBER 5th to OCTOBER 1st , 1918.**

**Introductory.**

**Situation on September 5th , 1918.**

The progress of the Canadian Corps as indicated above , was temporarily arrested in front of the CANAL du NORD. The Germans had not only destroyed all the Bridges but they had also followed the marshes of the SENSEE RIVER and shore along the CANAL. Owing to the topographical features , the ground for a considerable distance W. of our Front was under the direct observation of the enemy Gunners. Our Field Artillery found it extremely hard to get suitable locations for their Guns , before an attack on our Front could be undertaken , it was thought advisable that the Corps should mark time in its present position while Operations are developed further South with a view to manoeuvring the enemy out of his positions behind the CANAL. (X) The German Line was a natural Defensive Position , strengthened by a good System of Defences , built by an enemy fighting desperately to stop our onslaught. To assault such a Line , it would be necessary to prepare a scheme on a large scale , which involve Troops other than the Canadian Corps. Further , the same obstacles that stopped our advance would be in the way of the Germans , were they to attempt an Offensive against us. Advantage was therefore taken of these facts to rest and refit all the Units.

(X) Cdn. Corps G. 79/2526-4 , dated Sept. 5th , 1918.

**Training.**

**Overhauling of Equipment.**

The 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion spent the first 2 or 3 days after September 4th in resting the Men and overhauling their Equipment. The large number of vehicles damaged in the previous Action taxed the full energy of the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Mechanical Transport Company , and the 2 Brigade Trains to complete the necessary repairs before the next Operation.

**Tactical Exercises.**

The Motor Machine Gunners and the Cyclists trained every day for about 2 weeks in accordance with a Program of Training suggested by General BRUTINEL. All the N.C.O.s and Gunners went through a short course on the Vickers Gun , and were lectured by their Officers on the Duties of all Members of a Gun Crew , on Indirect Fire , Barrage Fire , the value of Cover , the necessity of close cooperation with the other Batteries and all Arms of the Service , and on other Allied Subjects. Batteries did individual Tactical Exercises as a preliminary to Exercises in cooperation with other Batteries. Exercises were carried out in which a number of Dismounted Batteries assisted with Direct and Indirect Fire a Mounted Battery whose advance had been held up : Batteries received Training in advancing in pairs and in mutual assistance against Defended Localities and Strong Points. Many Tactical Schemes were executed in which a group of Motor Batteries , a few Platoons of Cyclists , a Detachment of Armoured Cars , and a number of Motor Cyclists took part. All the Schemes and Exercises were followed by discussions and criticisms with a view to emphasizing special points and drawing lessons for the future. The G.O.C. , Cdn.M.G.Corps , and the Officers of his Staff were occasionally present at the Field Exercises and at the discussions on the manner in which the Schemes had been carried out.

## **Sports.**

During this period of Training , Sports of all kinds were greatly encouraged. Indoor Baseball and Football were two favorite games. Inter-Battery Machine Gun Drill , Guard Mounting , Revolver Shooting , getting into Action wearing a Small Box Respirator , and other competitions were organized and keenly contested. All Ranks were in high spirits and quite ready to join in the next hunt of the Canadian Corps.

## **Preparations for the Attack.**

Active preparations for the Attack on the CANAL du NORD began to occupy the full time and thought of the Units about September 24th , 1918. The Canadian Corps had been ordered to take part in the general Advance so as to protect the left flank of the Third Army.

## **Bourlon Wood Operation.**

The Operation of the Corps was to be carried out in 2 Phases comprising (I) the capture of BOURLON WOOD and the high ground N. of it , and (II) the seizing of the Bridge over the CANAL de l' ESCAUT , N.-E. of CAMBRAI , establishing necessary Bridgeheads , and at the same time capturing the high ground overlooking the SENSEE VALLEY , between the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and the CANAL du NORD.

## **Assaulting Divisions.**

The First and Fourth Canadian Divisions were to carry out the attack of the 1st Phase , under cover of an Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage. The Third Canadian Division and the Eleventh Division (British) were to come into Line at the beginning of the 2nd Phase.

## **Brutinel's Brigade Task.**

The Task of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE was to cross the CANAL de l' ESCAUT in the vicinity of CAMBRAI and to exploit success along the CAMBRAI-IWUY- VALENCIENNES Road , special attention being paid to securing the Crossings over the CANAL de l' ESCAUT between CAMBRAI and the SENSEE.

The probabilities were that 2 opportunities for a "break-through" might occur :-

- (a) On Zero Day , if the Fourth Canadian Division were successful in gaining RAILLENCOURT and SAILLY thus breaking the MARCOING Trench System running between the 2 Villages , or
- (b) On the Second Day , if the Assault of the Third Canadian Division on the MARCOING LINE were successful.

## **Plan of Engagement of Brigade.**

The actual place and method of engagement and the composition of the Groups of the Brigade were not definitely laid down. Its Operation would depend largely on the initial success of our Infantry and on the nature of the Roads and the resistance encountered.

The 3 most favourable points , which were fully discussed by the G.O.C. , Brigade and all the Unit Commanders to be (1) the Bridge of FAUBOURG de SELLES , (2) the PONT d' AIRE , and (3) the Bridge of ESWARS.

Liaison Patrols , each consisting of 1 N.C.O. , 6 Mounted Men , and 2 Motor Cyclists were to be employed to establish communication between the Canadian Infantry in the Line and BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Headquarters.

## **Machine Gun Barrage.**

4 Batteries from each of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades took part in the initial Machine Gun Barrage , these Batteries , which had been placed under Orders of the 1st Canadian Division



for the purposes of the Barrage , were organized into a Group Commanded by Major W.T. TRENCH , M.C. , 2nd C.M.M.G.B. (X) This Group , known as the Right Sub-Groups of the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. , Barrage Guns , was subdivided as follows :-

“B” Sub-Group “A” , “B” , “C” , and “E” Batteries , 1st C.M.M.G.B.

“C” Sub-Group “A” , “B” , “C” , and “D” Batteries , 2nd C.M.M.G.B. (X) See Pages 424 , ff

### **Preparations of Barrage.**

Owing to the practical impossibility of making a daylight reconnaissance , due to exposure of the area a night reconnaissance was made by Major TRENCH and 1 Officer from each of the Motor Brigades. The Barrage positions selected were just W. of and between INCHY-en-ARTOIS and PAVILAND WOOD. To facilitate communication , the Batteries were located in pairs. Each pair was connected by telephone and buzzer to the Group Headquarters , which was established at the 1st C.I.B. Headquarters , 600 yards W. of INCHY. By arrangement with the 1st C.I.B. , the group Commander was in communication with the First Canadian Division and the First Battalion , C.M.G.C. As a precaution , 2 Motor Cycle Dispatch Riders were held at Group Headquarters.

### **Barrage Batteries in Position.**

To reduce the congestion of traffic in the forward area , the Batteries limited their Transport to 3 Fighting Lorries , which were driven only as far as the Cross-roads between QUEANT and BUISSY. From this point only 1 Lorry per Battery , loaded with Belted S.A.A. , was allowed to proceed to within 300 yards of the Battery positions. The Guns and Equipment were carried by the Gun Crews. With the exception of 6 casualties suffered by “B” Sub-Group , this move was carried out on the eve of the attack without incident. At 3:15 A.M. September 27th , the 8 Batteries were dug in the Barrage Positions , with the Guns laid and all the Ammunition unloaded from the Lorries and carried to the Guns.

## **THE BATTLE.**

### **Barrage Fired.**

At 5:29 A.M. , Zero Hour , September 27th , 1918 , all the Guns opened Fire and followed out the Firing Program as laid down in the Machine Gun Barrage Map prepared by the G.O.C. , Cdn. M.G. Corps. Over 320,000 Rounds were fired by the 64 Guns of the Motor Brigades. As a result of hostile Artillery and Machine Gun Fire which became very noticeable an hour after Zero , the Right Sub-Groups had 6 Officers and 38 Other Ranks killed or wounded , 2 Guns completely destroyed and 5 other Guns put out of action. At Zero plus 7 hours , all the Batteries rejoined their Units ; all Guns were cleaned and Ammunition Belts refilled.

### **Concentration of Brutinel’s Brigade.**

While the above Batteries were taking up their Barrage Positions , on the night September 26th/27th , 1918 , the Units of BRUTINEL’S BRIGADE concentrated as follows :-

Canadian Light Horse	CHERISY
Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion	GUEMAPPE
1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades	WANCOURT – GUEMAPPE

A few hours after our Infantry went “over” on the 27th , a reconnaissance of the Bridges over the CANAL du NORD was made. The whole of BRUTINEL’S BRIGADE then moved to the area E. of SAINS-lez-MARQUION , “B” Battery , 251st Brigade , Royal Field Artillery , was placed under the Orders of General BRUTINEL , in the afternoon.

### **Situation Evening September 27th.**

Scouts which had been sent forward to get in touch with the situation on the whole Corps Front reported in the evening that our Line on the right flank was not very definite. RAILLENCOURT was still in enemy hands. On the left flank we had Posts in HAYNECOURT.

No surprise can be felt at the lack of an opportunity for a break-through on this day, if the magnitude of the Task allotted to the Infantry is properly appreciated. The CANAL du NORD presented a very strong and difficult obstacle , partially filled with water , which necessitated the launching of the attack on a Frontage of 2600 yards. This Frontage increased as the attack developed to 10,000 yards. Besides crossing the CANAL , 3 definite Trench Systems had to be assaulted , the CANAL du NORD Line , the MARQUION Line , and the MARCOING Line.

### **September 28th.**

The following morning , the Third , Fourth and First Canadian Divisions resumed the attack. Liaison Patrols were sent to Headquarters 7th , 9th and 10th C.I.B.s with instructions to keep the G.O.C. , BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE informed of any alterations in the situation that might be favourable to the employment of the Brigade.

At 9:00 A.M. all the Units moved to the vicinity of BOURLON Village and Brigade Headquarters opened near the Windmill on the SAINS-lez-MARQUION – BOURLON Road. From here , the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades , the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion and the Field Artillery Battery were moved to Tactical Locations in the neighbourhood of la MAISON NEUVE , where they held themselves in readiness to go into immediate action with the Bridges at ESWARS , RAMILLIES and PONT d'AIRE as Objectives. Brigade Headquarters moved to a point about 250 yards S. of the FERME des LILAS.

No action developed. The Third Canadian Division was held up in a Line about 2000 yards N. of FONTAINE-notre-DAME , and the Fourth Canadian Division behind SANCOURT in front of SAILLY. The First Canadian Division , on the left of the Fourth Division , held the Line along the DOUAI-CAMBRAI Road.

Throughout the afternoon and night the Brigade kept in touch with the situation on the whole Corps Front by means of Patrols. The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade had its Patrols working on the Third Canadian Division Front , the Canadian Light Horse on the Fourth Division Front and the 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade on the First Division front. They sent reports quite frequently and , when necessary , some of them were repeated by wireless to Corps Headquarters.

### **September 29th.**

Early reports , on the morning of September 29th , indicated that on the left our Troops were advancing N. of SANCOURT and making for the Railway Line. In the centre the Railway had been reached , and on the right our forward move was continuing.

Steps were immediately taken by the G.O.C. , BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE to have all his Units ready for action in the event of a "break-through" by the Infantry. The Canadian Light Horse moved to the area W. of SANCOURT and their Patrols kept in touch with the First and Fourth Canadian Divisional Fronts. The O.C. , C.L.H. was instructed to take advantage of any opportunity of exploiting success to seize the Bridgehead at ESWARS.

Lieut. L.N. BLACK , M.C. , 2nd C.M.M.G.B. in charge of 2 Armoured Cars , was sent along the Road through SAILLY and NEUVILLE ST. REMY with Orders to send out Motor Cyclist Patrols to keep in touch with the Infantry and , if conditions allowed , to push the Cars through and seize the SELLES and PONT ROUGE Bridgeheads.

Lieut. T.A. SMITH , 1st C.M.M.G.B. in charge of 2 Armoured Cars , was dispatched down the main CAMBRAI Road with Orders to follow the Infantry and if possible to take the Bridgehead W. of the Town. "B" Battery , 251st Royal Field Artillery moved into positions E. of the RAILLENCOURT - FONTAINE-notre-DAME Road.

The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion took up positions N. of SAILLY , ready to support the Cavalry in any action that might develop.

From the reports received from the Armoured Cars and the Patrols of the 2 Motor Brigades and the C.L.H. the situation in the afternoon appeared to be quite obscure. Our Infantry were held up for a while in ST. OLLE by Machine Gun Fire. The 2 Armoured Car Detachments cooperated with the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles in dealing with the enemy in this neighbourhood. In the centre our Line ran a short distance W. of the Railway Line. SANCOURT was in our hands and from the Eastern outskirts of this Village the Line was taken up by the First Division and ran about 300 yards N. along the CAMBRAI-DOUAI Road.

In the evening , the Canadian Light Horse was withdrawn to the SAINS-lez-MARQUION Area. Brigade Headquarters , the Armoured Cars , the Cyclist Battalion and the Field Battery went into Bivouacs for the night near the 2 Motor Brigades between BOURLON Village and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road.

### **September 30th.**

The attack was resumed by the Infantry on the morning of September 30th. BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Units once more moved forward to tactical positions behind the assaulting Divisions , ready to push forward at a moments notice. Their Patrols did splendid work all day keeping in close touch with the situation on the whole Front. The progress of our Infantry was very slow. The enemy , who had thrown into the battle opposite the Canadian Corps 3 or 4 fresh Divisions , offered a very determined resistance. The fighting became "sticky". No favourable opportunity for employment of Mobile Forces occurred. The Cavalry , Motor Brigades and Cyclists were therefore ordered back to the same positions they had occupied on the previous night.

### **October 1st.**

On October 1st , another effort was made by the Third Canadian Division on the right to advance our Line. The attempt proved quite successful at first , but strong enemy counter-attacks forced our Troops back. The enemy fought desperately and appeared to be preparing for further counter-attacks. BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE which had been in readiness during the morning to follow up the Infantry with the object of seizing the Crossings over the CANAL le l' ESCAUT , prepared defensive plans to support the Divisions in the Line in case of enemy action against them in the afternoon or during the night. 4 Batteries of the 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade took up defensive positions N.-E. , E. and S.-E. of HAYNECOURT. The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade reconnoitred their positions and were ready to go to the assistance of any part of the Canadian Front that might be threatened.

**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE**

**V  
CAMBRAI , PHASE IV : OCTOBER 2nd to 12th , 1918.**

**October 2nd.**

No new development took place during the night October 1st/2nd. Early in the afternoon of October 2nd , all Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. were placed under Orders of the Second Canadian Division which had relieved the Fourth Canadian Division and portions of the First and Third Canadian Divisions. The Guns of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. were placed under Orders of the Eleventh Division (British) , which relieved the First Canadian Division. (X)

At the same time BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Headquarters moved to Advanced Corps Headquarters , N. of BOIS du CAROSSE on the QUEANT-BUISSY Road.

The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion moved to Billets in SUN QUARRY , about 1000 yards S.-E. of CHERISY.

The period between October 3rd and October 8th passed without any material changes on the Corps Front.

(X) See Page 464.

**1st Motor Brigade in Defensive Positions.**

On October 2nd , "A" , "B" and "C" Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. , under the Second Canadian Division, took up positions immediately S. of SANCOURT and between the CAMBRAI-DOUAI Road and the Railway. The Gun Positions were dug in well and carefully camouflaged. All the Guns were laid on an S.O.S. Line along the North-Eastern outskirts of BLECOURT. The Batteries were in communication with the 6th C.I.B. Headquarters by telephone to an advanced Report Centre near the Crossroads S. of SANCOURT and from there by Dispatch Riders. "E" Battery occupied defensive positions behind the main DOUAI Road and N. of the above mentioned Cross-roads. "D" Battery remained in Mobile Reserve with the Unit Headquarters near la MAISON NEUVE. On October 4th , the first 3 Batteries moved to the Sunken Road which runs in a North-Westerly direction out of SANCOURT and laid their Guns on the same S.O.S. Line. While in these positions they were considerably Shelled with High Explosives and Gas Shells. "D" Battery relieved "A" Battery on the night of October 5th/6th and 2 nights later "B" Battery , having been relieved by "A" Battery , went into Mobile Reserve. The 1st C.M.M.G.B. Headquarters moved to SAILLY on October 7th.

**2nd Motor Brigade in Defensive Positions.**

The 4 Batteries of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. remained in their defensive positions under the Eleventh Division (British) , in front of HAYNECOURT until the morning of October 9th , when the whole Unit moved to the area just E. of TILLOY. Here they remained in Reserve till the following morning.

**Cambrai Operation.**

On October 7th , preparations were in full swing for an Operation aiming at the capture of Bridgeheads over the CANAL de l' ESCAUT , and subsequently the capture of the Town of CAMBRAI by an enveloping movement.

This Operation was to be carried out in 2 Phases by the Third Canadian Division on the right and the Second Canadian Division on the left.

BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE was allotted the Task of taking advantage of any opening during the 2nd Phase to exploit success.

### **Dispositions of Brutinel's Brigade.**

The Dispositions of the Brigade on October 8th were as follows :-

Headquarters.	With Advanced Corps H.Q. , near BOIS du CAROSSE.
Canadian Light Horse.	N. of SAINS-lez-MARQUION.
1st C.M.M.G.B.	Under Second Cdn. Division , 4 Batteries in the Line and 1 in Reserve at SAILLY.
2nd C.M.M.G.B.	Under Eleventh Division (British) , 4 Batteries in the Line and 1 in Reserve near la MAISON NEUVE.
Cdn. Corps Cyclist Battalion.	S.-E. of CHERISY.
Trench Mortar Section and )	CITADEL , ARRAS.
2 Motor Bde. Transport. )	
C.M.M.G. , M.T. Company.	HARBARCQ.

### **1st Motor Brigade Help in Initial Attack.**

During the night October 8th/9th , "A" and "C" Batteries , 1st C.M.M.G.B. moved their Guns in front of the Sunken Road they had been occupying , and "D" Battery took up new positions immediately S.-E. of SANCOURT. At 1:30 A.M. Zero Hour , October 9th , the first 2 Batteries Fired on their S.O.S. Line and continued to do so for 2 hours. "D" Battery Guns opened up at the same time on BANTIGNY and maintained their Fire until 6:00 A.M. At 8:30 A.M. , "A" and "C" Batteries moved to the N. edge of ABANCOURT to protect the left flank of the 6th C.I.B. and "D" Battery covered the right flank by moving forward into positions between CUVILLERS and RAMILLIES.

### **Canal de l' Escaut Crossed.**

The Infantry Attack was launched successfully and rapid progress was made. In a short time , RAMILLIES and the Crossing at PONT d' AIRE were captured and a firm footing had been established on the E. side of the CANAL.

### **Brutinel's Brigade Concentrated.**

During the morning the Batteries of the Motor Brigade attached to the Divisions in the Line were withdrawn and the whole of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE concentrated behind the Second Canadian Division Front.

Early in the morning , Motor Cyclist Scouts were sent forward to reconnoitre Crossings over the CANAL suitable for Motor Transport. General BRUTINEL was in touch with the Second Division Headquarters and the C.L.H. were in close liaison with the 5th and 6th C.I.B. Headquarters. The Cavalry Regiment (Lt.-Col. LEONARD) was concentrated S.-E. of MORENCHIES , near the 5th C.I.B. Headquarters with instructions to seize , as soon as the opportunity arose , the high ground between VAVES and THUN ST. MARTIN as a first bound , and the high ground E. of IWUY-RIEUX Road , as a second bound.

The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion (Major HUMPHREY) moved to the same area as the Canadian Light Horse. BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Headquarters was established in the same neighbourhood. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades concentrated later W. and S.-W. of TILLOY along the CAMBRAI-DOUAI Road.

### **Line Morning October 9th.**

At 10:00 A.M. , October 9th the 25th C.I.Bn. was in ESCAUDOEUVRES with Patrols in front , the 6th C.I.B. in ESWARS and the Eleventh Division (British) in THUN LEVEQUE.

### **“B” Squadron , Canadian Light Horse in Action.**

“B” Squadron (Major C.F. Mc EWEN) , C.L.H. , then moved forward along the CAMBRAI-IWUY Road , got into touch with the Infantry Patrols and pushed through them with great determination. The 2nd Troop of this Squadron , under Lieut. STIRRETT , went ahead , covered by 2 Patrols operating between the CAMBRAI-IWUY Road and the Railway. On reaching the Railway , the right Patrol was fired at by enemy Machine Guns and Men and horses were seen to fall. The left Patrol went over the crest of the Ridge , but was heavily fired on by Machine Guns behind Wire , in the Sunken Road leading E. from CROIX ST. HUBERT. The main body of the Troop , although under heavy Machine Gun Fire from both sides , dashed forward and took up positions on the high ground between the Railway and the Road E. of le MARIS. Hotchkiss Guns were dug-in on the flanks of the Troop , and greatly helped to neutralize enemy Fire throughout the day.

The Railroad on the right of this position consisted of a very high Embankment leading into a Cutting to the N. The Embankment commanded all the approaches to the position held by the 2nd Troop. To overcome the enemy in this point , the 4th Troop of “B” Squadron was sent forward to try and outflank the German positions. The Troop crossed the Railway E. of ESCAUDOEUVRES , divided itself into Parties and galloped Northwards as far as the Railway running to NAVES where they were held up by Wire and Machine Guns. The Cavalry then dismounted and dug themselves in.

At the same time Major Mc EWEN detailed his 1st Troop to work round the left flank of the 2nd Troop to deal with the enemy Machine Guns between THUN ST. MARTIN and IWUY. If the manoeuvres were successful , the Troop was to move Southward along the high ground . Covered by an advanced Patrol the 1st Troop made a determined attempt to push forward , but it was held up by well organized Machine Gun Nests and well-directed Rifle Fire. It was forced to dismount and take up positions on the left of the 2nd Troop.

### **Enemy Resistance.**

The enemy Line in front of “B” Squadron was well-organized and strongly protected by a band of Wire and numerous Machine Gun Posts. It became quite apparent during the day that a dismounted Force of considerable strength would be required to overcome the enemy resistance. It was , therefore , decided not to throw any more Men into the fight , but to consolidate and improve the ground already captured.

### **Aeroplanes Good Work.**

During the day , 2 of our Scout Aeroplanes were of great assistance to the Cavalry. They dived down and , flying very low , the Pilot indicated to our Men the location of the enemy and fired with their Machine Guns into the German positions. One of these Planes repeatedly came over and caused many casualties amongst the German Machine Gunners. Unfortunately , this Plane was finally hit by Machine Gun Fire and was seen to land behind our Line.

### **Enemy Active.**

In the afternoon the enemy became more aggressive and his Artillery Fire increased considerably. He attempted to dislodge the 2nd Troop from its positions and was greatly annoying the 4th Troop with Machine Gun Fire. Part of the 3rd Troop , “B” Squadron , was sent to reinforce Lieut. STIRRETT and 1 Troop of “C” Squadron was dispatched to support the 4th Troop.

### **Cavalry Patrol Clears Situation.**

At about 3:30 P.M. the 25th C.I.Bn. reported a Gap in the Line between the CAMBRAI-IWUY Road and the CANAL. Lieut. FYFE , C.L.H. , was dispatched in charge of a Patrol to get in touch with the enemy in that vicinity. The Patrol which throughout acted with great dash and bravery , located enemy Posts and Machine Gun Nests on the outskirts of TUN ST. MARTIN and got in touch with the O.C. , “B” Squadron and the Infantry on the right and left. The information brought back by Lieut. FYFE regarding the disposition of the enemy and our own Troops was most valuable and cleared up the situation on the left

flank. In the meantime the Bridge at POINT d' AIRE was ready for traffic and the 1st C.M.M.G.B. and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion were sent across the CANAL to relieve the C.L.H. in the Line as soon as the situation permitted.

#### **“B” Squadron Relieved.**

In the evening the 1st and 2nd Troops of “B” Squadron were relieved by the 1st Motor Brigade and the Cyclists , and the 4th Troop of “B” Squadron were relieved by the Infantry. “B” Battery , 1st C.M.M.G.B. , took up positions between ESCAUDOEUVRES and NAVES. “A” and “D” Batteries dug their Guns in on both sides of the CAMBRAI-IWUY Road in support to the Cyclists , who had relieved the 1st and 2nd Troops. The Cavalry brought out with them their wounded , who had not been evacuated during the day on account of the exposure of the ground.

#### **Observations.**

“B” Squadron advanced , during this Operation , to an average depth of 2000 yards on a Frontage of about 2000 yards. It secured a footing on the high ground between THUN ST. MARTIN and NAVES thus depriving the enemy of a valuable tactical point and obtaining for our Troops a good jumping-off Line for the resumption of the attack. The position was held in spite of strong enemy action and was turned over to the Infantry intact. 2 German Machine Guns were captured and many casualties inflicted on the enemy. The Cavalry casualties were 1 N.C.O. killed , 11 Other Ranks wounded , 12 horses killed and 25 wounded. The lightness of these casualties is accounted by the excellent way in which the Officers concerned handled their Commands and the brave and cool manner in which the Troopers rode straight and hard at their Objectives. Close liaison with the G.O.C. , 5th C.I.B. and his Battalion Commanders enabled full co-operation between the Infantry and Cavalry to be affected.

#### **Infantry Attempt to Advance.**

At 5:00 P.M. the Infantry attacked again with the object of seizing all the ground between NAVES and YHUN ST. MARTIN. Lieut. T.A. SMITH , 1st C.M.M.G.B. in charge of 4 Armoured Cars and 4 Platoons Cyclists co-operated with the assaulting Troops along the CAMBRAI-NAVES Road. If possible he was to cross the ERCLIN River and seize the high ground E. of the IWUY-RIEUX Road. The attack however did not make good progress. The 25th and 26th C.I.Bns. were held up between NAVES and ESCAUDOEUVRES. The British on the right reached CAGNONCLES but were driven back and took up positions a few hundred yards W. of the Village. The Armoured Cars were then withdrawn for the night.

#### **Motor Transport Suffers from Shell Fire.**

The Vehicles of the 1st Motor Brigade had been well concealed from the enemy , but a stray Shell during the night hit a “D” Battery Fighting Lorry and set it on fire. This drew a concentration of Shell Fire with the result that 2 Lorries were completely destroyed and 2 other Lorries and 1 Ford Car were damaged. The last mentioned 3 Vehicles were repaired by the C.M.M.G. , Mechanical Transport Company.

#### **Trench Mortars in Action.**

A Patrol of Motor Machine Gunners located a Nest of 10 German Machine Guns about 1000 yards W. of NAVES along the Railway running to the Village. These Guns offered a strong resistance to our Infantry on the evening of October 9th and continued to annoy out Troops throughout the night. Very early on the morning of the 10th , one of the Trench Mortar Sections attached to the 1st C.M.M.G.B. was dispatched forward with instructions to deal with this nest. The Mortars fired about 25 Rounds obtaining numerous hits and silencing the enemy Machine Guns. It was later reported that when the Infantry advanced at 6:00 A.M. October 10th , no resistance was encountered in this locality.

### **October 10th.**

Immediately after Zero Hour (6:00 A.M.) October 10th the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. concentrated N. of ESCAUDOEUVRES and the 1st C.M.M.G.B. and the Cyclist Battalion assembled S.-E. of the same Village. BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Headquarters was established in the Eastern edge of the Wood in which the CHATEAU d' ESWARS is situated.

The Armoured Car Detachment (Lieut. T.A. SMITH) with 1 Platoon Cyclists was given Instructions to work up the CAMBRAI-SAULZOIR Road and to accomplish its Mission of the day before , should an opportunity occur.

### **River Reconnaissance.**

Patrols of the C.L.H. , the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and Cyclist Bn. were in touch with the Infantry. A reconnaissance by these Patrols a short time after the advance occurred showed that all Bridges across the ERCLIN had been destroyed , but that a small stretch of the River , where it bends S.-W. just N. of the NAVES-VILLERS-en-CAUCHIES Road , was dry.

### **Armoured Car Detachment Seizes Bridgehead.**

Naves was captured by the Infantry. The Armoured Cars went through them , seized the Bridgehead and got into touch with the XVII Corps in RIEUX. Lieut. SMITH then dismounted his Crews , dashed forward with his Guns and Cyclists and took up positions astride the NAVES-SAULZOIR Road about 1200 yards E. of the River. The Detachment received a great deal of attention from the enemy Machine Guns situated on the high ground N. of the Main Road and from a Party of Germans holding the Sunken Road just in front of our Machine Gunners and Cyclists. The Sunken Road was soon cleared of the enemy by a Party of Cyclists and Lieut. SMITH occupied it with 4 Guns and 28 Men of the Cyclists.

### **Cavalry in Action.**

The O.C. , C.L.H. who had kept close touch with the Infantry all morning decided to send part of his Regiment over the dried portion of the River ERCLIN. In the afternoon , when the Infantry attacked again and their advance seemed to be going well , "A" Squadron and 2 Troops of "C" Squadron crossed the River and moved forward in a Northerly direction. As they advanced , enemy Rifle and Machine Gun Fire caused them considerable casualties , "A" Squadron losing practically all their horses. But they pushed on with great determination until they reached a cut bank close to the buildings on the right of the RIEUX-IWUY Road , where they were held up by terrific Machine Gun Fire. Many of the Horses of "C" Squadron were killed , the Men reaching the cut bank on foot. The Machine Gun Fire being very severe and the Cavalry forming too good a target , it was thought that no useful purpose would be accomplished by throwing more Men into the attack. By holding the positions they had reached , the 2 Squadrons helped considerably the advance of the Infantry and later , with their Rifle and Machine Gun Fire , neutralized enemy Machine Gun Nests when the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and the Cyclists advanced on the right. The Cavalry were withdrawn in the evening after handing their positions over to the Infantry.

### **2nd Motor Brigade E. of Naves.**

The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. , which had assembled N. of ESCAUDOEUVRES moved forward to just W. of NAVES in the morning of October 10th. Scouts were immediately sent to reconnoitre the Crossings of the River ERCLIN , and "A" Battery with 1 Platoon Cyclists was sent to the Bridgehead on the Main Road to strengthen and support the Armoured Car Detachment. Lieut.-Col. MEURLING , O.C. , 2nd Motor Brigade established his Headquarters in NAVES. On finding that all the Bridges over the River had been destroyed , he sent back a Party of his Men with a number of Lorries to an Engineer Dump to get bridging material to rebuild the Bridge on the CAMBRAI-SAULZOIR Road. At the same time , telephone poles , cable wire and other Engineer Stores that could be found in NAVES were being collected to use as temporary bridging material. Captain MAY , the Officer in charge of the 2nd Motor Brigade Train , with 6



Sappers borrowed from the 4th C.I.B. and a Party of Men from "C" Battery commenced to build the Bridge. Unfortunately the enemy, who had the advantage of superior observation, began to shell the Party shortly after the work had been started. Captain MAY and a number of Men were wounded and the work had to be suspended until dark.

#### **Motor Batteries Move Forward.**

The high ground E. of the IWUY-RIEUX Road was defended by the enemy with strong Machine Gun Posts, which frustrated the attempts of the Canadian Light Horse to gain possession of this commanding position. The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. then took steps to carry out a minor Operation during the afternoon with the object of overcoming the enemy resistance in this locality. "B" Battery and half of "D" Battery, and 2 Platoons Cyclists were sent forward as far as the Bridgehead to cooperate with "A" Battery in an endeavour to advance the Line. The Guns of "A" Battery and the 4 Guns of "D" Battery were deployed on the W. side of the Bridgehead. Covered by the Neutralizing Fire of these Guns, "B" Battery and the 2 Platoon Cyclists rushed forward as far as the Sunken Road about 1400 yards E. of the River. The Armoured Car Detachment with a number of Cyclists, operating under direct Orders of the G.O.C., BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE, had already occupied this position.

#### **Cyclists Capture Ground.**

"B" Battery Guns were immediately set up and assisted by the Guns of the Armoured Cars, opened an intense Fire on the German Machine Gun Posts and Sniper Nests on the Eastern and South-Eastern outskirts of IWUY. At the same time, Hotchkiss Guns of the Canadian Light Horse between IWUY and RIEUX concentrated their Fire on enemy positions on the high ground in front. Under the cover of this Fire the 2 Platoons of Cyclists, which had assembled in the Sunken Road, went forward divided into 2 Parties. The right Party operating parallel to the NAVES-SAULZOIR Road succeeded in dislodging the enemy Machine Gunners and Infantry from the high ground immediately N. of the Road and about 1000 yards E. of the Sunken Road. A number of Machine Guns were captured and many casualties were inflicted amongst the German Crews. The Cyclists established a strong Post at this point. The left Party of the Cyclists was not as fortunate in their attack. Heavy enemy Machine Gun Fire coming from all directions caused many casualties and prevented them from making any headway.

#### **Positions Occupied Night October 10th/11th.**

In the evening, 1 Company of the 19th C.I.Bn. and 1 Company of the 20th C.I.Bn. concentrated in the Sunken Road, but no further attack developed. All the Machine Guns of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE E. of the ERCLIN River, together with 4 Guns of "D" Battery, 2nd C.M.M.G.B., which had been sent forward, were placed in positions in and on all sides of the Sunken Road to cover all approaches of it.

#### **Bridge Over Erclin River Constructed.**

At 11:00 P.M. October 10th, when Shelling had to a certain extent died down, a Party of the 4th Bn., Canadian Engineers came up with bridging material and commenced to build the Bridge. A Battery of Machine Guns from the 2nd Motor Brigade covered the Sappers and every assistance was given them in accomplishing their Task. The Bridge was completed by 2:00 A.M. October 11th.

#### **Letter from Canadian Engineers.**

The following is an extract from a letter sent to the Second Canadian Division Headquarters and written Major G. Mc CALLUM, M.C., 4th Battalion, Canadian Engineers, who Commanded the Company that built the Bridge E. of NAVES :-

"In connection with the construction of the Bridge on the NAVES – VILLERS-en-CAUCHIES Road across the ERCLIN River, on the night of October 10th/11th, 1918, valuable information and assistance was given us by Lieut.-Col. MEURLING of the 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade."

“Besides information on the tactical situation and the state and size of the Gap to be Bridged , he gave us a Battery of Machine Guns to cover our Party while the bridge was being constructed , greatly increasing the confidence of the Sappers and speeding up the work.”

#### **October 11th , 1918.**

Early in the morning of October 11th , the Forty-ninth Division (British) , on the right of the Canadian Corps , resumed the advance. The Guns of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. covering the Bridge and those in positions in and near the Sunken Road supported the attack with Indirect , Flanking and Enfilade Fire. The Infantry seemed to make good progress at first , but the Germans counter-attacked with Tanks and drove our Line back over the high ground. A Field Battery of Artillery in action between NAVES and RIEUX , and the Guns of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. already in the Line together with another Motor Battery that was rushed forward , considerably helped the Forty-ninth Division to repel the counter-attack and recapture the high ground which had been lost on both sides of the Main Road.

#### **Brutinel's Brigade Withdrawn.**

The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and the Cyclists were withdrawn from the Line on the afternoon of October 11th. The 2nd Motor Brigade spent the night October 11th/12th in the Sugar Refinery , N.-W. of CAUROIR , moving back to BUISSY the following day. The casualties of this Unit for the period October 9th to October 12th , were 1 Officer and 1 Other Rank killed , and 6 Officers and 23 Other Ranks wounded. The 1st C.M.M.G.B. and the Canadian Corps Cyclists Battalion went into Billets at BARALLE on October 12th. The Canadian Light Horse moved from Bivouacs W. of CAMBRAI to MARQUION on October 13th.

#### **Observations.**

Between October 8th and 11th the Operations of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE were of great assistance to our Infantry by seizing Tactical Points and holding them against strong enemy resistance. The Cavalry , Cyclists and Motor Machine Gunners often acted as a screen to the next move of the Infantry. The enemy was kept under close observation by continuously disputing with him the possession of the high ground both W. and E. of the River ERCLIN.

The repeated attempts of the Canadian Light Horse to push forward against heavy enemy Fire , and their determination to hold the ground they had captured , especially S.-E. of THUN ST. MARTIN , where both flanks were exposed , is a noteworthy performance. The Work of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and the Cyclists in the Operations E. of NAVES was most noticeable , not only in the way in which the Units were handled and all Ranks tried to fulfill their various duties , but in their fine spirit of comradeship and co-operation.

**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE**

**VI  
SENSEE CANAL TO VALENCIENNES : OCTOBER 12th to 28th , 1918.**

**Introductory.**

All the Units of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE spent the period from October 12 to 18th in reorganizing and refitting , overhauling equipment , general Training and Sports. On October 18th HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS the PRINCE OF WALES visited the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades. On October 17th , 1918 the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions , which had been transferred to the Sector between DOUAY and the SENSEE River , were Ordered to continue the advance and keep in close contact with the enemy. Weak enemy detachments were to be brushed aside and not allowed to delay the advance.(X) (X) See Page 500 ff.

To assist in these Operations 1 Squadron , Canadian Light Horse , 1 Company , Canadian Cyclist Battalion were placed at the disposal of each of the Divisions. On October 18th the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G.Bs. detailed Motor Cyclist Patrols to keep in touch with the situation on the Corps Front , special attention being paid to reconnaissance of Bridges. The following day 2 Motor Machine Gun Batteries and 2 Armoured Cars were also placed at the disposal of each of the 2 Divisions to assist in breaking down the enemy's resistance. On the same day 1 Company Cyclist Battalion was placed at the disposal of the Second Canadian Division. Previously 1 Troop , C.L.H. had been attached to each Division for Dispatch Rider Duties.

The elements of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE attached to Divisions may be tabulated as follows:-

First Cdn. Division – (1) "B" Squadron , C.L.H.  
(2) "A" Company , Cyclist Bn.  
(3) "C" Battery , 1st C.M.M.G.Bde.  
"E" Battery , 1st C.M.M.G.Bde.  
2 Armoured Cars , 1st C.M.M.G.Bde.

Fourth Cdn. Division – (1) "C" Squadron , C.L.H.  
(2) "C" Company , Cyclist Bn.  
(3) "C" Battery , 2nd C.M.M.G.Bde.  
"E" Battery , 2nd C.M.M.G.Bde.  
2 Armoured Cars , 2nd C.M.M.G.Bde.

Second Cdn. Division – (1) "B" Company , Cyclist Bn.

**Action of Units with the Fourth Canadian Division.**

**Cavalry , October 18th.**

Early in the morning of October 18th , "C" Squadron , C.L.H. reported to the Fourth Canadian Division and its Troops were disposed as follows :-

1st and 2nd Troops	Fourth Canadian Division Headquarters.
3rd Troop	11th C.I.B.
4th Troop	10th C.I.B.

The 1st and 2nd Troops remained in ECOURT ST. QUENTIN all day.

The 4th Troop reported to the 10th C.I.B. in CEMETERY WOOD , N. of SAUCHY l' ESTREE. Patrols consisting of 1 N.C.O. and 7 Other Ranks were detailed to report to each of the 46th and 50th C.I.Bns. The remainder of the Troops were kept at Brigade H.Q. as Dispatch Riders.

No. 1 Patrol , after reporting to the 46th C.I.Bn. at FRESSIES , pushed ahead through MARCQ and the high ground N.-E. of it , where it gained contact with the enemy. The other Patrol reported to the 50th C.I.Bn. in FRESSAIN and then proceeded to MONCHECOURT. It encountered heavy Machine Gun Fire E. of the Village and remained in touch with the enemy until the Infantry came up.

Lieut. TEASDALE , in charge of the 3rd Troop , went to the 11th C.I.B. where a Platoon of Cyclists also was placed in his command. He received instructions to report to the H.Q. of the 102nd C.I.Bn. in QUENESSON FARM N.-E. of BUGNICOURT. Lieut. TEASDALE was directed by the Officer Commanding the Battalion to employ his Cavalry and Cyclists to gain contact with the enemy and to keep the Battalion constantly informed of the situation. 2 Cavalry and 2 Cyclist Patrols , consisting of 1 N.C.O. and 5 Men each , were organized. These Patrols gained contact with the enemy N. of MONCHECOURT and along the main MONCHECOURT-ECAILLON Road.

#### **Cyclists , October 18th.**

“C” Company Cyclist Bn. reported to the Fourth Cdn. Division and its Platoons were ordered as follows :-

No. 7 Platoon to the 10 C.I.B.

No. 8 Platoon to the 11th C.I.B.

No. 9 Platoon to Divisional Headquarters.

No. 7 Platoon was divided into 2 Patrols , one reporting to each of the 46th and 50th C.I.Bns. The Patrol with the 46th C.I.Bn. went forward to reconnoitre the roads through MARCQ. The other Patrol was sent forward ahead of the 50th C.I.Bn. in the direction of EMERCHICOURT and located enemy Guns along the AUBERCHICOURT-MONCHICOURT Road.

No. 8 Platoon operated in conjunction with the 3rd Troop “C” Squadron , C.L.H.

No. 9 Platoon remained in Reserve at ECOURT ST. QUENTIN.

#### **Cavalry , October 19th.**

The 1st and 2nd Troops , “C” Squadron , C.L.H. , remained in ECOURT ST. QUENTIN all day and reported in the evening to the 11th C.I.B.

The Patrols of the 4th Troop operating with the 50th and 46th C.I.Bns. reconnoitered MASTAING , ABSCON , FOSSE de ROEULX and went as far as DENAIN without meeting opposition. During the day , the 47th C.I.B. relieved the 50th C.I.Bn.

The 3rd Troop and No. 8 Platoon , Cyclists were again divided into 4 Patrols. Nos. 1 and 2 being Cavalry Patrols and Nos. 3 and 4 Cyclist Patrols. At noon October 19th , Patrols went forward through ABSCON and remained in observation E. of the Village until the Infantry came up. Then under the direct Orders of the G.O.C. , 11th C.I.B. the 2 Cavalry Patrols advanced over the open ground and the 2 Cyclist Patrols along the Roads. In the evening Nos. 1 and 2 Patrols reached BELLEVUE , No. 3 Patrol FOSSE LAMBRECHT and No. 4 Patrol le CHAUFFOUR. The 2 Cavalry Patrols then pushed on to HAVELUY and reported the Village clear of the enemy.

#### **Cyclists , October 19th.**

The Patrol of No. 7 Platoon , Cyclist , with the 46th C.I.Bn. advanced in the morning of October 19th , through MASTAING and ROEULX into DENAIN. The Cyclists captured 1 prisoner in ROEULX and encountered in DENAIN 9 Germans who retired hastily as soon as they saw our Men. The Patrol then pushed through to the Eastern outskirts of the Town where enemy Machine Gun Fire held them up. Touch with the enemy at this point was maintained until the Advanced Guard of the 44th C.I.Bn. , which had passed through the 46th C.I.Bn. , took over the Line. The remainder of No. 7 Platoon advanced ahead of the 47th C.I.Bn. No. 9 Platoon moved from ECOURT ST. QUENTIN and reported in the evening to the 10th C.I.B. H.Q. at MASTAING.

### **Motor Batteries , October 19th.**

In the evening of October 19th , “C” and “E” Batteries and 2 Armoured Cars of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. were placed under the Orders of the Fourth Canadian Division, They were ordered to report themselves as follows :-

“C” Battery and 1 Armoured Car to the 10th C.I.B.

“E” Battery and 1 Armoured Car to the 11th C.I.B.

Both of these groups were placed in Reserve by the Formations to which they were attached. “E” Battery spent the night in AUBERCHICOURT and “C” Battery in MASTAING.

### **Cavalry , October 20th.**

On October 20th , “C” Squadron Headquarters was established in FOSSE ABSCON. During the day the Troops of this Squadron accompanied the Infantry Battalions in their advance and carried messages for them.

### **Cyclists , October 20th.**

A Patrol of No. 7 Platoon , Cyclists crossed the CANAL de l' ESCAUT S. of DENAIN in a small rowing boat and made a reconnaissance of BOUCHY , which was found to be clear of the enemy. No. 9 Platoon , which had been held in reserve at 10 C.I.B. Headquarters went forward to join No. 7 Platoon. 4 strong Patrols were organized and sent forward to gain contact with the enemy E. of DENAIN. They located many enemy Machine Guns in action and Sniper Nests N. and N.-E. of the Town.

No. 8 Platoon , under Orders from the 54th C.I.Bn. pushed through HAVELUY and located enemy Machine Guns in the FOSSE E. of the Village.

### **Motor Batteries , October 20th.**

“C” Battery (Capt. Mc ISAAC) with 1 Armoured Car , 2nd C.M.M.G.B. moved on October 20th , with the 10th C.I.B. to DENAIN and were held there in Reserve.

“E” Battery (Capt. LEARY) and the other Armoured Car left AUBERCHICOURT early in the morning and proceeded to BELLEVUE where touch was gained with the 54th C.I.Bn. The Armoured Car went forward to HAVELUY to make a reconnaissance. It returned with the information that the Infantry had been held up on the Railway E. of the Village by Fire from Machine Guns located between WALLERS and OISY. It also reported that the enemy Machine Gun Defence appeared to be well organized and that the WALLERS Road was being swept by Shell and Machine Gun Fire. This information was immediately transmitted to the infantry Commander. The Armoured Car was again sent forward to HAVELUY and from there to WALLERS with instructions to get along the BELLAING Road to outflank the enemy Machine Gun Nests. This however proved impossible as the Car could not proceed beyond WALLERS owing to the Road junctions being blown-up. The Car then got in touch with the Troops on the left of the 11th C.I.B. and brought back their Dispositions. Capt. LEARY's Detachment was withdrawn to AUBERCHICOURT for the night.

### **Cavalry , October 21st.**

On the right flank of the Fourth Canadian Division a Patrol from the 4th Troop , “C” Squadron , C.L.H. advanced on October 21st to ROUVIGNIES with the 44th C.I.Bn. The remainder of this Troop was kept busy all day maintaining liaison between the 10th and 11th C.I.B.s and the 44th and 47th C.I.Bns.

The 1st and 2nd Troops operating with the 87th C.I.Bn. sent out 3 Patrols on the morning of October 21st. The 1st Patrol proceeded to the CHATEAU de MALPLAQUET , where it located a number of German Marksmen. This was reported to the Infantry. The Patrol continued to advance in a Northerly direction until it was held up by Machine Gun Fire from GROSSE FOSSE , E. of AUBRY. Part of the Patrol remained in touch with the enemy and the remainder reported back to the 87th C.I.Bn.

A number of the enemy were encountered by the 2nd Patrol on the Eastern outskirts of AUBRY. The enemy retired before any Action could be taken.

The 3rd Patrol carried out a reconnaissance N. of AUBRY meeting with no opposition until it reached the South-Western edge of MARAICAUX , where it came under heavy flanking Machine Gun Fire. It was found that the MARAICAUX-ANZIN Road was strongly held by the enemy and this was reported to the Infantry.

“C” Squadron Headquarters moved to FOSSE LAMBRECHT , N. of BELLEUVE , and the 3rd Troop was held in Reserve.

### **Cyclists , October 21st.**

Nos. 7 and 9 Platoons , Cyclists Patrolled the 44th and 47th C.I.Bns. Fronts. A small Party of Cyclists working along the Southern flank of the 10 C.I.B. went through ROUVIGNIES to PROUVY and then joined a larger Scouting Detachment of Cyclists , operating along the Main Road to VALENCIENNES. N. of the FERME URTEBISE a small group of enemy Cavalry was seen hastily retiring. As the Cyclist Scouts proceeded Northward they began to receive attention from a number of Machine Guns and a Field Gun located S.-W. of VALENCIENNES. On receipt of this information the 44th C.I.Bn. deployed for action. Other Cyclist Patrols kept the 47th C.I.Bn. constantly informed as to the situation on its front.

The 8th Platoon , working with the 11th C.I.B. moved to HAVELUY with Brigade Headquarters and was employed during the day as Dispatch Carriers.

### **Motor Batteries , October 21st.**

The 10th C.I.B. ordered the Detachment of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. attached to it to proceed through ROUVIGNIES to PROUVY. This last Village was occupied and Captain Mc ISAAC placed the 8 Guns of “C” Battery and the 2 from the Armoured Car in defensive positions along the CANAL Bank from PROUVY to TRITH-ST. LEGER to protect the exposed flank of the Fourth Canadian Division. These positions were held for 36 hours without Infantry support. During the night the Guns were subjected to heavy Shell and Machine Gun Fire.

At 8:00 A.M. October 21st , Capt. LEARY in charge of “E” Battery and an Armoured Car reported to the G.O.C. , 11th C.I.B. at the 102nd C.I.Bn. Headquarters on the ANICHE-ABSCON Road , S. of FOSSE FENELON. He was instructed to proceed forward with half of his Battery (4 Guns and Lorries) and the Armoured Car , and 20 Engineers to render every possible assistance to the Infantry , who had been held up by hostile Machine Gun Fire in FOSSE OUTEMPLE , S.-E. of AUBRY. Motor Cyclist Scouts were sent forward to reconnoitre the Roads in the forward Area. The enemy had been systematically blowing up most of the Crossroads and Road junctions , thus delaying the pursuit. To get forward , the Mechanical Transport had either to wait until the Roads were repaired or else move by a circuitous route over Third Class Roads , which were very often impassable.

The reports received from the Motor Cyclist Scouts compelled Capt. LEARY’s Detachment to take a very indirect Road to reach OISY. They proceeded first to HAVELUY and then left the Village in a South-Easterly direction via a Secondary Road running S. of the FOSSE d’ HAVELUY. This Road was followed as far as the first Fork-roads , where the Detachment turned S. along the Road running to DENAIN , and continued as far as the DENAIN-OISY Road. At this point the head of the Column turned N.-E. and proceeded to the first Crossroads , which had been blown up by a Mine. The Engineers bridged the Craters and the Motor Machine Gunners went on through OISY to the North-Eastern outskirts of HERIN, where another large Mine Crater at a Street Crossing proved a serious obstacle. The Armoured Car was skillfully driven around the back of a corner building and went on ahead to reconnoitre the enemy positions.

Working along the Road between PETITE FORET and ST. WAAST-la-HAUT , the Armoured Car effectively engaged the enemy Machine Gunners in FOSSE OUTEMPLE and forced them to evacuate the place. After Firing on other enemy groups , the Car returned with very valuable information. It located an enemy Field Artillery Battery in front of ST. WAAST-la-HAUT Church and a number of Machine Gun Nests E. of ANZIN which were later dealt with by our own Artillery. In the meantime the 4 Guns of “E” Battery had been pushed forward as far as PETITE FORET. But the Lorries could not be driven any farther owing to numerous large Shell-holes and Mine Craters on the Roads. The Guns were dismounted and placed in positions on the Eastern outskirts of the Village from which they supported by Fire the action of the Armoured Car. The Guns remained in their positions until the Infantry came up and established a Line for the night.

### **Cavalry , October 22nd.**

Headquarters "C" Squadron , C.L.H. moved during the day , October 22nd to le MOULIN , N. of HERIN , and the 1st and 2nd Troops were held there in Reserve.

Patrols of the 3rd Troop were sent out most of the day reconnoitring Roads and obtaining contact with the enemy. One Patrol arrived at the first crossroads E. of BONNE ESPERANCE and N. of ANZIN , just in time to prevent its destruction by the enemy. A reconnaissance of the 11th C.I.B. Front between ANZIN and MARAICAUX was carried out. Heavy Rifle and Machine Gun Fire coming from ANZIN and la CHAP were reported and Mines were seen to explode in ANZIN and BEUVRAGES. The latter Village was entered by the Cavalry Patrols without opposition.

The 4th Troop was held in Reserve at ROUVIGNIES.

### **Cyclists , October 22nd.**

The 12th C.I.B. took over the Line from the 10th C.I.B. on October 22nd. The 85th C.I.Bn. relieved the 44th C.I.Bn. and the 78th C.I.Bn. passed through the 47th C.I.Bn. 2 Patrols from Nos. 7 and 9 Platoons , Cyclists operated in front of these 2 Battalions. One of the Patrols reached ST. WASST-la-HAUT and the other was held up by Machine Gun Fire and Snipers while advancing towards la SENTINELLE.

### **Motor Batteries , October 22nd.**

"C" Battery , 2nd C.M.M.G.B. continued to protect the right flank of the Fourth Canadian Division. On several occasions during the day , it Fired on enemy groups and at night carried out a little Harassing Fire. Early in the morning of October 22nd the Engineers attached to "E" Battery repaired the Roads N. of PETITE FORET. The Motor Machine Gun Battery then moved forward as far as the Crossroads E. of BONNE ESPERANCE , where it came under intense Machine Gun Fire from ANZIN. The Armoured Car turned to the right towards ANZIN to deal with the enemy there , but it could not go very far owing to a large Crater in the Road. Captain LEARY then organized an Infantry Patrol and fought his way through the Western outskirts of ANZIN as far as the Main ST. AMAND Road. The Armoured Car operating on this Road from le PAVE Southwards covered the advance of the Patrol with the Fire of its 2 Guns. After the enemy had been ejected from this area , the Detachment went to BEUVRAGES. From here the Armoured Car was ordered forward to clear the enemy out of the main Road between ANZIN and BRUAY. While carrying out this Task , the Gunners engaged the enemy Machine Guns and inflicted many casualties on the Crews. The Road was successfully cleared and the Infantry were then able before dusk to establish a Line on the whole 11th C.I.B. Front without further opposition. The Guns of "E" Battery were placed in defensive positions for the night , N.-E. of la CHAP.

During the above action Corporal ANTHONY , 2nd C.M.M.G.B. greatly distinguished himself when the steering rod of his Armoured Car had been broken, he walked along in front of the Car , under heavy Machine Gun Fire and steered it by hand into a place of safety.

### **Cavalry , October 23rd.**

On October 23rd the Canadian Light Horse moved to HASNON and on the same day "C" Squadron was withdrawn from the Fourth Canadian Division and returned to its Regiment.

### **Cyclists , October 23rd.**

The Cyclists attached to the Fourth Canadian Division Brigades were used as Runners during the day.

### **Motor Batteries , October 23rd.**

"C" Battery , on the right flank of the Fourth Canadian Division was relieved during the night October 23rd/24th by "D" Battery , 2nd C.M.M.G.B.

In the evening of October 23rd , the Armoured Car attached to the 11th C.I.B. was sent forward to patrol the Main Road from BRUAY Southwards and report on the Bridges and Crossings over the CANAL and the disposition of our Infantry. The Car brought back the required information and reported that some of our Infantry had been held up in ANZIN at the junction of the BRUAY road with one of the Streets leading to the CANAL. This point is about 800 yards N.-E. from the junction of the ANZIN-BRUAY and ANZIN-ST. AMAND Roads. The Germans had placed Machine Guns in the houses near the CANAL and with their Fire were preventing our Men from approaching the CANAL Bank. The Armoured Car was sent back to clear the enemy from the neighbourhood of the Street-crossing and 2 Guns from "E" Battery under Lieut. BUCK were ordered to push through to the CANAL with the object of outflanking the German Machine Gunners. Capt. LEARY with 2 Guns followed the Armoured Car and took up positions in the Mine Crater at the Street-crossing. These 2 Guns immediately opened Fire on a German Machine Gun at a range of 500 yards from the top window of a house near the Canal. At the same time Capt. LEARY with 2 Infantrymen boldly rushed down the Street firing at the Germans with their Revolvers and Rifles. One of the 2 German Gunners was killed and the other taken prisoner. The enemy Machine Gun was captured and turned on the Germans who were then hastily retiring from that area. Our Infantry then established a Line along the CANAL and the Motor Machine Gun Detachment was withdrawn to AUBRY.

### **Action of Units with the First Canadian Division.**

#### **Cavalry , October 18th.**

Before dawn on October 18th , "B" Squadron , C.L.H. under Major Mc EWEN , left its Billets in MARQUION and reported to the First Canadian Division as follows :-

1st and 2nd Troops	to the 1st C.I.B.
3rd Troop (less Hotchkiss Gun Section)	to the 1st Canadian Division Signals as Dispatch Carriers.
4th Troop and Hotchkiss Gun Section of 3rd Troop	to 2nd C.I.B.

At 8:00 A.M. , the 1st and 2nd Troops moved forward to DECHY with the G.O.C. , 1st C.I.B. where the nature of the work required of them was explained. A Patrol of 7 Men commanded by a Sergeant was selected from each Troop and sent forward to get in touch with the enemy. The remainder of the Troops – 10 Men with Hotchkiss Guns – were detailed to remain at brigade Headquarters as special Orderlies to the G.O.C.

The left Patrol advancing in front of the 4th C.I.Bn. was to advance as far as the BOIS de MONTICHY and gain contact with the enemy. Heavy Machine Gun Fire at close range was encountered N.-W. of MONTIGNY. Two Men of the Patrol were wounded and their horses killed. The Patrol withdrew a short distance and then proceeded to approach the WOOD from a Northerly direction thus outflanking the enemy on the high ground and causing him to retire. The WOOD was found to be clear of the enemy. Sgt. LAWSON , who was in charge of this Patrol , then conducted the Infantry by a safe route to a position where they could attack MONTIGNY from the N.

The right Patrol was to encircle MONTIGNY from the S. as far as the Railway , advancing in front of the 1st C.I.Bn. They found the 3rd C.I.B. already in MASNY , but no enemy were encountered E. of MONTIGNY. Sgt. LUCAS , in charge of the Patrol , then tried to return through the Village from the E. He was driven back by the Fire of 2 Machine Guns located in the houses. The location of the enemy was immediately given to the nearest Infantry Commander who was able to attack the Village from the E. and S.

At 9:30 A.M. , Lieut. COCKSHUTT , 1st C.I.B. Headquarters , with 2 C.L.H. Orderlies galloped into MONTIGNY ahead of the Infantry Scouts. In the centre of the Village , they encountered about 30 Germans and located a number of Machine Gun Posts. One of these Guns opened Fire on them at close range wounding Pte. THOMPSON , one of the Orderlies and killing his horse. Pte. THOMPSON reported back to Brigade Headquarters at once and gave them the first hand information they had received to the effect that the Village was held by the enemy.



Undoubtedly the work of the Cavalry Patrols proved of assistance to the Infantry in discovering the flanks of the enemy's positions.

The 4th Troop , with part of the 3rd Troop , consisting of 1 Officer , 27 Other Ranks and 31 horses , reported to the 2nd C.I.B. Headquarters at LECLUSE where they were instructed to report to the 8th C.I.Bn. in the Line at CANTIN. The Cavalry reported to the 8th C.I.Bn. after the latter had reached ROUCOURT. The reason for the delay was the breaking down of the Bridge across the CANAL de la SENSEE , S. of GOEULIZN , which necessitated a crossing being effected E. of ARLEUX.

Three Patrols were sent forward , one got in touch with the foremost elements of the 8th C.I.Bn. The other 2 redirected the progress of the Infantry as the Line of Advance had been altered from due E. between ROCOURT and ERCHIN to a North-Easterly direction N. of AUBERCHICOURT. One of these Patrols got in touch with the Fourth Canadian Division on the right.

The Headquarters of the 102nd C.I.Bn. was located in VILLERS au TERTRE and its left Platoon was found 1000 yards N. of FOSSE ST. ROCHE. In the afternoon , another Patrol came into contact with the enemy between ECAILLON and AUBERCHICOURT , drawing Fire from FOSSE ST. MARIE and le PAVE. This information was forwarded to the Artillery , who engaged the targets and forced the enemy to evacuate their positions. In addition to the above Tasks , Troopers were used to carry dispatches to the 102nd C.I.Bn. and the Artillery.

### **Cyclists , October 18th.**

“A” Company , Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion was distributed as follows on reaching LECLUSE early in the morning of October 18th :-

No. 1 Platoon to the 10th C.I.Bn. (2nd C.I.B.) at ROUCOURT.

No. 3 Platoon to the 8th C.I.Bn. (2nd C.I.B.) at ROUCOURT.

No. 2 Platoon to the 1st C.I.B. at SAILLY-en-OSTREVENT.

No. 1 Platoon supplied Runners to keep Bn. Headquarters in touch with the Companies in the Line and the Units on the Flanks.

A Patrol from No. 3 Platoon went forward , via LEWARDE , to obtain contact with the enemy. It located hostile Machine Guns in the Southern edge of AUBERCHICOURT and FOSSE ST. MARIE.

No. 2 Platoon was not employed during the day and moved to MONTIGNY for the night.

During the night of October 18th/19th , the 3rd C.I.B. relieved the 2nd C.I.B. All the elements of the C.L.H. and Cyclists with the latter Brigade were transferred to the former.

### **Cavalry , October 19th.**

The 4th Troop , “B” Squadron , C.L.H. operated with the 3rd C.I.B. whose Headquarters was in LEWARDE. A Patrol of 1 N.C.O. and 6 Men was sent forward to each of the 14th and 16th C.I.Bns. and were used as Dispatch Riders. The remainder of the Troop moved with Brigade H.Q. through SOMAIN to ERRE where the night was spent.

At 9:00 A.M. on October 19th , 2 Patrols of the 1st and 2nd Troops moved forward to try and locate the enemy. One Patrol advanced on the right in front of the 2nd C.I.Bn. A few of the enemy who were concealed in RIEULAY were captured with little resistance and taken back to Brigade H.Q. The enemy was again encountered in la RENTIS , S. of RIEULAY. The Patrol remained here until the Infantry came up and dealt with the situation. The left Patrol advanced ahead of the 3rd C.I.Bn. and entered VRED , where it learnt from the East Lancashire Bn. that their Men had gone , earlier in the morning , as far as MARCHIENNES without opposition. This information was transmitted to a Company of the 3rd C.I.Bn. , who were able to route-march to WANDIGNIES-HAMAGES , screened by the Cavalry Patrol. While patrolling the Front , the Cavalry discovered a Gap about 1 mile wide between the 1st and 3rd C.I.B.s. The 2 Flank Battalions of these Brigades were immediately notified and while the Infantry extended their flanks the Cavalry Patrol covered the Gap.

Major Mc EWEN , C.L.H. , with the Infantry Bn. Commanders coordinated the Line to be held during the night. This Line ran about 1/4 mile W. of BOIS des ECLUSETTES and E. of BOIS ST. AMAND and HELESMES.

### **Cyclists , October 19th.**

On October 19th the Cyclists were used at the 1st and 3rd C.I.B. Headquarters and with the 10th and 16th C.I.Bns. as Runners and small advanced Patrols.

### **Motor Batteries , October 19th.**

At 6:00 A.M. October 19th , 2 Armoured Cars and "C" and "E" Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. reported to the 1st Canadian Division at FERIN. They were instructed to report to the 1st C.I.B. The G.O.C. , 1st C.I.B. divided the Detachment into 2 Groups :-

- (A) – 1 Armoured Car and "C" Battery commanded by Lieut. MONTGOMERY , to work under the 3rd C.I.Bn.
- (B) – 1 Armoured Car and "E" Battery commanded by Capt. WORTHINGTON , were attached to the 2nd C.I.Bn.

The last Group followed the 2nd C.I.Bn. from BOIS de MONTIGNY to GROHAIN FARM , N. of BOIS St. AMAND. The Roads were in very bad condition and many of the Railway Bridges had been blown down thus rendering the Roads impassable. "E" Battery had to make many wide detours to get forward. The Group with the 3rd C.I.Bn. advanced with the Infantry keeping in close touch with Battalion H.Q. In the evening , all of Lieut. MONTGOMERY's Guns were set up along the Western edge of the BOIS des ECLUSETTES and in the Southern outskirts of WARLAING. These positions were held throughout the night while the Infantry were behind resting. The Crews of "C" Battery and the Armoured Car had to fill in or bridge 8 Mine Craters before the Lorries could be taken forward.

### **Cavalry , October 20th.**

On the 3rd C.I.B. Front the 15th and 13th C.I.Bns. passed through the 16th and 14th C.I.Bns. on October 20th to resume the advance. The 4th Troop , "B" Squadron , C.L.H. had many Patrols out during the day locating the enemy and carrying messages between the various Units of the Brigade. One Patrol started from ERRE and went to the Northern edge of BOIS ST. AMAND , where it gained touch with the 1st C.I.B. Troops. The Patrol then returned through the WOOD and proceeded to WALLERS. They were Fired on by Machine Guns from a house about 400 yards N. of WALLERS Station. The Infantry were at once warned of the presents of these Guns and their location was sent to our Artillery who opened Fire on the house and forced the enemy to withdraw. Our Infantry later advanced across the open ground in this area without opposition. In the afternoon , another Patrol worked Southward and got in touch with the 54th C.I.Bn. of the Fourth Canadian Division holding the Railway E. and N.-E. of HAVELUY. In the evening , the same Patrol made a reconnaissance in front of WALLERS. It found the 13th C.I.Bn. holding a Post on the Eastern outskirts of WALLERS and another S. of the Railway , 800 yards E. of the Station. This last Post was drawing considerable ire from the WOODS , N. of the Railway. A report of this reconnaissance was forwarded to 3rd C.I.B. Headquarters who took steps to deal with the situation.

The 1st and 2nd Troops sent 2 Patrols forward in the morning to maintain contact with the enemy. The right Patrol working ahead of the 1st C.I.Bn. encountered the enemy in la CHOQUE and in the WOOD to the S. of it. The left Patrol operating in front of the 4th C.I.Bn. met Germans in the Village of HASNON. Both Patrols remained in contact with the enemy until the Infantry came up.

Major Mc EWEN was again detailed to coordinate with Battalion Commanders the Line to be held for the night. On his way to visit an Outpost in the Eastern outskirts of BOIS des ECLUSETTES , Major Mc EWEN rescued 3 French Soldiers , who had been captured by the Germans in 1916 , and had been hiding in the WOOD for the past 8 days.

### **Cyclists , October 20th.**

No. 2 Platoon , Cyclists , moved with the 1st C.I.B. Headquarters to the FERME HIVERCHICES , 1 mile E. of WARDGNIES. The other 2 Platoons working with the 3rd C.I.B. moved in front of the 15th and 13th C.I.Bns. acting as Patrols. They cleared an enemy Machine Gun Post out of WALLERS Station and

located another S. of the FORET de VICOIGNE , which had been holding up the advance of part of the 15th C.I.Bn.

#### **Motor Batteries , October 20th.**

1 Armoured Car and "E" Battery , 1st C.M.M.G.B. followed the 1st C.I.Bn. , and at dusk the Guns were placed in defensive positions on the Eastern and Northern edges of BOIS des ECLUSETTES. The other Armoured Car and "C" Battery advanced with the 4th C.I.Bn.

#### **Cavalry , October 21st.**

On October 21st , as on the previous day , the Men of the 4th Troop , "B" Squadron , C.L.H. were kept busy patrolling the Front of the 3rd C.I.B. and carrying Dispatches over heavy ground in the FORET de VICOIGNE. A Patrol proceeded with the 14th C.I.Bn. to AREMBERG. 4 Troopers of this Patrol were sent forward in a North-Easterly direction to get in touch with the enemy. Whilst crossing the BOIS LECAT , they were Fired on by Machine Guns from the Railway Embankment just W. of RAISMES. Another Patrol pushed Northwards across the WALLERS-RAISMES Railway to the Eastern outskirts of the Forest opposite VICOIGNE. They were Fired on by Machine Guns located in the houses on the ST. AMAND-ANZIN Road. A third small Patrol , later in the day , got in touch with the Fourth Canadian Division Troops at AUBRY , where our Infantry was encountering stiff resistance.

On the left Brigade Front of the First Canadian Division the ground was almost impassable for Mounted patrols. The 1st and 2nd Troops were employed throughout the day in carrying messages between the 1st C.I.B. Headquarters and the Battalions in the Line.

A very regrettable loss was sustained by "B" Squadron on this day. While mounting his horse in HASNON Major Mc EWEN , who had been attached to the 1st C.I.B. Headquarters and had been doing excellent work in organizing the Cavalry Patrols , was killed by a large Calibre Shell , which exploded within 40 feet of him.

#### **Cyclists , October 21st.**

The 1st and 3rd Platoons Cyclists operated on October 21st with the Battalions of the 3rd C.I.B. as Runners and Scouting Parties. No. 2 Platoon was attached to the 7th C.I.B. which had relieved the 1st C.I.B. during the night.

#### **Motor Batteries , October 21st.**

Early in the morning of October 21st the 2 Armoured Cars and 2 Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. , operating with the 1st C.I.B. were attached to the 3rd C.I.B. Working as a single Group under Capt. WORTHINGTON , the Detachment followed the advance of the 15 and 14th C.I.Bns. In the afternoon the right of the 14th C.I.Bn. was out of touch with the left of the 87th C.I.Bn. (Fourth Cdn. Division). Capt. WORTHINGTON got in touch with both Battalions and closed in the Gap by placing "E" Battery between BOIS LECAT and AUBRY. During the night , "C" Battery relieved "E" Battery in the same positions. Close communication was maintained with 3rd C.I.B. Headquarters and the Infantry Battalions on both flanks.

#### **Infantry Relief.**

On the night October 21st/22nd , the Third Canadian Division took the Line over from the First Canadian Division. The 7th and 9th C.I.B.s relieved the 1st and 3rd C.I.B.s respectively. (X) (X) See Page 520.

#### **Cavalry , October 22nd.**

The Patrols of the 4th Troop , "B" Squadron , C.L.H. maintained contact with the enemy in the morning while the 9th C.I.B. was passing through the 3rd C.I.B.

The 7th C.I.B. resumed the advance on October 22nd on the left of the Canadian Corps with the Royal Canadian Regiment on the right and the 42nd C.I.Bn. on the left. The 1st and 2nd Troops of "B" Squadron

were ordered to precede the Battalion Scouts in the advance through the FORET de RAISMES. 2 Patrols were sent out , 1 in front of each Battalion. The right Patrol forced the enemy to retire out of the positions he was holding about 500 yards N. of the junction of the ANZIN-ST. AMAND Road and Railway. The left Patrol encountered the enemy in MONT des BRUYERES and his location was reported to the leading Officer of the 42nd C.I.Bn. who dealt with the situation. The Patrols advanced through the Forest without further opposition and reached ESCAUTPONT in the afternoon.

### **Cyclists , October 22nd.**

Nos. 1 and 3 Platoons , Cyclists , operating with the 9th C.I.B. had Patrols out all day. A Patrol of No. 3 Platoon in front of the 52nd C.I.Bn. encountered 2 enemy Cavalry Patrols E. and S.-E. of the ETOILE de CERNAY. Later it obtained touch with the Fourth Canadian Division Troops on the right. Patrolling in front of the 43rd C.I.Bn. , a Patrol of No. 1 Platoon gained contact with the enemy at ETOILE de CERNAY in the RAISMES Forest.

The 42nd C.I.Bn. sent 2 Patrols from No. 2 Platoon through the FORET de VICOIGNE and the Western portion of the FORET de RAISMES to reconnoitre the Roads.

### **Motor Batteries , October 22nd.**

The Group from the 1st C.M.M.G.B. consisting of 2 Armoured Cars and 2 Batteries , operating with the 3rd C.I.B. were attached on the morning of October 22nd , to the 9th C.I.B. At 8:00 A.M. , Capt. WORTHINGTON received instructions to move forward and get in touch with the enemy. The Detachment advanced beyond the Infantry and proceeded into RAISMES as far as the sharp bend in the ST. AMAND-ANZIN Road. The intention was to exploit CHEMIN notre DAME. But as this Road was reported by a Motor Cyclist Patrol to be in bad condition , attention was directed to the RUE de MARAIS. The Civilians in this neighbourhood stated that a Party of Germans was occupying a Chateau just N. of WARAICAUX. The Armoured Cars were at once placed in positions commanding all the exits from it , but on a search being made no enemy was found. The Group then continued up the RUE de MARAIS as far as the Railway Crossing. Infantry screens came up to this point and established a Line of Outposts.

After a reconnaissance by Motor Cyclists the Detachment resumed its forward move with the Bridge over the CANAL , E. of DENAIN-ANZIN as the objective. The Armoured Cars led the way , followed closely by "E" Battery with "C" Battery a little distance behind in support. A glance at the Map will show DENAIN-ANZIN to be a Mining and Industrial Suburb of VALENCIENNES containing many Metal Factories and Coal Mines with their accompanying mass of closely built workman's houses. Slag Heaps are in abundance and the Village is traversed many times by Main Railway Lines , Sidings and Spurs leading to all the Mines , Factories and Workshops. The stretch of country E. of the Bridge and N.-W. of it across the ANZIN-CONDE Road is almost flat. W. of DENAIN-ANZIN the ground rises a little.

The Armoured Cars and the Batteries proceeded to the end of the RUE de MARAIS and then turned S. along the Road running S. and S. of the MARAIS de BEUVRAGES as far as the "Y" Roads S. of the MARAIS d' ARNONVILLE. From this point one Road led Eastwards and the other through la CHAP to VALENCIENNES. "E" Battery and the Cars were now about 2700 yards in front of our Infantry and about 1200 yards from the CANAL Bridge. They were being Fired at from the right flank , and one Party of Germans was seen working on top of the Bridge and another underneath it , apparently laying a Mine. One Armoured Car was sent to the right to locate and silence the enemy on that flank , and the other moved towards the Bridge but was unable to go very far owing to engine trouble.

On observing our Men , the enemy increased the volume of his Fire with 2 Machine Guns firing from the Bridge and the other from the Railway Embankment on the right. The Armoured Cars immediately retaliated with their 4 Guns and also fired on Groups of the enemy along the CANAL Bank. The German Guns were temporarily silenced , a few casualties were inflicted on their Crews and 1 Man was seen to fall from the Bridge into the CANAL. During this Machine Gun Duel , Lieut. T.A. SMITH , who had in previous Actions done very excellent work , was killed and 1 of our Gunners was wounded.

In the meantime , the 2 Guns from the foremost "E" Battery Lorry were quickly dismounted and set up near the "Y" Roads. As soon as they opened Fire , hostile Machine Guns sited in the bushes of the MARAIS d' ARNONVILLE and in the edges of la CHASSE FOURA , began to Fire on our Men. 2 more "E" Battery Guns were brought into action about 300 yards N.-W. of the other 2 , and with their Fire covered all the

Roads in front of la CHASSE FOURA , neutralizing the enemy in that area. A third pair of Guns were taken to the top floor of the first building on the right of the Road running S. of la CHAP. They were set up near the windows and effectively engaged the enemy on the CANAL Bank and the Railway Embankments. One Gun was placed near the BEUVRAGES Railway HALTE to cover the right flank and to Fire on the Slag Heap and high ground to the S. , where an active German Machine Gun had been annoying our Gunners. About 30 minutes after the Action had commenced , a number of Germans , crawling along a hedge , tried to push out from the Railway Crossing in front of the “Y” Roads. One of the Armoured Cars engaged and drove them back. The enemy was considerably harassed by our Gunners , who took immediate advantage of every live target within range. The demoralizing effect of our intense and effective Machine Gun Fire may be judged from the fact that the Motor Detachment was able to operate successfully although it was surrounded by the enemy on almost all sides. At about this time , Detachments of Men were seen moving about 1000 yards behind the positions of our Guns from N. to S. Owing to the rainy weather it was impossible to ascertain at that distance their identity , but they were thought to be some of our own Infantry. Information received from the French Civilians later on clearly indicated that they were Germans , who , although fairly strong in numbers , preferred to rejoin their retiring comrades rather than face our Guns.

The Germans made 3 attempts to crawl out to the centre of the Bridge , but each time the 2 Guns of “E” Battery , which had been placed in the upper windows of the buildings above mentioned , drove them back by accurate bursts of Fire. These same Guns were later on given another excellent target. An enemy Detachment was seen mounting a Machine Gun on the flat roof of one of the larger buildings in DENAIN-ANZIN. Fire was withheld until the Germans had set up their Gun and were ready to get into action. Our Gunners then Concentrated their Fire on the enemy Crew and either killed or wounded the man behind the German Gun.

Realizing that the element of time was of the greatest importance to the preparation of his Defensive Plans , the enemy now brought into action many more Machine Guns to strengthen his Rear Guard and to delay the energetic pursuit of our Troops. Captain WORTHINGTON had his Guns advantageously located and with their Fire he was able to frustrate all the efforts of the enemy to drive him out of his positions. Early in the afternoon , the Motor Machine Gunners replied very effectively to the German Gunners and continued to fire with all their Guns for 30 or 40 minutes until they had obtained superiority of Fire over the enemy.

Throughout this action , Captain WORTHINGTON kept in touch with the Infantry. At 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon , the 52nd C.I.Bn. and an hour later , the 75th C.I.Bn. came up as far as the positions held by our Machine Gunners and established Posts in that neighbourhood. In the evening , “A” and “B” Batteries , 1st C.M.M.G.B. relieved “C” and “E” Batteries of the same Unit. Captain WORTHINGTON withdrew his Detachment to ARENBERG for the night.

### **October 23rd.**

The Third Canadian Division established the Line of the CANAL de l’ ESCAUT on October 23rd. No further progress was made owing to the exposure of the left flank of the Canadian Corps , the proximity of the CANAL and the stiffening resistance of the enemy. The Cavalry and Cyclists were used during the day to carry Dispatches between the Infantry Units and to reconnoitre Roads. The Motor Machine Gunners were held in reserve in their positions in DENAIN-ANZIN.

### **Second Canadian Division.**

“B” Company , Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion , reported on October 19th , to the Second Canadian Division at SAILLY , N.-W. of CAMBRAI. The Cyclists were placed under Orders of the 4th C.I.B. and were mainly used as Runners and Dispatch Carriers. On October 22nd , the Company rejoined its Unit at DECHY, S.-E. of DOUAI.

### **Withdrawal of Units from the Line.**

While the Cavalry Squadrons , Cyclist Companies and Motor Machine Gun Batteries were operating with the Canadian Divisions in the Line , the remainder of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE also moved ahead in touch with the forward Troops. Brigade Headquarters moved to LEWARDE on October 21st , with Cdn. Corps H.Q. The Canadian Light Horse took up Billets in RIEULAY and the 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades , the C.M.M.G. , M.T. Coy. , and the Cdn. Corps Cyclist Battalion established themselves in DECHY. On October 23rd the C.L.H. went to HASNON to keep in close touch with its forward Squadrons. The following day , all elements of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE were withdrawn from the Line and the Dispositions of the Brigade were as follows :-

Canadian Light Horse	)	
Canadian Corps Cyclist Bn.	)	SOMAIN
1st C.M.M.G.B.	)	
2nd C.M.M.G.B.	)	DECHY
C.M.M.G. , M.T. Coy.	)	

From October 24th to October 28th , the Units of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE took advantage of a comparatively quite interval to rest and refit and also to overhaul their Transport and Equipment. A little General Training was done every day ; and sports and concerts helped to fill in the days Programs.

### **Observations.**

The above brief and sketchy account of the forward movement of the Canadian Corps between October 12th and October 28th indicated that the enemy , suffering from the successive blows dealt him by the British Armies during the previous 3 months , was trying to extricate himself from a threatening situation and then retire behind a shorter and less vulnerable Line , where he could reorganize his Forces and possibly re-start real Trench Warfare. To accomplish this manoeuvre , time was required , and time could only be secured by delaying our advance. The Germans , therefore , destroyed the Railways , blew up the Bridges and Road junctions , laid Mines at frequent intervals in the Main Roads , flooded the CANALS , and fought skillful Rearguard action with specially well-trained Machine Gun Detachments. As his Main Force retired , the German Engineers carried out a well planned system of demolition , screened by their Rearguard.

To prevent the enemy from carrying out his intention at leisure , it was necessary to maintain constant contact with him , and to hasten his retirement by pursuing him closely and annoying him as much as possible. In view of the flat ground over which the advance was made and the wholesale destruction of Roads and Railways with the resultant increased difficulties of bringing up supplies , no tactical advantage could have been gained by forcing the enemy to give Battle. The Canadian Divisions , which had been in action continuously since the beginning of August , followed very closely and kept in touch with all his movements through the Mobile Troops of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE attached to them.

The Squadrons of the C.L.H. , the Companies of the Canadian Cyclist Battalion and the Batteries and Armoured Cars of the Motor Machine Gun Brigades were of great assistance to our Infantry in patrolling the Front and keeping them well informed as to the enemy's movements and dispositions. Through them all the Infantry Battalions and Brigades kept in close communication with one another throughout the advance. In penetrating the enemy's territory to a great depth , the reports from these Mounted Patrols and advanced Reconnaissance Parties proved of the greatest value to our Dismounted Troops. In spite of the bad state of the Roads and the adverse weather conditions , the groups of Cavalry , Cyclists and Motor Machine Gunners carried out the duties assigned to them skillfully and boldly. They annoyed the enemy considerably , hastened his retreat on parts of the Canadian Corps Front and very effectively protected the flanks of the Infantry Divisions and Brigades , which are often exposed in a similar advance.

The following extract from a letter written on October 24th , 1918 , by Major-General Sir DAVID WATSON , commanding the Fourth Canadian Division , and addressed to the Canadian Corps ,

emphasized the value of the work accomplished by the Units of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE during the advance of the Canadian Corps from DOUAI through DENAIN and the FORET de RAISMES to the CANAL de l' ESCAUT :-

"I would take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered us by the Units at our disposal by the Corps during these last few days' operations.

"I refer particularly to the work of the Squadrons of Cavalry , the Cyclists and the Armoured Cars and affiliated Guns in Lorries with Crews. From first to last , these Units have cooperated with our Infantry with the utmost gallantry and vigour. They have carried out the orders and work allotted to them with the greatest satisfaction. Time and again Armoured Cars have been sent around to help in outflanking Machine Gun positions. On certain occasions these Armoured Cars have been sent out with Parties of Engineers , dropping these at various points where Roads required mending , and then coming back for additional loads. The Cavalry , acting as Patrols , have kept us constantly in touch with the enemy carrying out this hazardous work with great skill and complete satisfaction ; while the Cyclists have been most valuable in their excellent Patrol duties as well as carrying Dispatches and securing information regarding enemy movements and positions of our own Troops.

"From both Brigades in the Line , I have the same excellent reports of the work of these Units , and I am anxious that they should receive the full credit for the splendid results they have given me."

The Canadian Light Horse received the following letter from the First Canadian Division :-

"1st Canadian Division.  
November 3rd , 1918.  
G.3-101/3.

"O.C. Cdn. Light Horse.

"The following extracts have been received from reports by Infantry Brigadiers upon the advance recently carried out by the 1st Canadian Division.

"From G.O.C. 1st Cdn. Inf. Bde.

"I used one Troop of Cavalry for liaison on the flanks and for intercommunication , and one Troop for reconnaissance and they behaved remarkably well although they were not fresh when they came to me, having been recently engaged with another Division.

"From G.O.C. 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.

"One Troop C.L.H. was attached to the Brigade and used as follows :- A Section of 1 N.C.O. and 6 Men was attached to each of the forward Battalions , the remainder being kept under the orders of the G.O.C. the Brigade. The work of the Cavalry was good on the whole , especially on the last day when they pushed forward and sent in valuable reports."

I am directed by the Divisional Commander to send the above to you to ask you to accept his heartiest thanks for the splendid work carried out by these Troops which were attached to the Division."

(Sgt) A.R. PARSONS, Lieut.-Colonel , General Staff , 1st Canadian Division.

**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE**

**VII  
CAPTURE OF MONT HOUY AND VALENCIENNES :  
OCTOBER 28th to NOVEMBER 2nd , 1918.**

On October 28th , a Detachment from the 1st C.M.M.G.B. , 1 Squadron , C.L.H. , and 1 Company , Cdn. Corps Cyclist Bn. , reported to the Fourth Canadian Division , under whom they were placed for the VALENCIENNES Operation.

**Operation ; General ; November 1st.**

The main object of the Operation was the capture of the high ground S. and E. of VALENCIENNES. In conjunction with the XXII Corps on the right , the 10th C.I.B. , Fourth Canadian Division attacked on a front of 2500 yards at 5:15 A.M. November 1st with the object of capturing MONT HOUY , which dominated l' ESCAUT Valley and the Crossing of the RHONELLE River. The assault was made on a 2-Battalion Front , the 44th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 47th C.I.Bn. on the left. Well supported by an excellent Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage , the attack made good progress from the outset and continued according to time. Early in the morning , MONT HOUY was completely secured and AULNOY cleared of the enemy ; at noon our Troops had reached their Objective and were pushing Patrols forward towards MARLY.

The 12th C.I.B. took advantage of the successful attack on their right and forced Crossing over the CANAL de l' ESCAUT E. of the FAUBOURG de PARIS and also at a point about 500 yards N. of the main AMAND-VALENCIENNES Road. The enemy offered considerable resistance on the outskirts of the Town and our Infantry were unable to push very far beyond the Line of the Railway E. of the CANAL. Our Line that night ran from the Steel Works S. of MARLY , through the Village of MARLY and along the Southern and Western edges of VALENCIENNES.

**1st C.M.M.G.B.**

The 1st C.M.M.G.B. Detachment , consisting of "B" and "D" Batteries and 1 Armoured Car , reported on October 28th to the Fourth Canadian Divisional Machine Gun Commander , at ESCAUDAIN. The contemplated Operation having been postponed , they were ordered into Billets in PROUVY , where they were held in Divisional Reserve. On October 30th , the remainder of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. was allotted to the Fourth Canadian Division. Accordingly , the following day , "A" , "C" and "E" Batteries together with Unit Headquarters left DECHY and joined the other 2 Batteries at PROUVY.

**Machine Gun Barrage , November 1st.**

The 5 Motor Batteries , together with 4 Batteries of the 4th Bn. , C.M.G.C. , had been detailed to take part in a Creeping , Enfilade Machine Gun Barrage. (X) To support the attack of the 10th C.I.B. which was delivered in a Northerly direction from FAMARS towards VALENCIENNES , the Machine Gunners started their Barrage at the summit of MONT HOUY and ended at the Southern edge of VALENCIENNES. Battery Officers had already made a reconnaissance of the ground and on the night of October 31st/November 1st , the Motor Batteries took up the following Barrage Positions :-

"A" , "B" and "C" Batteries – from the vicinity of the USIN METALLURGIQUE , N. of TRITH-ST. LEGER , to the intersection of the Railway with the TRITH-ST. LEGER—la SENTINELLE Road.

"D" and "E" Batteries – near le VIGNOLE , S.-E. of la SENTINELLE.

The ground in front of TRITH and part of the Village itself was flooded. Some of the Guns were therefore mounted in the upper rooms of houses , and as the enemy was on the other side of the stretch of Water ,



which was only a few hundred yards across , great precaution had to be taken to avoid showing lights when laying the Guns and in checking their elevation and direction. At Zero Hour on the morning of November 1st all the Guns Fired in the Machine Gun Barrage. Owing to the closed in space in which some of the Guns had been mounted , a large percentage of the Gunners became casualties from the Cordite fumes and a small amount of Poison Gas which was present but hard to detect. Many of these casualties , however rejoined the Unit several days later. After completion of the Barrage , the Transport came up as far as TRITH-ST. LEGER and the Motor Batteries returned to PROUVY , where the Guns were thoroughly cleaned and all Ammunition Belts refilled.

(X) See Page 527.

Secret

# MACHINE GUN BARRAGE MAP FRANCE



### **1st C.M.M.G.B. Cooperation With 10th C.I.B. , November 1st.**

At noon November 1st , the 1st C.M.M.G.B. moved to MAING. On arrival there "C" and "E" Batteries , under Captain WORTHINGTON , reported to the 10th C.I.B. and received instructions to go forward in support to the 44th C.I.Bn. After a consultation with the Battalion Commander , Capt. WORTHINGTON placed his Guns on the Eastern Slope of MONT HOUY , on both sides of the FAMARS-VALENCIENNES Road , S.-W. of AULNOY. These positions were occupied during the night and the following morning. At dawn November 2nd the 11th C.I.B. passed through the 10th C.I.B. and resumed the advance. "C" and "E" Batteries were then withdrawn from the 10th C.I.B. and returned to MAING.

### **1st C.M.M.G.B. Cooperation With 11th C.I.B. , November 2nd.**

At 4:00 A.M. November 2nd Capt. BERESFORD , in charge of "B" and "D" Batteries and 1 Armoured Car was ordered to report to the 11th C.I.B. This Armoured Car had been attached to the 10th C.I.B. and had operated on the previous day , along the FAMARS-MARLY Road keeping in touch with the attacking Infantry and taking forward fresh supplies for them. Being a little under strength , "B" and "D" Batteries were reinforced by the personnel of "A" Battery , which had been very much depleted in numbers through Gas poisoning. In accordance with 11th C.I.B. Instructions the 2 Motor Batteries and Armoured Car moved to FAMARS , where they waited for a favourable opportunity to pass through the Infantry. Motor Cyclist Scouts kept the Batteries in close touch with the situation in front.

The 12th C.I.B. succeeded in completely clearing the enemy out of VALENCIENNES , early in the morning of November 2nd and pushing through the Town joined hands with the 11th C.I.B. North of MARLY. The enemy was offering resistance from the high ground N.-E. of MARLY and from the CHATEAU a SOURIS FARM. Capt. BERESFORD sent his Armoured Car forward at 9:45 A.M. preceded by Motor Cyclist Scouts. Lieut. CRISP , in charge of the Car pushed through the advanced elements of the 54th C.I.Bn. who were then in the Northern outskirts of MARLY , and proceeded to the CHATEAU a SOURIS FARM to deal with the hostile Machine Guns there. As soon as the Guns on the Car opened Fire the enemy replied with a number of Machine Guns in rear of the Car and located in the Cemetery N.-E. of MARLY. Lieut. CRISP withdrew a little distance and engaged with his 2 Guns enemy Parties in the Cemetery. In the meantime "D" Battery , which had received a report on the situation from the Armoured Car and had moved up , came into action against the enemy in the Cemetery. A number of Germans were seen to fall and a few to retire ; it was afterwards ascertained that considerable casualties had been inflicted by our Gunners. Owing to very strong resistance from the direction of the CHATEAU , it was impossible for the time being to make further progress. "D" Battery Guns took up positions in and around the Cemetery and held the ground until the 54th C.I.Bn. Patrols came up at noon and relieved them.

### **Armoured Car in Action , November 2nd.**

After a reconnaissance by Motor Cyclists the Armoured Car advanced along the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road towards ST. SAULVE. It got into touch with the 102nd C.I.Bn. (11th C.I.B.) and also with the 72nd C.I.Bn. (12th C.I.B.) which had come through VALENCIENNES from the W. The Car then proceeded beyond ST. SAULVE and engaged large Groups of Germans in the houses and clumps of trees about half way to ONNAING , inflicting considerable losses on the enemy and causing him to retire hastily. The Car then withdrew and brought back very valuable information as to the enemy. This information was immediately transmitted to the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s.

In the afternoon the Armoured Car went down the ST. SAULVE-SEBOURG Road and encountered a considerable number of the enemy on and around the Slag Heap in front of the "Y" Roads immediately S.-E. of ST. SAULVE. The Armoured Car Guns opened Fire at once with noticeable effect and silenced the active hostile Machine Guns in that neighbourhood. As the Car proceeded down the Road , 40 or 50 Germans were seen running from the Slag Heap and the ANCIENNE FOSSE PETIT in a North-Easterly direction towards ONNAING. The Gunners on the Car took advantage of this excellent target and inflicted more casualties on the retiring enemy. After this action , 3 Machine Guns and 10 dead Germans were found near the Slag Heap. As our Infantry came up to it the Armoured Car withdrew and joined "D" Battery , which had moved to the building along the W. side of the Drill Grounds at VALENCIENNES.

**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE**

**VIII  
VALENCIENNES to MONS : NOVEMBER 3rd to 11th , 1918.**

**November 3rd.**

A Counter-attack by the enemy was expected during the night November 2nd/3rd and, as a precautionary measure the Guns of "D" Battery were placed in defensive positions E. of MARLY in support to the 54th and 102nd C.I.Bns. "B" Battery remained in support at FAMARS throughout the night. No enemy action developed during the night. The following morning , November 3rd , "D" Battery moved back to its location of the previous evening , near the Drill Grounds. At the same time , the Armoured Car started from MARLY , passed through the Infantry E. of the Village and proceeded down the Road with the objective of entering ESTREUX from the S.-W. As the Car approached the main Crossroads between MARLY and ESTREUX , about 20 Germans gave themselves up and were taken prisoners by the Patrols of the 54th C.I.Bn. , who were following the Car. Owing to Mine Craters N. and E. of the Crossroads the Roads were impassable and prevented the Armoured Car from reaching its objective. In the afternoon of November 3rd , "B" Battery was ordered forward and proceeded on foot as far as the Northern edge of ESTREUX , where its Guns were placed in defensive positions for the night in support to the 75th C.I.Bn.

**1st C.M.M.G.B. Cooperating With 12th C.I.B. , November 3rd.**

"C" and "E" Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. spent November 2nd and the first half of November 3rd at MAING. In the afternoon of the latter day , the 2 Batteries under Capt. WORTHINGTON were ordered to report to the 12th C.I.B. at VALENCIENNES. Here they received instructions to proceed forward as quickly as possible and get in touch with the O.C. 38th C.I.Bn. whose Headquarters were at ST. SAULVE. The 38th C.I.Bn. was preparing to continue the advance at 5:00 P.M. , and Capt. WORTHINGTON was asked to follow the Infantry with his 2 Batteries in close support and assist in the consolidation of their gains. During the night the Guns of "C" Battery were placed astride the MONS-VALENCIENNES Road and about half-way between ST. SAULVE and ONNAING. The 38th and 72nd C.I.Bns. had Patrols in front of the position occupied by the Motor Machine Gunners. "C" Battery remained in its position all night but the enemy did not attempt to drive our Troops back. During the night Capt. WORTHINGTON attended a conference at the Headquarters of the 72nd C.I.Bn. , where arrangements for Operations of the following day were made. The Motor Machine Gun Detachment was given the Task of pushing forward in the morning to keep in touch with the enemy and harass his retreat. A Platoon of Cyclists was attached to the Detachment and a sub-Section of Engineers to fill in Mine Craters and assist the Motor Vehicles to make headway on the Roads.

**Action of 1st C.M.M.G.B. Detachment , 12th C.I.B. Front : November 4th.**

At 5:15 A.M. November 4th , "E" Battery with the Cyclists passed through "C" Battery and proceeded forward to take ONNAING and establish a Line on the E. side of the Town. The Infantry , following up , were to clean up the houses and side streets. With the exception of a few enemy Patrols , which were seen and engaged , no resistance was encountered in the Town. A small Party of Germans was caught Mining the MONS Road through ONNAING near the Church , but it was immediately dispersed by the Fire of the 2 forward Guns of "E" Battery. Just previous to the Battery's arrival a Mine had been blown near the same spot , on the street leading E. to the THIERS Road. On reaching the Eastern exit of the Town strong resistance was met with , but the 8 Guns of the Battery were brought quickly into action forcing the enemy to abandon his positions. A number of Germans were killed and wounded , and 4 prisoners and 2 Machine Guns were captured. The Cyclists were at the same time seen advancing on the N. side of the Main Road. They captured a few prisoners and 2 Field Guns.

Hostile Machine Guns located in the Western houses on QUAROUBLE were very active against our Troops. The destruction of the Road between the 2 Towns made it impossible for the Battery Lorries to make further progress. Captain WORTHINGTON sent 2 of his Guns to the Cemetery , just E. of the CHATEAU , to engage with their Fire , 2 German Machine Guns , which were mounted on the lip of a Mine Crater on the Road beyond the Cemetery. A Lewis Gun which had been picked up by our Gunners was taken around to the left flank of the Crater. The enemy Guns were put out of action , 2 Men of their Crews were killed and the remainder wounded. At about 7:00 A.M. Patrols of the 72nd C.I.Bn. came up but were unable to push beyond our Machine Gunners. They established a Line between the Cemetery and the Railway , connecting the positions held by "E" Battery and the Cyclists. In the meantime , 2 Guns of "E" Battery had established a Post at the Cross-roads S. of ONNAING and nearest to QUAROUBLE , and a little later 4 Guns were placed in the Sunken Road running E. to MARCHIPONT and about 1000 yards directly S. of the ONNAING Cemetery.

At about 9:00 A.M. an Armoured Car from the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. reinforced Capt. WORTHINGTON's Detachment. As the Car was leaving the above mentioned Sunken Road , on its way to ST. ROCH and MARCHIPONT , it was "knocked out" by hostile Shell Fire , which completely destroyed the 2 Machine Guns on the Car and wounded 4 Gunners. The enemy now began to enfilade the Sunken Road with Machine Gun Fire , greatly annoying our own Gun Detachments. After advising the Infantry Commanders in the area , the 4 Guns moved to the Brickfield , just S. of the Sunken Road. From these new positions a good Field of Fire was secured and harassing Fire was carried out during the day. In the evening the Infantry decided to establish for the night a Line extending from a point about 600 yards S.-E. of the Brickfield through the Cemetery in front of ONNAING to the VALENCIENNES-MONS Railway. Guns of the Motor Machine Gun Group were placed in defensive positions in support to the 78th and 85th C.I.Bns. , which had relieved the 72nd and 38th C.I.Bns. respectively.

#### **Motor Machine Gun Batteries With 11th C.I.B. , November 4th.**

Captain BERESFORD's Group , attached to the 11th C.I.B. remained in support all day. His Armoured Car could not go far forward as the enemy had blown up practically every Cross-road. While passing through ST. SAULVE , on its return from an unsuccessful attempt to reach ROMBIES the Armoured Car was hit by an enemy Shell and was temporarily put out of action. "D" Battery drove on its Transport as far as ESTREUX , and just before dusk advanced on foot to the vicinity of le CAVIN BOISSARD and le GRAND VAL , W. of ROMBIES. The Guns were then placed in positions on both sides of the Road to support the 75th C.I.Bn. Considerable enemy Shelling was experienced during the night. On the morning of November 5th , "B" and "D" Batteries under Capt. BERESFORD , operated with the 11th C.I.B. , moved back to the VALENCIENNES Drill Grounds where they remained in Brigade Reserve.

#### **Motor Machine Batteries With 12th C.I.B.**

At 5:00 A.M. November 5th the Infantry resumed the advance and made fairly good progress. QUAROUBLE fell into our hands early , but enemy resistance stiffened during the day. Our Infantry was held up in front of la MASON ROUGE and FOSSE NO. 2 between QUIEVRECHAIN and MARCHIPONT. With the Guns of "E" Battery Capt. WORTHINGTON assisted in the Covering Barrage and after QUAROUBLE had been captured he moved his Detachment forward to the Sunken Road , S.-E. of the QUAROUBLE Cemetery. From these positions our Gunners held FOSSE No. 2 under Fire for a long period to neutralize the intense Fire coming from German Machine Guns located in the vicinity of the FOSSE. The enemy Artillery Shelled the Battery positions during the day causing a few casualties amongst the Motor Machine Gun Group. In the evening the Infantry established a Line for the night S. of the MONS Road and about 2000 yards W. of QUIEVRECHAIN. The Guns of "C" Battery were dug in E. of QUAROUBLE and laid on an S.O.S. Line intended to protect the 85th C.I.Bn. Front in case the enemy attempted a Counter-attack under cover of darkness.

During the night Capt. WORTHINGTON attended a conference at the Headquarters of the 85th C.I.Bn. , where the details of the next days Operation on the AUNELLE River were discussed. At 5:00 A.M. on November 6th , "C" Battery Guns fired in the Barrage covering the Infantry advance and "E" Battery went forward on foot with the Infantry. As soon as FOSSE No. 2 was reached , the Guns of "E" Battery were set up and opened Fire at a range of 1600 yards on a small WOOD S.-E. of QUIEVRECHAIN. This Fire was



kept up until noon , when the Detachment received Orders to withdraw from the Line and rejoin the 1st C.M.M.G.B. the Headquarters of which had moved to VALENCIENNES on November 3rd. Capt. BERESFORD's Group was also withdrawn from the 11th C.I.B. , November 6th and returned to its Unit.

#### **1st C.M.M.G.B. Casualties , Oct. 28th to Nov. 6th.**

In the Operations from October 28th to November 6th the 1st C.M.M.G.B. suffered the following casualties in Personnel and transport :-

	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Personnel. Wounded</b>	<b>Total</b>
Officers	2	3	5
Other Ranks	1	77	78
Total	3	80	83

	<b>Transport.</b>
2 Armoured Cars	damaged by Shell Fire.
6 Lorries	damaged by Shell and Machine Gun Fire.
3 Ford Cars	damaged by Shell Fire. (1 completely destroyed)
2 Motor Cycles	damaged by Shell and Machine Gun Fire.
13 Total	

#### **C.L.H. and C.C. Cyclist Bn. , Oct. 28th to Nov.6th.**

In addition to the Motor Machine Gun Batteries , "A" and "C" Squadrons of the Canadian Light Horse and "B" Company of the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion reported on October 28th to the Fourth Canadian Division. The Troops of the 2 Squadrons and 3 Platoons of Cyclists were attached to the 10th , 11th and 12th C.I.Bs. for the VALENCIENNES Operation. They were employed as Dispatch Riders , Runners and Orderlies between Headquarters of Brigades and the advanced Battalion Headquarters and also for keeping up Communication between the Scouts , Patrols , Companies and Infantry Report Centres. Small Cavalry and Cyclist Parties were frequently used by the Infantry Battalions of the 11th and 12th C.I.Bs. to get in touch with their flank Companies and with the Units operating on either side of them. These duties were carried out , often under difficult conditions , to the satisfaction of the Infantry Commanders. Sometimes Patrol and Reconnaissance duties were assigned to them. They never failed to accomplish their mission and always sent back valuable reports on the Dispositions of our own Troops , the strength and location of the enemy , and the state of the Bridges and Roads. On a few occasions Cavalry and Cyclist Detachments were employed to Patrol temporary small Gaps that occurred between our advancing Battalions or Brigades.

The following extract from the 72nd C.I.Bn. Report on the VALENCIENNES Operation illustrates the appreciation by the Infantry of the work done by the Detachments of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE :-

"The work of the Cyclists attached to this Battalion throughout the recent Operations cannot be too highly spoken of and their services in reconnoitring Cross-roads and Tactical Points was of immense value. The reports rendered to Battalion Headquarters during the operations were concise and accurate".

#### **Moves of Units of Brutinel's Brigade.**

The Units of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE , with the exception of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. and elements of the Cavalry and Cyclists attached to the Fourth Canadian Division , moved on November 4th to HAVELUY. The same day , BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Headquarters moved from LEWARDE to DENAIN with Canadian Corps H.Q. The following day , November 5th , the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion went into Billets in VALENCIENNES. The C.L.H. remained in HAVELUY until November 9th , when they changed their location to MARLY.

### **Reliefs , Night November 6th/7th.**

On the night November 6th/7th , the 5th C.I.B. (Second Cdn. Division) relieved the 11th and 12th C.I.Bs. in the Line , and the Second Canadian Division assumed command of the Fourth Canadian Division Front. The Detachments of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE in the Line were , on the relief of the Infantry , transferred from the Fourth to the Second Canadian Division. The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. relieved the Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. which withdrew to VALENCIENNES.

### **Second Canadian Division Resumes Advance , Nov. 7th.**

In cooperation with the Third Canadian Division on its left and the Sixty-third Naval Division on its right , the Second Canadian Division resumed the Offensive Operations on the morning of November 7th. The object was to continue to press and harass the disorganized enemy , who were retreating behind a Rearguard consisting mainly of Machine Gun Detachments. The advance , which was to be carried out by strong Patrols of the 5th C.I.B. , was supported by a concentration of Artillery and Machine Guns and a specially organized Unit called the Independent Force. As soon as the G.O.C. , 5th C.I.B. considered that the enemy's Main Line of Resistance had been broken or that the enemy's Rearguard had been pierced , the Independent Force was to advance through the Infantry and work ahead of them.

### **Organization of Part of Brutinel's Brigade into an Independent Force.**

This Independent Force , which really was a detachment of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE consisted of :-

- 4 Batteries , 2nd C.M.M.G.B.
- 2 Squadrons , Canadian Light Horse.
- 1 Company , Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion.
- 2 Newton Trench Mortars , 5th C.D.A.
- 2 Sub-Sections of Engineers , 6th Battalion , C.E.

These Troops were placed under Major W.T. TRENCH , M.C. , 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and were organized as follows :-

- (A) – Southern Detachment – O.C. , Major SPENCER , C.L.H.
  - “A” and “C” Squadrons , C.L.H.
  - “B” and “C” Batteries , C.M.M.G.B. , (Capt. Mc ISAACS)
  - 1 Sub-Section , 6th Bn. , C.E. , (Lieut. CORLEY)
- (B) – Northern Detachment – O.C. , Capt. SCROGGIE , Cyclist Bn.
  - “B” Company , Cdn. Corps Cyclist Bn.
  - “A” and “D” Batteries , 2nd C.M.M.G.B. (Lieut. MARSHALL)
  - 1 Sub-Section , 6th Bn. , C.E. (Lieut. YOUNGHAM)
- (C) – At Force Headquarters :-
  - 2 Armoured Cars (Lieut. HOYLE , 2nd Motor Bde.)
  - 2 Newton Trench Mortars (Lieut. Mc KENZIE)

Three 3-Ton Lorries were allotted to the Engineers and were loaded with approximately 7 Tons of timbering to be used in bridging Mine Craters on the Roads. Each Detachment had 1 of these Lorries and the third Lorry was held in reserve at Force Headquarters.

### **Tasks and Assembly of Independent Force.**

The Task assigned to the Southern Detachment was to advance , as soon as an opportunity occurred , to the high ground W. of ELOUGES , and then push N. of the Village in a North-Easterly direction. The Northern Detachment was to move along the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road as far as the Village of BOUSSU. The 2 Detachments assembled at 7:00 A.M. on November 7th at ROMBIES and

QUAROUBLE respectively. Independent Force Headquarters were established in ONNAING with the 5th C.I.B.

#### **Infantry Attack , November 7th.**

The Infantry commenced to advance at 8:00 A.M. November 7th , and made good progress. The general Line ELOUGES-JONCQUOI-HENSIES were reached without opposition , and during the morning the latter 2 places were entered and Patrols pushed into ST. AYBERT. In the afternoon ELOUGES was cleared of the enemy , but the Line remained substantially the same.

#### **Independent Force , November 7th.**

The Independent Force was unable to follow up the progress made by the Infantry. 4 large Mine Craters , approximately 40 feet in diameter and 12 feet in depth made the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road between QUAROUBLE and QUIEVRAIN completely impassable to all traffic. The Roads forward from ROMBIES towards ELOUGES were badly destroyed by enemy Mines , and the GRANDE HONNELLE River (35 feet wide) could only be crossed by means of rafts. "B" and "C" Batteries moved during the morning , via VALENCIENNES to QUIEVRECHAIN. After 6 hours hard and continuous work by the Personnel of the Independent Force , the Mine Craters in the MONS Road as far E. as QUIEVRAIN were filled or bridged. Shortly after midday when the work in the MONS Road was completed , the 2 Armoured Cars were ordered forward to cooperate with and assist "A" and "D" Batteries , which had been instructed to advance towards BOUSSU. In spite of what appeared to be a favourable opportunity for the employment of Mobile Forces , the advance of the Armoured Cars and Batteries was completely stopped by a huge Mine Crater at the GANT d' OR CABARET , at the Cross-roads about 1000 yards E. of QUIEVRAIN. The attached Engineers estimated that the task of overcoming this obstacle would take at least 6 hours work , and the quantity of bridging material that would be required greatly exceed the available supply in the Lorries. The time being about 4:00 P.M. the Mobile Detachments withdrew for the night to Billets in QUIEVRAIN.

#### **Operations , Second Canadian Division Front , November 8th.**

Early in the Morning of November 8th , it was reported that the enemy had retired E. of ELOUGES. Our Infantry continued to advance meeting little opposition by noon , the general Line DOUR-HAININ had been reached. The 2 Cavalry Squadrons of the Independent Force were ordered in the morning to push forward. They were to endeavor to gain contact with the enemy and cooperate with our Infantry so as to avoid unnecessary deployment of Troops. The Cavalry Patrols succeeded in reaching the neighbourhood of FOSSE ST. ANTOISE No. 9 , N. of DOUR , where they were held up by Machine Gun Fire. At dawn on November 8th , 3 Parties of Motor Cyclist Scouts were instructed to reconnoitre the Roads in the forward area and report which were suitable for Motor Transport traffic. The Main Roads had been systematically Mined and the 3rd Class Roads were in very bad condition largely owing to the wet weather. "B" and "C" Batteries moved along the only passable Road , via JONCQUOI , to THULIE. Mine Craters on all the Roads E. of the point held up the advance of the Motor Machine Gunners until the following morning. Major TRENCH moved his Headquarters also to JONCQUOI. The 2 Squadrons , C.L.H. were detached from the Independent Force and attached to the 5th and 4th C.I.Bs. They were employed from this date until November 11th as Contact Patrols and Dispatch Riders.

#### **November 9th and 10th.**

On November 9th , the general advance on the whole Corps Front was resumed. Progress continued throughout the day and night. FRAMERIES and JEMAPPES were entered and the Infantry Patrols during the night reached the Line NOIRCHIN-CIPLY-CUESMES after bridging many Mine Craters and overcoming other obstructions in the Roads , the Independent Force managed to get as far as FRAMERIES , where it got into touch with the 6th C.I.B. November 10th found our Infantry still moving forward. During the day MESVIN and HOYN , were taken and the enemy resistance on the Western outskirts of MONS were overcome. In the evening the Line ran approximately W. of St. SYMPHORIEN through



MONS and NIMY. The Independent Force tried in the morning to outflank the enemy in the high ground S.-E. of MONS. After an early reconnaissance of the Roads the whole Force , less Cavalry , moved as far as the intersection of the Railway with the MAUBEUGE-MONS Road , about 1000 yards N. of CIPLY. From this point , one Detachment was to move in a Northerly direction and the other Eastwards to outflank the high ground from the S. Neither Detachment was able to make progress. The first one was held up by Artillery and Machine Gun Fire from BOIS la HAUT and the advance of the second Detachment was definitely arrested in FAVARIE (N. of CIPLY) at the River Bridge , which had been destroyed by the Germans. The Engineers and the Personnel of "C" Battery repaired the Bridge , but owing to the large quantity of material required for the work it was not finished until late in the afternoon. The Detachments were withdrawn to FRAMERIES , where Lieut. W.H. SMITH , in command of 2 Armoured Cars from the 1st C.M.M.G.B. reported for duty with the Independent Force.

#### **November 11th.**

In cooperation with the 6th C.I.B. , the Independent Force on November 11th pushed forward with considerable difficulty to the Village of SPIENNES , S.-E. of MONS. Owing to the very bad state of the Roads , no touch was gained with the retreating enemy up to 11:00 A.M. with the exception of 1 Light Car which managed to reach the small Village of ST. ANTOINE , S. of OBOURG by 10:30 A.M. The few small Parties of the enemy encountered offered no resistance. In the afternoon of November 11th the Independent Force was established in the CHATEAU 800 yards W. of ST. ANTOINE. The whole of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. (including Brigade H.Q.) concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the CHATEAU.



